Recurring concern

Unreliable reporting of patient-safety incidents

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First reported 16 Dec 2013•Latest report 1 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated patient-safety incident-reporting process, including encouragement and staff understanding, recognition of reportable events, submission of incident or error reports, and systems for entering, updating or amending reports.

Not included

  • Excludes failures of incident investigation, organisational learning or implementation of corrective actions where the incident-reporting process itself is not deficient.
  • Excludes generic documentation, training, staffing or communication deficiencies that are not directly tied to reporting patient-safety incidents or unsafe practices.
  • Excludes professional-regulator reporting duties where the concern is external misconduct reporting rather than the organisational patient-safety incident-reporting process.
  • Excludes factual descriptions of incidents or under-reporting risk that do not identify an unsafe reporting-process condition.
Reports
46

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
52

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
58

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care7
Care Quality Commission3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB2
Borough Care Ltd2
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Hc-One Limited2
NHS England2
Aden Court Care Home1
ADL Plc1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Capita Business Services Ltd1
Capita PLC1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Katharine Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katharine Emma Corrigan, a patient detained under the Mental Health Act, died by suicide after failing to return from unescorted leave on 22 July 2023. The report identifies concerns about failures in the management and recording of Section 17 leave, inadequate risk assessments and care planning, staffing and oversight, and failures concerning access to recognised treatment for a pre-existing hormonal imbalance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report and audit unauthorised Section 17 Leave incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was a lack of Datix reports for Ms Corrigan accessing Section 17 leave when the leave had been rescinded by the Responsible Clinician. Datix is the incident reporting system utilised within the Trust. There had been no auditing of the new system and senior managers had not been aware that Ms Corrigan had repeatedly accessed unauthorised section 17 leave on multiple occasions prior to her death when they gave evidence at the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Katharine Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Nottingham City & Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jennifer Susan BIRCH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jennifer Susan Birch died on 11 April 2025 after suffering anaphylaxis to teicoplanin during the peri-operative period of an elective procedure, resulting in hypoxic brain injury. Concerns included failure to make a 2222 call during the anaesthetic emergency, failures to promptly record and retain evidence after the event, and the absence of a penicillin allergy de-labelling pathway at the Trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete Datix reports promptly after clinical events

    Wider context from the report

    “1. (NUH) Failure to ensure an “inquiring mind” in satisfying the duty of candour The Trust can only seek to learn lessons from events if it has, at every level, an inquiring mind that seeks to capture all relevant evidence at the earliest opportunity following clinical events. My investigation, and that of the PSII, was hampered by the failure of staff to complete a Datix report on the day of the event. This led to a failure to quarantine the medical equipment used in theatre (which was suspected of potential malfunction), a failure to download all accurate clinical data from the machines, and a failure to retain the second, retrospectively completed, anaesthetic chart. This is not an isolated incident, nor one that is unique to this Department. This is a Trust wide issue. Coronial investigations over recent years have been hampered in establishing the truth because of a failure by the Trust to retain relevant material post clinical events (placentas disposed of following neonatal harm – PFD report issued 2021, lost CTG traces, cardiology medical devices not being retained/quarantined/inspected in a timely fashion leading to relevant data being overwritten or devices destroyed – informal letter sent 2026). The Trust must ensure a culture that promotes a forensic inquiring mind, supported by robust systems to promptly identify and retain evidence, especially as a number of the medical devices used across the Trust are not networked or cloud based, meaning data can be lost when the device is switched off or memory is overwritten when the device is next used. ”

    Source location

    Jennifer Susan BIRCH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen incident-reporting, device-quarantine and evidence-retention policies through governance ratification and publication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i. Strengthening Policy Framework:”

    Source location

    Response from NUH
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and deliver Trust-wide multiprofessional training on prompt reporting, candour, device quarantine, data preservation and related safety processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iv. Training and Workforce Development”

    Source location

    Response from NUH
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate interim incident-response messaging and implement a formal communication plan alongside revised policies and SOPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “v. Communication and Cultural Reinforcement”

    Source location

    Response from NUH
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor incident-reporting timeliness and investigate the rationale for reporting delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Planned Improvements and Assurance”

