Recurring concern

Failure to retain safety-critical source records and evidence

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First reported 21 May 2014•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to retain, preserve or protect original or contemporaneous records and other safety-critical evidence whose later availability is needed for patient care, safeguarding, formal review, inquest, investigation or organisational learning, including patient or family registration forms, supervision records, engagement notes, primary-source data and material evidence relevant to deaths.

Not included

  • Excludes records that were never created or are merely incomplete, inaccurate or inaccessible when no failure to retain or preserve the source material is identified.
  • Excludes ordinary record-transfer, filing, retrieval or information-sharing failures where the source record was reliably retained and the deficiency arose later.
  • Excludes routine destruction under an adequate and applicable retention schedule where no safety-critical record or evidence is lost.
  • Excludes non-safety-related administrative records and generic document-management failures without a material care, safeguarding, investigation or safety-learning consequence.
Reports
32

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
36

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
36

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
NHS England5
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Ministry of Justice3
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Lowdham Grange Prison2
Royal College of Pathologists2
Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust2
Bedfordshire Police1
British Retail Consortium1
Cambridgeshire Constabulary1
Care Quality Commission1
Carillion (AMBS) Limited1
Change, Grow, Live1
Chelsea and Westminster Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne were prisoners at HMP Lowdham Grange who died by suicide in October and November 2023, respectively. Both had been identified as at increased risk of suicide and self-harm and placed on ACCT plans, but the plans and welfare checks were not managed in accordance with policy. The report identified concerns about Safer Custody staffing and systems, the safety and management of the Care and Separation Unit, learning from deaths, retention of evidence, and cooperation between prison and healthcare staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain evidence pertinent to deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Failure to retain evidence pertinent to the death ”

    Source location

    Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an electronic central repository for prisoner records with controlled access, document tracking, retrieval and secure sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your fourth concern relates to the retention of evidence pertinent to a death in custody. In November 2024 a system was introduced whereby all prisoner records are stored electronically and the database acts as a central repository for all relevant documentation, enabling the establishment to collate, manage and securely share documentation with external stakeholders. The introduction of this approach ensures that all documentation is”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manage, download and securely retain death-in-custody CCTV footage under a local protocol to prevent overwriting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Access to CCTV footage for Death in Custody purposes is managed by the Safety Team who are responsible for the identification, downloading and secure retention of relevant footage to ensure it is not overwritten. All footage is obtained, and retained, in line with a local protocol.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response
  2. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    DARREN ROBERT DICKSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren Robert Dickson was found unresponsive at home on 5 February 2025 and died in hospital on 6 February 2025. Toxicology showed benzodiazepine and alcohol, which the report states led to his death on the balance of probabilities. The principal concern was that records had been overwritten and later destroyed, with insufficient reassurance that the trust’s policy addressed the retention and non-destruction of records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain and prevent destruction of supervision records

    Wider context from the report

    “I had evidence that Mr Dickson’s supervision records were being overwritten and the full nature of those records could not accurately be ascertained. Following Mr Dickson’s death, those supervision records were destroyed and were not available to me at the inquest. I heard evidence, and was provided with an updated policy, addressing the issues concerning overwriting of supervision records. I was therefore satisfied that the issues concerning overwriting of records has been addressed. I was not provided with sufficient evidence to allay my concern about the retention and the non-destruction of records and considered that the trust’s policy did not address the issue about destruction of records. I was therefore given insufficient reassurance that this specific concern is being addressed. ”

    Source location

    DARREN ROBERT DICKSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen the Clinical Supervision Policy to prohibit disposal or destruction of records before three years and link to the national Records Management Code of Practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, in response to HM Coroner's concern, the Trust has taken steps to further strengthen the relevant section of the Clinical Supervision Policy (enclosed). Section”

    Source location

    2026-0150 - Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne & Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a Trust-wide Policy Alert highlighting the coroner’s concern and the Clinical Supervision Policy amendment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To bring this update to the attention of all staff, the Trust have also issued a Trust-wide Policy Alert, via email on 27th April 26, also enclosed. This alert summarised HM Coroner's concern from this case and highlighted the policy amendment.”

