Recurring concern

Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review

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First reported 2 Jul 2014•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to review, investigate, reflect on or derive and communicate safety lessons from deaths, including the anchor's failure to review restraint-related deaths for licensing and responsibility lessons and failures to reflect on or learn from deaths in other services or settings.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in the underlying care, restraint, licensing or operational process where no failure of post-death review or learning is identified.
  • Excludes general incident-investigation deficiencies that concern events other than deaths unless the assertion explicitly connects them to learning from deaths.
  • Excludes failures to implement a clearly identified safety action after lessons have already been established, where the concern is implementation rather than death review or learning.
  • Excludes coroner, inquest or regulatory disclosure failures where the unsafe condition is incomplete or late disclosure rather than failure to review deaths for safety learning.
Reports
63

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
68

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
139

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care11
Care Quality Commission8
NHS England8
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Ministry of Justice3
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Priory Group3
College of Policing2
Greater Manchester Police2
Lowdham Grange Prison2
Metropolitan Police Service2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Howard SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Howard Smith was a serving prisoner at HMP Lowdham Grange who died at Queen’s Medical Centre on 19 May 2019 from cardiac arrest due to a massive pulmonary embolism, predisposed by deep vein thrombosis. The report describes progressive deterioration, inadequate monitoring and clinical assessment, delayed escalation and ambulance transfer, and failures in communication and care. It also identifies concerns about unsafe clinical-care practices, inadequate record keeping and disclosure, and a lack of candour in post-death investigations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to analyse evidence and learn from deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “2. An inability to record, retain and supply HM Coroner with material relevant to the inquest The progress of this inquest, taking places years after Christopher’s death, was halted many times due to the late disclosure of material relevant to the inquest. Policies and procedures said to exist at the time were produced mid-hearing. Despite the Trust having conducted their own review of the case, being provided with ample notice of the inquest hearing, and having attended multiple pre-inquest review hearings, there was an inability to identify key material and to supply that to the court in good time. The ability to reflect on the care provided in advance of a prisoner’s death is dependant on the Trust’s ability to isolate the relevant evidence, and to analyse it. Without the appropriate professional curiosity to understand exactly what happened, the Trust will repeatedly miss opportunities to learn from deaths and to take action to seek to prevent future deaths. An example of this, is the issue of a lack of safe system for NEWS2 monitoring of acutely unwell patients. This issue has repeatedly been raised at inquests involving the Trust’s forensic division. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Howard SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a formal review of Offender Health cases requiring coronial processes and undertake further review where identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will be aware that we have undertaken a formal review of all Offender Health cases which are due to be heard as a Coronial process and this has identified a number of cases where further review is required. This review recognised that not all investigations unfortunately met the Trust’s high standards of quality, candour and reflection. The further information provided as part of these reviews aims to strengthen our evidence and understand more about the required learning.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce two independent investigators to support Offender Health and lead new serious-incident investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that moving forward, I have bought in two independent investigators to support and work alongside Offender Health and they will also be allocated new Serious Incident Investigations with the aim of improving, supporting and providing leadership in this area of practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Drew Howe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Drew Howe was found dead on 19 October 2022 in a lorry on the A18 in Lincolnshire, having suspended himself by the neck with a ligature. He had experienced a deterioration in his mental health and was awaiting further assessment after being discharged without a diagnosis or treatment plan; concerns were raised that the Trust’s investigation did not fully examine his contacts with mental health services or derive all available learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to derive all available learning from deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “The Trust’s own investigation into events leading to Mr Howe’s death did not consider the full extent of his contacts with mental health services, lacked any meaningful degree of critical analysis of events, and omitted to seek to explore fundamental issues such as access to services from the patient’s perspective. As a consequence, it is a matter of concern that the Trust has not taken the opportunity to derive all available learning from Mr Howe’s death. ”

    Source location

    Drew Howe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share Trust-wide learning, including themes concerning military veterans’ experiences navigating mental health services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Ensure trust wide learning including exploring themes around death by suicide of Military veterans in mental health services given concerns relating to the perspective of the client in navigating mental health services.”

