Recurring concern

Unsafe emergency call handling

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the emergency call-handling process that impair location identification, information transfer, triage, escalation, reassessment, caller advice or appropriate resource deployment, including the anchor's failure to obtain riverfront coastguard location references and the delayed provision of a prison gate location.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in coastguard staffing or service coverage that are not failures of emergency call handling.
  • Excludes clinical assessment, treatment or other downstream response failures after the call-handling process has ended.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, policy or information-system deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to unsafe emergency call handling.
  • Excludes failures in non-emergency communication processes that do not concern handling an emergency call.
Reports
79

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
109

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
150

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care13
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust7
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust7
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust6
Devon & Cornwall Police4
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
NHS Pathways4
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Police3
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors3
North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust3
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Karen Jane Burns · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karen Jane Burns was found hanging from a basketball net at a park in Birmingham at 06.15 on 23 March 2019, after her ex-partner had reported that she had threatened to kill herself. The inquest concluded that her death was suicide. A serious concern was raised about West Midlands Police resources, particularly at night, and the incorrect grading and non-response of the call reporting the threat.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to grade calls correctly

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence at the inquest that this call was graded incorrectly. It should have been graded as a P2 call with a response time within 60minutes. I also heard evidence to confirm that the large number of P1 calls that evening meant that even if the call had been correctly graded it would not have been answered as all available resources were required for the P1 calls (15 minutes response). The evidence confirmed that nearly all the P2 and P3 calls went unanswered that night. This raises a serious concern about the amount of resources available to West Midlands Police. Urgent attention is needed to address the resources available, particularly at night, as current resources are unable to deal with the large volume of cases the Force is expected to deal with. ”

    Source location

    Karen Jane Burns · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ask Home Office officials to contact West Midlands Police to identify remedial or additional measures for appropriate 101 call handling.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the concern of 101 call grading and prioritisation, Elected Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables are responsible for deciding how best to manage their communications with the public, and how to respond to incidents in their force areas. However, I will ask Home Office officials to contact West Midlands Police to identify if any remedial or additional measures need to be put in place to ensure calls are handled appropriately.”

    Source location

    2019-0273-Response-by-Home-Office
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide ongoing further training to all control room staff to reduce call-grading errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “training for all control room staff is ongoing to ensure such errors are eliminated as far as possible. It is clear from the Coroner’s findings that the wrong grading of this call made no difference to the deceased in this case since even a correctly graded P2 call would not have been responded to due to pressure on resources on the night of 22/23 March 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0273-Response-by-West-MIdlands-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Capture learning from the incident and provide training to the involved call handlers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. West Midlands Police takes its response to emergency calls extremely seriously. We constantly monitor the level of resources and performance to ensure appropriate resources are available across the full range of demands we face. Learning has been captured from this incident and training has been provided to the call handlers involved. This has also formed part of a review of THRIVE+ training for staff. A new Command and Control platform is being developed to support call handlers and those involved in resource dispatch, allowing for improved identification of resource availability and response times.”

    Source location

    2019-0273-Response-by-West-MIdlands-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review THRIVE+ training for staff using learning from the incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. West Midlands Police takes its response to emergency calls extremely seriously. We constantly monitor the level of resources and performance to ensure appropriate resources are available across the full range of demands we face. Learning has been captured from this incident and training has been provided to the call handlers involved. This has also formed part of a review of THRIVE+ training for staff. A new Command and Control platform is being developed to support call handlers and those involved in resource dispatch, allowing for improved identification of resource availability and response times.”

    Source location

    2019-0273-Response-by-West-MIdlands-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables are responsible for deciding public communications and incident responses in their forces.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the concern of 101 call grading and prioritisation, Elected Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables are responsible for deciding how best to manage their communications with the public, and how to respond to incidents in their force areas. However, I will ask Home Office officials to contact West Midlands Police to identify if any remedial or additional measures need to be put in place to ensure calls are handled appropriately.”

    Source location

    2019-0273-Response-by-Home-Office
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incorrect call grading made no difference because limited resources meant a correctly graded P2 call would also not have received a response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “West Midlands Police has accepted that the call was incorrectly graded, which was recognised as human error. It has been discussed with the member of staff in question by management.”

