Recurring concern

Unsafe emergency call handling

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the emergency call-handling process that impair location identification, information transfer, triage, escalation, reassessment, caller advice or appropriate resource deployment, including the anchor's failure to obtain riverfront coastguard location references and the delayed provision of a prison gate location.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in coastguard staffing or service coverage that are not failures of emergency call handling.
  • Excludes clinical assessment, treatment or other downstream response failures after the call-handling process has ended.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, policy or information-system deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to unsafe emergency call handling.
  • Excludes failures in non-emergency communication processes that do not concern handling an emergency call.
Reports
79

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
109

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
150

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care13
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust7
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust7
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust6
Devon & Cornwall Police4
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
NHS Pathways4
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Police3
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors3
North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust3
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    STEVE MARTIN BRIAN COOKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steve Martin Brian Cooke had COVID-19 pneumonia following a COVID-19 infection and was found deceased at home on 26 December 2020. He had called an ambulance with extreme shortness of breath and apparent hypoxia, but communication difficulties led to the ambulance being sent to the wrong address and him not being located. Concerns included the failure to obtain his correct address, insufficient communication with his ex-partner, and failure to escalate the matter or review the original call when he could not be found.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish and verify the correct address during emergency call handling

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was heard at the Inquest that there were communication difficulties that resulted in the ambulance being dispatched to the wrong address and Mr Cooke not being located: Mr Cooke made an emergency call taken by NHS 111 with symptoms of COVID-19 and was extremely breathless with apparent hypoxia, the call handler was struggling to understand him in a busy working environment. The call was transferred for clinical assessment and an ambulance was dispatched. Paramedic ambulance crew arrived in under five minutes to an address provided by the emergency operations control (EOC) and could not locate the patient, Mr Cooke. The crew checked the address with EOC and managed to gain access from a key holder to the address that was unoccupied and a thorough search and enquiries with neighbours established the address was unoccupied. (1) Ambulance crew updated EOC Mr Cooke could not be located. EOC made checks with a telephone number on the system to attempt to establish the location of Mr Cooke. This telephone number was Mr Cooke’s ex-partner on 25th December 2020.The EOC established that Mr Cooke was not with his ex-partner. The call handler when speaking to Mr Cooke’s ex-partner: (i) EOC terminated the call within 62 seconds – this very brief given the serious nature of the query to locate a missing sick patient (ii) did not give a complete explanation of the reason for the call (iii) did not ask for Mr Cooke’s current address (iv) instead suggested part of the address that the crew had been dispatched to knowing Mr Cooke could not be located there and did not listen to or give sufficient time for Mr Cooke’s ex-partner to respond (v) did not update Mr Cooke’s ex-partner that Mr Cooke had not be located (2) Mr Cooke was very unwell and in need of medical attention: (i) the matter was not escalated further when Mr Cooke could still not be located (ii) the original call was not listened to again to attempt to establish the correct address being given by Mr Cooke. Mr Cooke gave the address as ████████ Hammond Hill and it was the call handler who suggested a different part of the address as there was difficulty establishing the postcode and this was approximately five metres from where Mr Cooke lived. (iii) It was possible to hear Mr Cooke stating with difficulty the word ‘opposite’ when this part of the address was suggested. ”

    Source location

    STEVE MARTIN BRIAN COOKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review the original emergency call recording to establish the correct address

