Recurring concern

Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processes

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First reported 17 Sep 2013•Latest report 24 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in healthcare transfer procedures, coordination, responsibility, transfer documentation and provision of complete clinical information to the transporting or receiving team.

Not included

  • Ordinary shift handover with no transfer of the patient or care responsibility
  • Clinical treatment failures after a safe and complete transfer
  • Discharge to the community where no healthcare transfer process is involved
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
131

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England14
Department of Health and Social Care10
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust5
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB4
HM Prison and Probation Service4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Swansea Bay University Local Health Board4
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust4
Welsh Government4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Healthcare Inspectorate Wales3
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ann Corfield was admitted to hospital with a urinary tract infection, low sodium levels and deteriorating mental health, later developing severe psychotic depression, poor oral intake and dehydration. She suffered a cardiac arrest and died after transfer between hospitals. Concerns included inadequate handover about anticoagulation, failure to administer prescribed prophylactic anticoagulation, poor completion of fluid balance charts, and the lack of suitably qualified staff to administer intravenous fluids at Park House.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide written handovers containing medication information during patient transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence at the Inquest staff at Park House were not aware that Mrs Corfield was receiving an anticoagulant in the form of enoxaparin whilst she was a patient at Royal Oldham Hospital to reduce the risk of her developing a VTE or that she had refused this medication whilst a patient ROH. I received written evidence from ████████ that the Pennine Acute Trust has in place an Adult Transfer Policy and a Form should be generated which includes details with regards the patient’s medication and most recent observations. However, the evidence I heard from ████████, Consultant Psychiatrist at Park House, was that this unit still does not receive a written handover. ”

    Source location

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Peter David KNIGHT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter David Knight, who had idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis and was dependent on oxygen, was not connected to portable cylinder oxygen during transfer to a ward and became hypoxic before dying later that evening. The report raised concern about delays in completing and trialling a revised policy for transferring oxygen-dependent patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to commence a trial of new patient-transfer documentation

    Wider context from the report

    “At the inquest I was satisfied that the Trust took the concerns raised seriously and was in the process of reviewing its Policy with regard to the transfer of patients, particularly those who are oxygen dependant. It was anticipated the Policy would be completed by the end of February 2019. In the circumstances, I wrote to the Trust asking them to write to me by 15 March 2019 with full details of the Policy. Not having heard from the Trust, my Officer contacted the Trust today. A response has been received indicating that new documentation has now been generated but a trial into its use has not yet commenced. Although it is stated that a trial is due to be started within the week and that if effective, implementation will be ratified by end of April, I am concerned that the inquest concluded in January 2019 and the Policy was not completed in the timescale indicated and agreed at the inquest and its trial has not yet commenced. ”

    Source location

    Peter David KNIGHT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redesign, approve and barcode the SBAR patient-transfer handover tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “12. The group researched and designed a handover sheet for all intra-hospital patients as the current documentation did not meet requirements. The guide for registered nurses to assess if the patient requires an escort was also amended and more detailed for patients with a lower News 2 score. The guide also suggests equipment for transfer of patients. The group decided that one document for all transfers would be of benefit and add in electronic links to specific documents separate from the policy would work well. This will enable specific documents to change and the policy link will always be as up to date as possible. This has delayed completion of the policy due to some policies being accessible on the intranet. Many emails were shared between meetings with various versions of documents for comment.”

    Source location

    2019-0219-Response-by-The-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trial the amended escort-assessment guide and SBAR transfer tool in high-risk clinical areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. 1st April 2019 – ‘Guide for Escort required for patient Transfers in hospital’ and ‘Patient Transfer Handover SBAR¹ tool’ out to trial during April in the high risk areas of Assessment Zone, Acute Medical Unit, Surgical Assessment unit and A&E before going Trust Wide. These areas found that the SBAR forms are working well and will to continue using the new forms beyond the pilot stage.”