    Source location

    2019-0273-Response-by-West-MIdlands-Police-and-Crime-Commissioner
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
  2. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Carl Richard KLIMYATYS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carl Richard KLIMYATYS’s body was found at Preston Park Station, where incorrect information about its location was communicated within the Regional Operating Centre. This contributed to an approaching train not being stopped and striking and carrying the body away. The report raises concerns about safety-critical communication training, the handling and verification of emergency information, the use of resources, and outdated contact details in the operating centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of safety-critical communication training for emergency call takers

    Wider context from the report

    “Three Bridges Regional Operating Centre (ROC) A member of the public arriving at Preston Park Station saw Carl’s body at Platform 2. He used the help phone pressing the emergency button to inform of this. The call was answered promptly by the initial call taker called a Resilience Customer Ambassador (RCA). This person had not been given the safety critical communication training. He had only been employed recently as an agency person to provide cover in the RCA over the Christmas period. The Inquest heard that when an emergency call comes in to the ROC there is a red flashing light and a buzzer to announce that this is an emergency call. The Inquest heard that the RCA should have picked up the telephone and handed it to his team leader who was shadowing him and sitting opposite him doing his own work. At 0602 the member of the public pressed the emergency button at the help phone. In fact the RCA answered the member of public’s call, took details from him which were correct as to the location of Carl’s body, said goodbye and terminated the call which lasted eleven seconds. The Inquest heard that almost immediately he passed information that the body was not on Track 2 but on Track 1. The Inquest heard that the Team Leader tried to phone the member of public back on the help phone but could not get an answer. It was not until 0609 hrs that the Team Leaders was able to speak to the member of public and ask for confirmation of the location of Carl’s body. This time the member of public appears to be saying that the body was straddling Tracks 1 and 2 (in fact he was straddling Tracks 3 and 2). The Team Leader should have known from the information available to him in the ROC that for Carl’s body to be straddling Tracks 2 and 1 was a physical impossibility since they are separated by a large island Platform. His call to the member of public lasted nineteen seconds. As a result of this incorrect and impossible information it was believed that Carl’s body would not be disrupted by the train 9T90 approaching from Brighton and due to arrive in Preston Park Station on Line 2 at 0611. The plan was to prevent the train stopping at the station for reasons which were explained at the Inquest, but because of the inputting of the wrong headcode and the fact that the train describer system was down the driver of 9T90 was not contacted, came into Preston Park Station arriving on the track where Carl’s body was lying, decapitating and then disrupting it, stopping at the station for approximately two minutes before leaving carrying Carl’s body with it. The other matter which caused concern from the point of view of what was going on in the ROC was that they apparently did not have up to date contact details for Bronze. Having set out these facts the purpose of this Regulation 28 Report is to refer to the failings in the ROC and to request that actions are taken regarding appropriate training and use of resources for those who work in that operating centre. ”

    Source location

    Carl Richard KLIMYATYS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate emergency calls from initial call takers to team leaders

    Wider context from the report

    “Three Bridges Regional Operating Centre (ROC) A member of the public arriving at Preston Park Station saw Carl’s body at Platform 2. He used the help phone pressing the emergency button to inform of this. The call was answered promptly by the initial call taker called a Resilience Customer Ambassador (RCA). This person had not been given the safety critical communication training. He had only been employed recently as an agency person to provide cover in the RCA over the Christmas period. The Inquest heard that when an emergency call comes in to the ROC there is a red flashing light and a buzzer to announce that this is an emergency call. The Inquest heard that the RCA should have picked up the telephone and handed it to his team leader who was shadowing him and sitting opposite him doing his own work. At 0602 the member of the public pressed the emergency button at the help phone. In fact the RCA answered the member of public’s call, took details from him which were correct as to the location of Carl’s body, said goodbye and terminated the call which lasted eleven seconds. The Inquest heard that almost immediately he passed information that the body was not on Track 2 but on Track 1. The Inquest heard that the Team Leader tried to phone the member of public back on the help phone but could not get an answer. It was not until 0609 hrs that the Team Leaders was able to speak to the member of public and ask for confirmation of the location of Carl’s body. This time the member of public appears to be saying that the body was straddling Tracks 1 and 2 (in fact he was straddling Tracks 3 and 2). The Team Leader should have known from the information available to him in the ROC that for Carl’s body to be straddling Tracks 2 and 1 was a physical impossibility since they are separated by a large island Platform. His call to the member of public lasted nineteen seconds. As a result of this incorrect and impossible information it was believed that Carl’s body would not be disrupted by the train 9T90 approaching from Brighton and due to arrive in Preston Park Station on Line 2 at 0611. The plan was to prevent the train stopping at the station for reasons which were explained at the Inquest, but because of the inputting of the wrong headcode and the fact that the train describer system was down the driver of 9T90 was not contacted, came into Preston Park Station arriving on the track where Carl’s body was lying, decapitating and then disrupting it, stopping at the station for approximately two minutes before leaving carrying Carl’s body with it. The other matter which caused concern from the point of view of what was going on in the ROC was that they apparently did not have up to date contact details for Bronze. Having set out these facts the purpose of this Regulation 28 Report is to refer to the failings in the ROC and to request that actions are taken regarding appropriate training and use of resources for those who work in that operating centre. ”