    Source location

    Response from Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 May 2023

    Open published response
  3. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Peter Gary SEABY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Gary Seaby was a resident of The Oaks and Woodcroft Care Home who died in hospital on 22 May 2018 after choking-related symptoms and subsequent aspiration pneumonia. His lunchtime food was not prepared in accordance with his SALT Care Plan, and he did not receive the required one-to-one supervision; the inquest found these possibly contributed to his death. The report also identified concerns about informal care arrangements, staffing levels, and the absence of an internal review after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct an internal review following an unexpected resident death

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Mr Seaby died in 2018 and this is the second inquest into Mr Seaby’s death. There has still been no internal review carried out following Mr Seaby’s death which was unexpected. No Manager was present throughout the inquest and when some elements of evidence were put in dealing with Regulation 28 matters there was some surprise at some of the points raised in evidence heard during the course of the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Peter Gary SEABY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report and review incidents and near misses, identifying improvement areas and lessons learned.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Arrangements to promptly report and review each incident and ‘near-miss’ incident.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Inquest findings and related information to identify remaining themes and trends.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our operational management team have now had an opportunity to meet with our legal representatives following the Inquest and this meeting highlighted several salient points that were raised, not least the requirement for a review to be undertaken of this matter as you have outlined.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a detailed action plan arising from the internal review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of taking this review forward, our operational management team are to now closely consider the findings of your Inquest and other information made available about the tragic incident involving Mr Seaby. The review will assist the operational management team to draw out any salient themes and trends that still exist despite the overarching improvements made and the passage of time. A detailed action plan will be created and any significant learning points will be shared with colleagues at the home and also be shared more widely across Priory services as appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report all serious incidents through escalation arrangements and coordinate next-day discussions on communication, support and investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All serious incidents are ‘reported up’. Where necessary a meeting is held the next working day after a serious incident is identified with discussion held in respect of communication with family, staff support and investigation arrangements.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit an additional Investigations Officer to support reviews and investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Priory are recruiting an additional Investigations Officer to assist in undertaking reviews and investigations.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt and embed the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework across Priory Adult Care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Priory are in the process of adopting the Patient Safety Incident response Framework (PSIRF). This will assist Priory to better examine incident themes and trends and respond proportionately to incidents to achieve the most learning. We anticipate that PSIRF will be fully embedded across Priory Adult Care by Autumn 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response
  4. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Teegan Marie Barnard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Teegan Marie Barnard suffered a prolonged PEA cardiac arrest during emergence from general anaesthesia after an emergency caesarean section, following significant postpartum haemorrhage and bilateral tension pneumothoraces. She sustained a non-survivable hypoxic brain injury and died at home six weeks later. Concerns included failure to consider and promptly recognise tension pneumothoraces during resuscitation, and inadequate investigation, clinical governance and learning after her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disseminate institutional learning from unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Trust Clinical Governance procedures The senior management team within the Trust have not acknowledged that there was a lack of a proper and robust system in place to trigger an investigation into all the circumstances of the death of a 17-year-old patient, with no steps taken by them to do so either before or after the publication of the HSIB report or at any time prior to the Inquest hearing. This gives rise to a concern of a lack of insight within the senior management team of the importance of undertaking a comprehensive investigation into unexpected deaths within their organisation and for there to be wider dissemination of any institutional learning with the aim of preventing future deaths. The failure of the Trust to fully investigate how Teegan came by her death also gives rise to a concern regarding the Trust’s obligation to comply with the Statutory Duty of Candour and their requirement to share their findings with both the regulators and Teegan’s family as well as to indicate the steps, if any, they have taken to prevent future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Teegan Marie Barnard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate potential anaesthetic-related causes of unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Investigation after Teegan’s death Following this incident, and despite Teegan being intubated and ventilated at the time, with a real possibility of this being an anaesthetic related event, no steps were taken by the anaesthetic department at St Richard’s Hospital, Chichester, either before or after the publication of the HSIB report, to explore potential iatrogenic or other anaesthetic related causes (such as exposure of Teegan’s lungs to excessive volume or pressure) as a possible or probable cause of Teegan’s death. Furthermore, the anaesthetic machine/ventilator was not taken out of service and assessed to see if there was a fault. Neither was the data from the anaesthetic machine downloaded and interrogated, which may have assisted in establishing how Teegan came to develop bilateral tension pneumothoraces during her emergence from general anaesthesia. The failure of the anaesthetic department to undertake any morbidity or mortality review/meeting following Teegan’s death led to a lost opportunity to share any possible learning opportunities both within and outside their department to prevent future deaths, and as a corollary to have been in a position to fully assist both the investigation by the HSIB and the inquest hearing. ”

