Recurring concern

Unsafe emergency call handling

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the emergency call-handling process that impair location identification, information transfer, triage, escalation, reassessment, caller advice or appropriate resource deployment, including the anchor's failure to obtain riverfront coastguard location references and the delayed provision of a prison gate location.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in coastguard staffing or service coverage that are not failures of emergency call handling.
  • Excludes clinical assessment, treatment or other downstream response failures after the call-handling process has ended.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, policy or information-system deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to unsafe emergency call handling.
  • Excludes failures in non-emergency communication processes that do not concern handling an emergency call.
Reports
79

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
109

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
150

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care13
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust7
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust7
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust6
Devon & Cornwall Police4
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
NHS Pathways4
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Police3
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors3
North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust3
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Andrew Alexander · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Andrew Alexander, who had a long-standing history of mental illness and was under the care of community mental health services, entered the water at Aspley Marina on 4 February 2024 and died from cold-water immersion. A welfare call to police was redirected to the ambulance service, which did not attend, and no emergency services were dispatched. The principal concern was a gap in how emergency services respond to welfare calls under the Right Care Right Person framework.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reliance on call takers to bring cross-agency welfare concerns to operational managers

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the evidence, it became apparent the police had introduced RCRP in September 2023. RCRP is a police initiative arising out of a national agreement but to be implemented by individual police forces. Little or no consultation with other agencies had taken place prior to the implementation of RCRP in September 2023.Whilst I heard evidence that meetings with other agencies now do take place, the specifics of Paul’s case and the broader issues it raises have not been discussed nor is there any understanding/agreement in place as to how such a situation would now be addressed. As much as the court was advised was that if a similar situation arose today, there may be a discussion between operational managers in the respective police and ambulance call centres, but that this would be reliant upon the matter being brought to the attention of those respective managers by the call taker. The evidence from the RCRP lead at the ambulance service indicated the scenario that arose with Paul was not an isolated example. As such there appears to be a lacuna in how emergency services will respond to such a situation when it was accepted this was a call expressing concern for Paul’s welfare. ”

    Source location

    Paul Andrew Alexander · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train contact-centre staff, supervisors, and managers on Right Care Right Person and escalation procedures through peer training and updated training packages.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Contact Focus Group established (November 2023) trained to deliver peer to peer training on RCRP – delivered updated training across Contact teams (July 2024)”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 29 May 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and operate a widened WYP–YAS escalation process with approved procedures, digital documentation, daily review, and monthly partnership learning meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4.1.5 This updated policy reflects discussions with partnership agencies, including a revised escalation process which was discussed with YAS in September 2024. Since this date, WYP have been in regular contact with YAS to develop and introduce an improved escalation process to streamline and widen the scope of escalation to support in cases where the RCRP threshold to deploy is not met.”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 6 · response
    Published 29 May 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    West Yorkshire Police states RCRP did not change existing processes, which were already governed by established welfare and escalation policies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4.1.1 There has been an existing ‘Escalation Policy’ in force prior to the launch of RCRP, contained within the ‘Welfare check deployment criteria’ Policy, which was updated in consultation with YAS in August 2022.”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 29 May 2025

    Open published response
  2. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Lachlan Charles Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lachlan Charles Campbell died on 1 November 2022 after being found outside a railway station in a distressed and possibly drug-affected state, where he remained for several hours in heavy rain and cold conditions. The report identifies concerns about delays in ambulance attendance, incomplete information sharing between ambulance and police services, and police officers not providing shelter, warmth, or timely medical attention. The inquest concluded that these failures contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to call an ambulance promptly following a concern for welfare call