    Source location

    Carl Richard KLIMYATYS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include safety-critical communications training in the Customer Ambassador competency standard.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Resilience Customer Ambassador (RCA) role provides a valuable interface for our customers which can respond directly to their questions about live network operations. Where we anticipate greater demand, agency staff will supplement the normal establishment. Temporary staff are subject to the same training and competency assessment regime as permanent staff. This now includes safety-critical communications training, which is assessed as part of the Customer Ambassador standard, so there is no longer a reliance on a Team Leader to establish a clear understanding about an emerging situation.”

    Source location

    2019-0276-Response-by-GTR
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Woods · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Woods died on 26 January 2019 while a patient at the Emergency Department of Bassetlaw District General Hospital after experiencing symptoms consistent with a cardiac event and subsequently suffering cardiac arrest. The report identified concerns about delays in ambulance dispatch for category 2 calls involving possible cardiac events and the failure to administer Amiodarone. It stated that these failings prevented her from having the best possible chance of survival, although it could not be concluded that either caused or contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient resources for triage of all non-category 1 emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Patients requiring an emergency ambulance response reporting symptoms consistent with a cardiac event, but who are not yet in cardiac arrest, may wait up to 40 minutes for a category 2 response in line with the current national response times. (2) To combat this perceived inadequacy in nationally agreed response times, the East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust has developed an adjunct to the protocol by triaging all non-category 1 calls to upgrade calls such as Mrs Woods for a priority response. However, resources do not permit each and every call to be triaged, and Mrs Wood’s call was not triaged before she went into cardiac arrest. If the system for national response times is having to be supported by local adjuncts to the system, this rather suggests that the allocation of these calls in category 2 lies outside of clinical need. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Woods · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Cobbina · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Cobbina entered the River Thames on 2 November 2018 and was later retrieved from the river and pronounced dead at the shore. The concerns related to emergency-call handling, including whether callers were prompted to request coastguard or other waterborne assistance and to provide riverfront location references, potentially delaying the deployment of appropriate assets.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain riverfront coastguard location references during emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That neither the initial caller, nor a passer-by who continued the call with the emergency control room, were prompted to request the coastguard or other waterborne assistance despite making clear that the emergency related to a person in the river. While it is understood that each service can subsequently involve other services as required, the concern inevitably arises that there was a potentially significant delay in involving the appropriate assets to locate Mr Cobbina which could have been avoided at the point at which the call was triaged and/or . 2. That neither the initial caller, nor the passer-by were prompted to identify existing signage placed along the riverfront providing a coastguard location reference to be provided in an emergency situation to enable a swift and precise arrival on scene in the absence of a normal address reference. It is acknowledged that this may have been an isolated instance but the concern remains that callers identifying an emergency related to someone in the river may not always be sufficiently interrogated, appropriately triaged, or be served with the appropriate assets as soon as may be possible, and that in other circumstances there is a risk that death will occur unless action is taken to ensure this is not systemic. ”

    Source location

    Robert Cobbina · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly triage river emergencies and involve appropriate waterborne assets

