Recurring concern

Failure to provide continuity of patient care

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First reported 4 Sep 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the end-to-end patient-care continuity process, including unclear or unassigned responsibility, changing or excessive personnel, inadequate continuity between clinicians or services, and insufficient coordination that leaves care fragmented or without consistent oversight.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to a specific handover, record, referral or discharge control when continuity of patient care is not itself the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing shortages, workload or turnover concerns unless they directly result in failure to maintain continuity of patient care.
  • Excludes continuity failures in non-patient processes, such as equipment, premises or administrative workflows.
  • Excludes failures belonging to a more specific named safety system or pathway where that system is the supported parent boundary.
Reports
88

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
92

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care27
NHS England16
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Care Quality Commission3
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust3
North East London NHS Foundation Trust3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
King'S College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie Turay-Thomas ate hazelnuts on 18 September 2018 and died soon afterwards from acute anaphylaxis. The report identifies concerns about inadequate allergy care, advice and training concerning adrenaline auto-injectors, prescribing and clinical communication, and errors in the NHS 111 response and ambulance categorisation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish whether specialist allergy care was being provided

    Wider context from the report

    “1. At the time of her death, Shanté was not receiving specialist care for her allergies. However, her general practitioners (GPs) failed to appreciate this. They assumed that she was being treated for her allergies at the transitional asthma clinic to which she had been referred following her paediatric discharge. This was an incorrect assumption. The GPs had not identified Shanté (who had a high BMI and was severely allergic) as being at particularly high risk from her allergies and asthma, and had no awareness that they were the sole providers of Shanté’s allergy care. ”

    Source location

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require clinical staff to review AAI prescriptions, device understanding and relevant secondary-care support whenever attending patients use adrenaline.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. It was recognised by the Practice that some patients will not be inclined to attend the Practice in order to obtain advice and training in the use of an AAI pen. To mitigate this, links to training videos and the relevant websites have been included within the letters to patients to encourage them to check that they are familiar with AAI self-administration and advice. Furthermore, all clinical staff at the Practice have been instructed to ensure that any patient who attends (regardless of the purpose of their attendance) and who is being prescribed adrenaline has their AAI prescription as well as their understanding in relation to the use of the pen reviewed. This includes checking whether the patient is receiving appropriate care and support from secondary care.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Radcliffes-Le-Brasseur_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Check during medication reviews whether patients turning eighteen are appropriately transitioned to adult allergy specialists where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. In addition, whenever a patient who has an allergy turns eighteen, the Practice will ensure that as part of any medication review, a check is undertaken as to whether that patient is appropriately transitioned into the care of adult allergy specialists if this is deemed necessary. This will guard”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Radcliffes-Le-Brasseur_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have commissioning teams liaise with relevant organisations to facilitate uptake of new guidance and resources supporting management of severe allergies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• I will ensure your report is sent to HEE and the Royal College of General Practitioners. Our commissioning teams will liaise directly with all relevant organisations to facilitate uptake of any new guidance and resource that would support better management of people with severe allergies.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-England_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider whether communication routes or commissioning levers can support uptake and embedding of new allergy guidance and resources.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are deeply saddened by Shante’s death. We are grateful to have had the opportunity to respond to your concerns relevant to NHSEI. We will continue to work with HEE, the professional Royal Colleges and the other organisations addressed in your report to keep abreast of any new guidance or resources that they produce that would support better management of people with severe allergies. We will consider whether any of our communication routes or commissioning levers can help with their uptake and embedding.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-England_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Matters of concern 1–14 and 20 do not concern NHS Pathways and fall outside its remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HM Coroner raised matters of concern numbered 1 - 20 in the PFD report. Matters of concern 1 – 14 and 20 are not applicable to NHS Pathways. We set out below our response to matters of concern 15 to 19.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Helen Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Helen Taylor, who had Down syndrome and significant learning disabilities, died at Stepping Hill Hospital on 23 September 2018 from pneumonitis following a chicken pox virus infection contracted while awaiting discharge. The concerns included inadequate reasonable-adjustment planning, lack of best-interests meetings and documented decision-making, poor communication between agencies, limited access to suitable learning-disability beds and support, information-sharing difficulties, and delayed recognition of chicken pox.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of interagency communication to produce a clear and effective care plan for people with learning disabilities

