Recurring concern

Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants it

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First reported 5 Sep 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to recognise the need for and promptly seek medical, paramedic or other appropriate clinical assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall, deterioration or other condition warrants it, including failures in care homes and emergency-response settings.

Not included

  • Excludes delays or failures occurring after medical assistance has already been requested, including ambulance attendance or hospital handover delays.
  • Excludes failures limited to the quality of assessment or treatment after medical assistance has been obtained.
  • Excludes failures to seek advice about routine care arrangements where no immediate or clinically warranted need for medical attention is identified.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, communication or documentation deficiencies unless they directly result in failure to seek warranted medical attention.
Reports
56

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
61

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
81

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission9
NHS England4
Department of Health and Social Care3
Recipient name withheld3
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Abbey Care Village1
Adbolton Hall1
Angel Solutions (UK) Ltd1
Appello Careline Limited1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Belle Green Court1
Bury Borough Council1
Care First Class (UK) Limited1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    EDWIN THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edwin Thompson, a 77-year-old residential care home resident with dementia, was found dead in a bathroom on 8 October 2011. The post-mortem identified a previously undiagnosed cardiovascular disease as the natural cause of death. The report identified concerns about protective measures for a vulnerable resident, delayed medical assistance, loss of contact with a resident prone to wandering, response to a final medical crisis, staff training, and record keeping.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear directive for care staff to seek medical advice without delay for residents presenting with pain

    Wider context from the report

    “There is a need to draft and disseminate to all care staff a clear, simple and concise directive to care home staff to seek medical advice or assistance in respect of residents presenting with pain, particularly of a cardiac nature without delay. Staff with no medical qualification must not seek to speculate as to possible causes of symptoms and should not seek to medicate ( unless otherwise previously prescribed by a Medical Practitioner) or prescribe “remedies” of no or no known worth to anyone in their care. ”

    Source location

    EDWIN THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Hallworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Hallworth was a frail, elderly woman living at home who fell from her bed on 18 March 2014 and was found in pain. The principal concern was that no medical attention was sought or considered for 24 hours after the fall and pain; the recorded medical cause of death included a fractured left hip and bronchopneumonia.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek or consider medical attention following pain or a fall

    Wider context from the report

    “Despite the deceased being in pain and having fallen, no medical attention was sought or considered for a period of 24 hours. ”

    Source location

    Mary Hallworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    LINDA ANNE RIGNALL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Anne Rignall's condition changed on 5 May 2014, but the change was not reported to a doctor and she was not assessed; her condition worsened approximately four hours later without a medical review. The report states that this failure to refer her for assessment resulted in the only available window of opportunity to treat her being lost, raising concern about the Acute Medical Unit's fitness for purpose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate changes in patient condition for timely medical assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) At 17:33 on the 5th May 2014, Linda Rignall's condition changed and this was recorded on the NEWS Observation chart. This change in condition should have been reported to a Doctor on the Acute Medical Unit and she should have been assessed. The position worsened some 4 hours later (the next time observations were performed) and there was still no request for a medical review. From the evidence it was clear to me and I found as you will see from the Conclusion that I recorded that this failure to refer Miss Rignall for assessment resulted in the only window of opportunity available to treat her, being lost. This makes me concerned as to AMU's Fitness for Purpose at the current time. I consider this to be serious. ”

    Source location

    LINDA ANNE RIGNALL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Sari Marlene KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sari Marlene KEEN underwent surgery to remove colon tumours on 23 October 2013, developed a faecal anastomotic leak causing peritonitis and shock, and died following cardiac arrest on 24 October 2013. The substantive concerns were insufficient staffing and failures to recognise deterioration, escalate care, and call the Hospital Crash Team when her blood pressure became unrecordable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of staff to recognise an un-recordable blood pressure as a medical emergency requiring a crash call

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was apparent that many Senior and Junior Members of Staff were not aware that an ‘un-recordable blood pressure’ was a ‘medical emergency’ and should have resulted in a crash call going out for immediate resuscitation. Perhaps the Protocols for the Crash Team need to be reviewed. ”

    Source location

    Sari Marlene KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot a revised observation and escalation process, with registered nurses observing patients requiring observations more frequently than every four hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A revised observation and escalation process is currently being piloted on 4 wards. A key change is the introduction of registered nurses to undertake the observations of all patients who require observations more than 4 hourly. Health Care Assistants also undertake observations but it was noted that the registered nurse has a greater ability and opportunity to identify other factors that might indicate deterioration where a Health Care Assistant would not be skilled enough to identify the patient during the actual observation process. Early indications are that there is a more timely escalation from nurses at the earlier signs of deterioration.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Emphasise Medical Emergency Team availability during mandatory basic life support training for all staff groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have a separate “Medical Emergency Team” policy, designed to be activated in situations where a patient is deteriorating but is not yet in cardiac arrest. This involves activation of the bleeps of the medical registrar and the ITU registrar by switchboard with a message asking the medical emergency team to go to ward X immediately. For patients deteriorating between 8am and 10pm, we have the third option of summoning the ITU Outreach team to review the patient. This can be initiated by either medical or nursing staff, and results in a review by a nurse trained in assessment of critically ill patients who can then escalate to either the medical team or the ITU team as appropriate.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate current nurse and doctor training on identifying deteriorating patients and develop an improvement proposal informed by cardiac-arrest learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Evaluation of the current training for nurses and doctors on the identification of the deteriorating patient is in progress with a proposal to improve the content as reflected in the learning from Root Cause Analysis of cardiac arrests.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing cardiac-arrest protocols, medical-emergency procedures and mandatory training are considered sufficient arrangements for activating the appropriate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have very clear and specific protocols for activation of the cardiac arrest process, which every member of staff is expected to be conversant with. It is taught through basic life support, which is an element of mandatory training for all clinical staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response
  5. Cardiff & the Vale of Glamorgan