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was heard at the Inquest that there were communication difficulties that resulted in the ambulance being dispatched to the wrong address and Mr Cooke not being located: Mr Cooke made an emergency call taken by NHS 111 with symptoms of COVID-19 and was extremely breathless with apparent hypoxia, the call handler was struggling to understand him in a busy working environment. The call was transferred for clinical assessment and an ambulance was dispatched. Paramedic ambulance crew arrived in under five minutes to an address provided by the emergency operations control (EOC) and could not locate the patient, Mr Cooke. The crew checked the address with EOC and managed to gain access from a key holder to the address that was unoccupied and a thorough search and enquiries with neighbours established the address was unoccupied. (1) Ambulance crew updated EOC Mr Cooke could not be located. EOC made checks with a telephone number on the system to attempt to establish the location of Mr Cooke. This telephone number was Mr Cooke’s ex-partner on 25th December 2020.The EOC established that Mr Cooke was not with his ex-partner. The call handler when speaking to Mr Cooke’s ex-partner: (i) EOC terminated the call within 62 seconds – this very brief given the serious nature of the query to locate a missing sick patient (ii) did not give a complete explanation of the reason for the call (iii) did not ask for Mr Cooke’s current address (iv) instead suggested part of the address that the crew had been dispatched to knowing Mr Cooke could not be located there and did not listen to or give sufficient time for Mr Cooke’s ex-partner to respond (v) did not update Mr Cooke’s ex-partner that Mr Cooke had not be located (2) Mr Cooke was very unwell and in need of medical attention: (i) the matter was not escalated further when Mr Cooke could still not be located (ii) the original call was not listened to again to attempt to establish the correct address being given by Mr Cooke. Mr Cooke gave the address as ████████ Hammond Hill and it was the call handler who suggested a different part of the address as there was difficulty establishing the postcode and this was approximately five metres from where Mr Cooke lived. (iii) It was possible to hear Mr Cooke stating with difficulty the word ‘opposite’ when this part of the address was suggested. ”

    Source location

    STEVE MARTIN BRIAN COOKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the 111-service requirement for callers to provide and confirm the ambulance address through an Operational Bulletin.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It has been identified that whilst there was in place clear instruction to 999 call handlers that the caller must give the address rather than the handler suggesting it, this instruction had not been replicated in the 111 system. This is being remedied.”

    Source location

    2021-0266-Response-from-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 August 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a patient-location verification process requiring team-leader escalation, call review, records checks, contact with information sources, and local hospital and police checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Our process upon a patient not being found by crew on scene”

    Source location

    2021-0266-Response-from-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 August 2021

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jack Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Goodwin experienced chest pains on 15 December 2017 and suffered a cardiac arrest after a delay in receiving emergency medical assistance, resulting in a hypoxic brain injury. He later developed significant cognitive impairment and died at home on 15 January 2020 from complications arising from the cardiac arrest and prolonged downtime. Concerns related to ambulance call-handling scripts, including the lack of guidance about self-transport, the need for an acute hospital, and reassessment if the patient deteriorated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the call-handling script to support discussion of self-transport or provide a realistic ambulance-arrival timescale

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that at the time of the calls to NWAS on 15th December 2017 they were very busy. The script used by the call handler allowed them to indicate that they were busy. However it did not allow for any suggestion or discussion about whether he would be better to make his own way there or allow for the provision by the call handler of a realistic timescale for the ambulance arriving. As a consequence it was difficult for the call maker to make an assessment of the best course of action to ensure that Mr Goodwin received medical attention at the earliest opportunity. ”

    Source location

    Jack Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of provision in the call-handling script to specify an acute hospital with an A and E department

    Wider context from the report

    “2. When a decision was made to take Mr Goodwin direct to the hospital and NWAS were told. There was no provision within the script to emphasise that the hospital would need to be an acute hospital with an A and E department. ”

    Source location

    Jack Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the call-handling script to emphasise further contact after deterioration for reassessment of urgency

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was an indication that given that if Mr Goodwin deteriorated then a further call should be made to NWAS. The evidence before the inquest was that this was not emphasised in such a way within the script to ensure there could be a further assessment of urgency. ”

    Source location

    Jack Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore adding advice to ambulance call scripts to direct callers to the nearest hospital with an emergency department when appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “999 calls to the ambulance service can be answered anywhere in the country so we cannot rely on local knowledge; call handlers do not have immediate access to which is the nearest emergency department in those situations where a caller advises that the patient would make their own way to hospital. In appropriate circumstances, NHS E/I consider that advising the caller that they should make their way to the nearest emergency department, noting that not all hospitals have emergency departments, would be a useful addition to the script callers receive. This will be explored through the Ambulance Transformation Forum.”

    Source location

    2021-0036-Response-from-NHS-England_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providing an accurate ambulance arrival time is impracticable because lower-priority responses may be diverted to higher-priority incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All ambulance services are responsible for having in place scripts and procedures for dealing with delays in responding when under operational pressure. It is not possible in practice to offer an accurate arrival time for any given patient, but ambulance services will know an approximate current waiting time for that category of patient. NHS E/I support a position that callers should be provided with sufficient information to make informed decisions if an ambulance has not been despatched to the patient.”