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Prior to her admission to the acute hospital there had been on-going discussion about her deteriorating condition and where her care needs could more effectively be met. The inquest heard that both in the community and subsequently in the acute setting there was a need for improved communication between agencies /professionals to ensure a clear, consistent and effective plan was put in to meet the needs of those with a learning disability. In her case it was recognised at the end of July that a learning disability acute bed would be beneficial. Driving that forward was limited by a number of factors including communication between agencies involved; ”

    Source location

    Julie Helen Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish an evidence review of care co-ordination for people with learning disabilities, focused on health and wellbeing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both the second⁴ and the third⁵ annual LeDeR reports highlighted the importance of care co-ordination. We committed to publishing an evidence review of care co-ordination for people with learning disability, focused on health and wellbeing. Once this work is complete, we will be better placed to understand how this can be used to inform how care co-ordination is delivered across the health and social care sector for people with a learning disability, particularly in relation to developing guidance.”

    Source location

    2019-0454-Response-from-the-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve timely discharge-summary publication, targeting delivery within 48 hours and performance above the Trust’s 95% standard.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is recognised that effective communication between the hospital and community settings is pivotal in ensuring a seamless transition of care. Consistent timely publication of the discharge summary within 48 hours of”

    Source location

    2019-0454-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-social-Care-Partnership-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The local NHS is expected to reflect on the LeDeR findings and address local failings in care for people with learning disabilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am advised by NHS England and NHS Improvement that Ms Taylor’s death is currently being reviewed under the LeDeR process and I expect the local NHS to reflect on the findings of the review and take action to address any failings in the care provided locally for people with a learning disability. I have also asked officials to bring your report to the attention of the National Director for Learning Disabilities, Ray James, who is leading work nationally to improve services for people with learning disabilities and/or autism.”

    Source location

    2019-0454-Response-from-the-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Community care matters in Derbyshire fall outside the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have also identified a number of areas regarding community care in Derbyshire. As Derbyshire does not fall under the remit of the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership we are unable to provide a response to those issues.”

    Source location

    2019-0454-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-social-Care-Partnership-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2020

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Serena Jane Nicholas · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Serena Jane Nicholas was born by category 1 emergency Caesarean section on 29 August 2017 after fetal bradycardia and died shortly afterwards at Leeds General Infirmary from intrauterine hypoxia, with the pregnancy also involving a diabetic mother and a fetal heart abnormality. Concerns included disjointed management and a lack of identified consultants overseeing the high-risk pregnancy, as well as inadequate continuity of care and monitoring, meaning reduced fetal activity and the potential desirability of an earlier Caesarean section were not recognised.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide continuity of antenatal care for a high-risk pregnancy

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The antenatal surveillance was largely carried out in Hull where the mother lived. She was seen by a variety of clinicians and at a late stage by a community midwife, despite the recognition that this was a pregnancy accompanied by clear risk factors. The absence of identified consultants responsible for the oversight of mother and baby’s care in relation to diabetic and gynaecological aspects resulted in disjointed management. ”

    Source location

    Serena Jane Nicholas · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. London Inner (North)

    AI-generated summary

    Amy Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amy Allan underwent elective corrective spinal surgery on 4 September 2018 and subsequently suffered severe deterioration, requiring ECMO support before dying on 28 September 2018. Concerns included inadequate pre-operative planning for ECMO, poor communication and handover between departments, extubation while her condition was deteriorating, delayed ECMO support, and a lack of clear co-ordination of her post-operative care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign a single properly informed clinician to coordinate complex post-operative care

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that: (a) It appears there was a lack of awareness and sharing of information between departments at Great Ormond Street Hospital. In particular, the PICU had not been given any advance warning of Amy’s complex medical background and needs before she was admitted there post operation. As PICU staff were not invited to the Multi-Disciplinary Team meetings prior to the operation, they were not aware of the “critical time” which lay ahead for her; (b) There was no clear plan or instruction for the management of Amy post operation in relation to extubation and ECMO support on the PICU; (c) The handover between clinicians involved in Amy’s operation and those taking over her care in the PICU, was poorly executed with vital information either not properly conveyed or recorded or simply missed; (d) There was a delay in commencing ECMO support, and (e) No single properly informed clinician appeared to be co-ordinating Amy’s post-operative care in such a complex and high risk case. ”