    Source location

    Teegan Marie Barnard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss HSIB investigation outputs and learning through Intensive Care, Maternity Mortality and Morbidity, and other Trust forums.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The anaesthetic team cooperated fully with the HSIB investigation and responded comprehensively to the draft report. The outputs were discussed at length within the Trust in a number of forums and continues to be, including at the Intensive Care and Maternity Mortality and Morbidity meetings. This feedback was not fully reflected in the final report.”

    Source location

    Response from St Richards Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning that non-traumatic bilateral pneumothoraces can cause failure to ventilate and cardiac arrest through safety updates, education and events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Bilateral pneumothoraces occurring on emergence from a general anaesthetic, especially one for surgery that did not include thoracotomy or thoracoscopy, is so rare that most anaesthetists will never encounter such a situation. All anaesthetists are taught the 8 reversible causes of cardiac arrest through the Resuscitation Council’s Advanced Life Support course, or an equivalent, that they must complete as part of their training and maintain their competencies throughout their career. Bilateral pneumothoraces are mentioned only in the setting of trauma in the Resuscitation Council’s guidelines. For this reason, we will share the learning from Teegan’s death that bilateral pneumothoraces can be cause of failure to ventilate leading to cardiac arrest in the absence of trauma or thoracic surgery.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning from Teegan’s death through the Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group network and relevant organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Bilateral pneumothoraces occurring as it did in this case is rare and we note that both the Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA) and Association of Anaesthetists has stated that most anaesthetists will never encounter such a situation. NHS England’s National Patient Safety Team forms part of the Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group (SALG), together with the RCoA and the Association of Anaesthetists, who will therefore be sharing the learnings from Teegan’s death across its network of relevant organisations. The national Regulation 28 Working Group will also be asking its regional members to share the learnings with their Integrated Care Boards (ICBs) for onward sharing to Trusts across England.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ask regional Regulation 28 Working Group members to share learning with Integrated Care Boards for onward dissemination to trusts across England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Bilateral pneumothoraces occurring as it did in this case is rare and we note that both the Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA) and Association of Anaesthetists has stated that most anaesthetists will never encounter such a situation. NHS England’s National Patient Safety Team forms part of the Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group (SALG), together with the RCoA and the Association of Anaesthetists, who will therefore be sharing the learnings from Teegan’s death across its network of relevant organisations. The national Regulation 28 Working Group will also be asking its regional members to share the learnings with their Integrated Care Boards (ICBs) for onward sharing to Trusts across England.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss all Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group to share learning, identify trends and consider further review or action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would also like to provide further assurances on national NHSE work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports receive are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around preventable deaths are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning that bilateral pneumothoraces can cause cardiac arrest without trauma or thoracic surgery through safety updates, education and events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Bilateral pneumothoraces occurring on emergence from a general anaesthetic, especially one for surgery that did not include thoracotomy or thoracoscopy, is so rare that most anaesthetists will never encounter such a situation. All anaesthetists are taught the 8 reversible causes of cardiac arrest through the Resuscitation Council’s Advanced Life Support course, or an equivalent, that they must complete as part of their training and maintain their competencies throughout their career. Bilateral pneumothoraces are mentioned only in the setting of trauma in the Resuscitation Council’s guidelines. For this reason, we will share the learning from Teegan’s death that bilateral pneumothoraces can be cause of failure to ventilate leading to cardiac arrest in the absence of trauma or thoracic surgery.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and ratify a standard operating procedure defining actions for HSIB investigations and considering parallel local investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although the Trust followed existing national guidance, additional safeguards have been put in place to ensure our processes for investigating maternal deaths are robust. In the Regulation 28 notice, the Trust’s decision not to undertake a local investigation alongside the one initiated by HSIB is highlighted. At the inquest the Trust presented evidence demonstrating the very clear national guidance indicating that the HSIB investigation should replace the need for local scrutiny as described above. However, in response to the coroner’s concerns, the Trust has developed a draft SOP that defines the actions required when an HSIB investigation takes place”