    Source location

    Response from NUH
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian tied a fatal ligature in her room on Longview Ward on 17 April 2021 and died two days later in hospital. The principal concerns included inadequate and falsified observations, insufficiently trained and staffed ward personnel, poor communication about ligaturing and self-harm, medication-recording errors, failures involving Oxevision, and other care and record-keeping deficiencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report supervision and ligature-risk breaches

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Detained patients including Elise were not kept under observations by trained staff and mealtimes were chaotic with patients moving between areas without the required supervision. On 17 April the activity co-ordinator left a box of mobile phone chargers and headphones that posed a ligature risk, with a member of ward staff in a communal area, asking that she look after this whilst he collected some takeaway food that had been ordered by patients from the ward entrance. On his return, the box was unattended in the presence of patients with a high risk of ligature and suicide, with no member of ward staff present to keep patients who required level 2 and level 3 observations. This was not reported to the nurse in charge, and no incident report was completed. Evidence was that there were many new staff and that breaches of procedure were a regular occurrence. This left patients at risk. Evidence was heard that patients are still being left without the required observations since this death. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to raise Datix incident reports

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mental Health Trust Staff on Longfield Ward: a. Elise was neurodiverse and staff were not trained in Autism b. were inexperienced. The majority were new bank and agency staff with limited experience working with detained children, and this matter had been raised by the Care Quality Commission about other Trust services in January 2021. c. Did not have sufficient staffing to conduct observations required by the doctors for patients on the ward. This was known to the mental health Trust management and had been raised by the ward manager. During the time of Elise’s admission, the staff member allocated for observations was required to conduct approximately 66 observations within an hour. This was not logistically possible. Management knew that staffing allocation on Longview Ward was not sufficient to conduct the required levels of observations to keep the patients safe. Evidence was heard during the inquest that there are still observations that are not being conducted either as required or at all within the Trust and remains an ongoing concern. Datix reporting incidents are not always raised. d. The mental health Trust implemented a system called Oxevision with a Project Board to assist with the planning and roll out of the new system. There were difficulties with the roll out on St.Aubyns ward who were part of the pilot, due to WiFi coverage and the Oxevision system not operating correctly. e. The clinical management at the Trust Project Board meeting overseeing the roll out for Oxevision, required that ward staff implement a procedure where the Oxevision fixed monitor in the ward office be observed by a member of staff whilst the WiFi problem was resolved. This did not happen on Longview Ward. f. The Trust Project Group had reports that WiFi was not working and any issues were required to be reported as incident reports on Datix forms but these were not being completed. The Trust Project Board did not question why they were not receiving the Datix forms with the known issues. There was no oversight of what was required to ensure that the roll-out was operating appropriately and/or what the Project Board expected in the interim whilst the WiFi difficulties were being investigated. g. Not all the Trust staff on the ward were trained to use the Oxevision System. h. There was disputed evidence about the volume on the fixed terminal for Oxevision in the office about whether the alert volume could be turned down or ‘muted’. It was established that there was no incident unrelated to Elise’s death where a doctor did turn this volume down on the ward. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate recording of ligature incidents and risks

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was poor communication between ward staff and vital information about self-harm and ligaturing was not handed over on shift change. It was undisputed that Elise tied 12 Ligatures between 7ᵗʰ and 14ᵗʰ April and ████████ on 15 April. The Datix incident recording gave minimal details and only the ligatures from the 13ᵗʰ and 14ᵗʰ were recorded on the whiteboard in the nurse’s office. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement Trust-wide incident-reporting improvements covering form revisions, risk-assessment prompts, change communications, reporter feedback and completion of key fields.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust undertook a project as part of a Trust-wide CQC action plan to improve incident reporting (both to ensure all incidents are recorded and to ensure all key information was captured in the incident). Actions taken have included:”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve CAMHS incident learning through ABC-format Datix records, staff training, action recording and ligature-risk categorisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ Training with preceptor nurses as part of induction”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  4. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Brooks, a 78-year-old care-home resident with respiratory and other comorbidities, was admitted after a fall and later died at Torbay Hospital on 17 May 2022. The inquest identified concerns about oxygen being switched off for an unknown period before her death, and about failures to report, investigate, escalate, and record the incident and related Datix referrals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff training and understanding of responsibility to report and escalate serious clinical incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a lack of training and understanding by staff at the Trust that it is everybody’s responsibility to report and escalate a serious clinical incident such as this ”

