Recurring concern

Failure to learn from deaths through systematic review

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First reported 2 Jul 2014•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to review, investigate, reflect on or derive and communicate safety lessons from deaths, including the anchor's failure to review restraint-related deaths for licensing and responsibility lessons and failures to reflect on or learn from deaths in other services or settings.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in the underlying care, restraint, licensing or operational process where no failure of post-death review or learning is identified.
  • Excludes general incident-investigation deficiencies that concern events other than deaths unless the assertion explicitly connects them to learning from deaths.
  • Excludes failures to implement a clearly identified safety action after lessons have already been established, where the concern is implementation rather than death review or learning.
  • Excludes coroner, inquest or regulatory disclosure failures where the unsafe condition is incomplete or late disclosure rather than failure to review deaths for safety learning.
Reports
63

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
68

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
139

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care11
Care Quality Commission8
NHS England8
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Ministry of Justice3
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Priory Group3
College of Policing2
Greater Manchester Police2
Lowdham Grange Prison2
Metropolitan Police Service2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Michelle Roach · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michelle Roach’s inquest was heard at Reading Town Hall between 6 and 9 November 2018, and the narrative conclusion recorded that natural causes contributed to by neglect in her clinical management from 09:11 on 29 January 2014 until 18:07 on 30 January 2014. Concerns related to GP knowledge of venous thromboembolism, record-keeping and reviews of unexpected deaths, as well as the level of overnight medical registrar cover at the hospital trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the GP practice system to investigate unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The GP practice should review their system for investigating unexpected deaths in order to learn from them and improve clinical management. It should also audit and review ████████ clinical knowledge in this area and her record keeping. ”

    Source location

    Michelle Roach · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. North West Wales

    AI-generated summary

    Simon Willans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Simon Willans was admitted to Ysbyty Gwynedd with breathlessness, recent loss of consciousness and a swollen right calf, and was discharged with diagnoses of orthostatic hypotension and anxiety. He died from a pulmonary embolism the following day. Concerns included inadequate assessment and follow-up, failure to elicit a family history of pulmonary embolism, lack of safety-netting, and failure to commence heparin despite DVT/PE being a differential diagnosis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to effectively scrutinise the ambulatory care unit following a patient death

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) BCUHB have only just commenced an SIR on this matter and the ambulatory care unit, its structure, practices, systems, staff have not been effectively scrutinised following Mr Willans death in direct contravention of the policy of BCUHB on reporting and given this the following concerns do not appear to have been addressed potentially compromising patient safety until the conclusion of the SIR ”

    Source location

    Simon Willans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Preston and West Lancashire

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen McDermott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen McDermott was found deceased at home on 25 May 2015, having died sometime earlier as a result of the intentional application of a ligature; the inquest recorded the medical cause of death as hanging and concluded suicide. In the preceding months, he had presented repeatedly after overdoses and being recovered from train tracks, but was discharged without mental health follow-up. The principal concerns included fragmented and poorly used records, incomplete assessments and record keeping, insufficient consideration of overlapping mental health and substance misuse issues, missed opportunities for face-to-face assessment, limited information sharing between services, and an incomplete incident review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in learning and implementing lessons from identified concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “9) Although ████████ accepted that a number of issues had been highlighted by the inquest that he would be “feeding back” and “learning lessons from,” it is a significant concern that almost two years have elapsed since Mr McDermott’s death and lessons have not yet been learned, especially since the Trust had been in possession of the expert’s report for over 3 months prior to the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Stephen McDermott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Christopher Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Christopher Roberts, a music student with a history of psychosis and a previous intentional insulin overdose, took a large overdose of insulin and prescribed psychotropic medication after returning to Sussex. He was admitted to intensive care in a coma with significant hypoxic brain damage and later died from a major haemorrhage at the tracheostomy site caused by acute arteritis of the innominate artery. Concerns included failures to log and scrutinise referral faxes, consider written clinical and risk information before assessing urgency, confirm the date of first contact, and formally review the death and seek relevant learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake formal reviews of deaths of people known to the organisation

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) That SPFT did not appear to have undertaken any formal review of the death of someone known to the organisation and, although SPFT were aware a RCA was being conducted by Avon and Wiltshire NHS Trust, SPFT had not received nor sought that final RCA report from Wiltshire. An opportunity to learn relevant lessons from the above events had therefore been delayed until the inquest, almost a year after events. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Christopher Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the new Trust-wide Serious Incident Policy for timely investigations and learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has developed a new Serious Incident Policy. Justine Rosser, Director of Nursing Standards and Safety is the lead for this new policy which I anticipate will be in use Trust wide from next week. This new policy will ensure investigations are carried out to identify learning without delay and follows NHS England guidelines and best practice. In future, when another Trust is leading on a Root Cause Analysis, SPFT will complete a local review and feed into the other Trust’s investigation to ensure maximum reflection and learning for both organisations is achieved.”