    Source location

    2021-0036-Response-from-NHS-England_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Case exit scripts already routinely instruct callers to call 999 again if the patient's condition changes or deteriorates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Instructions on worsening conditions, including specifically to call back on 999 should the patient’s condition change or deteriorate, are standard components of the case exit script. If this was not provided in a clear and easy to interpret manner this is a matter for ambulance services to resolve locally as a training issue for call handlers.”

    Source location

    2021-0036-Response-from-NHS-England_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambulance services must resolve unclear deterioration instructions locally through call-handler training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Instructions on worsening conditions, including specifically to call back on 999 should the patient’s condition change or deteriorate, are standard components of the case exit script. If this was not provided in a clear and easy to interpret manner this is a matter for ambulance services to resolve locally as a training issue for call handlers.”

    Source location

    2021-0036-Response-from-NHS-England_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 February 2021

    Open published response
  3. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Karl James BOLAM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karl James BOLAM fell and sustained a head injury at his home in the early hours of 14 August 2018. He made several calls for an ambulance, but paramedics did not attend until 3.42am, by which time he was unconscious; he died on 17 August 2018 without regaining consciousness. The principal concern was that emergency call scripts did not positively encourage lone callers to contact someone to be with them, particularly when paramedic attendance was delayed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of emergency caller scripts to positively persuade lone callers to contact someone when paramedic attendance is delayed

    Wider context from the report

    “I do not believe this issue has been adequately addressed by the amendment in Release 19.2, and that the script provided by NHS Pathways for use with emergency callers should be amended positively to persuade callers to call someone to be with them, and particularly when a delay in paramedic attendance is anticipated. SECAmb have also expressed disappointment with this response. 1. The script currently used by NHS Pathways in respect of emergency callers does not positively persuade callers to call someone to be with them, particularly in circumstances where paramedic attendance is delayed due to demands on the service. ”

    Source location

    Karl James BOLAM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend closing instructions to advise callers to contact someone immediately if needed, then keep the telephone line free for ambulance-service callbacks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The wording was further reviewed in 2019 (details below) and in Release 19, deployed January 2020, amended to: "If you do need to contact somebody do so now then try and keep the line free as we may need to call you back".”

    Source location

    2021-0011-Response-from-NHS-Digital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Pathways cannot mandate advice for delayed ambulance attendance because it lacks delay information held by 999 providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst using NHS Pathways, the health advisor may not be aware of delays within the 999 service. This information is held on the 999 providers host system and does not influence the NHS Pathways triage. Once an ambulance disposition is reached, the disposition script can be amended by a provider or local SOP to require health advisors to give further information depending on the circumstances. Demand management is maintained and managed within each 111 and 999 providers; therefore NHS Pathways is unable to mandate a script to persuade callers to call someone to be with them if the ambulance is delayed.”

    Source location

    2021-0011-Response-from-NHS-Digital-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Each 111 and 999 provider manages demand and delayed-attendance procedures through its own operational systems and local procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Operational standard operating procedures (SOP’s) manage calls where there is a delay in dispatch of an ambulance, including no contact welfare calls, therefore it is not for NHS Pathways to mandate.”

    Source location

    2021-0011-Response-from-NHS-Digital-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 January 2021

    Open published response
  4. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Fernyhough · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Fernyhough died at home in the early hours of 22 May 2019 after taking an overdose of venlafaxine, amisulpride and hydroxyzine, as well as cocaine, cannabis and alcohol. The report identified a delay in ambulance attendance and concerns about the categorisation of her call, including the failure to ensure that the relevant call recording or full medical information was reviewed by the person able to upgrade its categorisation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatic categorisation of abandoned calls as category 3