    Source location

    Amy Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require high-risk patient flagging, PICU team briefings, admission reminders and daily admission-risk discussions for elective spinal admissions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the safety improvements which Epic brings, the Trust has made a number of changes to ensure that the outcome of the spinal MDT meeting are effectively communicated. This includes:”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the spinal surgery ECMO pathway, including Joint Cardiac Conference review, postoperative location and consent planning, capacity checks, Epic documentation and multidisciplinary handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Spinal MDT TOR have been amended to include the specific responsibilities for clinicians attending the meeting in regards to ECMO. This is reiterated in the PICU guidance for managing spinal patients. A copy of this guidance is enclosed [Spinal Surgery Pathway PICU FINAL].”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish and use a spinal surgery pathway guideline defining responsibilities for complex cardiac patients admitted to PICU.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that all staff members involved in the care are clear about the pathway, and their roles and responsibilities within that pathway, the PICU Consultant Team have now developed a guideline on the spinal surgery pathway for complex cardiac patients admitted to PICU. A copy of this guideline is enclosed [Spinal Surgery Pathway PICU FINAL].”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 8 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The closed intensive care model clearly assigns responsibility for PICU care and identifies the PICU Consultant as the decision maker.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The PICU Consultant had responsibility for Amy’s post-operative care following transfer to the unit. The Trust operates a closed intensive care model. A closed intensive care model is when the responsibility for decision making is taken by the intensive care unit consultants. This is done in collaboration with other specialists, including the surgeons and anaesthetists, but the intensivists are the decision makers and they direct care for the patients whilst they remain on ICU. The ICU is staffed with intensivists directly responsible for care.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 8 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response
  5. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Justin Peter Gallagher · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Justin Peter Gallagher was received at HMP Lewes on 20 March 2016 and was later found collapsed in his segregation-block cell on 24 May 2016. He was taken to hospital, where he died on 17 June 2016; the post-mortem recorded hypoxic brain injury, cardiac arrest and laryngeal carcinoma with upper airway obstruction among the causes. Concerns included the absence of his previous medical history, a proper care plan and a single clinician responsible for his care, cancelled hospital appointments, missed opportunities to diagnose his cancer, lack of family involvement, and separate healthcare organisations using unconnected database systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a single clinician responsible for patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The prison never obtained his previous medical history. No proper care plan was drafted for him and there was no single clinician responsible for his care. ”

    Source location

    Justin Peter Gallagher · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fragmented responsibility for prison healthcare

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) The underlying problem was that healthcare in the prison was the responsibility of three different organisations, namely the prison service, the local mental health NHS Trust (who were given the responsibility of dealing with all physical health matters and running the healthcare centre), and a separate organisation who supplied GPs. These three organisations had entirely separate database systems. ”

    Source location

    Justin Peter Gallagher · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign prisoners with chronic conditions to a named clinician.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Reviewer recommended that the Head of Healthcare at HMP Lewes should ensure that the past medical history is obtained for new prisoners with chronic conditions, and that their care should be assigned to a named clinician. I can confirm an action plan was implemented with all actions achieved by 1 April 2017 which included:”

    Source location

    2019-0491-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission prison healthcare through a Prime Provider model using a single contract, provider and database.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2017, NHS England (NHSE) reviewed the model of commissioning in Kent, Surrey and Sussex as it was becoming increasingly apparent that the model was not delivering the benefits anticipated and services were not integrating effectively. In line with other prison groups in England, NHSE made the decision to commission services using a Prime Provider model. I can confirm that this model ensures a single contract and provider, and therefore better accountability for the delivery of integrated healthcare in a prison (or group of prisons). This will negate any communication issues and the single provider will use one database system only.”

