Recurring concern

Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review

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First reported 2 Jul 2014•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to review, investigate, reflect on or derive and communicate safety lessons from deaths, including the anchor's failure to review restraint-related deaths for licensing and responsibility lessons and failures to reflect on or learn from deaths in other services or settings.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in the underlying care, restraint, licensing or operational process where no failure of post-death review or learning is identified.
  • Excludes general incident-investigation deficiencies that concern events other than deaths unless the assertion explicitly connects them to learning from deaths.
  • Excludes failures to implement a clearly identified safety action after lessons have already been established, where the concern is implementation rather than death review or learning.
  • Excludes coroner, inquest or regulatory disclosure failures where the unsafe condition is incomplete or late disclosure rather than failure to review deaths for safety learning.
Reports
63

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
68

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
139

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care11
Care Quality Commission8
NHS England8
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Ministry of Justice3
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Priory Group3
College of Policing2
Greater Manchester Police2
Lowdham Grange Prison2
Metropolitan Police Service2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne were prisoners at HMP Lowdham Grange who died by suicide in October and November 2023, respectively. Both had been identified as at increased risk of suicide and self-harm and placed on ACCT plans, but the plans and welfare checks were not managed in accordance with policy. The report identified concerns about Safer Custody staffing and systems, the safety and management of the Care and Separation Unit, learning from deaths, retention of evidence, and cooperation between prison and healthcare staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Persistent failure to maintain a robust system for learning from deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Persistent failure to have in place a robust system for learning from deaths ”

    Source location

    Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a Prevention of Future Deaths meeting to review learning recommendations, raise actions and verify their effective implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your fourth concern is in relation to lessons learnt from deaths in custody at HMP Lowdham Grange. In October 2024 the Governor of HMP Lowdham Grange introduced a Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) meeting where recommendations arising from Early Learning Reviews, Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) investigations and Regulation 28 reports are regularly reviewed and actions raised. Assurance checks are conducted on all actions once completed to ensure that recommendations have been fully embedded and are operating effectively within the establishment.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appoint an Inquest and PFD Lead to coordinate PFD responses and oversee implementation and sustainment of learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, in April 2026 HMP Lowdham Grange appointed an Inquest and PFD Lead who is responsible for coordinating the prison’s response to PFD matters and for providing oversight and assurance that learning is implemented and sustained across the establishment.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Creagan, an 81-year-old woman with heart failure, underwent emergency abdominal surgery in February 2025 and was later admitted with breathing difficulties, anaemia and a suspected gastrointestinal bleed. She died in hospital on 17 March 2025; the inquest determined that untreated and undiagnosed infective endocarditis caused her death. Concerns included the failure to investigate the source of her worsening infection, the missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, inadequate monitoring of her heart failure, and the decision not to conduct a Patient Safety Framework investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate deaths under the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “1. BHRUT chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mrs Creagan’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Decisions were reached at two clinical governance meetings that meaningful learning could not flow from a governance investigation into the circumstances of Mrs Creagan’s care. Such decisions appear to be incongruous with; a. The inaccurate cause of death initially offered by the Trust, b. The failure to investigate the seat of Mrs Creagan’s burgeoning infection after her pneumonia resolved. c. The missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, d. The failure to monitor the development of Mrs Creagan’s heart failure during her inpatient treatment. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Coroner’s Case Review Meeting as a formal governance mechanism for multidisciplinary oversight of inquest and coronial cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To have good governance process to support these decisions, HM Coroner will be aware that the Trust has now established a Coroner’s Case Review Meeting (CCRM) as part of its formal coronial governance arrangements.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require multidisciplinary clinical review of relevant coronial cases, including cases involving concerns about diagnosis, deterioration, monitoring, treatment or missed opportunities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has reflected carefully on the concern expressed in the Report that meaningful learning should have flowed from the circumstances of Mrs Creegan’s care. We accept the need to demonstrate clearly, in coronial cases, that learning is being actively pursued and is not dependent on PSIRF alone. Our revised approach is that coronial cases of this nature will be considered through the CCRM and, where relevant, alongside other existing review methodologies so that there is explicit multidisciplinary scrutiny, clear senior clinical oversight, and a documented record of the Trust’s appraisal of the care and the resulting actions.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use multiple review routes, including MDT, mortality, complaints, clinician reflection and CCRM reviews, rather than relying solely on PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust agrees that learning should not be constrained by whether a case meets a particular PSIRF learning response threshold. In these cases, a number of review methods have been, and continue to be, used to examine the care provided and identify learning. These include:”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify in governance arrangements that PSIRF is one learning mechanism and not the Trust’s sole route for reviewing deaths or responding to coronial concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Clarification within governance arrangements that PSIRF is one mechanism for learning, but not the sole route by which the Trust reviews deaths, identifies learning, or responds to coronial concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BHRUT is responsible for responding to the broader concerns raised about Mrs Creegan’s care and the application of PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to ensure we adequately address your concerns on PSIRF. I note you have also copied your report to Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust (BHRUT) who will respond to the broader concerns you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing clinical reviews, mortality review, governance meetings and reflection had identified sufficient learning, so a PSII would not add further learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The group was asked to reflect specifically on whether declaring a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) would have generated additional learning beyond what had already been obtained. A full clinical timeline had already been completed; a Trust Mortality review and the case had been discussed at Trust wide meetings with senior medical representation. Reflective learning was also presented by the Quality and Safety Team to seek clinical colleagues’ views on whether the incident had been managed appropriately by the Quality and Safety Advisor with a focus on ensuring optimal care and outcomes for patients going forward.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Jillian Anne Steedman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jillian Anne Steedman died at Pitsea Station on 12 May 2023 after intentionally going into the path of an oncoming train, following a deterioration in her mental health. The report identifies concerns including failures in information sharing, risk assessment, care planning, escalation, crisis response, and review of her placement and support arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn lessons from the death