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The deceased’s call was described as an “abandoned call” and thereafter automatically categorised as category 3 A review of this practice is required. 2. A review is required as to whether it is appropriate for all reported medical conditions to be categorised no higher than category 3 3. In the situation leading up to Ms Fernyhough’s death, the duty EOC who had authority to upgrade the categorisation of the call did not listen to the recording of the “abandoned” call and was not provided with full details of any medical information given. Measures could be put in place to ensure that the duty EOC or other person who has authority to upgrade the categorisation of calls is asked to listen to the recording of the “abandoned” call or provided with full details of any medical information given. 1. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Fernyhough · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide call recordings or full medical information to categorisation decision-makers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The deceased’s call was described as an “abandoned call” and thereafter automatically categorised as category 3 A review of this practice is required. 2. A review is required as to whether it is appropriate for all reported medical conditions to be categorised no higher than category 3 3. In the situation leading up to Ms Fernyhough’s death, the duty EOC who had authority to upgrade the categorisation of the call did not listen to the recording of the “abandoned” call and was not provided with full details of any medical information given. Measures could be put in place to ensure that the duty EOC or other person who has authority to upgrade the categorisation of calls is asked to listen to the recording of the “abandoned” call or provided with full details of any medical information given. 1. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Fernyhough · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the process for abandoned calls, including calls involving potential mental health concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has reviewed its process for abandoned calls and specifically those calls relating to potential Mental Health concerns. The Trust has already introduced a new EOC Standard Operating Procedure (ESOP) specifically for Mental Health calls and has now made a further revision to the document. Within this ESOP, guidance is given that if the call is abandoned and therefore has incomplete triage (i.e. we haven’t been able to seek responses to all the triage questions), and the information provided suggests the patient is actively at risk due to action they have already taken, or currently taking to harm themselves or end their life, then consideration should be given to responding as a Category 2 call.”

    Source location

    2020-0187-Response-from-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-REDACTED.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce and revise the mental health abandoned-call procedure to guide Category 2 responses for patients actively at risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has reviewed its process for abandoned calls and specifically those calls relating to potential Mental Health concerns. The Trust has already introduced a new EOC Standard Operating Procedure (ESOP) specifically for Mental Health calls and has now made a further revision to the document. Within this ESOP, guidance is given that if the call is abandoned and therefore has incomplete triage (i.e. we haven’t been able to seek responses to all the triage questions), and the information provided suggests the patient is actively at risk due to action they have already taken, or currently taking to harm themselves or end their life, then consideration should be given to responding as a Category 2 call.”

    Source location

    2020-0187-Response-from-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-REDACTED.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop, approve and release an abandoned-call procedure covering Category 2 escalation and mandatory Duty Manager checks, including call-recording review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is also another ESOP currently in development to address the concerns identified at inquest in relation to abandoned calls and this is currently going through the Trust’s governance and approval process. This will be completed and released in December 2020. Within this ESOP it is planned that certain calls will be categorised as a Category 2 and examples may include:”

    Source location

    2020-0187-Response-from-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-REDACTED.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 November 2020

    Open published response
  5. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Helen Jayne SHEATH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Helen Jayne Sheath, who had a recent history of self-harm and suicidal ideation, ingested a fatal dose of sodium nitrate at home and died in hospital on 20 August 2018. Concerns included the initial ambulance call being coded as Category 3 rather than Category 2, subsequent delays in ambulance attendance, and the Community Mental Health Team leaving her home before gaining access despite being alerted to her threats to self-harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to code uncertain self-harm ingestion calls as Category 2

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Helen’s father first called ambulance services at 18.20 hours on 2018 which was before he had ingested the sodium nitrate. EAS’s investigation report stated that “from the information provided on this call, that Helen had locked herself in the bathroom and was threatening to self-harm by ingesting a substance, the call handler selected the set of questions titled “Psychiatric/Abnormal Behaviour/Suicide Attempt” and the call was coded as a Category 3. This call has been audited by the Quality Assurance Team and was correctly coded and the correct set of questions used” …yet a Category 3 call is for patients who have potentially urgent conditions that are not life threatening and yet Helen had a history of suicide ideation and her father was unable to tell, being the other side of the locked door, whether the substance had been taken or not. In view of both Helen’s past medical history and the fact that her father had no knowledge as to whether the substance had been ingested or not at that stage, it seemed to the Court that an assumption that an overdose had been taken ought to have been made and this first call, therefore, coded as a Category 2; ”

    Source location

    Helen Jayne SHEATH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to code uncertain self-harm ingestion calls as Category 2

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) If the first call had been coded as a Category 2, it seems likely that the RRV, Mental Health Street Triage Team (and even possibly the original DSA) would have arrived on scene much earlier (potentially just before or just after Helen had ingested the sodium nitrate) which could potentially have altered the outcome. ”

    Source location

    Helen Jayne SHEATH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage ambulance trusts to implement early clinical review of calls involving patients threatening suicide.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A person that is threatening suicide does not constitute a life-threatening emergency and therefore doesn’t warrant a higher category of response but, given the potential for a small number of these cases to become potentially life threatening, early clinical review of these calls is recommended. NASMeD has previously encouraged all ambulance trusts to implement clinical review of these cases in support of the letter sent by Professor ████████ in April 2019.”

