Recurring concern

Failure to provide continuity of patient care

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First reported 4 Sep 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the end-to-end patient-care continuity process, including unclear or unassigned responsibility, changing or excessive personnel, inadequate continuity between clinicians or services, and insufficient coordination that leaves care fragmented or without consistent oversight.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to a specific handover, record, referral or discharge control when continuity of patient care is not itself the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing shortages, workload or turnover concerns unless they directly result in failure to maintain continuity of patient care.
  • Excludes continuity failures in non-patient processes, such as equipment, premises or administrative workflows.
  • Excludes failures belonging to a more specific named safety system or pathway where that system is the supported parent boundary.
Reports
88

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
92

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care27
NHS England16
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Care Quality Commission3
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust3
North East London NHS Foundation Trust3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
King'S College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Francis Robert Beech · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis Robert Beech had a conservatively treated right ankle fracture and was discharged to a nursing home, where monitoring and care planning for his plaster cast were not arranged. Infection signs were present by 1 July 2017 but were not investigated promptly, and he later developed a severely infected compound fracture and pressure sores before dying from bronchopneumonia contributed to by chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and the infected fracture site.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Lack of continuity of care. Each week a different consultant took over his care. This led to a lack of continuity and inadequate discharge planning. ”

    Source location

    Francis Robert Beech · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add the date of X-ray performance and review to consultant handover documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The consultant on-call rota is run on a weekly basis with changeover on Friday. Currently, the exiting consultant completes a handover sheet for every patient, during his/her ward round, which includes appropriate discharge planning. This is filed within the patient’s notes. It provides helpful information for the receiving consultant, such as original diagnosis, management plan and any salient changes to the patients’ condition during his on call week. Following this incident, a further point will be added on the handover asking for the date when an X-Ray was performed and reviewed. This will emphasize the need for regular X-Ray reviews as will be outlined in the new guidelines. Furthermore, there is a formal handover which takes place every Friday between the exiting and incoming consultants. The current process will be maintained but will be strengthened by the new guidelines.”

    Source location

    2017-0367-Responses
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 February 2018

    Open published response
  2. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    BENJAMIN THOMAS GOODRUM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin Thomas Goodrum, who had schizophrenia and Asperger’s syndrome and lived in the community with support from several organisations and his parents, was found clearly deceased in his flat on 27 June 2016. Concerns included the absence of a person with overall responsibility for him, the failure to appoint a replacement Care Co-Ordinator, and the incomplete implementation of an investigation recommendation concerning allocation of a Lead Care Professional or Care Co-Ordinator.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to allocate a specific individual Care Co-Ordinator or Lead Care Professional to service users receiving active treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Although there was evidence of good communication between the various organisations involved with Mr Goodrum and attempts were ongoing to retain contact with him, there was no person taking overall responsibility for Mr Goodrum. (2) Mr Goodrum had originally been allocated a Care Co-Ordinator but on this person leaving, no new Care Co-Ordinator was appointed. (3) The Serious Incident Investigation recommended all service users receiving active treatment should be allocated a Lead Care Professional or a Care Co-Ordinator and this action was to be completed by 30/04/2017. At the time of the inquest this action had not been put in place and the Action Plan was regarded as complete. (4) Evidence was heard that alternative measures have been taken within the various teams to ameliorate the lack of sufficient Care Co-Ordinators for service users, for instance using a team-based approach, but that such measures are not as effective as services having a specific individual appointed as a Care Co-Ordinator. ”

    Source location

    BENJAMIN THOMAS GOODRUM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit to fill the Central Norfolk Long Term Treatment Team’s band 5 vacancy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The clinical team involved in the case (Central Norfolk Long Term Treatment Team) currently has one band 5 vacancy which is being recruited to.”