    AI-generated summary

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sandra Wordingham, a resident of Springbank nursing home, was found unconscious after a suspected epileptic fit on 22 July 2013 and remained unconscious overnight before being taken to hospital. She died in hospital on 26 July 2013; the medical cause of death was recorded as intracerebral haemorrhage. The principal concern was that no medical opinion was sought despite her remaining unconscious for longer than expected after an epileptic fit, creating a risk to similarly treated residents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical opinion for prolonged unconsciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Sandra Wordingham, was put to bed in the nursing home in an unconscious state after a suspected epileptic fit. In fact she had suffered a sudden primary intracerebral haemorrhage. No medical opinion was sought even though Sandra Wordingham remained unconscious throughout the night for a longer period than would be expected after an epileptic fit. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide all staff with first-aid and life-support training focused on the immediate care of unconscious residents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improved First Aid & Life Support Training All staff to attend training with specific training element for the immediate care of the unconscious person Persons Responsible: ████████ Operations Manager Springbank & ████████ Manager Date By: Planned for March 2014.”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess nurses’ competency in recognising consciousness levels, providing and documenting life support, conducting neurological observations, and following relevant guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ensuring Nursing Staff Competency Following training and instruction nurses will have an assessment of their competency to:”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Instruct staff to summon emergency services promptly for unconscious residents, follow valid DNNAR instructions, and use a protocol available to all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Summoning Emergency Assistance”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update residents’ risk assessments and care plans with specific information about causes of unconsciousness, including detailed epilepsy seizure types and recovery periods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Knowledge of probable reasons and causes for residents who may become unconscious due to epilepsy (and other illnesses)”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the unconscious-person management protocol to occasional staff through agency induction materials.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providing & Sharing Information about the management of unconscious people with Bank and Agency Nurses working occasional shifts”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform nurse agencies and provide their head offices with the unconscious-person management protocol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providing & Sharing Information about the management of unconscious people with Bank and Agency Nurses working occasional shifts”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response
  6. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Labuben Amarsi Vaghadia · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Vaghadia developed bleeding after receiving an anticoagulant injection for suspected deep vein thrombosis and died in hospital on 27 August 2012 from haemorrhage and haematoma of the abdominal wall. Concerns included the community nurse administering a further anticoagulant injection without seeking medical advice despite knowing about the bleeding, failing to share that information with other healthcare professionals, and lacking training, experience, and insight into the potential risks of her actions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical advice before administering anticoagulants despite known bleeding

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Community Nurse ████████ administered the anticoagulant on the 26th August 2012 without seeking medical advice from a Doctor even though she knew Mrs Vaghadia had been bleeding from the site of the previous injection. Although the expert evidence in this case is that the nurse’s actions did not cause or contribute to the death in this instance, there is a risk that such action in another case may not have the same outcome and could be causative of death. ”

    Source location

    Labuben Amarsi Vaghadia · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Re-inform CHS healthcare professionals about medicines-management standards, communication responsibilities, relevant case learning, and the community medicines SOP through email cascades, briefings, meetings, and SOP reissue.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is accepted fully that part of a health professional's responsibility to communicate all relevant information to other clinicians and organisations on the specific details of a patient's condition. The CHS Division will now re-inform all health care professionals about their professional responsibility regarding this issue via a system of email cascade. Specifically the message for compliance with NMC Standards for Medicines Management will be given. Ensuring the message is conveyed will be achieved by cascading the information via their communications lead using direct emails to staff, the inclusion of key learning points of the case within the monthly briefing paper, and dissemination through the professional nurses monthly meeting by the lead nurses for physical and mental health.”

    Source location

    2013-0201-Response-by-Leicestershire-Partnership-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide medicines-management and emotional-resilience training, monthly clinical supervision for six months, and reflective-practice assessment to strengthen the nurse’s clinical decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of this process Nurse ████████ is judged to be competent in all areas of clinical practice assessed. However in response to the concerns raised a programme of training has now been arranged for Nurse ████████ which includes medicines management training and emotional resilience training. In addition she will participate in additional clinical supervision on a monthly basis for six months and undertake a reflective practice assessment, the sum of which is to strengthen her clinical decision making skills.”

    Source location

    2013-0201-Response-by-Leicestershire-Partnership-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 September 2013

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026