    Source location

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of when Serious Incident Reports should be made or actioned retrospectively

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There appears to be a lack of understanding as to when a Serious Incident Report should be made or actioned retrospectively ”

    Source location

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit and establish three Care Group Director of Nursing roles to lead governance and support patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure it is everybody’s responsibility to report and escalate serious patient safety incidents, the Trust has strengthened its patient safety governance, training, and reporting infrastructure.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver incident-reporting education and training for clinical staff, including medical staff and new starters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These roles support our clinical staff with the reporting of incidents, including education and training sessions for clinical staff, including medical staff. We have also just recruited 3 new Care group Director of Nursing roles to lead governance within our care group structures and to support patient safety.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement DCIQ as the Trust incident-reporting system and communicate that all staff may report unexpected or unintended incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new reporting system [DCIQ] was implemented in the Trust in October 2023; the importance of reporting incidents formed a large part of the communication plan around this system.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver additional community-hospital training and targeted communications reinforcing incident-reporting expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the inquest, additional community-hospital training and targeted communications have been delivered to reinforce incident reporting expectations, and a quarterly learning event programme will commence from June with incident reporting as a core topic. Effectiveness is monitored by the central Patient Safety Team through DCIQ reporting volumes and training compliance, reviewed monthly via PSIRG and escalated through care group governance where required.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commence quarterly learning events with incident reporting as a core topic.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the inquest, additional community-hospital training and targeted communications have been delivered to reinforce incident reporting expectations, and a quarterly learning event programme will commence from June with incident reporting as a core topic. Effectiveness is monitored by the central Patient Safety Team through DCIQ reporting volumes and training compliance, reviewed monthly via PSIRG and escalated through care group governance where required.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review structured judgement review scores through care-group governance and executive meetings to determine further patient-safety investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These are then reviewed by governance leads in the care group and scored on the DCIQ SJR system, with any scoring 1 or 2 triggering being considered for further investigation. These structured judgment reviews will be considered at the weekly executive review meeting for consideration of a more detailed patient safety review or patient safety incident investigation in line with local and National PSIRF priorities. Effectiveness is monitored by the ME service and care group governance leads via completion of ME reviews and the number/timeliness of DCIQ submissions and SJRs, reviewed weekly at the Executive Incident Review Meeting (EIRM).”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt PSIRF and operate weekly Executive Incident Review Meetings to determine proportionate investigation responses, including retrospective incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To clarify when incidents require investigation (including retrospectively), the Trust has adopted PSIRF and uses a weekly Executive Incident Review Meeting (EIRM) to determine and govern the appropriate response.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and publish the Trust PSIRF policy and plan to reflect new patient-safety insight data.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust PSIRF policy and plan is available to access on the internet and was updated in January 2026 following new safety insight data. Effectiveness is monitored by the EIRM through review of all moderate-or-above incidents and confirmation of agreed investigation route and completion, reviewed weekly with actions tracked through care group governance.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  5. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Hazel Gambles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hazel Gambles was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and was later found to have sustained a brain bleed in an unwitnessed in-patient fall. She died on 27 January 2025, and the report states that the head injury more than minimally contributed to her death. The principal concerns were failures to complete and implement falls assessments and prevention measures, delay in medical review, inadequate communication with her family, failure to report and investigate the fall, and omission of the fall from the discharge letter.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete a Datix report following an inpatient fall

    Wider context from the report

    “There are several areas of concern around failures in documentation and failures to follow Trust policy, namely: 1. Lying and standing Blood Pressure was not recorded on admission. 2. There was no documentation of any falls prevention measures at the time of the first falls assessment. 3. There is no evidence of falls prevention measures being put in place following the first falls assessment. 4. There was no falls assessment done at the time of transfer to ward B4. There should have been a falls assessment within six hours of transfer but that did not happen. The assessment took place some 23 hours after admission to the ward, by which time Mrs Gambles had already fallen. 5. Following the in-patient fall there was a delay of over 5 hours before a medical review took place. The note recording the request for medical review is not timed. 6. There was no discussion with Mrs Gambles' family explaining the findings of the CT scan and they were not told about the bleed on the brain. 7. No Datix report was done following the in-patient fall leading to a delay in investigation. 8. The in-patient fall is not mentioned on the Discharge letter. I am concerned that these failures suggest a lack of awareness of, and lack of compliance with, the Trust’s processes on falls assessment and record keeping. ”

    Source location

    Hazel Gambles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add incident-reporting prompts to the nurse-in-charge checklist to identify and escalate outstanding Datix reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The nurse in charge checklist now asks the question “has there been any incidents? Have these been recorded via Datix?”. This gives an opportunity for the senior team to consider whether there are any outstanding incident reports and if so, ensure that these are reported at the earliest opportunity.”