    Source location

    Response from St Richards Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend guidance to require a standardised investigation process automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote the amended catastrophic-event investigation process to the anaesthesia specialty.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the amended catastrophic-event investigation process through the Royal College of Anaesthetists’ Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review guidance to identify the need for a standardised investigation process automatically triggered after catastrophic events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend guidance to specify a standardised investigation process automatically triggered immediately after catastrophic events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote the amended catastrophic-event investigation process to the anaesthesia specialty.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the amended catastrophic-event investigation process through the Royal College of Anaesthetists’ Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The identified care, evidence-handling, Duty of Candour and investigation concerns fall outside HEE’s current role and statutory responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I write in response to your report of 17 January 2023, made under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. I have been asked to respond on behalf of Health Education England. Please may I start by offering my sincere condolences to the family of Teegan Marie Bernard, following her tragic death. However, having carefully considered the report, together with the facts of the case, we believe that whilst there are valuable lessons to be learned; Unfortunately, these do not come within the scope of HEE’s current role and statutory responsibilities.”

    Source location

    Response from Health Education England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HSIB investigation replaced the need for a parallel local investigation under national guidance, so no concurrent local investigation was required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The coroner raises the concern that there was no local investigation by the anaesthetic team before or after the HSIB report. However, initiating a local investigation in parallel to the HSIB investigation would have been contrary to national guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from St Richards Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Roy Elton TRAVERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Roy Travers died on 6 June 2022 from a spontaneous cerebral bleed after admission to Whittington Hospital on 2 June, where he was not initially scanned and the bleed was not diagnosed. Concerns included delayed review after melaena was noted, failure to withhold apixaban, uncertainty about whether identified learning actions took place, and concerns about the treatment of Mr Travers and the late disclosure of the hospital’s review to the coroner and family.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review deaths and learn lessons before inquest

    Wider context from the report

    “5. As you will be aware, an ancillary function of every inquest is to attempt to learn lessons from the death, the driver behind prevention of future deaths reports. However, it is incumbent upon every hospital trust to consider the deaths of those within its care long before the matter comes to inquest, and to attempt to learn from these if possible. Whittington Health conducted a 72 hour review of Mr Travers’ care on 17 June 2022. This was disclosed to my coroner’s officer late on the afternoon of Friday, 4 November, in preparation for an inquest listed for 10am on Monday, 7 November. This meant that Mr Travers’ family and I received the 72 hour review on the morning of inquest. This had several consequences. • It placed family members in an unfair position in terms of their preparation for inquest. • It did not comply with the duty to co-operate with HM Coroner, not simply when asked but also by volunteering all relevant information. • It denied HMC the ability to call to inquest any witnesses the need for whom only became apparent from the review. • And it did not inspire confidence that Whittington Health took its own review seriously and tried to learn from it. Even the Whittington consultant giving oral evidence at inquest only saw the review on the morning of inquest, and then purely as a result of being provided it by my coroner’s officer. ”