    Wider context from the report

    “(14) There was an absence of a Council investigation and confusion as to which organisation should take the lead following Mrs Steedman’s death and then dispute before the inquest on the Investigation Report provided by the mental health Trust at the inquest. This caused concerns that lessons have not been learned. ”

    Source location

    Jillian Anne Steedman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a post-Inquest debrief with Community and Crisis Response teams to share learning about information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The Trust appreciates the need to ensure information sharing between professionals is carried out in a robust and timely manner. To share the learning on this point, a post-Inquest debrief was held with the Community and the Crisis Response Team teams to discuss the Inquest and the concerns raised with regards to information sharing.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share patient-safety learning through the lessons team with clinical and non-clinical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response The Trust has shared learning through the lessons team available to all clinical and non clinical staff. Information regarding patient care is discussed robustly through MDT’s and supervision, Caseloads are reviewed through audit.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Section 117 policy to improve care delivery and incorporate learning from the death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also been working with system partners to improve the governance arrangements that support mental health care in our administrative area and are presently working on a revision to the Section 117 policy so that it supports the effective delivery of care in this important area and incorporates the learning from Mrs Steedman’s sad death. This work is ongoing, but we anticipate it will be completed within the next six months.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

    Open published response
  4. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Keith James Hankin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith James Hankin was admitted for an elective optical urethrotomy on 8 September 2023, developed sepsis shortly after the procedure, was transferred to Worthing Hospital, and died there on 11 September 2023. The report identifies concerns about poor clinical governance and lack of integration, oversight and clinician assessment within the Community Urology Service, as well as multiple omissions in his pre-operative, intra-operative and post-operative care at Goring Hall Hospital, including delays in recognising and treating sepsis and transferring him for further management.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of independent review of deaths for learning and practice change