    Source location

    2020-0107-Response-from-Association-of-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandating or instructing ambulance services is outside the organisation’s constitution and authority.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “AACE is a private company owned by the English Ambulance NHS Trusts. It exists to provide ambulance services with a central organisation that supports, coordinates and implements nationally agreed policy. Our primary focus is the ongoing development of the English ambulance services and the improvement of patient care. We are a company owned by NHS organisations and possess the intellectual property rights of the JRCALC UK ambulance service clinical practice guidelines. AACE is not constituted to mandate or instruct ambulance service however we do have national influence via the regular meetings of ambulance Chief Executives and Trust Chairs along with a network of national specialist sub-groups. One of our specialist sub groups is the National Ambulance Service Medical Directors (NASMeD) and this response therefore is from AACE and has been informed by NASMeD.”

    Source location

    2020-0107-Response-from-Association-of-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ECPAG, an NHS England-led group, is responsible for approving changes to clinical code sets and response categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The response categories are set by the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG), an NHS England led group responsible for the governance, control and approval of any change to clinical code sets (aligning codes to response categories).”

    Source location

    2020-0107-Response-from-Association-of-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2020

    Open published response
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie Turay-Thomas ate hazelnuts on 18 September 2018 and died soon afterwards from acute anaphylaxis. The report identifies concerns about inadequate allergy care, advice and training concerning adrenaline auto-injectors, prescribing and clinical communication, and errors in the NHS 111 response and ambulance categorisation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistency in anaphylaxis ambulance categorisation between 999 and 111 services

    Wider context from the report

    “16. The individuals making these errors were working within the context of NHS Digital’s categorisation of anaphylaxis as needing a category 2 ambulance rather than a category 1 ambulance, on the Adastra computer system that supports the LCW 111 service. This was the wrong categorisation and not the categorisation that the call would have received if 999 had been called and the London Ambulance Service contacted in the first instance. Acute anaphylaxis is immediately life threatening and must be treated as a category 1. I heard at inquest that NHS Digital has since changed its categorisation. However, I also heard that for those areas (I think approximately half the country, though this is not completely clear to me), where the 999 service and the 111 service are supported by different computer systems rather than the same system being common to both services, there could remain inconsistencies of categorisation between 999 and 111. Even where there are inconsistencies in categorisation, the 999 service will not re-categorise following a 111 clinician’s categorisation, unless a 999 clinician has spoken to the patient, so inappropriate 111 categorisation will not be safety netted by the 999 service. This must be recognised and factored in. ”