    Source location

    Response from Rotherham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 30 June 2025

    Open published response
  6. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Kathleen Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Kathleen Hill was admitted for an elective ERCP to remove gallstones and developed worsening pancreatitis, perforation, multi-organ failure and cardiac arrest before dying in the early hours of 8 November 2024. Concerns included inadequate falls-risk assessment and reporting, insufficient documentation and monitoring, poor observability in a side room, and understaffing despite escalation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report falls or collapses on the ward

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There was a lack of evidence suggested appropriate falls risk assessments had been undertaken and a failure to report falls / collapses on the ward . ”

    Source location

    Sarah Kathleen Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver refresher incident-reporting training to AMU nursing staff covering falls, collapses, unwitnessed incidents and reporting thresholds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Incident Reporting Training: Refresher training is being delivered to all AMU nursing staff to clarify expectations around reporting collapses, falls, and unwitnessed incidents with an emphasis on always reporting even if there is doubt. Clarity will be included on borderline definitions and thresholds for reporting. This training will be expanded based upon the findings of the compliance review audit.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    FRAMP falls assessments were completed and updated appropriately; the identified failure concerned documenting and applying mitigating controls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 1: Inadequate Falls Risk Assessment and Incident Reporting Response: The Trust acknowledges the failure to evidence appropriate falls risk assessment and timely incident reporting in Mrs Hill’s care.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 June 2025

    Open published response
  7. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    June Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    June Thompson died on 1 November 2023 from radiation-induced metastatic sarcoma following radiotherapy for cervical cancer. She underwent a hindquarter amputation after a CT scan showed that the cancer had spread to her lungs, but the surgical team and multidisciplinary team were not informed of the change from a potentially curative to a palliative condition. Concerns included proceeding with major operations without full knowledge of disease progression, failure to report and investigate the error, and the absence of policy or guidance for processing medical reports received from other hospitals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report errors through the OUH Incident Reporting process

    Wider context from the report

    “• The error has not been reported through the OUH Incident Reporting process. ”

    Source location

    June Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Feed back to the Sarcoma team the importance of reporting all patient safety incidents, including no-harm incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge that the incident was not reported in our incident reporting system until after the inquest. The Sarcoma service has an open and transparent reporting culture as evidenced by 37 incidents that have been reported in the last 2 years with 26 of these being of ‘no harm’. We have fed back to the team the importance of reporting any patient safety incidents and will send a Trust wide Safety Message emphasising the importance of reporting all safety incidents including ‘no harm’ (previously known as ‘near misses’) to ensure learning to prevent future harm.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send a Trust-wide safety message emphasising reporting all patient safety incidents, including no-harm incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge that the incident was not reported in our incident reporting system until after the inquest. The Sarcoma service has an open and transparent reporting culture as evidenced by 37 incidents that have been reported in the last 2 years with 26 of these being of ‘no harm’. We have fed back to the team the importance of reporting any patient safety incidents and will send a Trust wide Safety Message emphasising the importance of reporting all safety incidents including ‘no harm’ (previously known as ‘near misses’) to ensure learning to prevent future harm.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report and investigate the incident under the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The incident has now been reported and investigated in line with the Trust’s implementation of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. The learning from the inquest and this investigation has been highlighted at the Trust-wide Safety Learning and Improvement Conversation and circulated to all clinical teams. It will also be presented at the next Sarcoma Surgery Clinical Governance meeting, Trust Clinical Governance Committee and the OUH Mortality Review Group over the next 2 months.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response
  8. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ida Jean Lock died on 16 November 2019 after suffering a lack of oxygen during delivery on 9 November 2019, resulting in severe hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage. The report describes missed opportunities for enhanced care and obstetric input, delays in responding to fetal distress, and initially ineffective neonatal resuscitation. The principal concerns include the Trust’s alleged lack of candour and transparency, deficient clinical and maternity governance, inadequate investigations, gaps in mandatory and remedial training, and inappropriate grading of the harm suffered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify external and internal patient-safety bodies of serious incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via STEIS and the Trust's internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust's Patient Safety Summits .The matter was reported to the Coroner a year after Ida's death by the family after the Trust took no action to do so, despite being on notice of failures in treatment from the HSIB report Ida’s harm was at no point categorised by the Trust as a harm event that caused “death”. ”