    Source location

    2026-0150 - Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne & Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing policy already required clinical supervision records to be retained for at least three years; the destruction occurred outside expected policy guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HM Coroner remained concerned, following the inquest, about the retention and the non-destruction of records and considered that the Trust’s policy did not suitably address this.”

    Source location

    2026-0150 - Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne & Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Ashana Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Ashana Charles died suddenly in hospital on 20 November 2018 after an unexpected cardiac arrest during intravenous feeding. The inquest concluded that cellulose fibres from inadvertently contaminated intravenous infusions caused acute obstruction of small pulmonary arteries, and that the death would have been prevented by using a 1.2-micron filter, which was not standard practice at the time. Concerns included the failure to retain infusion equipment for forensic investigation, inconsistent guidance and practice on filters, and uncertainty about the adequacy of batch-based visual checks of parenteral nutrition products.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain infusion equipment and supplies for forensic investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That no source of contamination could be identified due to the infusion set, filter, feeding bag and lines not being retained for forensic investigation. The pathologist Professor ████████ gave an opinion that deaths that might be associated with IV feeding were probably underreported due to inadequate investigation. 2. ████████, expert pharmacist and pharmaceutical regulator drew attention to a) The inconsistency at the time between US and European and UK guidance about use of filters in parenteral feeding (PN). b) Reference to filters for Omega Special by the drug manufacturer at the time indicating an appropriate filter “if one was used”, but not its need or desirability or context of use, and the value of manufacturers and health providers integrating their approach to risk management. c) The use of the 1.2 micron filter at the time was not standard practice, perhaps because of cost or operational reasons as the filter often led to blockages and delays in IV feeding. Now both that BNPG guidance and B Braun recommend the use of 1.2 micron filters on Omega Special label, but that does not give assurance that all PN and filter manufacturers issue the same guidance nor that their products are operationally consistent with guidance. d) Lewisham & Greenwich NHS Trust have begun to re-evaluate the use of 1.2 micron filters in PN feeding but the matter had not yet gone to its governance department but should do so next year. There was a need for those responsible for decision implementation in hospitals nationally to cross work with manufacturers and specialist bodies. e) Uncertainty whether the reported visual checks of PN products by batch rather than individually provided adequate safety assurance. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Ashana Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Benedict BLYTHE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benedict died at Peterborough City Hospital on 1 December 2021, aged 5, from fatal anaphylaxis following accidental exposure to cow’s milk protein. The report identifies concerns about the retention and testing of samples, including blood and stomach contents, and the police seizure and retention of relevant evidence such as vomitus during investigations of unexplained deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seize and retain relevant scene samples and evidence for later investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “1) In relation to Pathology That Kennedy samples collected during a post-mortem examination, should be revised to include the following in cases of suspected anaphylaxis: a. blood samples for mast cell tryptase and sp IgE serology 2 suspected allergens b. stomach contents to be immediately stored (and/or frozen) by the pathologist for the analysis of the presence of the triggering allergen c. blood samples if taken at hospital should not be destroyed but retained for testing d. that an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for later analysis e. that the possibility that the death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the senior coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity f. tissue samples are taken and retained. g. Consideration given to the development of a standard protocol to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation. 2.) The police investigation: In the circumstances where there is an unexplained death of a child or the person and where that data samples and evidence available at the scene including by way of example vomitus, that the police should include as part of their investigation, the seizure and retention of any such material for the purposes of later investigation either by the Police Pathologist or the Coroner. ”

    Source location

    Benedict BLYTHE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain hospital blood samples for testing