    Source location

    2019-0219-Response-by-The-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn
    Page 5 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch the adapted SBAR patient-transfer tool Trust-wide after pilot feedback and audit results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. 1st April 2019 – ‘Guide for Escort required for patient Transfers in hospital’ and ‘Patient Transfer Handover SBAR¹ tool’ out to trial during April in the high risk areas of Assessment Zone, Acute Medical Unit, Surgical Assessment unit and A&E before going Trust Wide. These areas found that the SBAR forms are working well and will to continue using the new forms beyond the pilot stage.”

    Source location

    2019-0219-Response-by-The-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn
    Page 5 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response
  3. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Marjorie GARTSIDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marjorie Gartside, aged 100, fractured her hip in an unwitnessed fall at a residential home and underwent surgery. She was discharged from hospital on two occasions, with concerns about inaccurate information regarding her mobility, unsafe discharge processes, lack of care handover and unclear palliative-care arrangements, and anticipatory medication not being sent with her. She died at the Home on 19 October 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide accurate mobility information during hospital-to-home communication

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That the information provided by the Royal Oldham Hospital to the Home on 10 October 2018 was inaccurate in suggesting that Mrs Gartside was able to mobilise. Had that information been relied upon by the Home it would have resulted in Mrs Gartside not having suitable or appropriate equipment in place for her return. ”

    Source location

    Marjorie GARTSIDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The mobility information was consistent with documented needs, and suitable equipment was arranged before discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During Mrs Gartside’s first admission, she was documented to have been “mobile with one” (requiring support from one person) and “a frame over short distances with assistance of one”. This was in line with Mrs Gartside’s pre-admission mobilisation needs according to the risk assessment completed by the Residential Home.”

    Source location

    2019-0091-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  4. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Gwyneth Ann EDWARDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gwyneth Ann EDWARDS was admitted to Bedford Hospital on 7 December 2017 and deteriorated after Hydrocortisone and Desmopressin were not dispensed. She developed severe hypernatraemia and died on 14 December 2017 while receiving end-of-life care; the stated cause of death included bronchopneumonia and hypernatraemia, with failure to administer Desmopressin and maintain appropriate fluids. Concerns included gaps in weekend transfer arrangements, NEWS scores not being acted upon, an unverified Mobile Medic review marked complete, staff unfamiliarity with Desmopressin storage, and staffing pressures affecting monitoring and record-keeping.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the transfer solution to include weekend transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Serious Incident Investigation Report (SIR) addressed the issue of transfers from out of the Acute Assessment Unit (AAU), but the current solution does not include weekend transfers, which is when the deceased was transferred. ”

    Source location

    Gwyneth Ann EDWARDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Maureen Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Maureen Brown was admitted to the Royal Derby Hospital with an infection and was identified as being at high risk of falls. Information from her daughter about her confusion and previous fall was not included in the electronic handover, and Mrs Brown subsequently fell from her bed and suffered a fatal subdural haemorrhage. The report raised concerns that electronic transfer information can omit relevant information needed for effective handover and that national policy still treats it as the only information necessary for transfer.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the electronic transfer system to support recording and transmission of all information necessary for an effective handover

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that the electronic transfer information is the only information that the receiving ward is given before a patient is transferred. Other relevant information, that is necessary for an effective handover to take place, can be missed as the electronic transfer system limits how much information can be recorded. 2. Evidence was heard regarding the steps that the Royal Derby Hospital has made to remedy this issue. However, the national policy still states that the only piece of information necessary for a transfer is the electronic transfer information. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Maureen Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National transfer policy failing to require all information necessary for an effective handover

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that the electronic transfer information is the only information that the receiving ward is given before a patient is transferred. Other relevant information, that is necessary for an effective handover to take place, can be missed as the electronic transfer system limits how much information can be recorded. 2. Evidence was heard regarding the steps that the Royal Derby Hospital has made to remedy this issue. However, the national policy still states that the only piece of information necessary for a transfer is the electronic transfer information. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Maureen Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A national minimum dataset exists for inter-provider hospital transfers, contrary to the concern that only electronic transfer information is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In your report you express concern that “the national policy still states the only piece of information necessary for a transfer is the electronic transfer information”. I am assured by my colleagues at NHSX that there is a national Minimum Dataset (MDS) for transfers of patients between hospitals; Inter-Provider Transfer Administrative Minimum Data Set. This is overseen by NHS Digital. This does not relate to transfers of patients between wards within a single healthcare provider (a Trust in this case) and in such circumstances Trusts would be expected to have their own policies and protocols to govern the minimum data provided between departments to facilitate an effective transfer of patient information, following relevant clinical standards. On that basis, the actions taken by University Hospitals Of Derby And Burton NHS Foundation Trust would be relevant to your concerns.”