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Information sharing between SWAST and D&CP. A number of issues were revealed during the course of the evidence. a) A concern for welfare call was received by police at circa 00:15. Officers attended on scene at circa 01:00 and chased an ambulance at 01:42 only to find one had not been previously called resulting in an initial delay of nearly 1.5 hours. b) The initial caller had been a bus driver. His mobile details were not taken and so SWAST was unable to call him back for further information they required. When police officers were asked for their numbers, they provided their shoulder numbers, not their mobile numbers. SWAST thus had incomplete information when considering what disposition was appropriate. c) Police Officers were advised the call had resulted in a Category 2 disposition but were not provided with an ETA. The target time was 18 minutes but an ambulance did not arrive until 06:15, some 4.5 hours later. Had Officers been aware of the likely delays, their evidence was that they would have considered other options (such as conveying Lachlan to hospital in their car.) d) In reaching a Category 2 disposition, SWAST understood the Officers were remaining with Lachlan. In the event, they left him to deal with an unresolved domestic violence incident. At inquest, evidence was given that, had this been known to SWAST, a Category 1/2 disposition may have been reached. e) In the event Officers had concluded there was a need to convey Lachlan to hospital, it would have meant there were no available Officers in the Penzance area. While this is a matter for police to reflect upon, it was notable the Officers’ supervisor was not contacted to discuss options. f) The inquest heard that in other countries (USA) there are arrangements in place for police to drop victims in need of urgent treatment at hospital (eg stabbings) without being detained for extended periods (current handover for ambulance crews in excess of 2 hours.) If ambulance delays are set to continue and police may need increasingly to convey patients to hospital, is there value in considering whether arrangements of this nature would be beneficial? ”

    Source location

    Lachlan Charles Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train officers requiring additional medical support to telephone 999 from the scene so operators can liaise directly and allocate resources.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a part of RCRP, if our police officers come across or attend an incident in respect of which they deem that there is a requirement for additional medical support, they are trained to telephone 999 from the scene. This is to seek to ensure that the 999 operator can liaise directly with the person who has the patient with them and can offer appropriate treatment, as well as allocating a resource to attend.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon and Cornwall Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require officers using the police control room to explain why they cannot call 999 directly, and train police and ambulance personnel to record relevant information when liaising.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If our officers call for an ambulance through the police control room, they are asked if there is a reason that they cannot do this themselves (such as the need to commence CPR, or other environmental factors). Police control room and SWAST personnel are trained to record all relevant information when contacting or otherwise liaising with SWAST.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon and Cornwall Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2025

    Open published response
  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Robert John Fray · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert John Fray became unwell with suspected sepsis during a dialysis session on 4 April 2022, and ambulance delays and emergency department failures meant he remained untreated for many hours. He developed multi-organ failure after sepsis and a stroke and died on 9 April 2022. The principal concerns were that repeated 999 calls did not trigger consideration of a more urgent response and that the duplicate-call system failed to identify a further call when his location changed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the automated duplicate checker to identify repeat calls when the patient changes location

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A volume of 999 calls over a longitudinal period (vs a volume of calls in a short space of time) does not trigger or prompt NHS Pathways to require the call assessor to consider whether a more urgent response is needed. The simple fact of repeated 999 calls over a longitudinal period may be an indicator of a worsening situation. Currently, the call assessor repeats at each call the question ‘has the presentation changed?’ and is reliant on the judgment of the caller who may not have the complete picture (e.g. Mr Fray’s neighbour), rather than also having regard to the number of calls. 2. Linked, the automated ‘duplicate checker’ is based on checking location within a 250-meter radius and not the patient’s name. As Mr Fray had moved more than 250 meters between 999 call no.3 and 999 call no.4, the call at 23:05hrs was not identified as a fourth call. It follows the call assessor was not prompted to ask whether his presentation had worsened and the ambulance was sent to an out-of-date location. This would not have happened had the ‘duplicate checker’ included Mr Fray’s name rather than simply looking for a location within 250-meters. ”

    Source location

    Robert John Fray · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prompt call assessors to consider repeated 999 calls over time when assessing urgency

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A volume of 999 calls over a longitudinal period (vs a volume of calls in a short space of time) does not trigger or prompt NHS Pathways to require the call assessor to consider whether a more urgent response is needed. The simple fact of repeated 999 calls over a longitudinal period may be an indicator of a worsening situation. Currently, the call assessor repeats at each call the question ‘has the presentation changed?’ and is reliant on the judgment of the caller who may not have the complete picture (e.g. Mr Fray’s neighbour), rather than also having regard to the number of calls. 2. Linked, the automated ‘duplicate checker’ is based on checking location within a 250-meter radius and not the patient’s name. As Mr Fray had moved more than 250 meters between 999 call no.3 and 999 call no.4, the call at 23:05hrs was not identified as a fourth call. It follows the call assessor was not prompted to ask whether his presentation had worsened and the ambulance was sent to an out-of-date location. This would not have happened had the ‘duplicate checker’ included Mr Fray’s name rather than simply looking for a location within 250-meters. ”

