Recurring concern

Unreliable reporting of patient-safety incidents

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First reported 16 Dec 2013•Latest report 1 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated patient-safety incident-reporting process, including encouragement and staff understanding, recognition of reportable events, submission of incident or error reports, and systems for entering, updating or amending reports.

Not included

  • Excludes failures of incident investigation, organisational learning or implementation of corrective actions where the incident-reporting process itself is not deficient.
  • Excludes generic documentation, training, staffing or communication deficiencies that are not directly tied to reporting patient-safety incidents or unsafe practices.
  • Excludes professional-regulator reporting duties where the concern is external misconduct reporting rather than the organisational patient-safety incident-reporting process.
  • Excludes factual descriptions of incidents or under-reporting risk that do not identify an unsafe reporting-process condition.
Reports
46

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
52

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
58

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care7
Care Quality Commission3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB2
Borough Care Ltd2
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Hc-One Limited2
NHS England2
Aden Court Care Home1
ADL Plc1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Capita Business Services Ltd1
Capita PLC1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Derryck Lynn CROCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derryck Crocker underwent a CT-guided lung biopsy on 3 May 2023 and subsequently developed a cerebral air embolism, deteriorated, and died on 10 May 2023. The principal concerns were limited recognition of air embolism following invasive procedures, insufficient training and awareness across medical specialties, and delays in recognition and treatment that may increase the likelihood of death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise and report air embolism cases

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I also heard evidence that in areas where enhanced training has been provided, due to adverse incidents such as Mr Crocker’s death, there appears to be increased numbers of cases. This leads to the question of whether the lack of knowledge means that such cases are missed and unreported and the rise is due to greater awareness. ”

    Source location

    Derryck Lynn CROCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Re-issue a previously published air-embolism case report to raise awareness among members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We note the known rare side-effect of an air embolism following lung biopsy occurred outside of the emergency department. Emergency physicians are aware of the possibility of air embolism following invasive procedures such as the insertion of central lines and therefore take precautions, such as ‘head down’ positioning, to prevent this. However, we are grateful to you for highlighting this tragic case and we intend to raise awareness of the condition of air embolism amongst RCEM members by re-issuing a previously published case report involving air embolism as well as considering providing specific guidance on the recognition and management of air embolism on our RCEM eLearning educational platform.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Emergency Medicine
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider providing specific air-embolism recognition and management guidance through the RCEM eLearning platform.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We note the known rare side-effect of an air embolism following lung biopsy occurred outside of the emergency department. Emergency physicians are aware of the possibility of air embolism following invasive procedures such as the insertion of central lines and therefore take precautions, such as ‘head down’ positioning, to prevent this. However, we are grateful to you for highlighting this tragic case and we intend to raise awareness of the condition of air embolism amongst RCEM members by re-issuing a previously published case report involving air embolism as well as considering providing specific guidance on the recognition and management of air embolism on our RCEM eLearning educational platform.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Emergency Medicine
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Georgia Dehaney-Perkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Georgia Dehaney-Perkins was found deceased on 6 September 2022 on Latton Common, Harlow, after a history of mental health difficulties, self-harm and suicidal ideation. The medical cause of death was recorded as combined alcohol and drug toxicity. Concerns included the suitability and safety of her ward bathroom, incomplete risk assessment and incident recording, insufficient documentation and communication about medication and alcohol risks, and a lack of action after family raised concerns about her leaving home with medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incomplete incident reporting

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) On 28 August Ms Dehaney-Perkins was agitated and distressed on return to the ward from leave and had consumed alcohol that was known to increase her risk of self-harm. ████████. Staff found Ms Dehaney-Perkins and removed the ligature. a. Ms Dehaney-Perkins was admitted to a room with an assisted bathroom (this was not a requirement for her) with a fault in the anti-ligature safety mechanism meant that the safety feature could not be implemented. b. There was no risk assessment about the suitability of this room for Ms Dehaney-Perkins a patient with a self-harming history at the time of the admission. c. The fixed-point ligature was not appropriately updated in the risk assessment and was not discussed at a discharge planning meeting. d. The Trust Datix Report was incomplete ”