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That neither the initial caller, nor a passer-by who continued the call with the emergency control room, were prompted to request the coastguard or other waterborne assistance despite making clear that the emergency related to a person in the river. While it is understood that each service can subsequently involve other services as required, the concern inevitably arises that there was a potentially significant delay in involving the appropriate assets to locate Mr Cobbina which could have been avoided at the point at which the call was triaged and/or . 2. That neither the initial caller, nor the passer-by were prompted to identify existing signage placed along the riverfront providing a coastguard location reference to be provided in an emergency situation to enable a swift and precise arrival on scene in the absence of a normal address reference. It is acknowledged that this may have been an isolated instance but the concern remains that callers identifying an emergency related to someone in the river may not always be sufficiently interrogated, appropriately triaged, or be served with the appropriate assets as soon as may be possible, and that in other circumstances there is a risk that death will occur unless action is taken to ensure this is not systemic. ”

    Source location

    Robert Cobbina · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review OP61 to remove ambiguity about directly informing the Maritime Coastguard Agency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The dispatcher failed to follow this policy as they did not inform the coastguard directly. Upon review of this incident it has become apparent that the procedure within OP61 needs to be reviewed to eradicate any ambiguity and the individual dispatcher and all staff working within EOC will be reminded of the correct procedure for informing the MCA.”

    Source location

    2019-0210-Responses
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind all Emergency Operations Centre staff of the correct OP61 process for informing the Maritime Coastguard Agency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The dispatcher failed to follow this policy as they did not inform the coastguard directly. Upon review of this incident it has become apparent that the procedure within OP61 needs to be reviewed to eradicate any ambiguity and the individual dispatcher and all staff working within EOC will be reminded of the correct procedure for informing the MCA.”

    Source location

    2019-0210-Responses
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop Multi-Agency Incident Transfer data transmission to speed transfer of incident details between emergency services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The current system of incident transfer between emergency services is being developed to utilise data transmission via a protocol called Multi-Agency Incident Transfer (MAIT), this allows emergency services to speed up transfer of incident details from one service to another.”

    Source location

    2019-0210-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing advice to seek nearby help, roads and landmarks is considered sufficient; mandatory coastguard-signage requests could delay dispatch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The use of the coastguard signage along the River Thames was discussed at the meeting on 17 July 2019 and it was confirmed by MCA that coastguard signage is only specific to the Greenwich stretch of the Thames path. We have reflected upon whether we should make it mandatory for call handlers to request the coastguard signage from the caller. However, we have concluded that this may result in a delay in the dispatch of resources as it would be difficult to ensure that the information was only requested for the very limited area of the Greenwich stretch and might require callers to move some distance in order to locate the signage. It would be easier for callers to identify landmarks, roads etc in the vicinity instead.”

    Source location

    2019-0210-Responses
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing location systems and backup methods are considered sufficient, so callers are not routinely required to provide additional landmarks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the concern that the callers in this case were not prompted for additional location information, as noted above, the emergency services have access to the EISEC and AML systems which can provide, especially in the case of AML for callers using most mobile phones, very accurate location information without the need for callers to provide it. It is therefore often not necessary for additional landmarks to be sought. Each emergency service does however have a variety of back up capabilities to identify location where the primary means has not provided sufficient accuracy. This ranges from simply asking the caller, through the use of landmarks such as described in the report,”

    Source location

    2019-0210-Responses
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing emergency-service information-sharing arrangements are considered sufficient, so callers should not be required to alert multiple services themselves.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the need to alert multiple services it is the view of the 999LTC that this should not be required of the caller; once a call is received by one of the emergency services then we believe that it would be reasonable for the public to expect that the emergency services will work together to ensure that the appropriate resources are identified to resolve the incident irrespective of where the first call is received. Given the context of an emergency, where callers may well be traumatised, it would also be inappropriate to rely on them to ensure that appropriate information is passed to every relevant service.”

    Source location

    2019-0210-Responses
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  5. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Williams underwent a procedure to remove an infected foot-surgery screw and later developed severe leg pain, bilateral paraesthesia, worsening back pain, and suspected cauda equina. There were delays in ambulance attendance and Emergency Department admission, and concerns about incorrect call triage, failure to escalate his worsening condition, and communication about an arranged admission bed. His condition deteriorated with sepsis, multi-organ failure and worsening heart failure, and he died on 26 January 2019.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by call handlers to escalate worsening conditions