    Source location

    Roy Elton TRAVERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collate learning from deaths and report it quarterly to the Trust board-level Quality Assurance Meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mortality review meetings are led by the department mortality leads. There is evidence to support that these meetings are taking place, including provision of timely mortality reviews. These meetings provide opportunities to capture and share the learning from death. This case was discussed at a Mortality Meeting on 21 July 2022. The Associate Medical Director for Patient Safety and Learning from deaths collates the learning and reports this to the Trust board level Quality Assurance Meeting on a quarterly basis. This has continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.”

    Source location

    Response from Whittington Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning from deaths through Grand Rounds, the Trust-wide Patient Safety newsletter and the monthly Patient Safety Forum.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Learning from deaths have been shared in Grand rounds, highlighted in the Trust wide Patient Safety newsletter and the monthly Patient Safety Forum.”

    Source location

    Response from Whittington Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing mortality review meetings and reporting arrangements were considered sufficient to capture and share learning from deaths.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mortality review meetings are led by the department mortality leads. There is evidence to support that these meetings are taking place, including provision of timely mortality reviews. These meetings provide opportunities to capture and share the learning from death. This case was discussed at a Mortality Meeting on 21 July 2022. The Associate Medical Director for Patient Safety and Learning from deaths collates the learning and reports this to the Trust board level Quality Assurance Meeting on a quarterly basis. This has continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.”

    Source location

    Response from Whittington Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 November 2022

    Open published response
  6. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Charles Michael Stringer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Charles Michael Stringer, a cyclist, died after hitting a pothole on Church Lane, causing a punctured front tyre and loss of control that resulted in a fatal chest injury. The report raises concerns about Surrey County Council’s lack of documented reflection, changes to pothole-management systems, communication, risk assessment, defect categorisation and timely repairs following his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of reflection and learning following road-related deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A lack of reflection by SCC following Mr Stringer’s death SCC indicated in their written submissions that a senior manager was available to give evidence as to reflection and learning following Mr Stringer’s death, in the absence of any such evidence in writing or a request to do so during the hearing. ”

    Source location

    Charles Michael Stringer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Significant reflection and learning occurred following the death, and service improvements were implemented afterward.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “concern in this regard, evidence was provided (in written form) by Ms Amanda Richards, addressing each of the points of concern raised by the Family).”

    Source location

    Response from Surrey County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response
  7. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew John Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew John Evans was a 47-year-old man who developed insomnia, anxiety and depression during the third COVID-19 lockdown and died on 16 June 2021 after ending his life. The principal concerns related to the GP’s lack of mental-health assessment, suicide-risk assessment, follow-up and consideration of referral; the general practice’s prescribing, communication and clinical-governance arrangements; and TalkPlus’s lack of clear guidance on referral to secondary mental-health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate and review deaths for learning and implementation of necessary changes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The actions of the General Practice No policy was provided to assist GP’s with prescribing of Mirtazapine and antidepressants and anxiolytics in general practice. There is no confirmation electronic letters have been signed as read and acted upon by the relevant GP. No evidence was provided with regard to ongoing training in mental health for GP’s. Matthew’s death was not investigated or reviewed by the GP practice with the consequence no learning points have been considered or, if necessary, changes implemented, giving rise to concern over the lack of robust clinical governance procedure within the practice. ”