    Source location

    Georgia Dehaney-Perkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the incident sign-off process to improve completion of patient-safety Datix reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Matron has made urgent contact with the risk management team in relation to the Datix Report for this matter – the datix report was approved by the Patient Incident Team on 26th March 2024. A further review of the process is being undertaken to improve sign off where there is a patient safety incident.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 February 2024

    Open published response
  3. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Grenville Hammersley Ithell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Ithell, aged 77, died in hospital on 20 November 2022 after prostate cancer progressed and caused his death. He had become lost to follow-up, with PSA monitoring and clinical review not occurring for about 10 months after November 2021. Concerns included the absence of a Datix report and Health Board investigation, lack of assurance about learning or changes, and staff time constraints affecting incident reporting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to raise Datix reports for identified matters

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the evidence it was identified that:- 1. There was no Datix raised by anyone when the error (Mr Ithell being lost to follow up) was identified, either at the time of the appointment on 22 October 2022 when the error was identified or at any point thereafter; 2. There has been no investigation by the Health Board into how Mr Ithell came lost for follow up after his appointment on 5 November 2021; 3. There have been no assurances as to what, if any, changes and learning have been identified other than a tracking system for PSA monitoring; 4. Evidence was heard at the Inquest that time restraints on hospital staff had meant that Datix was not completed and that the system was not user-friendly. I have raised a number of Prevention of Future Death reports with the Health Board previously around investigation processes. I remain incredibly concerned that where matters are not raised in accordance with internal Health Board processes that assurances given to me previously in Prevention of Future Death Reports cannot be supported. Furthermore, I am concerned that Datix reports will not be raised if time constraints prevent such, where the Health Board themselves often identified the Datix reporting system as the initiation of governance / investigation processes. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Grenville Hammersley Ithell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise an incident report for the identified follow-up error.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that an Incident Report has now been raised in regards to the error identified and a Make it Safe Rapid Review was undertaken. This review was completed on 05 March 2023. A decision was made to conduct a full investigation and this is underway at present. The incident has been confirmed as a Nationally Reportable Incident (NRI). The investigation report is due to be completed by 09 May 2024 and will include a full action plan to address any areas of learning.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver a revised Datix training programme through recurring team sessions, local training, videos and guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am aware you have raised your concerns with regards to incident reporting and management previously. Since those earlier concerns, a revised training programme has been put in place for our Datix incident reporting system. This includes training offered by our Quality Systems Team on the Datix system twice monthly, training specifically on incident reporting and reviewing delivered by our Patient Safety Team weekly, and local training delivered by our locally based quality teams (in our East Integrated Health Community for example, there are weekly dates offered). This range of training means there is a mix of opportunities for staff to access training. A number of training videos and “how to guides” are available on our staff intranet.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redesign the incident process with services using frontline feedback and Welsh best practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can also advise that the Patient Safety Team have reviewed the incident process and intend to make changes to that process from April 2024. The team have been working with services to co-design the changes taking into account feedback from front line clinicians and looking at best practice across Wales. Over the coming months, we plan further reviews into this process with support from the NHS Wales National Executive Quality Team.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the incident process further with support from the NHS Wales National Executive Quality Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can also advise that the Patient Safety Team have reviewed the incident process and intend to make changes to that process from April 2024. The team have been working with services to co-design the changes taking into account feedback from front line clinicians and looking at best practice across Wales. Over the coming months, we plan further reviews into this process with support from the NHS Wales National Executive Quality Team.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response
  4. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lindy Lyanne Aston underwent a total gastrectomy for stomach cancer and later suffered a ruptured spleen, requiring emergency surgery. She was transferred from Kettering General Hospital to Leicester Royal Infirmary, where she underwent a splenectomy, remained very unwell and died on 18 October 2021. The principal concerns were the decision not to provide immediate surgery at Kettering and inadequacies in the Trust’s investigation and incident-reporting processes, which delayed learning about potential care failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to raise incident reports for serious care concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Trust investigations into Mrs Aston’s care – I am gravely concerned about the seeming inadequacies in the investigation and/or incident reporting processes at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust. The inquest was advised that a DATIX incident report was not raised in relation to Mrs Aston’s care or death. I am concerned about the fact that Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did not look into the care provided to Mrs Aston until such time as the University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust contacted them about the inquest. I am further concerned about the fact that when Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did look into the care provided to Mrs Aston they did so on the assumption that the clinical decision making had been appropriate, this makes the exploration of the care provided somewhat otiose. The Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston failed to identify the fact that surgery should have been undertaken within an hour and the fact that, despite some of the assurances to the contrary, it would have been appropriate and possible to undertake that life-saving surgery at Kettering General Hospital. The failure to properly investigate led to the wholly untenable situation where the Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust were alerted for the first time to the questionable clinical decision making and the potential errors in care at the inquest, which took place some 24 months after death (due to witness availability). I am concerned that the lack of robust critical analysis and investigation of the clinical decision making and care provided to Mrs Aston at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust before her death has caused a delay to, and led to missed opportunities to learn lessons that are vital to patient safety. My concerns relating to the inadequacy of the Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston and the risks related to that go far beyond just the care provided by the Surgical Team at Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust. The risks have the ability to prevent learning, therefore negatively impact upon patient safety, across the entire Trust. ”