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Learning from Mr Hankin’s death The ICB did not independently review the circumstances of Mr Hankin’s death to confirm if there was any learning or changes in practice to prevent further deaths. Likewise, SMC relied on ████████ to inform them and investigate Mr Hankin’s death without considering the inherent conflict of interest in so doing. The lack of an independent review prevented any proactive learning and changes in practice following the death of Mr Hankin. This gives rise to a concern that the system within the ICB and SMC are insufficiently robust and could – as it was with Mr Hankin – prevent transparency and openness as to the circumstances of his death and limit any learning and or necessary changes in practice to prevent future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Keith James Hankin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the serious incident and identify all associated learning and recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Learning from Mr Hankin’s death. NHS Sussex ICB is not responsible for conducting serious incident (SI) investigations regarding individual patient care this is the responsibility of the providers in line with National NHSSE Serious Incident Framework which was in place in 2023. Goring Hall Hospital completed the appropriate notifications to NHS Sussex.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Follow up completion of serious-incident recommendations through enhanced contract quality meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Inquest Goring Hall Hospital have submitted the final version of the Serious Incident which has followed the Serious Incident Framework. NHS Sussex have reviewed the incident and have identified that all learning and recommendations have been identified. NHS Sussex through enhanced contract quality meetings will follow up to ensure that recommendations are complete. The next meeting is on 14th November 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serve a Contract Performance Notice on Goring Hall Hospital concerning clinical governance, serious-incident learning and quality assurance failures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Management of Mr Hankin at Goring Hall Hospital. NHS Sussex ICB have served a contract performance notice to Goring Hall Hospital (Circle Health Group) in respect of services delivered at Goring Hall Hospital, following concerns about the governance and response to a serious patient safety incident. The CPN cited breaches of the NHS Standard Contract, including failure to meet clinical standards, failure to act meaningfully on serious incident learning, and lack of transparent quality assurance.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The ICB is not responsible for investigating serious incidents involving individual patient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Learning from Mr Hankin’s death. NHS Sussex ICB is not responsible for conducting serious incident (SI) investigations regarding individual patient care this is the responsibility of the providers in line with National NHSSE Serious Incident Framework which was in place in 2023. Goring Hall Hospital completed the appropriate notifications to NHS Sussex.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providers are responsible for conducting serious incident investigations under the applicable Serious Incident Framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Learning from Mr Hankin’s death. NHS Sussex ICB is not responsible for conducting serious incident (SI) investigations regarding individual patient care this is the responsibility of the providers in line with National NHSSE Serious Incident Framework which was in place in 2023. Goring Hall Hospital completed the appropriate notifications to NHS Sussex.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The provider’s serious-incident review and ICB scrutiny were considered sufficient; an independent review would be considered only if learning was inadequate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding reviewing the causes of Mr Hankin’s death and the risk of a lack of transparency, Mr Hankin’s case was reviewed by the provider under the National Serious Incident (SI) framework as it occurred in 2023. NHS Sussex have reviewed the SI as per ICB scrutiny process and the SI has been closed. This provider review is the same process that any provider would undertake following the SI Framework. The ICB would consider an independent review if the quality of the provider report was an issue or did not elicit appropriate learning. The provider SI identified appropriate learning and subsequent actions.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Integrated Care Board is responsible for commenting on actions taken following Mr Hankin's death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will leave it to the ICB to comment on any actions it took following Mr Hankin's death. Insofar as your concerns regarding SMC's review of his death are concerned, it is incorrect to say that ████████ allegedly investigated Mr Hankin's death. The circumstances of his death were reviewed at a clinical governance meeting on 1 November 2023 at which I was present along with ████████ who is a consultant in renal medicine at University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust, ████████ (Director), ████████ (Operations Managers). We discussed the events leading up to Mr Hankin's death and the fact that Goring Hall Hospital was conducting its own investigation into Mr Hankin's care. We wrote to Goring Hall Hospital offering to input into their investigation, as is usual when treatment spans multiple providers.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Medical Chambers
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oversight and governance of Integrated Care Boards fall outside the regulatory scope of this respondent.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are unable to comment on the aspects of this concern that relate to the Integrated Care Board (ICB) as it falls outside the scope of our regulatory responsibilities. The Integrated Care Board (ICB), as a named respondent in this case, would be best placed to address this point and provide further clarification.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Integrated Care Board is best placed to address concerns about its oversight, governance and performance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has statutory powers to regulate providers of health and social care services, we do not hold regulatory authority over Integrated Care Boards (ICBs). Responsibility for the oversight, governance, and performance of ICBs lies with NHS England.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Masood Hamid · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Masood Hamid, who had dementia and multiple physical health conditions, died on 24 December 2024 shortly after being transferred under restraint from Shawside Care Home to hospital. The report identified concerns about inadequate planning for the transfer, ineffective communication between GMP and NWAS that delayed assistance, and an ineffective investigation into his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ineffective learning from deaths of detained patients