    Source location

    Robert John Fray · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop an alternative duplicate-call detection method using patient and caller demographic details beyond location-based matching.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is sorry that in the case of Mr Fray neither method described correctly identified the final call to his home address as a duplicate call. The Trust therefore agrees with the recommendation within the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths to implement an alternative method for detection based upon the patient's personal demographics.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a call-taking protocol requiring clinical review when three or more repeat calls are identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledges the concern raised in Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, relating to the management of repeat calls. The Trust details the actions to identify duplicate, or repeat calls, in response to concern 2 below. In response to your first recommendation, the Trust will implement a change in call taking protocol that requires a clinical review of a patient’s condition where three or more repeat calls are identified. This will support an immediate review of the patient’s call history and presenting symptoms.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National policy on how ambulance services manage duplicate callers is outside NHS England’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England do not set national policy on how ambulance services should manage duplicate callers. Ambulance services adopt good practice and implement their own local procedures to manage this issue. The duplicate checker referred to by the Coroner is good practice across the sector but is not nationally mandated policy.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambulance services are responsible for adopting good practice and implementing local procedures for managing duplicate callers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England do not set national policy on how ambulance services should manage duplicate callers. Ambulance services adopt good practice and implement their own local procedures to manage this issue. The duplicate checker referred to by the Coroner is good practice across the sector but is not nationally mandated policy.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Treating callers with previous contacts differently could delay NHS Pathways assessment, ambulance dispatch, or life-saving advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Pathways triage assessment assesses symptoms at the time of the call. If all patients who had a previous 999 contact or a previous encounter with a healthcare provider were treated differently when a call reaches the 999 system, this could delay or prevent an NHS Pathways assessment occurring. This could in turn delay ambulance dispatch or life-saving advice.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Established protocols treat repeat calls as requiring full retriage only when the patient's condition has changed or worsened.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust answers, triages and processes 999 calls in-line with established call taking protocols that detail the required actions for managing duplicate or repeat calls. Most duplicate calls received are not because a patient’s condition has changed, they are because a caller is seeking an estimated arrival time. These calls are not routinely retriaged as it has been confirmed that there is no change in the patients presenting condition which means that the response category will not differ from that originally established. All duplicate calls from patients or callers, where it is confirmed the condition of the patient has changed or worsened will receive a full NHS Pathways triage. If the”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A higher response category would not have been achieved because the patient was reported conscious and breathing regularly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As described in the circumstances relating to the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, during the fifth 999 call that originated from a neighbour, Mr Fray received a further triage of his symptoms requiring a category 2 response. A higher response category would not have been achieved, due to Mr Fray being reported as conscious and breathing regularly. This call would therefore not have changed the priority of the existing response.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Bernard Compton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bernard Compton developed symptoms of a myocardial infarction, but delays in ambulance response, ECG interpretation, triage, blood-result review and clinical assessment meant that the optimum window for intervention had passed. He later suffered a left ventricular rupture and died on 19 October 2023. The concerns included inadequate oversight of patients and urgent results, unclear systems for repeating and acting on tests, and demand-related delays in ambulance and emergency care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the emergency call algorithm to identify symptoms consistent with an ongoing myocardial infarction

    Wider context from the report

    “When Mr Compton made his first call to NWAS he was exhibiting symptoms consistent with an ongoing MI. However the questioning via the algorithm did not pick that up. NWAS were unable to clarify why that was the case. A call from someone actively having a MI was therefore categorised as a category 3 despite the time critical nature of the condition. ”