    Source location

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enhance engagement with level 3 centres to improve handover of maternity events and concerns relevant to external reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledged that poor handover of maternity events and concerns to level 3 centres would impact on their decisions around reporting to the CQC and the Coroner and so have enhanced our engagement with these centres.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate the operating effectiveness and consistency of serious-incident controls following PSIRF adoption.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Board has asked the internal auditors to:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain contractual oversight and scrutiny of the Trust’s patient-safety-event reporting, challenging unexpected variation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In line with contractual and regulatory requirements LSC ICB expects all providers to report all patient safety events onto the Learning From Patient Safety Events (LFPSE) platform (this has replaced the National Reporting Learning System – NRLS). Where appropriate and in line with Trust local and national priorities, patient safety events must also be reported onto StEIS where the ICB is then notified. The ICB is very concerned to note from you findings that the Trust failed to fulfil these contractual and regulatory requirements. Since the inception of the ICB there has been a detailed oversight in the reporting of patient safety events from the Trust against expected reporting, with challenge where there has been unexpected variation. The ICB will continue to seek assurance from the Trust through the contractual route and by the ongoing scrutiny of patient safety events.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a regional procedure for escalating serious maternity patient-safety incidents to regional and national NHS England teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England North West (NW), has developed a Management of Patient Safety Incidents Standard Operating Procedure (April 2024), which ensures escalation of the maternity incidents of serious concern to the NW Regional Maternity Team. The ICB are responsible for escalating concerns, which are shared directly with the regional maternity team. The regional maternity team receive, monitor, and share escalation through the regional governance architecture. By extreme exception(s), the significant concerns are escalated to the National Chief Midwifery Officer and the National Obstetric Lead within NHS England.”

    Source location

    Joint response from DHSC and NHSE
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust and Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB will address specific changes arising from the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response therefore focuses on concern D and E. I note that you have also addressed this report to University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (UHMBT) and NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (LSC ICB). These organisations will address specifics as to the changes being implemented as a result of the Report. NHS England’s response to you is also made on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), and I understand that they will not therefore be issuing a separate response to the Coroner. With DHSC input, I have also addressed in this response some of your concerns regarding A and B.”

    Source location

    Joint response from DHSC and NHSE
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response
  9. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    THOMAS ADRIAN BURROUGHS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Burroughs was a 35-year-old learning disabled man with cerebral palsy, scoliosis, pressure ulcers and PEG feeding who died in hospital on 22 February 2024 after recurrent aspiration pneumonia and prolonged admissions. Concerns included a split Hickman Catheter that was not reported through the required Datix process, remained in situ after advice that it should be removed, and was later surgically removed on 30 January 2024; he also developed tachycardia and a raised temperature while it remained in place.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report a split Hickman catheter through the required incident-reporting process

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The incident was escalated for urgent medical review due to the significant risk of infection, however no Datix was raised for the split Hickman Catheter as required by the acute Trust protocol. ”