    Wider context from the report

    “1) In relation to Pathology That Kennedy samples collected during a post-mortem examination, should be revised to include the following in cases of suspected anaphylaxis: a. blood samples for mast cell tryptase and sp IgE serology 2 suspected allergens b. stomach contents to be immediately stored (and/or frozen) by the pathologist for the analysis of the presence of the triggering allergen c. blood samples if taken at hospital should not be destroyed but retained for testing d. that an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for later analysis e. that the possibility that the death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the senior coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity f. tissue samples are taken and retained. g. Consideration given to the development of a standard protocol to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation. 2.) The police investigation: In the circumstances where there is an unexplained death of a child or the person and where that data samples and evidence available at the scene including by way of example vomitus, that the police should include as part of their investigation, the seizure and retention of any such material for the purposes of later investigation either by the Police Pathologist or the Coroner. ”

    Source location

    Benedict BLYTHE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to collect and retain tissue samples in suspected anaphylaxis

    Wider context from the report

    “1) In relation to Pathology That Kennedy samples collected during a post-mortem examination, should be revised to include the following in cases of suspected anaphylaxis: a. blood samples for mast cell tryptase and sp IgE serology 2 suspected allergens b. stomach contents to be immediately stored (and/or frozen) by the pathologist for the analysis of the presence of the triggering allergen c. blood samples if taken at hospital should not be destroyed but retained for testing d. that an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for later analysis e. that the possibility that the death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the senior coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity f. tissue samples are taken and retained. g. Consideration given to the development of a standard protocol to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation. 2.) The police investigation: In the circumstances where there is an unexplained death of a child or the person and where that data samples and evidence available at the scene including by way of example vomitus, that the police should include as part of their investigation, the seizure and retention of any such material for the purposes of later investigation either by the Police Pathologist or the Coroner. ”

    Source location

    Benedict BLYTHE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish SOCO liaison and incorporate assessment and seizure of potentially evidential biological samples into child-death forensic strategies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “First, full liaison with Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCOs) has been established to ensure that, in all cases of unexplained child death, the potential evidential value of samples found at the scene—such as vomitus or other biological material—is actively recognised and considered. SOCOs have been formally briefed, and the need to assess and seize such samples is now incorporated into the forensic strategy in consultation with the Senior Investigating Officer. This ensures that opportunities to preserve material for the Coroner, the Pathologist, or investigators are not missed.”

    Source location

    Response form Cambridgeshire Constabulary
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend, reissue and widely circulate procedural guidance and aide-memoires for child-death investigations, covering evidence preservation, medical liaison and anaphylaxis considerations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Second, the Constabulary has amended and re-issued internal procedural guidance and aide-memoire materials relating to child death investigations. These documents have been circulated widely to all officers and staff who may attend such incidents,”

    Source location

    Response form Cambridgeshire Constabulary
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include revised child-death investigation processes in ongoing training cycles for frontline and investigative staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, the revised processes are now included within ongoing training cycles for child death investigations, meaning all staff involved in frontline or investigative roles will receive regular reinforcement of expectations and good practice standards. This training emphasises the forensic, investigative, and safeguarding considerations required in early decision-making, helping ensure that opportunities to understand cause of death are preserved and that future investigations are informed by best practice.”

    Source location

    Response form Cambridgeshire Constabulary
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Sample retention is determined by the requesting Coroner and subsequently by parental or next-of-kin consent under the Human Tissue Act 2004.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In all Coronial post-mortem examinations in children, tissue samples are taken primarily in accordance with the published protocols and also any that are relevant to ascertaining the cause of death. Retention of samples is determined initially by the Coroner requesting the post-mortem examination and thereafter by parental / next-of-kin consent in line with the Human Tissue Act 2004.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Pathologists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response
  5. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Malik BUNTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Malik Bunton was found suspended from a ligature on 17 July 2023, and his death was confirmed at the scene. The inquest concluded that he died as a result of suicide, following earlier incidents involving suicidal intent and self-harm concerns. The principal concerns related to insufficient inquiry into an earlier incident, weaknesses in the Defence Medical Service Clinical Care Review process, and delays or obstructions in gathering important evidence.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to preserve potentially important service email evidence