    Source location

    Bernard Compton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns outside NHS England’s national policy or programme remit are not addressed in this response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response to you focuses on those concerns raised in your Report that come under the remit of NHS England’s national policy or programme work. It would be more appropriate for the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) NHS Trust and Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust to respond to some of the concerns raised, and you may wish to revert to those Trusts for further information.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS, Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust, and the ICB should provide information on concerns assigned to them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response to you focuses on those concerns raised in your Report that come under the remit of NHS England’s national policy or programme work. It would be more appropriate for the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) NHS Trust and Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust to respond to some of the concerns raised, and you may wish to revert to those Trusts for further information.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS identified that the initial call was safely and appropriately triaged as Category 3 based on the symptoms provided.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My regional colleagues in the North West have also engaged with NWAS on your concerns and are advised that NWAS have identified that the call was safely and appropriately triaged as Category 3 with the symptoms provided by Bernard on the initial call. It was identified by NWAS at the time that the call was potentially suitable to be supported by clinician callback and details were sent to the Greater Manchester Clinical Assessment Service (GMCAS) for clinical assessment, as per agreed”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Dow · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Dow died on 3 April 2023 after taking an overdose of medication while alone in a hotel room. He had indicated that the overdose might be an attempt to take his own life, but both ambulance calls were coded as category 3, with no clinician involved at the time. There were also concerns that the lack of response to three follow-up calls, potentially indicating loss of consciousness, did not lead to escalation.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate calls when repeated non-response may indicate loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Despite giving a clear indication that he had taken an overdose of a lot of medication with an indication that he did so to take his own life the calls at 18.35 and 19.38 were both coded as category 3. 2. There was no involvement from a clinician at the time of either call. 3. Mr Dow was on his own in the hotel room. When a clinician called on 3 separate occasions there was no response. During her evidence Ms Lee, the Service Delivery Manager of the Emergency Operations Centre accepted that this could indicate that Mr Dow had lost consciousness but the call made at 18.35 was not escalated ”

    Source location

    Paul Dow · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign an appropriately urgent category to calls indicating a medication overdose and suicidal intent

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Despite giving a clear indication that he had taken an overdose of a lot of medication with an indication that he did so to take his own life the calls at 18.35 and 19.38 were both coded as category 3. 2. There was no involvement from a clinician at the time of either call. 3. Mr Dow was on his own in the hotel room. When a clinician called on 3 separate occasions there was no response. During her evidence Ms Lee, the Service Delivery Manager of the Emergency Operations Centre accepted that this could indicate that Mr Dow had lost consciousness but the call made at 18.35 was not escalated ”

    Source location

    Paul Dow · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Route overdose and poisoning calls through Clinical Navigation for timely clinician review, escalation, further triage and welfare action when specialist triage is delayed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since Mr Dow’s death, there have been various operational changes within the Trusts EOCs with regards to how emergency calls are dealt with.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide extended overdose and poisoning training to clinicians in Clinical Navigation, the Clinical Support Desk and Clinical Coordination Desk, including use of TOXBASE.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Training”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    When patients do not answer return calls, existing arrangements provide ambulance dispatch and clinician-led judgement on whether categorisation should be upgraded.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As set out above, when Mr Dow did not pick up the three calls made by the NWAS Specialist Practitioner, the decision was made by that clinician to dispatch an ambulance to him. This was, in and of itself, an escalation of the call, as it had initially been deemed appropriate for further telephone triage.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatic upgrading of every unanswered patient call is not feasible because it would significantly burden ambulance capacity and response-time targets.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is common for return calls from the ambulance service to patients to go unanswered. In that scenario, it is not possible for this to result in an automatic upgrading of calls. Automatically upgrading the categorisation of all calls to patients that go unanswered would have a significant impact in dispatching the ambulance service is able to provide to patients who have already been triaged at a higher priority (for example category 1 and category 2 calls) and would place a significant burden on the Trust’s wider response times for all patient incidents, such that the achieving of target response times is likely to become unachievable.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS is best placed to respond on the specific local action addressing the concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have also shared your report with NWAS who are best placed to respond on the specific action they are taking locally to address your concerns. I am informed that NWAS has reviewed how it uses the call handling triage tool (NHS Pathways) in calls that involve patients who have taken overdoses. When NHS Pathways recognises a "risk of suicide" or "accidental poisoning or overdose" from the initial call triage, it will automatically prompt the call handler to continue with an advanced recommendation module to determine if the patient has taken an overdose of a number of higher risk medications. Patients who have taken such medicines will automatically be upgraded to a Category 2 response at the point of the call.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The category 3 outcomes were appropriate based on NHS Pathways information and audits of both calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Based on the information provided by him in response to the call handler’s questioning during both 999 calls made to NWAS, the outcome elicited by NHS Pathways for Mr Dow’s 999 calls was a category 3 response.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Pathways, rather than the ambulance trust, ultimately determines categorisation of calls triaged through its system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The categorisation of emergency 999 calls, which are triaged through the NHS Pathways system, is standardised across England in all ambulance Trusts which use the Pathways system. Whilst ambulance Trusts can (and do) provide feedback to NHS Pathways with views/opinions on call categorisation, the decision as to categorisation is ultimately a decision for NHS Pathways.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Joseph Michael Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 31 May 2023, Joseph Michael Miller suffered seizures at home, became unconscious, and did not regain consciousness despite resuscitation attempts. He was declared dead on 5 June 2023 after tests confirmed severe hypoxic brain injury. The report raised concerns that differing ambulance service pathways can lead to inconsistent call categorisation and affect the dispatch of potentially lifesaving attendance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure consistent ambulance call categorisation pathways across England