    Source location

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce and roll out Stop the Line across the Trust, incorporating concerns into Datix reporting and daily team huddles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the responsibility for decision making regarding a patient’s care rests with the named consultant, all members of the clinical team are encouraged to speak up if they have any safety concerns in real time. One such example is “Stop the Line” which was been introduced into the treatment centre in May 2023 and which has been rolled out”

    Source location

    Response from Kettering General Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response
  5. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Hazel Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hazel Pearson, who had known coeliac disease, consumed Weetabix in hospital on 26 November 2021, then vomited, aspirated and developed respiratory deterioration before dying from aspiration pneumonia on 30 November 2021. The report raised concerns about inadequate management of food intolerances and allergies, the lack of investigation into the incident, and failures to complete incident reports for other instances of gluten ingestion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure staff complete Datix reports when required and know how to complete them

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There were other incidences of gluten ingestion at Ysbyty Maelor and Deeside Community Hospital. On the at least 4 occasions at Deeside Community Hospital there were no Datix reports completed at the time. I was provided with no evidence that additional training, refresher training or induction training deals with when such reports should be made. I cannot be satisfied and reassured that all staff are aware of when to make a Datix report and how to complete this. ”

    Source location

    Hazel Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a full Health Board incident-process review through staff co-design.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the second and third points around incident reporting and investigations, I know we have written to you recently regarding these points. To summarise our earlier responses, as you know we are undertaking a full review of the incident process in the Health Board, in co-design with our staff, and will introduce a new process and procedure for April 2024. This new process will include a revised training programme for staff on conducting investigations. A revised training programme for incident reporting is in place for all staff with dates confirmed across North Wales for the next quarter alongside “how to” guides and videos for staff to access at any time via the BetsiNet intranet.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a new incident reporting and investigation process and procedure, including revised investigation training, for April 2024.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the second and third points around incident reporting and investigations, I know we have written to you recently regarding these points. To summarise our earlier responses, as you know we are undertaking a full review of the incident process in the Health Board, in co-design with our staff, and will introduce a new process and procedure for April 2024. This new process will include a revised training programme for staff on conducting investigations. A revised training programme for incident reporting is in place for all staff with dates confirmed across North Wales for the next quarter alongside “how to” guides and videos for staff to access at any time via the BetsiNet intranet.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver revised incident-reporting training and provide staff with accessible how-to guides and videos through the BetsiNet intranet.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the second and third points around incident reporting and investigations, I know we have written to you recently regarding these points. To summarise our earlier responses, as you know we are undertaking a full review of the incident process in the Health Board, in co-design with our staff, and will introduce a new process and procedure for April 2024. This new process will include a revised training programme for staff on conducting investigations. A revised training programme for incident reporting is in place for all staff with dates confirmed across North Wales for the next quarter alongside “how to” guides and videos for staff to access at any time via the BetsiNet intranet.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2023

    Open published response
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Sasha Honey MISHABI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sasha Honey MISHABI died at Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham on 18 April 2023 after a cardiac arrest followed by overwhelming bronchopneumonia. He had severe physical and mental health conditions and skin ulcers that were later determined not to have significantly contributed to his death. The inquest identified failures at St Andrew’s Healthcare to complete required pressure-ulcer risk assessments and skin inspections, record them adequately, report lesions, and provide appropriate oversight, as well as failures in governance and serious-incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make required Datix incident reports for grade II lesions