    Source location

    2020-0021-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 February 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trusts or providers are responsible for robust handover and transfer procedures for inter-hospital transfers, rather than national policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is no national policy for a Minimum Dataset for inter-hospital transfers, as was the case in Mrs Brown’s care, and where these occur it would be incumbent on the Trust or provider to ensure they have robust handover and transfer of information procedures. My Regional Colleagues have had assurance from the Trust of the changes they have made and the response to learning that has been implemented.”

    Source location

    2020-0021-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 February 2020

    Open published response
  6. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    Richard John Lockley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard John Lockley had throat and neck cancer and sustained falls that resulted in cervical spine fractures. He died in hospital on 11 September 2018, with suitable feeding not arranged before his death. The concerns were poor communication during a proposed transfer between County Hospital and Royal Stoke University Hospital, and difficulties finding a gastroenterology bed at Royal Stoke.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor communication during transfers between County Hospital and Royal Stoke

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Mr Lockley’s condition was a complex one but following discussions it was decided that he should be admitted to a gastroenterology ward at the Royal Stoke University Hospital for a radiologically inserted gastrostomy. Mr Lockley was at County Hospital. There appears to have been very poor communication between County Hospital and Royal Stoke in respect of the transfer. I wonder if this could be improved generally where patients need to be transferred between County Hospital and Royal Stoke. ”

    Source location

    Richard John Lockley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing cross-site bed-management, transfer and escalation arrangements are considered sufficient to minimise treatment delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Managing available beds across both sites is a task which requires constant adjustment and supervision and the Trust has various measures to ensure that patients receive the appropriate treatment with minimal delay. This includes the measures below:”

    Source location

    2019-0010-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  7. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Rita Elizabeth GILES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rita Elizabeth GILES underwent an endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography after delays and was reported not to have recovered, dying a few days later. The concerns included unnecessary transfers without supporting paperwork, failure to follow the Trust’s Transfer Policy, limited ERCP capacity, and failure to recognise the urgency associated with her sepsis; it was suggested that earlier transfer to the Royal Sussex County Hospital might have enabled urgent treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adhere to the Trust’s Transfer Policy

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Unnecessary transfers to and from the Princess Royal Hospital with no supporting paperwork. (2) The Trust’s own Transfer Policy not adhered too in any respect. (3) Delay in her endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography ERCP until she was so ill that it needed to be done on the CEPOD list under general anaesthetic and required ICU support. This lady never recovered from this procedure and died a few days later. (4) At Inquest it was explained to me that there are only three people in the Trust that can carry out ERCP work, they have one list each a week, lists are only on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. The lists seem to be booked well in advance so there is little or no resource for the patient who comes in as Miss Giles did with an urgent requirement. There was a failure to appreciate that as she was already septic when she came in the matter was urgent. From the Inquest it appeared that the Princess Royal Hospital was not the right place for her to be, there is argument to suggest that she should have been transferred early to the Royal Sussex County Hospital in Brighton and presumably if she needed urgent treatment she could have had it. Surely, the lists are designed to accommodate the patients not the other way round. ”

    Source location

    Rita Elizabeth GILES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of supporting paperwork for patient transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Unnecessary transfers to and from the Princess Royal Hospital with no supporting paperwork. (2) The Trust’s own Transfer Policy not adhered too in any respect. (3) Delay in her endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography ERCP until she was so ill that it needed to be done on the CEPOD list under general anaesthetic and required ICU support. This lady never recovered from this procedure and died a few days later. (4) At Inquest it was explained to me that there are only three people in the Trust that can carry out ERCP work, they have one list each a week, lists are only on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. The lists seem to be booked well in advance so there is little or no resource for the patient who comes in as Miss Giles did with an urgent requirement. There was a failure to appreciate that as she was already septic when she came in the matter was urgent. From the Inquest it appeared that the Princess Royal Hospital was not the right place for her to be, there is argument to suggest that she should have been transferred early to the Royal Sussex County Hospital in Brighton and presumably if she needed urgent treatment she could have had it. Surely, the lists are designed to accommodate the patients not the other way round. ”