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There were inexplicable delays and some apparent deliberate obstructions to the gathering of important evidence from key witnesses. This impacted on the extent and quality of evidence ultimately available to both the Service Inquiry and the inquest. Examples of this were – - The long delays in obtaining formal accounts from key witnesses either in writing or via an interview process. - The absence of any account from Mr Bunton’s colleague who attended hospital with him following the 26 March 2023 incident. Such an account would have informed the process of inquiry referred to at point 1 above as well as the Service Inquiry and inquest. - The decision to delete Mr Bunton’s service email account without consideration of its potential importance in the context of a suspected suicide. - Withholding statements of two key witnesses from the Service Inquiry panel for some months following Mr Bunton’s death. - The absence of a clear and contemporaneous account of the 11 July 2023 GP consultation, either in the Clinical Care Review document and/or a separate formal account of events obtained from the doctor concerned. ”

    Source location

    Malik BUNTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a process to retain, where appropriate, deceased service personnel’s email accounts for potential inquest evidence retrieval.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the delay in providing statements to the Service Inquiry panel, I understand that the statements in question were prepared for the inquest, and I am assured that the delay arose from a desire to adhere to the appropriate disclosure processes. However, further direction and guidance has been issued to ensure such delays are avoided in the future. Furthermore, the Defence Inquests Unit is working to implement a process to retain, where appropriate, the email accounts of deceased service personnel. This will allow for the retrieval of relevant data, should it be required for inquests.”

    Source location

    Response from Ministry of Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response
  6. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Lyn Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Lyn Davies was pronounced dead at his home on 13 March 2023 after sustaining chest and neck injuries in an explosion. The cause of the explosion could not be determined because material evidence was not preserved during the search and rescue and clean-up operations, and concerns were raised about the lack of guidance or a protocol between the Police and the HSE on preserving evidence from domestic explosions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to give orders securing evidence for domestic explosion investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest it was established that the cause of the explosion could not be ascertained since the clean up operation removed debris from the scene which was subsequently disposed of. It was confirmed that evidence ascertaining the cause of that explosion may not be secured and as such was disposed of without an exercise to determine its significance to the investigation. The HSE’s Principal Gas Engineer commented that on viewing the television footage of the incident prior to attending the scene he feared that any investigation would be compromised due to evidence having been lost or disposed of. He also noted that the Police may not have come across a scene like this since gas explosions are rare. If the HSE are not involved then decisions made by Police in the interests of search and rescue that then hinder the investigation process and he would not expect them to understand the intricacies of what he would be looking for as part of his investigation. It is acknowledged that in search and rescue operations the preservation of life has to take precedence, however there should be an understanding the Police as to what evidence should be preserved due to them having the initial primacy of investigation, and the information to fuel that understanding as to what evidence should be preserved where possible should come from the HSE who have the experience of investigating such events. I am concerned that without thorough investigations into the causes of domestic explosions then those causes cannot be determined and steps put in place to prevent future deaths by way of recurrence. 1. There was no understanding of what evidence was required to be preserved for the purposes of an investigation as to the cause of the explosion; 2. There was no order given to secure such evidence; 3. There was no memorandum of understanding or protocol between the Police and the HSE to provide information on what the HSE would need to be able to identify the cause of the explosion as far as practicable without impacting upon the primary objective of preserving life undertaken by the search and rescue operation ”