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The amount of time taken for the ambulance to arrive which was markedly outside the Trust’s guidelines. (2) The failure by the call handler to both escalate Mr Williams worsening condition and her incorrect use of the haemorrhage algorithm. (3) When the ambulance transported Mr Williams to the NNUH he was kept on board the vehicle awaiting a space in the Emergency Department, despite a bed already arranged several hours before by the GP. This information was unknown to the crew and resulted in several hours delay in Mr Williams being investigated and treated which may have contributed to his death by sepsis. The Trust’s Business Continuity Manager was unaware until the inquest that the call handler had erred in failing to escalate and in using the wrong algorithm. He gave evidence that the Trust does not have an algorithm dealing with neurological deficit only a question asking if the patient is conscious. Given that Mr Williams had paraesthesia to both legs and the GP’s concerns about cauda equina this would seem to be a potentially dangerous gap in the Trust’s triaging system, placing patients at risk. In evidence the reasons given for the call handlers failure was that they did not know why she failed to escalate Mr Williams’ worsening condition and why she used the wrong algorithm and that the supplier of their IT software (the triage system), were reluctant to add a neurological algorithm, the reason for this is unclear. When asked the manager accepted that as the customer surely (the trust) could state that a neurological algorithm was necessary but merely that the supplier was reluctant. It is unknown why the paramedic crew were unaware of the arranged admission bed and the manager accepted in evidence that he had not made any enquiries about this, prior to inquest. Again, this failure in communication is one which I feel places other patients at risk of death and is unacceptable. This is not an isolated incident (death) and it appears that there are system failures within your organisation which should be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce call-handler escalation through initial training and one-to-one sessions with existing staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As stated in ████████ report we have re-enforced the escalation process in the initial training with Call handlers and also through a series of 1-2-1 sessions with existing staff.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response
  6. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Graham George Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Graham George Smith died in a house fire at his home on 24 April 2018, after deteriorating during alcohol and benzodiazepine withdrawal and refusing hospital transport on three occasions. The report raised concerns that emergency call handling could not link repeat calls about the same patient and address, and that attending ambulance crews lacked information, senior review and warning of heightened concern.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of capacity to link repeat emergency calls concerning the same patient at the same address

    Wider context from the report

    “It became apparent during the course of the inquest that the emergency call handling system did not have the capacity to link repeat calls regarding the same patient at the same address within a short period of time. As the system is unable to currently link such patterns of call behavior, there is no system in place regarding how this information could be used for the benefit of patients and to introduce safety-netting. There was no senior review or “red flag” warning of heightened concern to alert the attending crews. The court was advised that if the history of recent calls had been known, this may have altered the way in which the attendance was managed. It is acknowledged that any system to capture repeat calls will need to have careful consideration of multiple occupancy buildings and the need for confidentiality, but there may be good working models already achieving this aim, or parallels may be considered with sudden frequent attendances of patients to ED. ”

    Source location

    Graham George Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extend duplicate-call alert checking toward a 12-hour window while reviewing CAD feasibility and system-performance impact.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “EMAS currently has a process in place to alert all Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) staff upon receipt of a call, that a previous call has been made from that same address, or within 50 meters of the address coordinates, within the last nine hours. This is highlighted by a yellow warning box stating “Possible Duplicate Calls” on the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.”

    Source location

    2019-0167-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extending duplicate-call checking requires assurance that increased CAD processing will not detrimentally affect the system’s ability to handle incoming calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having received this notification, the dispatcher will check the CAD system and verbally notify the crew by radio of any previous attendance within the last nine hours. In Mr Smith’s case, however, the previous attendance was outside of this window, which at that time was only five hours. We are incrementally increasing this time to twelve hours; however we have to do this in small increments to ensure that it does not have a detrimental impact on the CAD system.”

    Source location

    2019-0167-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 August 2019

    Open published response
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Karanbir Singh CHEEMA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karanbir Singh CHEEMA, a pupil at William Perkin High School with multiple food allergies and asthma, went into anaphylactic shock after another pupil threw cheese at him on 28 June 2017 and died. Concerns included inadequate awareness of his allergies, insufficient checking and availability of EpiPens, an out-of-date EpiPen, failures in sharing and standardising allergy action plans, a cancelled follow-up appointment, and shortcomings in emergency response guidance and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omission of second adrenaline auto-injector guidance from the emergency call algorithm

    Wider context from the report

    “11. The London Ambulance Service 999 operator did not at any time suggest that a second EpiPen be given, because this is not contained within the algorithm. That could be remedied internationally. ”

    Source location

    Karanbir Singh CHEEMA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the recommendation with IAED-MPDS governance bodies for consideration of a second EpiPen prompt.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware, under the terms of the licence to use MPDS the LAS as a licenced user does not have jurisdiction to make changes to the call taking protocols unilaterally and must submit requests for change to the Standards Committee of the IAED. I am advised by our Chief Medical Officer that this PFD was raised at the UK Clinical Focus Group for IAED-MPDS on 22 May 2019 and has also been raised with the Executive Director of MPDS; ████████ The group welcomed this recommendation and we await their conclusion/outcome.”