    Source location

    Rita Elizabeth GILES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    James Sheffield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Sheffield suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest on 12 July 2016 after surgery following an accidental fall and died on 17 July 2016. The report identified concerns about the absence of an established system to ensure that patient-owned CPAP equipment remained with patients during internal hospital transfers and was immediately available and ready for use. The report stated that the missing CPAP machine did not have a bearing on the outcome.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure immediate availability and readiness for use of patient-owned medical equipment after internal transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “3. However, the evidence that I heard revealed that there was no established system in place to ensure that such a piece of important medical equipment would remain with the patient in the event of transfer of that patient within the hospital from differing wards, units or departments; 4. Whilst I heard evidence that a comprehensive “Report following investigation” had been conducted by Salford Royal Hospital, facilitated by their Governance Manager, in which there was correctly identified the necessary potential root causes, conclusions and sharing of lessons, proposed monitoring mechanisms, ward to ward transfer documents and electronic record systems that had been put in place – nevertheless, the evidence that I received suggested that there were outstanding protocols and/or policies to be implemented to ensure that following an internal transfer, patient owned medical equipment such as the “CPAP” machine should not only be moved with that patient, but specific measures taken to ensure that it was both immediately available and ready for use to enable the patient to self-care upon completion of the transfer. ”

    Source location

    James Sheffield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system to ensure that patient-owned medical equipment remains with patients during internal hospital transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “3. However, the evidence that I heard revealed that there was no established system in place to ensure that such a piece of important medical equipment would remain with the patient in the event of transfer of that patient within the hospital from differing wards, units or departments; 4. Whilst I heard evidence that a comprehensive “Report following investigation” had been conducted by Salford Royal Hospital, facilitated by their Governance Manager, in which there was correctly identified the necessary potential root causes, conclusions and sharing of lessons, proposed monitoring mechanisms, ward to ward transfer documents and electronic record systems that had been put in place – nevertheless, the evidence that I received suggested that there were outstanding protocols and/or policies to be implemented to ensure that following an internal transfer, patient owned medical equipment such as the “CPAP” machine should not only be moved with that patient, but specific measures taken to ensure that it was both immediately available and ready for use to enable the patient to self-care upon completion of the transfer. ”

    Source location

    James Sheffield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and operate enhanced ward-to-ward transfer documentation requiring equipment readiness confirmation and explanations for unavailable equipment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further to the assurances given by ████████ at the Inquest into the death of James Sheffield which concluded on Wednesday 31 January 2018, the Trust has already now implemented further changes to the ward to ward transfer document on its electronic patient record system in order to address the additional concern raised.”

    Source location

    2018-00214-Response-by-Salford-Care-Organisation-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 April 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing ward-transfer documentation and process changes are considered sufficient to address the identified recurrence risk, so no further Regulation 28 action is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the circumstances, it is clear that the duty to make a Regulation 28 report is no longer engaged since the Trust has already taken steps to put in place measures to prevent the recurrence of the risk identified.”

    Source location

    2018-00214-Response-by-Salford-Care-Organisation-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 April 2018

    Open published response
  9. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Ross REEVES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ross REEVES died after taking more than one week’s worth of Gabapentin, Zomorph and Mirtazapine, which caused profound stupor and respiratory depression; he subsequently developed lobar pneumonia. The principal concern was that his transfer to a new GP was likely unsafe and that better handover information might have led to different prescribing arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide adequate information during transfer of patients between GP practices