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was an ineffective investigation into the death of a patient who died in the care of the state whilst detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. As a result, the findings in the SWARM huddle document contradicted evidence of key witnesses. A lack of effective investigation in such cases means there is ineffective learning in order to prevent future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Masood Hamid · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in the Safeguarding Adult Review and act on learning identified through it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since Mr Hamid’s inquest concluded, there has been a Safeguarding Adult Review commissioned by the Oldham Safeguarding Adult Partnership. Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust will be participating in that review and will continue to fully engage with that process and act upon any learning identified as part of the review. This is ongoing at the point of sharing this letter with you.”

    Source location

    Response Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review governance and decision-making around selecting and approving the learning review after the death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of Mr Hamid’s death, and when the SWARM Huddle was completed and progressed through our approval processes, some of the information that became apparent in inquest disclosure and subsequent evidence heard during the hearing was not known. As a consequence, the Executive Director of Nursing, Quality and AHP’s has commissioned a review of the governance and decision making around which type learning review was commissioned and undertaken following Mr Hamid’s sad death. This is being undertaken by the Head of Quality in our Tameside and Glossop Care Hub. This is to ensure this is considered independently of the Care Hub and Network in which the incident took place. As”

    Source location

    Response Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider and decide whether to change the process for reassessing learning reviews when additional information becomes available.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is possible that consideration of a change in process in how we assess if learning reviews are still effective in identifying learning when more information is made available, could be implemented. A decision around this will be made once we have an outcome from the review, which is expected by the end of November 2025. I would be happy to share the outcome of this review and any associated recommendations and actions that are identified once these are available.”

    Source location

    Response Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that a further investigation was required because no evidence then linked the death to problems in its care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since you identified the above concern, further analysis and reflection was undertaken in the Trust’s Central Safety Summit. This was focused on the decision to undertake a SWARM Huddle, of its conclusion and closure, opposed to the commissioning of a further learning review, such as a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII). As part of these discussions the Trust’s PSIRF Policy was consulted which indicates that a PSII should be undertaken for ‘Deaths of patients detained under the Mental Health Act (1983) or where the Mental Capacity Act (2005) applies, where there is reason to think that the death may be linked to problems in care.’ At the time of Mr Hamid’s death, there was nothing to show following the completion of the learning review that Mr Hamid’s death was linked to any problems in relation to the care provided to Mr Hamid from the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

    Open published response
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Brown was found hanging at his home on 24 January 2024 and was confirmed deceased by police. The report identified concerns about the lack of post-death investigation and the absence of adequate welfare support and welfare-recording mechanisms for senior staff experiencing significant stress or disciplinary investigations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate deaths and learn from work-related events and welfare support

    Wider context from the report

    “1. WMFS did not undertake any investigation after Mr Brown’s death and have no policy requiring them to do so. Any opportunity to learn from a death such as a suicide related to work events including what welfare support was provided has not been addressed. This creates a risk of future deaths and action should be taken. ”

    Source location

    Mr Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review crisis management and death-in-service protocols for employment-linked workplace deaths, including support for affected staff, and implement linked policy changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, we acknowledge that the terms of reference of a review of this nature could be enhanced to ensure that learning is maximised and built into our policies and the outcomes from it better analysed to ensure that appropriate actions are built into our structures.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Fire Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning from the case to improve support for senior officers nationally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are committed to sharing the learning from this case to help improve support nationally.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Fire Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 May 2025