    Source location

    2017-0362-Response-by-Norfolk-and-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 February 2018

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Siân Louise WITHERIDGE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Siân Louise Witheridge died by suicide after hanging herself at home on 30 May 2017, following admission to Highbury Grove Crisis House. Concerns included staff not having or fully reviewing her mental health records, inadequate or unenforceable risk-assessment arrangements, misunderstanding of responses about suicide plans, and disjointed care between the crisis house and crisis team.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disjointed coordination of care between crisis house and crisis team services

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The care offered to service users of Highbury Grove Crisis House and the Islington Crisis Team seemed disjointed and not dovetailed between OneHousing and Camden & Islington NHS Trust. For example, the crisis team members who gave evidence did not have any knowledge of the crisis house procedure for risk assessing before allowing leave. ”

    Source location

    Siân Louise WITHERIDGE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with OneHousing to establish shared access to clinical records and risk assessments for Highbury Grove staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We agree that Highbury Grove Crisis House staff should have access to our clinical records. To this end, we have been working with One Housing to enable members of their staff to acquire access to our IT system. We are aiming to have shared access in place in early 2018 following staff completing the relevant training and necessary checks.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce joint risk assessments completed by OneHousing and Camden and Islington staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also going to move to undertaking joint risk assessments which will be completed by One Housing and C&I staff members. This will ensure that all risk factors as identified by all the staff caring for the patient are taken into account when formulating risk assessments and next steps. In cases where C&I staff conduct the risk assessment themselves, the Operations Manager and Team Manager for the crisis teams have reinforced to the teams the importance of providing detailed feedback to One Housing staff and agreeing a written plan of action for each patient.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce detailed feedback to OneHousing staff and agreement of a written action plan when crisis team staff complete risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also going to move to undertaking joint risk assessments which will be completed by One Housing and C&I staff members. This will ensure that all risk factors as identified by all the staff caring for the patient are taken into account when formulating risk assessments and next steps. In cases where C&I staff conduct the risk assessment themselves, the Operations Manager and Team Manager for the crisis teams have reinforced to the teams the importance of providing detailed feedback to One Housing staff and agreeing a written plan of action for each patient.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Information-sharing problems have been rectified through ready access to relevant clinical information and established communication channels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are aware that Highbury Grove has sent you our ‘Working Protocol’ setting out how our teams work together. As set out earlier, we accept that there have been challenges with information sharing. We are confident however that this has been rectified and Highbury Grove and staff will in the future have ready access to all the relevant clinical information.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response
  4. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Ian Fairhurst · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Ian Fairhurst, aged 26, was found deceased on a footpath near Spotland Bridge, Rochdale, on 5 December 2016, with empty alcohol bottles and paracetamol packets nearby. The report identified concerns about shortages of GPs, lack of continuity and accessibility of care, inadequate appointment times and GP training, and increasing demand and referral thresholds for adult and children’s Autism and ADHD/ADD services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care caused by reliance on locum GPs

    Wider context from the report

    “2. As a consequence of 1 above, many surgeries are heavily reliant upon locum GPs. For patients this brings about a lack of continuity of care, putting patient safety at risk. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Ian Fairhurst · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Dennis Allen Teesdale · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dennis Allen Teesdale underwent surgery including insertion of a PEG tube on 17 October 2016 and subsequently developed severe abdominal pain, multi-organ failure and septic shock. He was found to have peritonitis caused by leakage of bowel contents from the PEG tube passing through the bowel, and died on 20 October 2016. Concerns included the insertion and post-operative management of the PEG, delayed recognition and treatment of deterioration, delayed transfer, and limitations in specialist, diagnostic and laboratory services at Queen Victoria Hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor multidisciplinary communication for consistent systematic patient management

    Wider context from the report

    “11. Poor communication between nursing staff, anaesthetic staff and surgical staff making it difficult to provide an overall consistent and systematic approach to the management of Mr Teesdale in a small High Dependency Unit with an inconsistent consultant presence during the day. ”