    Source location

    Matthew John Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the report to Regional Mortality Boards for dissemination to all Integrated Care Boards to support learning from the event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This report will be provided to the Regional Mortality Boards so that they may share it with all ICBs to ensure that they are able to learn from this event.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Request Serious Event Audits from practices and review whether learning points from suicide investigations have been considered.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Practices will also be reminded of the importance of completing Serious Event Audits for serious/unexpected incidents. The NHS Frimley ICB quality team will be requesting the Serious Event Audits from practices as part of the investigation into suicides recorded as part of the NHSE”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Firmley
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a significant event analysis of the death with clinical staff and review the resulting learning and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The Partners at the Practice were awaiting the outcome of the Inquest before undertaking a Serious Event Audit (“the SEA”). The Practice Partners considered it appropriate that the SEA took place when it was possible to maximize the number of clinicians attending the audit meeting. The Practice conducted a SEA on Tuesday 31 May 2022. There having been delays due to bereavement, sickness, leave and the various Bank Holidays which interrupted the Practice working timetable, which impacted on the availabilities of the various members of Practice team. Six clinicians participated in the SEA, including ████████.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the significant event analysis findings with practice staff, the CCG and CQC.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “44. The Practice has shared the findings of the SEA with all staff at the practice, the CCG and CQC.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss unexpected deaths at weekly practice clinical meetings attended by GP clinicians and Partners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “45. Going forward, as part of the Practice’s Clinical Governance Policy, it was further agreed that unexpected deaths will be discussed at the Practice Clinical Meetings’ Meetings which are held every week and attended by the GP clinicians and Partners.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS commissioners are responsible for assuring provider serious-incident investigations, overseeing action plans, and closing incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c) Matthew’s death was not investigated or reviewed by the GP practice with the consequence no learning points have been considered or, if necessary, changes implemented, giving rise to concern over the lack of robust clinical governance procedure within the practice.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The circumstances were a specific case, not widespread poor care, and the care provided was not unsafe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are satisfied, at this point, that the circumstances surrounding Mr Evans’ death were a specific case and not indicative of widespread poor care on the part of the provider. Whilst we have concluded that improvements could have been made in the care and treatment provided to Mr Evans, this was not unsafe. We are pleased to see the provider has identified areas of improvement in its care and treatment, and we are assured that the actions taken will protect others using the service from harm. At this stage we have decided not to instigate any further action. However, we will continue to regularly monitor the provider and, where”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is currently considered necessary because the provider’s actions are expected to protect service users from harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are satisfied, at this point, that the circumstances surrounding Mr Evans’ death were a specific case and not indicative of widespread poor care on the part of the provider. Whilst we have concluded that improvements could have been made in the care and treatment provided to Mr Evans, this was not unsafe. We are pleased to see the provider has identified areas of improvement in its care and treatment, and we are assured that the actions taken will protect others using the service from harm. At this stage we have decided not to instigate any further action. However, we will continue to regularly monitor the provider and, where”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns do not indicate that the doctor poses a patient risk or undermines public confidence in doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AR is assured that the matters contained in your complaint do not raise concerns that ████████ poses either a risk to patients or undermines the public’s confidence in doctors. Although we do not need to investigate further, we will share your concerns with the doctor’s responsible officer and ask the doctor to discuss it with their appraiser as part of their revalidation.”

    Source location

    Response from General Medical Council(2)
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further investigation is considered necessary, although the concerns will be shared for discussion during revalidation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AR is assured that the matters contained in your complaint do not raise concerns that ████████ poses either a risk to patients or undermines the public’s confidence in doctors. Although we do not need to investigate further, we will share your concerns with the doctor’s responsible officer and ask the doctor to discuss it with their appraiser as part of their revalidation.”