    Source location

    Brian Lyn Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of evidence requiring preservation during domestic explosion investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest it was established that the cause of the explosion could not be ascertained since the clean up operation removed debris from the scene which was subsequently disposed of. It was confirmed that evidence ascertaining the cause of that explosion may not be secured and as such was disposed of without an exercise to determine its significance to the investigation. The HSE’s Principal Gas Engineer commented that on viewing the television footage of the incident prior to attending the scene he feared that any investigation would be compromised due to evidence having been lost or disposed of. He also noted that the Police may not have come across a scene like this since gas explosions are rare. If the HSE are not involved then decisions made by Police in the interests of search and rescue that then hinder the investigation process and he would not expect them to understand the intricacies of what he would be looking for as part of his investigation. It is acknowledged that in search and rescue operations the preservation of life has to take precedence, however there should be an understanding the Police as to what evidence should be preserved due to them having the initial primacy of investigation, and the information to fuel that understanding as to what evidence should be preserved where possible should come from the HSE who have the experience of investigating such events. I am concerned that without thorough investigations into the causes of domestic explosions then those causes cannot be determined and steps put in place to prevent future deaths by way of recurrence. 1. There was no understanding of what evidence was required to be preserved for the purposes of an investigation as to the cause of the explosion; 2. There was no order given to secure such evidence; 3. There was no memorandum of understanding or protocol between the Police and the HSE to provide information on what the HSE would need to be able to identify the cause of the explosion as far as practicable without impacting upon the primary objective of preserving life undertaken by the search and rescue operation ”

    Source location

    Brian Lyn Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the identified investigation concerns with the National Liaison Committee for consideration in the Protocol review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this respect, South Wales Police will take steps to raise your concerns with the National Liaison Committee in order that due regard may be had to such a possibility in the future, so that any amendments which are considered appropriate, may be made to the Protocol.”

    Source location

    Response from South Wales Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare national training material on work-related aspects of investigations, including advice for first responders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Provide an update to the NLC regarding work HSE has been doing in preparing national training material focussing on the work related elements of such investigations for those responding to incidents including more specific advice for those first on scene. This will in due course be put to the NLC for consideration and endorsement;”

    Source location

    Response from HSE
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a proposed Suspected Gas Explosion checklist for consideration alongside the existing Carbon Monoxide checklist.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Provide an update to the NLC on other HSE on-going work to develop a proposed ‘Suspected Gas Explosion checklist’, to sit alongside the current ‘Carbon Monoxide checklist’ within Appendix 1 of the WRDP Practical Guide – ‘Additional duties of first officer – Domestic Gas Incidents’. This would be for the NLC to agree and update the guide.”

    Source location

    Response from HSE
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The National Liaison Committee is responsible for deciding and implementing any appropriate amendments to the Protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As would be expected, the Protocols contains provisions and guidance which provide full or partial answers to the issues you have raised. However, it remains important that the Protocols are reviewed and refreshed as appropriate. In this regard, it is significant that Detective Superintendent ████████ ████████ from South Wales Police attended the National Work Related Death Liaison Committee on 17 November 2025 which is the national multi agency meeting that oversees the Protocol and linked matters. At that meeting the Protocols, were discussed as it was universally agreed that these documents need to be updated. The motion to give effect to the same was carried, and the National Liaison Committee has committed to undertaking a review and update as appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from South Wales Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing Work Related Death Protocol is considered fit for purpose and addresses evidence preservation, investigation coordination and information-sharing concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the specific ‘Matters of Concern’ raised in your letter, it is HSE’s opinion that the Work Related Death Protocol (WRDP) addresses your points. I have responded to each of those points individually with excerpts from the protocol below.”

    Source location

    Response from HSE
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Elton Deutekom · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elton suffered acute hypoxic-ischaemic injury following a placental abruption during labour and was delivered by forceps at 04:35 on 12 January 2022; despite resuscitation, he was recognised as life extinct at 05:12. The report identifies failures to recognise and respond to abnormal CTG changes, and raises wider concerns about neonatal death referrals, disclosure of evidence, record-keeping, staffing, supervision and CTG monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Destruction of contemporaneous handwritten notes following neonatal deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That following neonatal deaths assistance is given to midwifery staff as to how to write records in retrospect and contemporaneous handwritten notes are destroyed possibly reducing the accuracy of the records and thus risking that lessons may not be learned that may save the lives of others. ”

    Source location

    Elton Deutekom · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Muhammad Esmael and Naemat Esmael · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 1 July 2023, a fire started in an upstairs bedroom of a Council-leased property while three-year-old Muhammad Esmael was inside; Muhammad and his father, Naemat Esmael, died in the fire. The concerns included that the two working smoke alarms were not activated by the fire because it was contained in a closed bedroom, and that bedroom items were removed before all investigations were completed, potentially preventing the cause of the fire from being determined.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to preserve fire scenes until all instructed investigations are completed