    Source location

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change NHS Pathways ambulance categorisation so symptoms suggesting life-threatening anaphylaxis receive a category 1 response, and deploy the changes nationally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Ambulance Response Program, NHS England led (supported by NASMED and ECPAG) a “clinical coding review” in May 2019, reviewing the category 1 ambulance response definition. Consequently, it was decided that symptoms which may suggest life-threatening anaphylaxis should receive a category 1 ambulance response and the necessary changes were made by NHS Pathways. These were beta tested in September 2019 and deployed nationally from October 2019.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue participating in ambulance user groups to share data, discuss cases, exchange learning, and support triage-system improvements through feedback mechanisms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS, as an MPDS user for its 999 services and an NHS Pathways user for its 111 services, attend the relevant user groups with other ambulance trusts and fully participate in such meetings, where there is the opportunity to share data back and forth, discuss cases of note and share learning in order to make continual improvements through the feedback mechanisms to NHS Digital and the Academy at PDC process. The LAS will discuss the findings of PFD report at such user groups. Ultimately, however, changes to how the triage system operates are a matter for the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED) where MPDS (owned by PDC) is concerned, or for NHS Digital under their national clinical governance group where NHS Pathways is concerned.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with NHS England and other partners, and request resolution of inconsistent anaphylaxis coding between AMPDS and NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In line with the evidence you heard, at the time of this incident there was an inconsistency in the way in which AMPDS and NHS Pathways categorised anaphylactic shock. Whilst the technicalities of how the respective triage systems operate would be more appropriately commented on by others, it is worth noting that the tools have fundamentally different architecture and methods of operation. They are always likely to produce differing outcomes however we have worked closely with NHS England and other partners to reduce the variation as far as possible.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambulance categorisation and alignment of NHS Pathways with MPDS are not NHS Digital’s responsibility or oversight function.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance response categorisation, and the alignment of different triage systems, is not the responsibility of NHS Digital. This was set out in the following submissions made on behalf of NHS Digital:”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England oversees both systems and must address ambulance categorisation or inconsistencies between MPDS and NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is the organisation charged with overseeing both NHS Pathways and MPDS, and has the remit and ability to review potential inconsistencies or change ambulance categorisation. Accordingly, concerns regarding ambulance categorisation or inconsistencies between MPDS and NHS Pathways can only be properly answered by NHS England.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Established NHS Pathways governance systems capture, review and resolve clinical coding issues, including those raised through Prevention of Future Deaths reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to NHS Pathways specifically, I am advised that there are established governance systems in place to capture, review and resolve issues relating to clinical coding (including from Prevention of Future Deaths reports); and to ensure latest clinical advice and guidance is reflected in call categorisation. Independent clinical scrutiny of NHS Pathways is provided by a National Clinical Governance Group that includes representatives of medical Royal Colleges.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ECPAG, acting for NHS England, controls ambulance categorisation and can identify inconsistencies between NHS Pathways and MPDS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Response Priority for each MPDS determinant descriptor – being the Category of ambulance it requires – is set by ECPAG. This is because final decisions about categorisation are made by ECPAG on behalf of NHS England. It is, therefore, this organisation (if any) who has the power to take the action the learned Coroner is seeking at sub-paragraph 3 above and, where possible, would be capable of identifying any inconsistencies between the categories of ambulance assigned to dispositions within the NHS Digital system on the one hand and PDC on the other, in relation to acute anaphylaxis and otherwise.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changes to MPDS and NHS Pathways operation are matters for IAED and NHS Digital respectively.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS, as an MPDS user for its 999 services and an NHS Pathways user for its 111 services, attend the relevant user groups with other ambulance trusts and fully participate in such meetings, where there is the opportunity to share data back and forth, discuss cases of note and share learning in order to make continual improvements through the feedback mechanisms to NHS Digital and the Academy at PDC process. The LAS will discuss the findings of PFD report at such user groups. Ultimately, however, changes to how the triage system operates are a matter for the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED) where MPDS (owned by PDC) is concerned, or for NHS Digital under their national clinical governance group where NHS Pathways is concerned.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ECPAG has limited ability to align NHS Pathways and MPDS because the systems use different methodologies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From the LAS’s understanding however, there are limitations to ECPAG’s ability to align the two systems – NHS Pathways and MPDS – as they operate differently and have two different methodologies for reaching a triage decision.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No remaining anaphylaxis categorisation inconsistency exists between NHS 111 and ambulance services because 111 incidents pass directly into ambulance dispatch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report makes the observation that inconsistency may remain in parts of the country where NHS Pathways is in use by the 111 provider and AMPDS is in use by the ambulance trust. I do not believe that is the case and, having consulted with clinical and operational colleagues within AACE, I cannot conceive of a circumstance where an incidence of anaphylaxis would be categorised as Cat 1 by the 111 provider but result in a different categorisation by the ambulance trust. Once categorised by 111 incidents are passed directly to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system of the ambulance trust bypassing any further call handling or other intervention. The incident would present as a Cat 1 to the ambulance dispatcher who would allocate an ambulance response.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An independent body, rather than NHS Digital, should conduct the review of clinical triage systems because NHS Digital provides the NHS 111 Pathways system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Independent review of clinical triage systems”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Advanced_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response
  7. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    John Michael WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Michael Wells died at the scene after lacerating a varicose vein and suffering severe blood loss while prescribed anticoagulant medication. The report identified concerns about incomplete medical information, the accessibility and handling of responder contact details, the absence of automatic risk flagging, and the triage of third-party emergency calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a facility for call handlers to pass calls directly to ambulance triage staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Under NHS Pathways triage system ambulance calls received from third party callers are handled in a different way from those received from persons present with a patient. The SECAMB SIR identified that the receipt of a call from a third party was a contributory factor, partly as it required a first party call back. Mr Wells stated he was not able to talk to the ambulance service on the telephone. From the evidence before the inquest it was clear that the Appello operator was still connected to Mr Wells when in contact with SECAMB. However there was no way for the operator pass the call though thereby allowing direct contact between Mr Wells and the SECAMB EMA. ”