    Open published response
  7. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Christian James Gabriel Hobbs · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christian James Gabriel Hobbs, a 17-year-old, suffered an acute deterioration at home and was taken to hospital on 26 December 2017, where he developed cardiac arrest and died after treatment was stopped. The inquest recorded multi-organ failure, cardiogenic shock and arrhythmogenic cardiomyopathy. Concerns included the absence of an echocardiogram before his arrest, non-targeted fluid management, delays in obtaining blood gases, team communication, radiology documentation, differential diagnosis, ECG interpretation, record keeping and emergency-department alarm data retention.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of child death review to identify learning across relevant environmental and service factors

    Wider context from the report

    “POINT R – CHILD DEATH OVERVIEW PANEL REVIEW Whilst the death occurred in Cambridgeshire, it is understood that the Northamptonshire CDOP reviewed this matter. However, it appears that a copy of the Analysis Proforma is not available but taking information from a collation of reviews, there was no identification of any learning in terms of factors intrinsic to the social environment, physical environment or service provision. ”

    Source location

    Christian James Gabriel Hobbs · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 22 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collect, collate and store all child death review forms and associated communications in accordance with data protection requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All CDOP forms and associated communication are now collected, collated and stored appropriately per the General Data Protection Regulation. Ensuring all relevant information is available supports a comprehensive review of the deaths of children and young people in”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Children Safeguarding Partnership
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review serious incident and comparable investigation reports to identify service-related modifiable factors and challenge insufficient findings or improvement actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The CDR team review SI reports and those from similar investigative processes. If they have concerns that the report findings don't reflect the issues associated with the child's death and/or the improvement actions don't sufficiently address the issues identified, the CDR team will seek further information from the organisation. If the team still has concerns, they elevate them through the ICB quality team. When reviewing the deaths of children where there has been an SI investigation, CDOP will identify modifiable factors related to the service provision, which echo those found in the investigation and others CDOP believe to be important. This mirrors practice in other CDOPs I've chaired.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Children Safeguarding Partnership
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a joint decision process to determine when child deaths should be brought to CDOP, informed by completed investigations and inquests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The CDR team reached a joint decision on when to bring a case to CDOP. Typically, children and young people's deaths are not usually discussed until formal processes, such as serious incident (SI) investigations or inquests, have concluded. Delaying the CDOP panel ensures that the SI investigation reports, and inquest conclusions inform the CDOP discussion. When the CDR team knows that inquests will be delayed, they decide whether to have an initial discussion at CDOP to identify learning. If so, the case will be returned to CDOP for further discussion and ratification.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Children Safeguarding Partnership
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2025

    Open published response
  8. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Jean Pike · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jean Pike, who had suicidal thoughts and intended to hang herself, was left unattended for between 20 and 45 minutes in her supported living accommodation and was then found suspended and declared deceased on 18 May 2022. The concerns included hospital discharge decisions made without multidisciplinary consultation with community professionals, inadequate consideration of risks, and an inadequate safety plan before Jean was left unattended.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and learn critical lessons from the death

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that Jean was discharged from Ward F of Neath Port Talbot Hospital on two occasions shortly before her death by a consultant psychiatrist and that prior to the decision to discharge on both occasions there was no multi-disciplinary meeting between the consultant on Ward F and the professionals directly involved in caring for Jean in the community about Jean’s mental health and the risks she posed to herself in the community. This was in circumstances where the consultant knew before the decisions to discharge that these professionals, which included Jean’s care co-ordinator, were clearly stating that they were extremely concerned about Jean’s mental health and that they did not consider that they could keep Jean safe in the community and that they thought that Jean would hang herself in the community – which is in fact what happened in this case. I am particularly concerned by the evidence I heard from Jean’s care co-ordinator that care co-ordinators are rarely if ever consulted by consultant psychiatrists in Ward F of Neath Port Talbot Hospital before a decision is made to discharge a patient/person under secondary mental health care. This issue was not identified by Swansea Bay University Health Board (“SUBHB”) in their internal investigation into Jean’s death. This investigation found that “there is evidence of regular and effective communication between support staff, community staff and hospital staff”. The above finding of SUBHB’s internal investigation raises a concern that critical lessons have not being identified and learnt by SUBHB from Jean’s death about the importance of multi-disciplinary decision making in clinical care and risk management and the importance of including care co-ordinators and professionals in the community before a decision is taken to discharge a patient from Ward F. This creates a continuing risk to life as it may lead to risk being ignored or not properly considered by Ward F. I am also concerned that if there is a lack of clarity or a reluctance in Ward F at the consultant level to engage with care co-ordinators and professionals in the community (and before decisions are made to discharge) there is a risk that the concerns of the professionals managing a patient/person under secondary care will not be adequately considered in the decisions made by Ward F clinicians. This also creates a continuing risk to life as it may lead to risk being ignored or not properly considered by Ward F. ”