    Source location

    Response from General Medical Council(2)
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Practice disputes that the death was not investigated or reviewed, stating that it was discussed promptly and later subjected to significant event analysis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Matthew’s death was not investigated or reviewed by the GP practice with the consequence no learning points have been considered or, if necessary, changes implemented, giving rise to concern over the lack of robust clinical governance procedure within the practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Connor Samuel Timothy Wellsted · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Connor Samuel Timothy Wellsted, a five-year-old boy with significant neuro-disabilities, was found deceased in his cot on 17 May 2017 during a residential neuro-rehabilitation stay. The investigation determined that he died following entrapment by a loose cot bumper causing airway obstruction. Concerns included inadequate cot maintenance and securing, lack of regular direct visual night-time supervision, and failures to preserve the scene, inform relevant bodies, and investigate the circumstances openly and transparently.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake prompt internal enquiries after sudden unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Probity and Investigation by the Children’s Trust, Tadworth The Police and the coroner’s service attending the Trust shortly after being informed of Connor’s death were not fully informed of the circumstances of his death. The scene had not been preserved. They were not told of the position Connor was found, that he had been dead for some time (likely hours) or that the padded board was initially found across his neck and that it required force by either one or two nurses for it to be pushed down to be removed. Connor’s death was sudden and unexpected, and the senior management of the Trust (chief nurse and medical director) were concerned at the time the role the padded board may have played in Connor’s death. However, they did not keep a copy of Connor’s medical records, nor did they undertake their own initial internal enquiries, or inform the relevant statutory bodies of their concerns. Furthermore, they arguably misled the CQC as to the circumstances of Connor’s death. Likewise, the pathologist who undertook the autopsy on Connor was not informed of the circumstances of his death thereby preventing a forensic post-mortem to have taken place to establish the role the cot bumper may have played in his death. In addition, the Trust engaged an expert opinion from a forensic pathologist without fully informing him of the position the cot bumper may have played in Connor’s death. The Trust undertook several Serious Investigation reports, the first of which was six months after Connor’s death. These reports did not acknowledge or address the role the cot bumper may have played in Connor’s death despite evidence from multiple witnesses indicating it was likely to be significant. ”

    Source location

    Connor Samuel Timothy Wellsted · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework to support effective investigation and learning from patient safety incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of investigation, the NHS England Patient Safety Incident Response Framework in July 2022. The Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) sets out the NHS’s approach to developing and maintaining effective systems and processes for responding to patient safety incidents, for the purpose of learning and improving patient safety. The PSIRF is a contractual requirement under the NHS Standard Contract, and as such is mandatory for services provided under that contract and will include Providers such as The Children’s Trust at Tadworth Court.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out a comprehensive review of the Report’s concerns at the Children’s Trust through South East regional representatives.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that you also sent your Report to the Chief Executive and Medical Director of the Children’s Trust, Tadworth, and I have had sight of their response as referred to above. On 15 July 2022, representatives from the South East Region attended upon the Trust and carried out a comprehensive review of all of the points that you made in your Report. They concluded that there were no current quality concerns, however there was room for improvement. The outstanding actions for improvement will continue to be monitored by NHS England South East. I am assured that the Children’s Trust, Tadworth, have addressed all of the concerns raised in your Report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add unexpected-death procedures to mandatory basic-life-support induction and annual-update training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our Basic Life Support (BLS) training follows the Resuscitation Council UK guidelines and is mandatory for all nursing and care staff. Shift leaders and senior nurses also attend an enhanced BLS+ training annually which is designed to increase knowledge, skills and confidence in managing medical emergencies. It further emphasises and builds upon the Resuscitation Council UK guidelines taught in BLS and includes enhanced simulations and training around escalation of care and management of medical emergencies more relevant to our service. Additionally, the training covers how to call for help, using the bleep system, using call bells, dialling 999 and at what point each might be appropriate. Each BLS session ends with a mandatory assessment of skills.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children's Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop clear protocols and training for unexpected child deaths using relevant national and local guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to this, we have reviewed The Royal College of Pathologists guidelines on ‘Sudden unexpected death in infancy and childhood: Multi-agency guidelines for care and investigation’, 2016, and guidance produced by the Surrey Child Death Review Partnership. We are further developing a clear protocol and training for our nursing and medical staff in the event of an unexpected child death. We accept that our training has historically focussed on basic life support and actively assessing and supporting children who we do not anticipate will die unexpectedly. Whilst our staff will continue to receive their basic life support training, we will have clear guidelines on processes and actions to be taken in the event of a sudden unexpected death. We are also planning to expand our existing simulation training beyond medical emergencies and basic life support, to cover unexpected deaths.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children's Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand simulation training to cover unexpected deaths in addition to medical emergencies and basic life support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to this, we have reviewed The Royal College of Pathologists guidelines on ‘Sudden unexpected death in infancy and childhood: Multi-agency guidelines for care and investigation’, 2016, and guidance produced by the Surrey Child Death Review Partnership. We are further developing a clear protocol and training for our nursing and medical staff in the event of an unexpected child death. We accept that our training has historically focussed on basic life support and actively assessing and supporting children who we do not anticipate will die unexpectedly. Whilst our staff will continue to receive their basic life support training, we will have clear guidelines on processes and actions to be taken in the event of a sudden unexpected death. We are also planning to expand our existing simulation training beyond medical emergencies and basic life support, to cover unexpected deaths.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children's Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response
  9. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Alan Hodgson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Alan Hodgson died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 14 January 2021. The report describes failures to recognise the severity of his condition, delays in acting on and reporting imaging, failures to follow the vascular pathway, inadequate communication and continuity of care, and an insufficient review of the circumstances leading to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficiently robust review of deaths and lessons to be learnt