    Source location

    2019-0491-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the tripartite prison healthcare partnership agreement to add the Department of Health and Social Care and Ministry of Justice for greater oversight and accountability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At a national level, the National Audit Office report into Mental Health in Prisons¹, published in June 2017, made a recommendation in relation to the way that NHS England, Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service and Public Health England manage their joint working on prison healthcare.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish and operate the National Partnership Agreement for Prison Healthcare 2018–21 as a joined-up framework for collaborative prison healthcare delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The National Partnership Agreement for Prison Healthcare in England 2018-21², published in April 2018, acknowledges the need for health and justice partners to work together to ensure “safe, legal, decent and effective care that improves health outcomes for prisoners, reduces health inequalities (particularly for those with protected characteristics), protects the public and reduces reoffending”.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Healthcare providers are responsible for the quality and safety of care provided at HMP Lewes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providers of healthcare services are responsible for the quality and safety of the care they provide. I expect the healthcare providers at HMP Lewes to look into the care provided to Mr Gallagher and to consider where improvements can be made. This includes how they work with the prison authorities and other relevant organisations, including NHS England which is responsible for commissioning healthcare services for prisoners. Given its role in monitoring, inspecting and regulating the providers of health and social care in prisons, my officials have brought your reports to the attention of the Care Quality Commission (CQC).”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj had anorexia, depression and fluctuating suicidal ideation, and died at Salford Royal Hospital on 13 July 2018 from injuries sustained after jumping from a first-floor café. Concerns included inadequate communication and discharge planning, unsuitable placement and care coordination, incomplete sharing of clinical information, and the safety of the café balustrade and adjacent table.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide care coordination after placement with a private provider

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Communication with private providers by NHS trusts once mental health trusts have placed individuals in private settings. During the time that Hannah was placed at the Priory the mental health trust who placed her did not have any discussion with Hannah, her family or the Priory regarding the placement. A care coordinator had been allocated by the Trust once requested by the Priory but no care coordination had taken place; ”

    Source location

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ezra James BOULTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ezra James Boulton, aged two months, died on 20 May 2018 after being found unresponsive while co-sleeping with his mother on a sofa; alcohol had been consumed and he could not be resuscitated. The principal concerns were inadequate continuity of antenatal care, insufficient early safe-sleeping information for parents, and midwives’ lack of awareness about the legal implications of infant deaths involving co-sleeping and alcohol or drugs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care in antenatal appointments

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) At Ezra's Inquest I was told in evidence that throughout her pregnancy (this being her first pregnancy) ████████ (Ezra's mother) did not see the same midwife twice. I believe that there should be some level of continuity of care in antenatal appointments to ensure that all of the necessary checks are preformed and appropriate antenatal advice is shared with the mother. (2) I was also heard that ████████ own personal pregnancy was uneventful but I am concerned that the distinct lack of continuity of care appears to expose a risk that should there be any abnormalities and/or risk factors to either mother or baby as the pregnancy develops, that these have the potential to be missed; either entirely misses or not properly communicated to whichever midwife conducts the next antenatal appointment, causing significant risk to both mother and baby. I believe that there is a serious risk of future death posed by this lack of continuity of care. ”

    Source location

    Ezra James BOULTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish two continuity-of-carer pathway teams providing named midwives and buddies throughout antenatal, birth and postnatal care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a first step towards achieving this, PHT is setting up 2 continuity of carer pathway teams, of 6-8 community midwives, each with midwife having a caseload of approximately 40 women. This will enable those women to have a named midwife and a “buddy” who will coordinate care throughout the antenatal, birth and postnatal period. The first team will be in place by the end of August with the second team being established towards the end of 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0222-Response-by-Portsmouth-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Handheld notes, scheduled checks and trained midwives are considered sufficient to identify and escalate pregnancy abnormalities despite lack of continuity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Nice Guidance “Antenatal care for uncomplicated pregnancies” CG62 sets out at Appendix D a schedule of appointments which should be provided for women with uncomplicated pregnancies. The requirement is for 10 appointments for nulliparous women and 7 for parous women. The schedule sets out in detail which checks and advice should be provided at each of the appointments. Each patient has their own hand held notes which are retained by them and brought to every antenatal appointment. As such each healthcare professional who meets a woman will have access to all the information they need to enable them to ensure that all necessary checks are performed and appropriate advice is shared with them.”