    Source location

    Jean Pike · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed recommendations from the commissioned review of Serious Incident Group functions and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the Serious Incident Review Process, the MH&LD team is continually working towards improving this and in August 2024 a review was commissioned by the MH&LD Nurse Director, requesting that Professor Jason Davies: (RDIAL Hub Director and Consultant Forensic and Clinical Psychologist).”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a two-stage Serious Incident Review approval and learning process, including senior clinical scrutiny and a forum to share learning and assign improvement actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A further change has been implemented in the development of a two-stage process for sign off and approval of the learning and findings identified in Serious Incident Reviews. The initial stage is for a focused group of senior clinicians to scrutinise and critique the outcome report to ensure that it meets the scope, terms of reference and areas of review as commissioned within”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train Serious Incident Investigators in effective review techniques and cascade process-mapping training to the mental health investigation team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In line with the above review, further training has been provided to the Serious Incident Investigators within MH&LD Service Group. The Health Board Serious Incident Investigators received training from Consequence UK, an organisation which provides training on techniques and processes to increase the effectiveness of Serious Incident reviews. Following this, training on process mapping in particular, was cascaded to the MH&LD Serious Incident investigator team (October 2024) in line with this. This way of reviewing, aids the investigator to break down policy and procedures into step-by-step guidance, which in turn can be used by the investigator to map and measure the care provided. This allows the incident investigators to make more accurate analysis of the clinical input against the specified clinical processes and guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement regular investigator-team meetings to reflect on review methods, identify learning themes and consider report feedback.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As with the change in process for strategy meetings, the Service Group are in a transition period regards the investigation methodology and will be monitoring and reviewing the process. To support this the team are implementing regular team meetings to reflect on the review process, identify themes in the learning and reflect on feedback on the reports.”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 March 2025

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    John Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Tompkins died on 25 July 2024 after hepatic artery embolisation and right-sided portal vein embolisation were undertaken simultaneously rather than sequentially. He subsequently developed acute-on-chronic liver failure and died from consequential multiorgan failure. Concerns included limited internal review of the circumstances and the Trust’s apparent failure to consider NatSSIPS2 standards when undertaking or reviewing the procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited internal review of procedure-related circumstances

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned that there was limited internal review of the circumstances of Mr Tompkins’ death, following identification that the procedures were undertaken at the same time; 2. Further and linked to the above, I am concerned that the Trust seemingly did not consider the NatSSIPS2 standards either when undertaking the procedures, nor in detail as part of its review following the inquest. ”

    Source location

    John Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Binfield and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Binfield, David William Richards and Rolandas Karbauskas died at HMP Lowdham Grange in March 2023 after using ligatures; Anthony’s and Rolandas’s deaths were suicides, while David’s death was accidental. The report identified missed opportunities to recognise and share risk information, shortcomings in prison and healthcare staffing, training and systems, and concerns about prisoner transfers, isolation, the prison contract transfer, and learning from previous deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to embed learning from deaths and monitor safety culture