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard that certain items within the bedroom where the fire started, including a console unit and electrical items, were removed before they could be fully inspected in situ by the Chartered Electrical Engineer instructed to investigate the cause of the fire. I am told that the items were removed by the Crime Scene Investigators from South Wales Police in circumstances where the Fire Service had exercised its powers under section 45 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 and had commenced an investigation which was aimed at determining the point of origin, cause and behaviour of the fire at ████████. The Chartered Electrical Engineer expert told me that he was unable to provide me with any assistance on the cause of the fire because the items had been removed from the scene and because he had only been able to view photographs. It was this Expert’s opinion that it would have been preferable if the items had remained in position at the property to enable him to inspect them in situ. I am concerned that items were removed from the scene before all inspections were completed and that this may have prevented me and indeed the Fire Service investigators from determining the cause of this fire. I am concerned either that there may not be a sufficiently robust protocol in place between South Wales Police and the Fire Service on preserving a scene to ensure a full investigation takes place and / or that if there is such a protocol it may not have been followed in this instance. If coroners and investigators are unable to determine the cause of a fire because the scene has not been preserved for as long as required to ensure a full in situ investigation by all instructed investigators, then this prevents lessons from being learnt about the cause of a fire which in turn means there is a continuing risk to life. ”

    Source location

    Muhammad Esmael and Naemat Esmael · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Welsh Government has no control over operational scene and inter-service matters and cannot take action addressing them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am responding in relation to the first Matter of Concern raised in your Report, regarding the provision of smoke alarms within rented accommodation. The second Matter of Concern relates to the possible removal by South Wales Police (SWP) of relevant items from the scene of the fire, and to the working relationship between SWP and Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service (MWWFRS). Those are operational matters for SWP and MWWFRS over which the Welsh Government has no control; as such there is no action we can take which would address this concern. However, I note your Report has also been issued to the Head of Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service and I understand that he will respond on that Matter.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational matters concerning scene items and inter-service working are for South Wales Police and Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am responding in relation to the first Matter of Concern raised in your Report, regarding the provision of smoke alarms within rented accommodation. The second Matter of Concern relates to the possible removal by South Wales Police (SWP) of relevant items from the scene of the fire, and to the working relationship between SWP and Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service (MWWFRS). Those are operational matters for SWP and MWWFRS over which the Welsh Government has no control; as such there is no action we can take which would address this concern. However, I note your Report has also been issued to the Head of Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service and I understand that he will respond on that Matter.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police retain responsibility for scene management and decisions to remove or seize items in fatality or suspected-criminality fire investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the second MATTER OF CONCERN. In fire cases involving fatalities or suspected criminality, the Police are the lead agency with primacy over the investigation. For incidents within its area, Mid & West Wales Fire and Rescue Service will often support the Police with their investigation alongside Crime Scene Investigators and forensic scientists commissioned by the Police, as in this case. A decision to remove items for laboratory testing is undertaken by the Senior Police Officer and any evidence subsequently seized is done under the authority offered by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE).”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 November 2024

    Open published response
  9. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin John McDonnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin John McDonnell was discovered deceased in his prison cell on 29 September 2022, having died by ligature asphyxiation; the inquest concluded that he had died by suicide. The principal concerns included failures to conduct planned ACCT reviews and checks, share identified suicide-risk information, provide necessary mental-health support, and preserve accurate documentary evidence after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to secure and retain accurate documentary evidence following a death in custody

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Failure to secure and retain documentary evidence following a death in custody. If post-death investigations are misled by inaccurate documentation that has been amended post-death, then the ability to learn from deaths in custody will be hampered. The preservation of accurate documentary evidence must be of paramount concern when a person dies in custody. ”