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) An insufficiently robust review by The Trust of the circumstance leading to the death of Mr Alan Hodgson and of the lessons to be learnt from it, i.e. an insufficient review of the vascular pathway, including its dissemination, awareness and continuous training to improve the importance of the rapid escalation of care against the background of effective communications and handovers between staff to promote holistic patient care. ”

    Source location

    Mr Alan Hodgson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Nichola Jane Lomax · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nichola Jane Lomax had a long history of an eating disorder and attended hospital several times in 2020 with severe malnutrition and electrolyte imbalance. She died on 3 August 2020 after delays and failings involving hospital treatment, specialist referral, communication, monitoring, nutritional care and access to appropriate services. The report identified concerns about inadequate eating-dis disorder training, access to specialist advice, referral criteria, critical services, community monitoring, nursing care and investigation of deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of appropriate investigation and learning from eating disorder deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “7) Lack of Recognition of the need to Investigate For National Medical Examiner It was of concern to the court that the only reason Nichola’s death was referred to HM Coroner was her initial medical cause of death had incorrectly included paracetamol toxicity. It was not until the court investigated this case, that there was any recognition by any of the agencies that there had been failings in the care of Nichola. If this death had not been reported to the Coroner, none of the above failings or the need for learning would have been identified. The court is extremely concerned that there is the real potential for under reporting of such cases and a lack of appropriate investigation to ensure learning is captured so as to prevent future deaths. This is important given the court heard eating disorders have the highest mortality rate of any mental disorder. ”

    Source location

    Nichola Jane Lomax · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Convene a stakeholder round table and publish guidance for medical examiners on investigating eating disorder deaths.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The National Medical Examiner is also concerned about deaths of people with eating disorders. In late 2021, the National Medical Examiner’s team proposed a round table discussion with subject matter experts and stakeholders, including representatives from the Chief Coroner’s office, with a view to publishing guidance for medical examiners through the National Medical Examiner’s series of Good Practice papers. The round table discussion to inform this paper is due to take place in February 2022, with publication expected later in 2022.”

    Source location

    2021-0433 - Response regarding Nichola Lomax
    Page 16 · response
    Published 31 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share case learning through Greater Manchester quality, governance and learning forums.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions taken or being taken to share learning across Greater Manchester.”

    Source location

    2021-0433 - Response regarding Nichola Lomax
    Page 41 · response
    Published 31 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor key learning and recommendations to ensure they are embedded in practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In conclusion, key learning points and recommendations will be monitored to ensure they are embedded within practice. GMHSCP is committed to improving outcomes for the population of Greater Manchester.”

    Source location

    2021-0433 - Response regarding Nichola Lomax
    Page 41 · response
    Published 31 December 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026