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard evidence that different ambulance services use different pathways that can impact how calls are categorised /downgraded. The consequence of this is that how the ambulance services across England deal with a call varies depending on where you live. As an example in this inquest, because of where Joseph lived, calls can go to EMAS or NWAS depending on which mobile telephone mast the call pings on. The initial call went to EMAS who on being told he was no longer fitting downgraded the call, in line with their pathway. The inquest was told that had the call been dealt with by NWAS they would not have downgraded the call to a category 3 in this situation because that was not how their pathway operated. 2. The consequence of these different pathways is that there is not a consistent approach to call categorisation across the country which can have a significant impact on the dispatch of potentially lifesaving attendance by the ambulance service. ”

    Source location

    Joseph Michael Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing mapping and continual review of triage categorisation are considered sufficient to reduce unwarranted variation and support appropriate ambulance prioritisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In considering the concerns raised about the potential for variation between categorisation, NHSE has advised the Department that it has in place a process to appropriately map the outcomes of 999 call triage systems against ambulance response time categories. NHSE has responsibility for the production, maintenance, review and revision of the dataset used in these systems, which is managed by the NHSE-chaired Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG). ECPAG keeps the categorisation of calls under continual review, and ambulance services support this process through providing evidence and expertise to reduce unwarranted variation across services, helping ensure appropriate prioritisation, equity of access and uniformity of response across England.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for overseeing ambulance services and maintaining, reviewing and revising the triage dataset through ECPAG.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raised concerns about the two call triage systems in use by NHS ambulance trusts, and the potential for patients to be given a different ambulance categorisation depending on the system used. The Department’s officials have shared your report with the East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS), North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) and NHS England (NHSE) as the body responsible for oversight of NHS ambulance services.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response
  7. Coventry

    AI-generated summary

    Ronald James JEPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ronald James Jepson, who resided at a mental healthcare facility and had a known risk of choking, suffered an unwitnessed choking episode after being provided with supper and died in hospital on 15 March 2023. Concerns included delayed and suboptimal CPR, staff calling 111 rather than 999, and infrequent and ineffectual emergency training for care home staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify emergencies and contact the appropriate emergency service

    Wider context from the report

    “i. Timely and commensurate interventions of care staff can have a significant positive bearing upon the outcome of a choking episode. Training on how to deal with emergency situations is not ingrained in care home staff. ii. The circumstances of this inquest touching upon the death of Ronald JEPSON accentuated this point. The evidence was that Mr Jepson 'gargling' and becoming unresponsive was an emergency. 111 (a non-emergency number) was called by care home staff and not 999. iii. A call handler recognising it was an emergency escalated matters and guidance was given to care staff as to CPR. First attempts as resuscitation by care staff were following an appreciable period of time (ascribed to inexperience and panic) and the cardiopulmonary resuscitation was sub optimal. iv. The removal of the food occluding the airway of Mr Jepson and effective CPR was provided by paramedics immediately lead a reduced cyanosis. v. A choking episode, of itself, is a time critical event. vi. Such training at the time of the incident was ineffectual and infrequent (online) with the consequence being that when an emergency arose the actions of staff to aid a resident were cumulatively sub optimal. vii. Following the incident there has been no significant increase in training frequency such as would better enable commensurate training to be ingrained in staff which may make significant difference in averting an adverse outcome for a resident in need of emergency care/ assistance. ”