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Awareness of and compliance with St. Andrew's Healthcare 'Pressure Ulcer Prevention and Management' Policy Due to his chronic physical health conditions Mr. Mishabi was at very high risk (score of 21) of pressure damage and ought to have had weekly waterlow assessments and daily skin inspections with more frequent assessment and inspection to be considered in the event of change such as the development of an ulcer. Statements were provided from ████████, Consultant Psychiatrist, and ████████, Lifford Ward Manager, on behalf of SAH in advance of the inquest. The statements included information on Mr. Mishabi's waterlow assessment and skin inspections, and provided some records. At no time was it identified that the SAH 'Pressure Ulcer Prevention and Management Policy' was not followed in Mr. Mishabi's case. At inquest it was identified that ████████ had forgotten that there was such a policy (he initially denied there was a policy/procedure for waterlow assessments and later, after the policy had been produced, said there was but he had forgotten about it). The areas of non compliance identified at inquest were as follows: a. failure to undertake weekly waterlow assessments in accordance with paragraph 4.2 and 4.3 of the policy; b. failure to carry out and/or adequately record daily skin inspections in accordance with paragraph 4.4 of the policy; c. failure to carry out a waterlow assessment when Mr. Mishabi was identified as having what were believed to be pressure ulcers on the 15th March 2023 in accordance with paragraph 4.3 of the policy; d. failure to consider increasing the frequency of skin inspections and carry out and/or adequately record any skin inspections between the identification of ulcers on the 15th March 2023 and the admission to hospital on the 17th March 2023 in accordance with paragraph 4.4 of the policy; and e. failure to make a datix incident report when grade II lesions were identified on the 15th March 2023 in accordance with paragraph 4.7 of the policy; and f. failure to provide adequate monitoring and oversight of the implementation of the policy in Mr. Mishabi's case in accordance with paragraph 5 of the policy. . ”

    Source location

    Sasha Honey MISHABI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles was found unresponsive on 10 April 2021, suspended on a mental health ward, after being admitted under the Mental Health Act following an attempt to take his own life. The principal concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation practices, emergency response, record keeping, and governance processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide accurate emergency-response information in incident reports

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Governance process failings. a. A datix incident report created on the evening of 10ᵗʰ April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not. b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action. c. The Trust 72 hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15th April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of the suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10th April 2021. d. The Trust SI report was not prepared to fully address the poor risk assessment or inadequate datix & 72 hr reports. ”

    Source location

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review original evidence and assess whether disciplinary action is warranted for inaccurate or misleading records and reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Revisit original evidence provided to the SI report.”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 6 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care provision and coordination are mainly for the NHS Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response
  8. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma collapsed during separate military selection runs at Whittington Barracks and later died after being taken to hospital. Both were found to have metabolic acidosis, acute kidney injury, rhabdomyolysis and sickle cell trait; the final causes of death remained under investigation, with the most likely cause of collapse described as sickle cell trait combined with military exercise. The principal concern was the risk of death or harm to non-UK selection candidates, including the need to consider screening for sickle cell trait.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of parallel incident reporting forms on separate IT systems

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unresolved or unclear functionality problems in the Casper incident reporting system