    Source location

    John Michael WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Paul Mclean · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Paul Mclean died on 9 October 2018 after prolonged status epilepticus, following an emergency call to the Welsh Ambulance Service on 22 July 2018. The initial call was downgraded from code red to amber, resulting in an approximately 80-minute response instead of the anticipated 15–20 minutes; the jury found that the extended response contributed to prolonged status epilepticus and his subsequent death. The principal concerns related to seizure-call question scripting and categorisation, recognition of airway problems, and communication pathways between the ambulance service, prison healthcare operators, and hospital clinicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ask callers how long the patient has been fitting

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The adequacy/accuracy of the scripting of questions for seizure/fitting calls. In particular, and in relation to code 12D02 calls (post 19.6.19) the requirement for a healthcare professional to call back after 20 minutes of continuous fitting to trigger a call upgrade from Amber 1 to Red. In an email from ████████ of 17.10.19 @ 07.11 and read to the court, it was confirmed that the question is not currently asked of the caller to WAST, how long has the patient been fitting? This would appear to be a crucial piece of information in order to ascertain as accurately as possible, the known timing of the onset of the fit, for the purposes of determining when the 20minutes has elapsed. E.g. if it is known that the patient has already been fitting for 10 minutes, then the advice to call back should be in 10 minutes hence. If the fit has just commenced, then obviously, that advice can be for a 20 minute call back. ”

    Source location

    Mr Paul Mclean · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consistently categorise non-maintenance of airways as a continuous red code

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The wider issue of whether a response from a healthcare professional (to a question(s) posed by a call handler) that the patient is not maintaining his/her airways should in itself trigger/categorise a continuous red code. The evidence of ████████ at the Inquest, was that such a scenario was of the highest clinical priority, as the patient had a high risk of cardiac arrest in such circumstances. There appeared some tension in the evidence surrounding the 12D01/02/03 categorisation as to which code would be triggered on the volunteering, or otherwise of this indication from the caller. ”

    Source location

    Mr Paul Mclean · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing MPDS triage, clinical support and escalation arrangements are considered sufficient to prioritise healthcare professional calls appropriately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To overcome this, the Trust now use the questions through the Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS), to ensure that all patients across Wales are treated with parity, including HCP requests. HCP calls are consequently prioritised as Red where it is clinically appropriate.”

    Source location

    2019-0347-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing pan-Wales CPAS governance framework and international MPDS system are considered sufficient for best-practice call categorisation without a separate hospital pathway.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Whether there is, or should exist, a clear pathway for dialogue between the Princess of Wales Hospital Emergency Department clinicians and WAST in relation to best practice for call categorisation. In particular, whether there should be regular input from the emergency department consultants at the Princess of Wales Hospital into the CPAS group for the purposes of assisting in relation to the appropriate categorisation of calls.”

    Source location

    2019-0347-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 November 2019

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón died while performing as a Mexican wrestler at a Lucha Libre event. After he lost consciousness and suffered cardiac arrest, there were delays in recognising the emergency, summoning assistance, starting CPR and providing effective resuscitation. The report also identified inadequate event briefing, unclear emergency roles and procedures, communication difficulties, delayed ambulance access, and a confused handover to ambulance staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide ambulance crews with correct venue access directions

    Wider context from the report

    “3. In the event, the instructions given to the London Ambulance Service did not include the direction to drive round to the rear entrance and so valuable minutes were lost as the paramedics made their way from front to rear on foot outside the building. ”

    Source location

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    William James Moody · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William James Moody, aged 85, intentionally entered the River Itchen from the banks of his home on 19 April 2019 and could not be revived after being taken to Southampton General Hospital. The report raises concerns that Hampshire’s 999 call-handling system may cause delays, missed triage opportunities and inadequate information-sharing between emergency services during mental health crises involving suicidal ideation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of 999 call triage to quickly and effectively identify the appropriate emergency response agency