    Source location

    THOMAS ADRIAN BURROUGHS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report the split Hickman catheter incident retrospectively through the Trust’s electronic incident-reporting system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge regrettably on this occasion there was a failure by staff to raise an incident when the event occurred on the trust’s Datix incident reporting system (DCIQ) for the split Hickman line. A retrospective incident has since been reported with immediate learning identified and cascaded to all staff. We have also retrospectively reported the incident to the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). In events where implants or prosthesis has failed/malfunctioned or broken, the correct process is for the clinical team raise an incident and report it to the MHRA. Reflective learning has been taken by the individual staff involved, as well as the nursing staff from Edith Cavell Ward, and the wider medical and surgical wards.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cascade immediate and reflective learning from the catheter incident to involved, ward, medical and surgical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge regrettably on this occasion there was a failure by staff to raise an incident when the event occurred on the trust’s Datix incident reporting system (DCIQ) for the split Hickman line. A retrospective incident has since been reported with immediate learning identified and cascaded to all staff. We have also retrospectively reported the incident to the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). In events where implants or prosthesis has failed/malfunctioned or broken, the correct process is for the clinical team raise an incident and report it to the MHRA. Reflective learning has been taken by the individual staff involved, as well as the nursing staff from Edith Cavell Ward, and the wider medical and surgical wards.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce incident-reporting requirements through ward meetings and Elevate training or refresher training for staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On 23 December 2024 and 29th January 2025 staff meetings were held on Edith Cavell Ward, (the location of the split Hickman line incident), to discuss Mr Burrough’s experience in detail and identify learning opportunities. All staff were reminded of the Trust’s expectations around incident reporting, and the requirement to complete their incident reporting training on the Trusts electronic training platform, ‘Elevate’. Staff who were already compliant were directed to complete refresher training on incident reporting where required.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use senior-leader briefings to disseminate incident-reporting expectations, including reporting equipment failures, near misses and no-harm incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Each month we hold in-person Senior Leader’s briefing sessions on all our acute hospital sites. The purpose of these briefings is to share key messages to senior colleagues, and the expectation is for these messages to be cascaded to all teams across all trust sites.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a Patient Safety update highlighting incident-reporting requirements and incident-record management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to this, the Patient Safety team issued an ‘MSE Patient Safety update’ during the week commencing 13th January 2024, highlighting the importance of reporting incidents, and our expectations on how the incident record should be managed.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Stanley Fallows was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and later sustained further unwitnessed falls while an inpatient, including a fracture to his right neck of femur. He subsequently developed severe bilateral aspiration pneumonia and died on 28 March 2024. The principal concerns were delayed completion of a Datix report, unclear automated approval processes, and the use of templates that could result in incorrect or incomplete incident information and missed patient-safety learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of Datix templates leading to incorrect or incomplete incident information

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Thirdly, I was concerned to hear from Senior Ward Sister ████████ that nursing staff utilise templates or pro-forma text when completing DATIX reports. The use of templates, whilst time saving, can easily lead to incorrect or incomplete information being provided on incidents (as in Mr Fallows' case) and therefore there is a real risk that opportunities will be lost to correctly investigate incidents which affect patient safety and which may cause a risk of death. ”

    Source location

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete and review Datix reports within the required timeframe

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Firstly, I have heard that the Datix report for Mr Fallows' first fall on 12 February was not completed at the time by staff, and the nurse in question is now retired and thus it was not possible to ascertain why it had not been completed. The report was only completed retrospectively two months later by staff once an inquest had been opened and a request for evidence was sent to the Trust. A Datix is a risk management information system which gathers information on processes and errors and allows staff to report on any issue which may compromise patient safety, which is central to good clinical governance and best practice, as well as contributing to learning. Whilst the failure to create the DATIX here could be a one-off, I am concerned that staff may not be aware of the importance of completing these reports and doing so in a timely fashion, which I understand should be completed within 24 hours of incident or knowledge of an incident. It is not difficult to see that where incidents are not being logged and reviewed, patient safety could be compromised, and future deaths could occur as a consequence; ”

    Source location

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update falls-team training to reinforce incident-reporting requirements after a fall.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The above data provides assurance that most falls are reported within 2 days. Whilst the data is reassuring, we have updated the training provided by our falls team to reinforce the reporting requirements following a fall.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Birmingham
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Templates are not used for incident reports; the post-fall care plan lists required actions, while staff record incident information separately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We can confirm that we do not have a template list of actions for incident report forms. Within our electronic patient record there is a post-fall section in the daily care plan which includes a number of actions that staff must take following a fall which includes; ensuring that neurological observations have been commenced, ensuring that an incident form has been submitted, ensuring that the Next of Kin have been informed etc. In this case the Senior Sister used a set list of actions to ensure all necessary falls prevention interventions were in place. I can provide assurance that templates are not used.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Birmingham
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 August 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026