    Source location

    Dennis Allen Teesdale · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Define critical-care leadership and accountability under the consultant in charge, with consultant-led handover for junior night staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Leadership of the critical care unit has been better defined with an improved system of handover, and the on-site consultant presence has been extended recently, with consultant led handover for junior night staff.”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use unified multidisciplinary critical-care documentation and audit its implementation within the enhanced recovery programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Coroner drew attention to inconsistencies between the ‘snap shot’ medical reviews and the more frequent reviews of the nursing staff. Since Mr Teesdale’s death, we have developed unified multidisciplinary documentation as part of the enhanced recovery programme, and are auditing its use. Multidisciplinary documentation will be further developed as we progress with electronic document management.”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop multidisciplinary communication training, including staff ability to challenge decision-makers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “C5 Multidisciplinary communication training, including ability to challenge decision maker Owner: EP/JMT Due: Review 1 Oct 2017 Continuous programme of values, behaviours and communication. Status: N”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 12 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop electronic document management to integrate multidisciplinary documentation, enhanced recovery pathways and patient alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Coroner drew attention to inconsistencies between the ‘snap shot’ medical reviews and the more frequent reviews of the nursing staff. Since Mr Teesdale’s death, we have developed unified multidisciplinary documentation as part of the enhanced recovery programme, and are auditing its use. Multidisciplinary documentation will be further developed as we progress with electronic document management.”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Improvement, NHS England, and the Care Quality Commission, working with the Trust and commissioners, were responsible for ensuring appropriate action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, I am satisfied that the regulators are alert to the risks you have highlighted, and it is for NHS Improvement, NHS England and the Care Quality Commission, working with the Trust and its commissioners, to ensure sufficient and appropriate action is taken to address the concerns raised. My officials have asked to be kept informed of developments.”

    Source location

    2017-0202-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    John Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Anthony Davies had Lewy body dementia and Parkinson’s disease and died on 23 October 2016 after deterioration following an infected pressure sore. Concerns included inadequate risk assessment when his care needs changed, poor communication and information sharing, incomplete records, lack of continuity of care, difficulties securing a suitable nursing home placement, and failures relating to pressure-relieving strategies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care by the District Nursing Team

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was no continuity of care provided by the District Nursing Team. ”

    Source location

    John Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide continuity through Named Nurse visits, structured handovers, and Caseload Holder oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Named Nurse for each care home will undertake all visits to the residents within their allocated home; however, when not on duty, the Named Nurse will hand over any relevant information to whichever nurse is assigned to visit.”

    Source location

    2017-0138-Response-by-Stockport-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold monthly residential-home care meetings and share key information at District Nursing Time Team meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new Named Nurse has been appointed to the residential home involved in this case. This nurse will ensure communication and documentation is improved and this will be overseen by the DN Caseload Holder (Band 6 Nurse). The Named Nurse now attends monthly meetings at the residential home with the manager and the staff to ensure all aspects of patients’ care are discussed and communicated to the DN team. The home manager will also invite Adult Social Care staff, District Nursing staff, GP and home care staff to the meeting for ongoing discussion of the patients’ care.”

    Source location

    2017-0138-Response-by-Stockport-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 July 2017