    Source location

    2019-0161-Response-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the PFD recommendation with NASMED leadership for consideration and wider ambulance-service escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our Chief Medical Officer has taken the opportunity to share this PFD with ████████ the Chair for The National Ambulance Service Medical Directors (NASMED) for their consideration who will raise it with the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE). As the Trust is also a NHS 111 provider for integrated urgent care, this PFD has also been raised with ████████ the Chair of NHS Pathways National Clinical Governance Group and ████████ the NHS Pathways Deputy Clinical Director. ████████ has confirmed that NHS Pathways advises to give another dose if there is no improvement after the first dose and states that “If the individual’s condition does not improve, adrenaline should be repeated if available after 10-15 minutes, according to the manufacturer's instructions”.”

    Source location

    2019-0161-Response-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the PFD recommendation with NHS Pathways clinical governance leadership.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our Chief Medical Officer has taken the opportunity to share this PFD with ████████ the Chair for The National Ambulance Service Medical Directors (NASMED) for their consideration who will raise it with the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE). As the Trust is also a NHS 111 provider for integrated urgent care, this PFD has also been raised with ████████ the Chair of NHS Pathways National Clinical Governance Group and ████████ the NHS Pathways Deputy Clinical Director. ████████ has confirmed that NHS Pathways advises to give another dose if there is no improvement after the first dose and states that “If the individual’s condition does not improve, adrenaline should be repeated if available after 10-15 minutes, according to the manufacturer's instructions”.”

    Source location

    2019-0161-Response-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust lacks authority to amend MPDS call-taking protocols unilaterally under its licence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware, under the terms of the licence to use MPDS the LAS as a licenced user does not have jurisdiction to make changes to the call taking protocols unilaterally and must submit requests for change to the Standards Committee of the IAED. I am advised by our Chief Medical Officer that this PFD was raised at the UK Clinical Focus Group for IAED-MPDS on 22 May 2019 and has also been raised with the Executive Director of MPDS; ████████ The group welcomed this recommendation and we await their conclusion/outcome.”

    Source location

    2019-0161-Response-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Requests to change MPDS call-taking protocols must be submitted to the IAED Standards Committee.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware, under the terms of the licence to use MPDS the LAS as a licenced user does not have jurisdiction to make changes to the call taking protocols unilaterally and must submit requests for change to the Standards Committee of the IAED. I am advised by our Chief Medical Officer that this PFD was raised at the UK Clinical Focus Group for IAED-MPDS on 22 May 2019 and has also been raised with the Executive Director of MPDS; ████████ The group welcomed this recommendation and we await their conclusion/outcome.”

    Source location

    2019-0161-Response-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response
  8. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Aidan David Ridley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Aidan David Ridley was struck by a car while crossing a road on 12 February 2016 and died three days later from hypoxic brain injury caused by how he landed, which obstructed his airway. Concerns included police call-handler advice not to turn him over, insufficient direction to seek ambulance advice or defer to medically trained bystanders, and inadequate call-handler training, guidance and supervision.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate supervision of Police call handlers

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The guidance, training and supervision of the Police call handler was inadequate to enable the call to dealt with effectively. ”

    Source location

    Aidan David Ridley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited use of three-way calls between the public, Police call handlers and the ambulance service

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) The system that has been introduced since Aidan's death, of allowing 3 way calls between the member of the public, the police call handler and the ambulance service appears on the evidence heard at the Inquest, to have had little if any use. To what extent does the induction training and the ongoing training of Control room call operators refer to it or demonstrate it in action? ”

    Source location

    Aidan David Ridley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to intervene in or correct unsafe call-handler advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) There was a failure to intervene in or correct the advice given by the call handler not to turn Aidan over. ”

    Source location

    Aidan David Ridley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train new call handlers, issue staff briefings and reminders, and regularly test the three-way police-ambulance conferencing process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The functionality of this system is a standard telephony conferencing. This is trained to all of our new starters as is all other Cortex / Telephony processes. It is fair to say that the set of circumstances relating to the road traffic collision report involving Aidan remain unusual.”