    Source location

    Kevin John McDonnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Keep ACCT books on the wing during quality assurance checks so staff can make contemporaneous entries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matter of accurate documentary evidence being secured following a death in custody is something that I take extremely seriously. I am satisfied that the actions taken by staff in this instance were not malicious or done with the intention of misleading any investigation or enquiry. Nevertheless, this was not best practice and I understand that ACCT books are no longer taken”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 August 2024

    Open published response
  10. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Weatherley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Weatherley died at HMP Thameside from the toxic effects of cocaine and methadone after swallowing a package containing a drug during a prison visit. The report identifies concerns about the visitor being allowed an open visit, inadequate investigation and monitoring after the visit, poor record keeping and data retention, and the absence of written guidance for suspected drug swallows.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain and retain complete contemporaneous records and documents

    Wider context from the report

    “Data recording and retention in HMP Thameside/oversight by MOJ 1. Key documents around decision making by Serco officers in respect of open/closed visits for SW were lost. 2. Record keeping of key events on 23rd and 24th February 2018 was not properly completed by Serco officers on the central system for recording, operated by the MOJ (“PNOMIS”). 3. There were only 3 entries on SW’s PNOMIS record in the 5 months he was at HMP Thameside. 4. The PPO investigator encountered delays in obtaining documents, unclear and incomplete records from HMP Thameside. The decision making around closed visits/reviews was requested by the PPO in September 2018 and had not been provided at the time the PPO report in April 2019, which pre-dated the electronic migration of data in October 2020 (see below). 5. Solicitors representing HMP Thameside informed me on 30 March 2023 that the prison was unable to adduce the 2018 versions of the local standard operating procedures in place at the time of SW’s death (i.e re visits procedures) due to a large IT migration which took place around 18 months prior (October 2020), which resulted in the loss of some historical data saved on their systems. 6. I subsequently requested the underlying decision making around closed visits/review (as I had the PPO before me) and was informed that these documents were no longer available, also lost in the electronic migration. 7. I was then informed (during the Inquest), that material may have been lost due to officers storing it on local desktop computers and not uploading it to the main system. 8. Having expressed concerns about record-keeping and data retention, I heard PFD evidence on 12th June 2023 about a limited internal audit of PNOMIS which revealed concerns over 15% of the records reviewed. I heard evidence that contract managers oversee the contract between the MOJ and Serco, reporting monthly on contract delivery indicators. They do not conduct specific checks on PNOMIS record keeping/audits of the same. 9. I also heard evidence on 12th June 2023 that there remain two systems for record keeping, the Serco system, CMS and the national MOJ system, PNOMIS. CMS requires a layer of officer input (uploading and/or printing off) to ensure retention and distribution. A notice to staff dated 23rd June 2023 reminded them to upload material to CMS. 10. A witness statement from the director of HMP Thameside dated 26th June 2023 further explained the contractual relationship between the MOJ and Serco including the 28 contract delivery indicators. There is also a contractual requirement to ensure compliance with Prison Service Instructions (PSIs) which include PSI 04/2018 which relates to records, information management and retention policy. 11. In this witness statement, the director stated that he had instructed the Serco Assurance Team (independent of the prison team) to conduct a widespread audit of the PNOMIS and Death in Custody files, which will be completed by September 2023. Whilst I am reassured that an independent audit is being conducted, the results are not currently available. SW died in 2018 and the audit was not initiated until June 2023. 12. I accept that there have been improvements. However, given the extent and impact of the deficiencies outlined above, I remain concerned as to whether systems (for both record keeping and retention) have improved sufficiently since 2018. 13. I am also concerned as to the level of oversight and monitoring by the MOJ (having subcontracted to Serco) of recording and retention of data, given that key data was lost, key records were not maintained and the PPO was not provided with documents requested. 14. If key documents are not available/incidents are not recorded contemporaneously, then the PPO and the Inquest process is frustrated. It is more difficult to identify deficiencies and prevent future deaths. Further, if communications are not recorded, there is a risk that relevant factors are not considered when officers are making potentially life-impacting decisions. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Weatherley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish and maintain MS Teams folders to retain death-in-custody information and provide required documents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly, in relation to data retention following a Death in Custody ("DIC"), Assistant Director ("AD") ████████ provided evidence at the Inquest that he now has autonomy of this process and that there is now a system in place whereby he has set up MS Teams folders which contain all the relevant information, in accordance national PSI's. ████████ was candid in accepting that he could not explain why documents weren't provided to the Prison and Probation Ombudsman ("PPO") back in 2018 (before he was in post) as the relevant staff members were no longer employed by Serco. However in any circumstance since, he has personally provided the PPO with the information required to further their investigations.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an independent audit of document retention in death-in-custody cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It was indicated by me that I attend a Quarterly Contract Review Meeting with the MOJ controllers and we discuss findings from the PPO investigations. Nonetheless, an independent audit of the retention of documents on the DIC cases was instructed from the Assurance Team (part of the Serco Enterprise Risk Management team) and reporting to UK&I General Counsel of Serco. It was confirmed that this is independent to the Prison and arrangements for this are underway, with an expected completion date of September 2023. The difficulty with the case of SW was that it had been delayed for a number of years (to some extent due to the criminal liability for SW's visitors) so the management of the DIC's had long since improved and the Prison had no cause for concern in relation to the DIC information retention since my appointment three years ago.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct an independent review of a wider selection of PNOMIS files.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A small audit was completed by ████████ in short order to assist you with your concerns before 12 June 2023. However, as provided in my statement dated 26 June 2023, the Prison have instructed the same Serco independent audit team to conduct an independent review of a wider selection of PNOMIS files. Again, arrangement are in place to have this completed by September 2023 and we understand that our legal team, DWF LLP, offered to share the results of the same with you on our behalf. It is understood that this offer was made in email correspondence on 05 July 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement written security guidance governing body-scanner use and recording of scans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of Concern Two, there is a written Serco Custodial Security Strategy ("SCSS") dated July 2021 which outlines when a prisoner can be put through the bodyscanner and it incorporates the national policy 'Use of X-ray Body Scanners (Adult Male Prisons)' dated 18 May 2022 and reissued 3 October 2022¹ which states:”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing contractual monitoring, record-retention requirements and death-in-custody plans provide sufficient oversight of records and data retention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that I have received a copy of the response from the Director at HMP Thameside which sets out the policies that the prison must adhere to and the contract requirements. To further assist, I can confirm that the contract has several delivery indicators which measure the performance of all aspects of custodial delivery. The prison’s performance is reviewed each month and during quarterly contract reviews. All aspects of the custodial contract are monitored through provider submissions and compliance testing. Each month the provider, Serco, submit evidence that they have complied with all contract delivery indicators (CDIs) and compliance tests are carried out on a monthly basis to test different aspects of the contract which are scored on a RAG (red, amber, green) rating scale for monitoring and improvement purposes.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issues beyond the inspection process fall outside the inspectorate’s remit, which is distinct from the prison service’s role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response, it is important that I outline that the purpose of HM Inspectorate of Prisons is to ensure the regular independent inspection of places of detention, report on conditions and treatment and highlight concerns to the relevant authorities with the aim of improving outcomes for those detained. As such our remit is distinct from the role of HM Prison and Probation Service and so my response can only address issues related to the inspection process.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Inspectorate of Prisons
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing MS Teams, SharePoint, PNOMIS, QA audits and management safeguards are considered sufficient for retaining and recording death-in-custody information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly, in relation to data retention following a Death in Custody ("DIC"), Assistant Director ("AD") ████████ provided evidence at the Inquest that he now has autonomy of this process and that there is now a system in place whereby he has set up MS Teams folders which contain all the relevant information, in accordance national PSI's. ████████ was candid in accepting that he could not explain why documents weren't provided to the Prison and Probation Ombudsman ("PPO") back in 2018 (before he was in post) as the relevant staff members were no longer employed by Serco. However in any circumstance since, he has personally provided the PPO with the information required to further their investigations.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026