    Open published response
  7. City of London

    AI-generated summary

    Charlotte Anne Agnew · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Charlotte Anne Agnew became psychiatrically unwell and expressed suicidal ideation. After referrals to psychiatric services, her care was not effectively transferred, her suicide risk was not sufficiently assessed or managed, and no care plan was put in place; she died on 25 March 2016 after ingesting high levels of alcohol and medication and jumping in front of a London Underground train. The report identified an ongoing risk that similar failures in timely assessment, treatment, care transfer and suicide-risk management could recur.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign clear responsibility for coordinating and delivering care before discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “It was apparent from the evidence that there were five principal failures by the Trust in relation to the treatment and care provided to the Deceased. These were: (1) The Deceased was first assessed by the Trust’s Early Intervention and Assertive Psychosis Team who recognised that she was in need of psychiatric treatment and care by another team but, despite referring her on to other psychiatric teams within the Trust, made no effective transfer of her care before discharging her back to her General Practitioner and closing her case. A significant number of clinical and managerial staff were involved in this process and none of them prevented the Deceased’s premature discharge. (2) Prior to the Deceased’s discharge no sufficient assessment was made of her risk of suicide. Despite at least two clinical staff being involved, there was insufficient evidence gathering, including from the Deceased’s family, and a wholly inadequate assessment was made despite the use of the Trust’s electronic assessment tool (which was not properly completed). Further, no plan was put in place to manage the Deceased’s recognised risk of suicide. (3) Prior to the Deceased’s discharge no care plan was put in place and no single person had responsibility for ensuring care was properly assessed, co-ordinated and delivered prior to discharge. (4) The Deceased was discharged back to the care of her General Practitioner with a recommendation for the prescription of psychiatric medication without her having been seen or assessed by the psychiatrist who made the recommendation and with no means of monitoring its subsequent effectiveness. (5) Despite the matters set out in (1) to (4), the General Practitioner’s request, made on 15 March 2016, for an urgent assessment was not granted and the Trust’s Access and Assessment Team provided an appointment for a date five weeks later on 20 April 2016. I was told by witnesses from the Trust (and in submissions made on behalf of the Trust) that the Trust had adequate relevant policies and procedures in place at the time and that the failings set out above occurred because all the staff involved failed to follow those policies and procedures. It was said that there had been no subsequent amendment of the policies and procedures but, in summary, that staff have been reminded of them and what ought to happen (by email) and there is now an increased level of monitoring of compliance. Whilst the staff directly involved, who gave oral evidence at the inquest, told me that they now understand that the above failings ought not to have happened and would not occur now, I remain concerned that one or more of the above failings could recur in the future. Although the Trust has taken steps to inform current staff of what went wrong in the Deceased’s case, it has not taken steps to ensure that the above failings could not occur again (whether by amendment or clarification of its policies and/or procedures or sufficient training of staff or otherwise). Most particularly, the evidence provided to me did not satisfy me that the Trust’s policies and procedures, and the training given upon them, now ensure that every patient who is referred to the Trust will be assessed and treated in a timely manner, even if transfer between teams is necessary. Nor did it satisfy me that every patient’s risk of suicide is now properly assessed and managed so as to ensure the risk is minimised. In all the circumstances I consider that there is an ongoing risk that any one or more of the above failings could recur. If that risk is permitted to continue, it could have an adverse impact on the assessment, treatment and care of current and future patients and upon the protection of their lives. ”

    Source location

    Charlotte Anne Agnew · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Uriely · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Uriely had asthma from early childhood, which deteriorated and was uncontrolled in the seven months before his death. The report identified missed opportunities in the management of his asthma, including a lack of coordinated overall responsibility and long-term care planning, failure to assess and optimise treatment consistently, poor communication between services, and failure to refer him to a specialist respiratory service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign overall management responsibility for care

    Wider context from the report

    “3) Despite the presence of a significant number of health care professionals involved in his care, no single individual assumed management for his care overall. ”

    Source location

    Michael Uriely · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Leah Abby Ratheram · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leah Abby Ratheram, who had autism, foetal alcohol syndrome and a history of self-harm, died after being found hanging from a tree on 7 October 2016. The report raised concerns about the lack of coordinated care and unclear responsibility between mental health organisations, ineffective sharing of records and risk information, and uncertainty about the Mental Health Act assessment process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of coordinated mental health care during crisis and transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Adults aged between 18 – 25 now have mental health services provided by two organisations – Forward Thinking Birmingham and Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust. If a patient presents in crisis to A&E they will be seen by someone from the RAID team who work for Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust. If they require ongoing treatment they will be referred to forward Thinking Birmingham. There is a concern that patients will have no coordinated approach to their care at a time of crisis. It is also unclear who will ultimately be responsible for the patient, particularly during the period of transfer. ”

    Source location

    Leah Abby Ratheram · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Anna Teresa Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Anna Teresa Walker underwent a liver biopsy on 8 July 2016 and suffered a bleed caused by a tear to the hepatic artery. She died in hospital the following morning after a significant delay in detecting the bleed. The principal concerns were that required post-operative checks were not carried out, monitoring responsibilities were unclear, and the appropriate environment for post-operative monitoring was not provided.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear post-procedure clinical accountability

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The lines of clinical accountability post-procedure, was unclear. The radiologist confirmed that Mrs Walker was no longer the responsibility of the radiology team after the procedure, as she should have gone up to the ward. The ward however were concerned with her clinical parameters and considered that she should remain with the radiologist. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Anna Teresa Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026