    Source location

    2019-0173-Response-by-Wiltshire-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A minor road-traffic-collision report, as initially understood, would not require supervisor oversight under existing procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This call was initially reporting a road traffic collision and this quickly developed into a medical emergency call that was not identified as such at the point the call came to the police. The training given to call handlers enables them to take control of the call and extract relevant information from the caller and remaining calm and reassuring. As information developed a call was made to ambulance by a colleague to ensure an ambulance was attending the scene which was within procedure.”

    Source location

    2019-0173-Response-by-Wiltshire-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routine monitoring of every call is not achievable because supervisors have other responsibilities and the control room manages numerous live incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As mentioned, incoming calls are not all routinely monitored by supervisors. The layout of the call center means the Force Incident Manager (Inspector) has responsibility for up to seventeen members of staff who are either taking calls or dispatching units. The inspector may hear one half of the conversation as the operator is speaking. The inspector and supervisors have the ability to dip sample calls of call handlers but also have other roles and responsibilities which include assessing the current active logs across the county. A supervisor could review or monitor the call requested by the call handler. It is routine within the Crime & Communication Centre to have up to 30 live incidents across the county over five different radio channels which places demands on all the staff.”

    Source location

    2019-0173-Response-by-Wiltshire-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 August 2019

    Open published response
  9. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terrence Smith died in hospital on 13 November 2013 after developing amphetamine-induced Excited Delirium/Acute Behavioural Disturbance, being subjected to prolonged restraint, and stopping breathing while being transported to hospital. The principal concerns included failures to recognise the condition as a medical emergency, inadequate assessment and training, excessive restraint, delayed conveyance to hospital, and deficiencies in relevant emergency response, clinical, police and custody policies and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of call-handling provision for identifying unrecognised ED/ABD presentations

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that, whilst waiting for version 17 of NHS Pathways, SECAMB has provided its call handlers with guidance (by way of a “Hot Topic”) that a call from the Police or a Health Care Professional stating that a patient is suffering ED/ABD should be given a category 2 response. I was also told, however, that SECAMB’s call handlers have no discretion when using NHS Pathways which must be followed precisely. I have three concerns about the current situation. First, there appears to be a contradiction between the call handlers being told they have no discretion when using NHS Pathways and their being given additional guidance for certain calls. This contradiction could cause confusion. Secondly, the guidance given in the “Hot Topic” is concerned only with calls from the Police or an HCP in which ED/ABD is identified. Currently, therefore, there is no provision for identifying the condition in calls from the Police or an HCP which do not expressly mention ED/ABD or in calls from the public (meaning the call from Terry’s family would still not be recognised as a call relating to ED/ABD, even today). Thirdly, the “Hot Topic” does not guide the call handlers to ask whether the patient is under restraint. If a patient suffering ED/ABD is under restraint this could add to his risk of sudden death and this information could affect the proper categorisation of the response to the call. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contradictory ambulance call-handling instructions

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that, whilst waiting for version 17 of NHS Pathways, SECAMB has provided its call handlers with guidance (by way of a “Hot Topic”) that a call from the Police or a Health Care Professional stating that a patient is suffering ED/ABD should be given a category 2 response. I was also told, however, that SECAMB’s call handlers have no discretion when using NHS Pathways which must be followed precisely. I have three concerns about the current situation. First, there appears to be a contradiction between the call handlers being told they have no discretion when using NHS Pathways and their being given additional guidance for certain calls. This contradiction could cause confusion. Secondly, the guidance given in the “Hot Topic” is concerned only with calls from the Police or an HCP in which ED/ABD is identified. Currently, therefore, there is no provision for identifying the condition in calls from the Police or an HCP which do not expressly mention ED/ABD or in calls from the public (meaning the call from Terry’s family would still not be recognised as a call relating to ED/ABD, even today). Thirdly, the “Hot Topic” does not guide the call handlers to ask whether the patient is under restraint. If a patient suffering ED/ABD is under restraint this could add to his risk of sudden death and this information could affect the proper categorisation of the response to the call. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance call-triage tools to support recognition and appropriate response to ED/ABD