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that many of the contributory factors leading to the deaths of Anthony, David and Rolandas, had been raised as issues in the investigations following previous deaths in custody at HMP Lowdham Grange. While Serco no longer manage HMP Lowdham Grange, they continue to manage prisons, and there is a risk of future deaths if the organisation is unable to create a robust culture of seeking to identify issues early, adopt learning, and continually monitor culture to ensure any action taken is embedded to reduce the risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Binfield and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish and operate a Pan Custodial Safety Lead role to embed safety improvements across custodial sites.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “practices persist. In light of the concerns that the issues identified, and remedial actions are not fully embedded across our estate we have recently created a new role of Pan Custodial Safety Lead and appointed an Assistant Director with extensive operational experience. She is responsible for driving the safety and well-being of individuals across all custodial sites by leading initiatives that improve outcomes related to self-harm, suicide, violence, and debt. She will assist in chairing the Safety Forum meetings and will liaise with the Inquest solicitor, to ensure that lessons are learned and that improvements are fully embedded operationally following review of investigations, PPO reports, Inquests and any PFDRs issued in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue embedding remedial actions operationally and monitor their implementation through the Pan Custodial Safety Lead.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “practices persist. In light of the concerns that the issues identified, and remedial actions are not fully embedded across our estate we have recently created a new role of Pan Custodial Safety Lead and appointed an Assistant Director with extensive operational experience. She is responsible for driving the safety and well-being of individuals across all custodial sites by leading initiatives that improve outcomes related to self-harm, suicide, violence, and debt. She will assist in chairing the Safety Forum meetings and will liaise with the Inquest solicitor, to ensure that lessons are learned and that improvements are fully embedded operationally following review of investigations, PPO reports, Inquests and any PFDRs issued in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish enhanced Executive-led oversight and assurance reviews for Offender Health and HMP Lowdham Grange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improvement oversight for Offender Health and HMP Lowdham Grange - The Trust has established enhanced Executive led oversight and assurance reviews for Offender Health. This comprises a weekly meeting where progress against the Transformation Plan is reviewed with individuals held to account.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a meeting focused on addressing issues raised in Reports to Prevent Future Deaths.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM) is being refreshed so that it provides a more effective mechanism for all those involved in the care of prisoners and to discuss those at risk, share information and ensure a strategic overview that pulls in all relevant information and agencies to ensure support is tailored to the individual. The Governor is committed to learning from deaths that have occurred and has introduced a meeting to focus on work to address issues raised in Reports to Prevent Future Deaths.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend future prison competitions to require culture plans and strengthen safety evaluation and safety-risk responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As stated at the inquest, we are committed to learning from the experience of the transfer of Lowdham Grange from one provider to another to inform subsequent competitions for contracts and their mobilisation, and a number of changes have already been made in response.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct pre-expiry safety audits at private prisons and share reports and recommendations with responsible HMPPS teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also agreed with the Performance, Assurance, Risk (PAR) Group to conduct Safety Audits at these sites, closer to the mobilisation period. The Safety Audits are usually unannounced, however, given the challenging nature of transferring a site from one Operator to another, we have agreed that these safety audits are carried out 6 – 9 months prior to expiry for these sites (the incumbent operator still won’t be notified prior to them going in). Final”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use Reports to Prevent Future Deaths to identify safety themes and disseminate learning through guidance, bulletins and group safety-lead meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “More generally HMPPS is committed to learning from all deaths and to taking action to address any issues that are identified as a result. The Follow-up to Deaths in Custody policy framework describes the early learning review process for all apparently non-natural deaths, through which cases are reviewed by the group safety lead and the resulting report considered by the Governor, the Prison Group Director and the National Safety Group. It also explains our commitment to supporting the various independent investigations processes that follow a death and particularly to meeting our duty of candour, including by disclosing all relevant documents.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 7 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ringfence key safety tasks and safer-custody staff against future resourcing pressures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We know that you will share a copy of this response with the families, and we would like to again express our sincere condolences for their loss. Following the inquests Sodexo have ringfenced key safety tasks and safer custody staff in the event of changes in resourcing pressures. The implementation of learning from these sad deaths is a priority.”

    Source location

    Response from Sodexo
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026