    Source location

    Ronald James JEPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide face-to-face basic life-support and Level 1 first-aid training covering choking recognition, immediate response and escalation; training has reached 82% of staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ii) At the time of Mr. Ronald James Jepson, staff at Meadow House had all completed e-learning 1st aid training. To ensure staff team are further prepared to deal with medical emergencies that might arise during support and care delivery, Provider sourced Face-to-Face Basic Life Support Training for staff, for which 82% of the staff attended. Since the incident, the Provider has sourced and supplied Level 1 1st Aid. The training encompassed a practical session for various emergencies that might arise in the service including recognizing when a resident is choking, immediate actions to take and escalation.”

    Source location

    Response from Meadow House
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reissue care-home escalation guidance to staff and display it in key service areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) In response to staff contacting 111 rather than 999 further discussions with staff team on duty on the day indicates staff acted out of panic. J&K Partnership can confirm at the time of the incident staff at the Service had an appropriate escalation guidance aimed at care homes provided by Coventry and Warwickshire ICB in place within the Service (Appendix1). The Registered Manager has recirculated the escalation guidance to all staff in the service, posters of these also displayed in key areas of the service.”

    Source location

    Response from Meadow House
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce tabletop emergency exercises alongside face-to-face training and continuing e-learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iii) From the face-to-face training provided and the desk top exercises now in place, the provider is assured that should a similar incident occur staff will act accordingly without panic and in a timely manner.”

    Source location

    Response from Meadow House
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appropriate escalation guidance was already available; staff contacted 111 rather than 999 because they panicked, not because guidance was absent.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) In response to staff contacting 111 rather than 999 further discussions with staff team on duty on the day indicates staff acted out of panic. J&K Partnership can confirm at the time of the incident staff at the Service had an appropriate escalation guidance aimed at care homes provided by Coventry and Warwickshire ICB in place within the Service (Appendix1). The Registered Manager has recirculated the escalation guidance to all staff in the service, posters of these also displayed in key areas of the service.”

    Source location

    Response from Meadow House
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response
  8. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Wyllow-Raine Swinburn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wyllow-Raine Swinburn became unresponsive at home on 30 September 2022 after being discharged from hospital the previous evening, and died in hospital that day. The concerns related to a seven-minute delay in connecting the 999 call to an emergency call taker and the 31-minute response time for the first paramedic to attend.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in connecting 999 calls to an Emergency Call Taker

    Wider context from the report

    “The two concerns relate to, firstly, the length of time for the 999 call to be connected to a ECT (Emergency Call Taker, and secondly, the length of time for an ambulance/paramedic to attend. I fully appreciate there have been very significant demands on ambulance services including on SCAS in the past few years. I also understand, from the written and oral evidence of ████████ that multiple actions have been undertaken to improve ECT staffing and inconsistency. My primary concern is in relation to this first issue. I realise there will be occasions when ambulance resources, particularly in the early hours when there are fewer resources, happen to be located in a different area leading to prolonged response times. It would seem that the issue of the delay in being connected to an ECT is more amenable to a systems improvement, particularly when one considers that arrangements are in place for calls to default to other ambulance services who may be less busy or who have greater capacity. Given the risk associated with delayed response times, particularly in connecting to an ECT, I request that the concerns I have raised are considered and that you respond thereafter. I would be interested to learn if actions identified as part of SCAS’s own internal review have been fully implemented and are subject to auditing to ensure compliance. ”