    Source location

    2019-0222-Response-by-Portsmouth-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 September 2019

    Open published response
  8. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Peter Lawrence (PL) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Peter Lawrence, a 48-year-old man with paranoid schizophrenia and a history of disengagement from mental health services, was found outside his flat on 8 February 2019 after falling from the balcony and died from traumatic injuries. Concerns included the lack of a joint multi-disciplinary/agency care plan, inconsistent care coordination, and the absence of a coordinated mental health assessment and possible admission when concerns about self-care and disengagement arose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide assertive care coordination for patients at risk of disengagement and relapse

    Wider context from the report

    “3. A more assertive approach with consistency of care coordinator for a patient with a history of disengagement and relapse could possibly have been implemented reducing the likelihood of disengagement with services and promoted necessary concordance with medication. ”

    Source location

    Mr Peter Lawrence (PL) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mason Logue · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mason Logue, who had been born prematurely and had a complex medical history, was found unresponsive in his mother’s bed at home on 28 October 2017. The post-mortem examination did not identify a clear cause of death, and the medical cause was recorded as unascertained. Concerns included limited integration and information sharing between services, the absence of an overarching supportive care plan and a single professional coordinating his care, and difficulties arising from differing protocols and the lack of a single IT system across NHS trusts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to allocate a health professional to oversee and coordinate care for children with multiple specialist needs

    Wider context from the report

    “Furthermore, no one health professional had an overview of his health needs and ensuring that support was put in place and appointments were coordinated. There was no system for an allocated paediatrician to coordinate care where multiple paediatric specialists were involved. ”

    Source location

    Mason Logue · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Tamsin Rebecca Lianne GRUNDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tamsin Rebecca Lianne Grundy, who had a history of depression and was under the care of Mental Health Services, was found dead at home on 26 July 2018 with a weightlifting bar across her neck. Concerns included her difficulty relating to the more than 25 members of the Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team involved in her care and the lack of a definitive, timed action or named person responsible for addressing this issue.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide continuity in the number of staff involved in care

    Wider context from the report

    “1.Miss Grundy repeatedly spoke about her concern about the number of people involved in her care, particularly from the Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team. It is understood Miss Grundy saw 25 plus members of the Team in some 14 months. The evidence was that she found it difficult to relate to so many people, having to repeat the difficulties she was experiencing which she felt was adversely impacting on her mental health. It was not clear from the evidence that this issue was addressed during Miss Grundy's contact with the service. 2. This issue is referred to in the Serious Incident Requiring Investigation Report, having been raised by Miss Grundy’s family, but there is no definitive, timed action arising from it and no named person responsible for any such action. ”

    Source location

    Tamsin Rebecca Lianne GRUNDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply the national 39-point fidelity scale across the Trust to identify improvement areas and consistently match clinicians with patients using daily planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Notwithstanding this challenge, it was the expressed experience of Ms Grundy that having such numbers of staff involved made it difficult to form therapeutic relationships. To support continued development of the service provided, the CRHT team is using a national 39 point fidelity scale to help it reflect on current practices identifying areas of focus and improvement. One of the points refers directly to this matter and the team are working to apply this on a consistent basis, using daily planning to match clinicians with individual visits where a positive therapeutic relationship has developed. The scale is being used more widely across the Trust.”

    Source location

    2019-0088-Response-by-Norfolk-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The CRHT cannot guarantee that service users will see a limited number of staff because intensive support requires flexible 24/7 staffing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ms Grundy was in contact with the Trust’s Youth Service since 2016. She was allocated a staff member whose role was to coordinate her care. This member played an important role in forming a therapeutic relationship with the service user, working together to implement plans to help respond to the individual’s needs. There are occasions where an individual’s need changes requiring a period of more intensive support which is provided by the Trust’s acute services. The CRHT provide intensive periods of support in the community for short periods, supplementing the care provided by the community team. This means the team have to be flexible and adaptable in approach requiring staff to work over a 24 hour period, seven days per week. Appointments with users may range from multiple contacts in a day to every few days.”

    Source location

    2019-0088-Response-by-Norfolk-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026