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The transfer of this patient to his new GP was likely ‘unsafe’. I am particularly concerned because in Brighton and Hove we have an extremely high rate of drug related deaths. It seems to me that there were clues to this man’s death and if there had been more information available to the new GP it is highly likely that they would have taken different action with regard to him. In particular, they may well have prescribed his medications weekly rather than monthly. At the Inquest it was clear that only he had access to the medications that he collected on the 3rd October, 2017 and that with regard to Gabapentin, Zomorph and Mirtazapine he took over one week’s worth of each. This caused his sudden collapse, his state of profound stupor and his ultimate death due to a lobar pneumonia which developed during the time he was in such a state of profound respiratory depression due to the drugs that he had been able to take. I would like it made clear that the Inquest is not a vehicle for apportioning blame however lessons must be learned and it was clear that better hand over of patients from one practice to another would provide a better chance for the manipulative patient who lies to his new GP to be picked up and dealt with adequately, hopefully preventing his death. ”

    Source location

    Ross REEVES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Alert local primary care to safe data transfer, robust coding and restricted medication quantities for high-risk patients, advising practices to adopt a blanket policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Alert to local Primary Care, highlighting issues around safe transfer of data [paper and electronic] during patient transfer, robust coding and the importance of restricting quantities of medication in patients identified as high risk until relevant clinical notes are available, and a period of assessment has reassured the new practice that prescribed medicines are used according to directions. Practices will be advised to adopt a blanket policy thereby removing the need for negotiation with individual patients.”

    Source location

    2018-0093-Response-by-Brighton-Hove-CCG
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify the digital issues causing corruption or loss of correspondence during GP-to-GP data transfer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On registration, St Peter’s asked for a faxed summary (from RR’s previous Practice) that arrived promptly, as did an electronic summary via the ‘GP to GP’ process. Unfortunately, St Peter’s were unable to access details of correspondence via the electronic record; the digital explanation for this is unclear and requires urgent clarification, as full access was not possible until after RR’s death.”

    Source location

    2018-0093-Response-by-Brighton-Hove-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify the reasons for delayed paper-record transfers against Primary Care Support England’s contractual obligations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The paper records arrived on 12/12/2017 having been requested on 10/10/2017. The records were requested urgently; this delay is very concerning and warrants clarification as a priority.”

    Source location

    2018-0093-Response-by-Brighton-Hove-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have the Task and Finish group report on prescribing-safety and patient-transfer issues within six to eight weeks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This Task and Finish group will aim to report over the next 6-8 weeks. In addition to covering the issues raised above, I envisage:”

    Source location

    2018-0093-Response-by-Brighton-Hove-CCG
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHSE commissions Primary Care Support England, which is responsible for the paper-record transfer service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Clarification as to reasons for delay in paper records arriving in the context of contractual obligation of Primary Care Support England. Commissioning of this service is via NHSE.”

    Source location

    2018-0093-Response-by-Brighton-Hove-CCG
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Elaine Bradbrook · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elaine Bradbrook suffered a severe ischaemic stroke, deteriorated into a deep coma, underwent a craniectomy, and died at Queen’s Medical Centre on 27 April 2017. Concerns included failures to escalate and monitor her deterioration, reassess her condition before transfer, and reduce risks during transfer, including transfer with an unprotected airway and without clinical escort. The report also raised concerns about the trust’s failure to investigate the circumstances, fulfil its duty of candour, and support or properly represent witnesses during the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide clinical review before transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “d. There was a failure to reduce the risks during transfer – a patient with a GCS of 4 and a history of vomiting was handed over to ambulance staff with an unprotected airway and without clinical review, or escort. ”

    Source location

    Elaine Bradbrook · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide a clinical escort during transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “d. There was a failure to reduce the risks during transfer – a patient with a GCS of 4 and a history of vomiting was handed over to ambulance staff with an unprotected airway and without clinical review, or escort. ”

    Source location

    Elaine Bradbrook · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to protect the airway during transfer of a patient with severely reduced consciousness and vomiting risk

    Wider context from the report

    “d. There was a failure to reduce the risks during transfer – a patient with a GCS of 4 and a history of vomiting was handed over to ambulance staff with an unprotected airway and without clinical review, or escort. ”

    Source location

    Elaine Bradbrook · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commence a serious incident investigation to review the care provided.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I agree that there are clear learning points from this case and I have asked the Risk Team to commence an SI investigation to review the care and submit an action plan, as necessary. I will of course share this with you and the family once complete.”

    Source location

    2018-0044-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 June 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026