    Source location

    Wyllow-Raine Swinburn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remodel Emergency Call Taker staffing to identify numbers required for reliable operational demand.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within the CCC we have undertaken the following work in addition to the work that you have already been informed of via evidence for the hearing:”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with Isle of Wight NHS Trust to increase Emergency Call Taker numbers and availability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We are continuing to work in partnership with the Isle of Wight NHS Trust to increase ECT numbers and availability.”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing critical call process remains in place for time-critical 999 situations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to call answer time, you are already familiar with the critical call process available where a BT operative becomes aware of, or is informed of, a time critical situation from the evidence provided to you for the inquest by both SCAS and BT. I have therefore not covered this within my letter but can confirm that this process remains in place.”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 February 2025

    Open published response
  9. Teesside and Hartlepool

    AI-generated summary

    Donna Georgina Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Donna Georgina Smith suffered chest pain at home on 17 July 2021, deteriorated into cardiac arrest, and died shortly after arriving at hospital. The report identifies concerns that her worsening condition was not recognised or escalated from Category 2 to Category 1, that the methods for detecting deterioration were not sufficiently robust, and that the ambulance response took one hour and six minutes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate Category 2 calls to Category 1 when conditions worsen

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The call handler did not detect a worsening condition and did not escalate the call from Category 2 to category 1. ”

    Source location

    Donna Georgina Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Finalise the EOC clinician procedure for managing deteriorating patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst not directly linked with this case, we are writing a procedure for EOC clinicians to provide guidance for deteriorating patients. The procedure is not yet finalised given the complexities and balance of not overwhelming the system with higher priority ambulance responses. The risk with the latter is that we would create potential risk for patients categorised as Category 2 and Category 3, ultimately leading to delayed responses. The underpinning principles are those achieved by using the NHS Pathways system and/or other algorithm-based triage tools and achieving the Ambulance Response Programme response targets.”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Dispatch Clinical Risk Assessment procedure to prioritise Category 2 responses by clinical risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Dispatch Clinical Risk Assessment Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 9 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for changes to NHS Pathways algorithms and system-generated response categories rests with NHS England and the Secretary of State.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The system is owned by the Department for Health and Social Care and delivered by the Transformation Directorate of NHS England. NEAS, as a service commissioned by NHS England and host system suppliers enter into licences with the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, allowing them to embed NHS Pathways within their products. The system is maintained by a group of experienced staff most with an urgent and emergency care background. All the clinical authoring team are registered, licensed practitioners.”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The call handler followed NHS Pathways correctly, and the patient's conscious, breathing condition did not warrant a Category 1 response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect to this concern, the NEAS investigation concluded that the call handler managed the call correctly and followed the NHS Pathways system and generated a Category 2 ambulance response. This is the highest level of response for a patient who is severely unwell but conscious and breathing and in line with the Ambulance Response Programme (ARP).”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Even with further clinical information, a conscious patient with regular breathing would not necessarily have warranted a higher-priority Category 1 response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clinicians working in the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) have the ability to upgrade a disposition following their clinical assessment, supported by the NHS Pathways system and underpinned by their clinical knowledge. In this case the investigation identified that the clinician had not sufficiently probed the responses provided.”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Tammy Mary Louise WATKINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tammy Mary Louise Watkins died on 6 June 2021 after swallowing a plastic twistable crayon that perforated her bowel while she was detained at Rampton Hospital. The principal concerns were failures to risk-assess and manage foreign-body ingestion, recognise and escalate her deteriorating condition, follow NEWS2 requirements, and coordinate an emergency transfer to hospital. The report also identifies poor-quality acute physical healthcare and confusion about emergency medical calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear procedure for relaying emergency information to the ambulance service

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Emergency Medical Calls There was significant confusion in this case as to who should call a medical emergency and how information should be relayed to the ambulance service. It had been recognised early in the day by the Security Team that Tammy may require an out of grounds medical transfer, but it was not until much later in the afternoon, when Tammy was in cardiac arrest, that an ambulance was called. The Security Team expected the physical healthcare team to place the call, the physical healthcare team expected the ward to place the call due to proximity to the patient. Evidence called at the inquest established continued confusion amongst staff as to how an emergency should be managed. This appears to be a training issue. ”

    Source location

    Tammy Mary Louise WATKINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026