    Wider context from the report

    “The version of NHS Pathways currently in use is version 16 which does not enable operators to recognise potential ED / ABD and respond accordingly. I was told that it is intended that version 17 will do so but this is not yet in use. My concern is that, unless and until it is in use, there will continue to be a failure by call handlers to recognise ED/ABD and respond appropriately. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    John SCOTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John SCOTT’s death was investigated and the inquest concluded that he died from natural causes. The concerns raised related to emergency call handling, including support for callers who are alone, ambulance estimated arrival times, whether lone callers could re-contact the service if they became unresponsive, and questions about symptoms that might indicate an abdominal aortic aneurysm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to manage support arrangements safely for callers who are alone

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) With regard to the questions asked when an emergency call is made to South East Coast Ambulance Service my view is that the additional questions should be asked: 1. Is there anyone else with you or are you alone? If there is anyone else with you may I please speak to them. 2. If the caller is alone: we will be asking you not to ring anybody because we need to consider the possibility that we will need to ring you back however, if you want to phone for somebody to come and bring you some support and company could you please do that within the next 15 minutes from now. ”

    Source location

    John SCOTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish whether an emergency caller is alone and whether another person can be spoken to

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) With regard to the questions asked when an emergency call is made to South East Coast Ambulance Service my view is that the additional questions should be asked: 1. Is there anyone else with you or are you alone? If there is anyone else with you may I please speak to them. 2. If the caller is alone: we will be asking you not to ring anybody because we need to consider the possibility that we will need to ring you back however, if you want to phone for somebody to come and bring you some support and company could you please do that within the next 15 minutes from now. ”

    Source location

    John SCOTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the closing instruction for callers alone, consider adding advice to call someone else, and work with 999 services on its development.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Pathways will review this instruction in line with its review process and consider adding in a statement to “call someone else” and work closely with all 999 services using NHS Pathways in this development. If changes are required these will be incorporated into release 19 (due for deployment May 2020) following NHS Pathways robust processes for authoring, assuring, testing and deployment of clinical content.”

    Source location

    2019-0051-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The service cannot add contradictory instructions to its own script because it must follow NHS Pathways and this could confuse callers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The question of whether a patient is alone would have to form part of the script written by NHS Pathways. The direction “once this phone call is finished, don’t ring anyone else in case we need to call you back” is part of the current Pathways script. Giving the caller the opportunity to ring someone to come to them if they are alone therefore also falls within the NHS Pathways part of the script. It would follow naturally from asking the caller if they are alone. We are obliged to adhere to the Pathways script to maintain our Pathways licence. Whilst we can add our own script after the Pathways script, it would not be sensible and would lead to confusion if we were to contradict instructions we had just given as part of the Pathways script.”

    Source location

    2019-0051-Response-by-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Pathways is responsible for amending the script to ask whether patients are alone and provide corresponding instructions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We therefore defer to NHS Pathways to make any appropriate amendment or addition to the script to enquire as to whether the patient is alone and to amend the instructions to them accordingly. We meet with NHS Pathways on a monthly basis and we have discussed this matter with them. We understand that it is under their consideration (see more in this regard at point 3 below).”

    Source location

    2019-0051-Response-by-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The instruction not to contact others after ambulance dispatch remains necessary because ambulance services may need to call patients back.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within NHS Pathways, where there is an ambulance dispatch in both 999 and 111, callers are advised to not to ring anybody else since the ambulance service needs to call the patient back for example to confirm the address or any special requirements like entry information. This is especially important in calls generated from 111 as these are automatically sent through to the ambulance service and the service that has received the case may need to call back.”

    Source location

    2019-0051-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The decision to require call handlers to ask whether another person is present is an operational matter for South East Coast Ambulance Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Call handlers using NHS Pathways are always trained to speak directly with the patient when it is a 3rd party call, this ensures that the questions being asked are answered as accurately as possible to ensure both a safe outcome and that questions are not mis-interpreted through a 3rd party. Call handlers are not trained to ask if there is someone else with a 1st party caller, however this is assessed on a case by case basis as there are certain situations where it may not be appropriate to speak with the patient including, but not limited to, children of certain ages, callers with communication difficulties, those with hearing disabilities or so ill they cannot speak. The decision whether to ask all call handlers to ask to speak to someone else if they are with the caller would be an operational decision for South East Coast Ambulance Service as NHS Pathways cannot mandate this.”

    Source location

    2019-0051-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 June 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026