    Wider context from the report

    “At Mr Moody’s Inquest I heard that his family (who were present throughout events as his daughter and son-in-law on the Estate in which Mr and Mrs Moody had a cottage) initially called 999 and asked for the Police to attend. The 999 call-taker triaged the call as requiring the attendance of Ambulance Service and deemed this to be a matter that the Police would not attend. This resulted in the family having to redial 999 and ask for an alternative service; during which some level of screening questions were repeated. This caused delay in the family reaching an appropriate service to attend. I heard evidence from the Mental Health Lead for Hampshire Constabulary who explained that as the incident on the 19th April 2019 was occurring in the person’s home and, as such the Police have no power to intervene where a person is in their own home and in mental health crisis and/or threatening to harm themselves. The situation on the 19th of April was distinguished from that which had happened the day before, on the 18th April, as the incident on the 18th had occurred in a public place and so, in that case, the police had a duty to attend. I heard further evidence that there is a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between Hampshire Police and the South Central Ambulance Service as to who is the primary response agency for persons making threats of suicidal ideation. Ultimately, the family were confused as to where help would come from and the call-handler will not transfer the call to a particular route/service unless the caller makes the decision as to which service they need. Despite there being a MOU between the agencies this does not appear to be something that the general public is aware of, and the task of making the general public aware of this is likely to be insurmountable and therefore it remains entirely foreseeable that future delays could occur because callers are unaware of which emergency service is the correct one to request in a situation where a person is suffering a mental health crisis episode and/or expressing suicidal ideation within the boundaries of their home. I heard further evidence regarding the existence of a different triage system, that operates in at least one area/jurisdiction of the country, but this only applies when a caller dials the 111 service; callers are given an option of accessing “Mental Health” services and this allows calls to be triaged through to an appropriately trained team/call-handler who can ask a set of wider diagnostic questions to understand and establish which agency, on the particular facts, should be the primary response service to that individual. In the situation of Mr Moody it transpired that it was actually a mixed response that was required; both the Police and Ambulance services. I am concerned that the current system of dealing with 999 calls in Hampshire gives rise to the potential for opportunities to be missed to triage the emergency call quickly and effectively, and to share information between agencies without the need to repeat the screening approach, and these factors may result in further deaths in the future. ”

    Source location

    William James Moody · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share information between emergency agencies without repeating caller screening

    Wider context from the report

    “At Mr Moody’s Inquest I heard that his family (who were present throughout events as his daughter and son-in-law on the Estate in which Mr and Mrs Moody had a cottage) initially called 999 and asked for the Police to attend. The 999 call-taker triaged the call as requiring the attendance of Ambulance Service and deemed this to be a matter that the Police would not attend. This resulted in the family having to redial 999 and ask for an alternative service; during which some level of screening questions were repeated. This caused delay in the family reaching an appropriate service to attend. I heard evidence from the Mental Health Lead for Hampshire Constabulary who explained that as the incident on the 19th April 2019 was occurring in the person’s home and, as such the Police have no power to intervene where a person is in their own home and in mental health crisis and/or threatening to harm themselves. The situation on the 19th of April was distinguished from that which had happened the day before, on the 18th April, as the incident on the 18th had occurred in a public place and so, in that case, the police had a duty to attend. I heard further evidence that there is a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between Hampshire Police and the South Central Ambulance Service as to who is the primary response agency for persons making threats of suicidal ideation. Ultimately, the family were confused as to where help would come from and the call-handler will not transfer the call to a particular route/service unless the caller makes the decision as to which service they need. Despite there being a MOU between the agencies this does not appear to be something that the general public is aware of, and the task of making the general public aware of this is likely to be insurmountable and therefore it remains entirely foreseeable that future delays could occur because callers are unaware of which emergency service is the correct one to request in a situation where a person is suffering a mental health crisis episode and/or expressing suicidal ideation within the boundaries of their home. I heard further evidence regarding the existence of a different triage system, that operates in at least one area/jurisdiction of the country, but this only applies when a caller dials the 111 service; callers are given an option of accessing “Mental Health” services and this allows calls to be triaged through to an appropriately trained team/call-handler who can ask a set of wider diagnostic questions to understand and establish which agency, on the particular facts, should be the primary response service to that individual. In the situation of Mr Moody it transpired that it was actually a mixed response that was required; both the Police and Ambulance services. I am concerned that the current system of dealing with 999 calls in Hampshire gives rise to the potential for opportunities to be missed to triage the emergency call quickly and effectively, and to share information between agencies without the need to repeat the screening approach, and these factors may result in further deaths in the future. ”

    Source location

    William James Moody · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026