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain integrated oversight of parallel accident-reporting systems through shared access, a reporting register, common reporting ownership and monthly tracking.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both partners within Recruiting Group (Army and Capita) have organisational obligations that necessitate the ongoing use of two accident reporting systems. Recognising the risk of a lack of coherence between these two systems, Recruiting Group, in consultation with Army Recruiting and Initial Training Command, has implemented a number of changes to maintain consistency. The Capita Health and Safety Executive Manager now has access to the Defence Unified Reporting and Lessons System so he can ensure consistency between this system and Capita Accident, Safety, Property and Environmental Reports. He also maintains an accident reporting register (a new post-inquest measure) that details all reports received – this is presented to the Corporate Governance Board each month.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 13 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Two separate accident-reporting systems must continue because Army and Capita have distinct organisational reporting obligations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both partners within Recruiting Group (Army and Capita) have organisational obligations that necessitate the ongoing use of two accident reporting systems. Recognising the risk of a lack of coherence between these two systems, Recruiting Group, in consultation with Army Recruiting and Initial Training Command, has implemented a number of changes to maintain consistency. The Capita Health and Safety Executive Manager now has access to the Defence Unified Reporting and Lessons System so he can ensure consistency between this system and Capita Accident, Safety, Property and Environmental Reports. He also maintains an accident reporting register (a new post-inquest measure) that details all reports received – this is presented to the Corporate Governance Board each month.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 13 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response
  9. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Delina Etienne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Delina Etienne, who had schizo-affective disorder and was an inpatient receiving treatment, was found unresponsive in bed on 7 May 2021 and was declared deceased at the scene. The report identifies concerns about the chaotic response to her cardiac arrest, including failure to follow resuscitation procedures and an erroneous assumption that a DNACPR order was in place. It also identifies concerns about failures to escalate raised blood pressure and chest pain, assess VTE risk, and disclose the resuscitation error.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the DNACPR error in the incident report

    Wider context from the report

    “5. When nursing staff discovered that they had fallen into error by asserting that Mrs Etienne had a DNACPR in place the matter was discussed with ward management on the morning of 7th May 2022. Despite that, the error was not admitted; A. To officers of the Metropolitan Police who investigated the circumstances of the death that morning, B. To the Trust’s governance team – an incident report (DATIX) failed to mention the error, C. To Mrs Etienne’s family who, subject to the Trust’s statutory “Duty of Candour” were communicated with by telephone and in person on 7th May 2021 and in written correspondence on 10th May 2021 ”

    Source location

    Delina Etienne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Wells was treated for colon cancer with liver metastases, but after liver surgery he received no further contact or oncology follow-up for one year because communication and referral processes between two NHS trusts failed. He later developed widespread liver and lung metastases and died at home on 4 October 2021. The report raises concerns about inter-provider referrals, tracking systems, communication between trusts, use of the Datix system, and clarity over patients’ key contacts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient guidance or refresher training for hospital doctors on use of the relevant Datix system

    Wider context from the report

    “a) I heard evidence that Mr Wells GP wrote two urgent letters to the RSFT consultant oncologist and HPB surgeon dated 22 September 2021 raising concerns that the patient had heard nothing further after the liver surgery in September 2020. These letters were sent to the East Surrey hospital by the GP. I heard evidence that both consultants hold clinics in two East Surrey hospitals as well as within their own Trust area. Principally the letters were about lack of treatment for a cancer patient and I heard evidence during the inquest that the RSFT witness assisting the court on governance & risk issues did not know the doctors had received the letters and presumably were not logged on the Datix system thereby raising concerns regarding: i. whether additional guidance may be appropriate for GPs to know where to raise concerns about patient treatment in hospital or tertiary care; and ii. whether further guidance or refresher training is needed for hospital doctors regarding use of the relevant Datix system. ”

    Source location

    Stephen WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident occurred at SASH, so RSFT had no Datix incident and relevant letters were held by SASH rather than RSFT.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This concern was raised following evidence heard by yourself during the inquest that the RSFT witness assisting the court on governance and risk issues did not know that the doctors had received letters from Mr Wells’ GP raising concerns about the lack of ongoing follow up following his liver surgery.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Annual mandatory Datix training, governance discussions and appraisal processes provide sufficient awareness of incident-reporting requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To provide assurance about the raising of Datix incidents when a significant problem in patient care is identified, both Trusts can confirm that all consultants undertake yearly mandatory training which includes the use of the Datix system and the expectation for Datix reporting of incidents. The consultants also attend departmental and divisional governance meetings at which incidents are discussed that have been reported using the Datix system. There is therefore a high level of knowledge and awareness across the consultant body of the requirement to report incidents using the Datix system and of how to do this. The consultants, and all other staff members, are also aware of the need to report any patient identified as potentially lost to follow up immediately and to complete a Datix incident report.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Surrey Foundation Trust NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Annual mandatory consultant training already covers Datix use and incident reporting, addressing the need for refresher training for hospital doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Royal Surrey County Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (RSFT) have assured us that all consultants undertake yearly mandatory training, which includes the use of the Datix system and the expectation for Datix reporting of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2022

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026