    Source location

    2017-0028-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a local review and contribute to another Trust’s investigation when that Trust leads a Root Cause Analysis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has developed a new Serious Incident Policy. Justine Rosser, Director of Nursing Standards and Safety is the lead for this new policy which I anticipate will be in use Trust wide from next week. This new policy will ensure investigations are carried out to identify learning without delay and follows NHS England guidelines and best practice. In future, when another Trust is leading on a Root Cause Analysis, SPFT will complete a local review and feed into the other Trust’s investigation to ensure maximum reflection and learning for both organisations is achieved.”

    Source location

    2017-0028-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  5. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Parke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Parke, who had chronic liver disease, was admitted to West Cumberland Hospital and had a nasogastric tube inserted. The tube was misplaced into his left lung, an x-ray showing this was misinterpreted, and feeding and medication were administered through the tube before he developed aspiration pneumonia and died. The concerns included staff not following nasogastric-tube policy and systemic failures in policy implementation, training, competency checks, auditing and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from deaths and incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “I have now held inquests into 3 deaths as a result of misplaced nasogastric tubes at North Cumbria Hospitals which occurred over a period of a little over 7 years. These types of death are described as ‘Never Events’. On the facts of these three cases the deaths were avoidable. Common themes in all are: (a) Staff not being aware of the policy. (b) Staff not reading the policy. (c) Staff not applying the policy. (d) Staff not following good practice. (e) The Trust not ensuring compliance nor rolling out training to all who needed it. (f) Lack of checks and audits to establish competence and adherence to policy. (g) Failure of the Trust to learn from the first death. (h) Lack of Corporate Memory (the issue of NGTs was not on the Risk Register). (i) The Trust not fully implementing the 2011 NPSA Alert for over two years and only as a result of the second death. (j) Even after the second death not having systems in place to ensure compliance on the ward which contributed to the third death. (k) The Trust Policy growing in size from 20 to 36 pages in 7 years, making it difficult for busy practitioners to absorb (there are some 200 Policies in the Trust). (l) The current Policy has cross-references to paragraphs which do not exist. These errors have been carried through three versions, and raise the risk of misinterpretation by staff and undermining their confidence in such an important document. ”

    Source location

    Michael Parke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend regulations to require NHS Trusts to summarise published deaths information, learning and resulting actions in Quality Accounts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also amending regulations to require Trusts to summarise the published information in Quality Accounts from June 2018, including evidence of learning and action as a result of that information and an assessment of the impact of actions that a Trust has taken.”

    Source location

    2017-0024-Response
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the deceased patients’ families to obtain personal comments for organisational learning briefings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold organisational briefings in April 2017 to share learning from the Never Events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  6. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Amanda Coulthard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amanda Coulthard, who had multiple sclerosis, died on 26 April 2015 after a nasogastric tube entered her right lung and feed and medication were administered into it. She developed aspiration pneumonia. The concerns included failures to follow and implement nasogastric-tube policies and best practice, inadequate checking and training, and insufficient systems to ensure compliance and learn from previous deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from a prior nasogastric tube death

    Wider context from the report

    “I have now held inquests into 3 deaths as a result of misplaced nasogastric tubes at North Cumbria Hospitals which occurred over a period of a little over 7 years. These types of death are described as ‘Never Events’. On the facts of these three cases the deaths are avoidable. Common themes in all were: (a) Staff not being aware of the policy. (b) Staff not reading the policy. (c) Staff not applying the policy. (d) Staff not following good practice. (e) The Trust not ensuring compliance nor rolling out training to all who needed it. (f) Lack of checks and audits to establish competence and adherence to policy. (g) Failure of the Trust to learn from the first death. (h) Lack of Corporate Memory (the issue of NGTs was not on the Risk Register). (i) The Trust not fully implementing the 2011 NPSA Alert for over two years and only as a result of the second death. (j) Even after the second death not having systems in place to ensure compliance on the ward which contributed to the third death. (k) The Trust Policy growing in size from 20 to 36 pages in 7 years, making it difficult for busy practitioners to absorb (there are some 200 Policies in the Trust). (l) The current Policy has cross-references to paragraphs which do not exist. These errors have been carried through three versions, and raise the risk of misinterpretation by staff and undermining their confidence in such an important document. ”

    Source location

    Amanda Coulthard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend regulations to require NHS Trusts to summarise published deaths information, learning and resulting actions in Quality Accounts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also amending regulations to require Trusts to summarise the published information in Quality Accounts from June 2018, including evidence of learning and action as a result of that information and an assessment of the impact of actions that a Trust has taken.”

    Source location

    2017-0024-Response
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the deceased patients’ families to obtain personal comments for organisational learning briefings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold organisational briefings in April 2017 to share learning from the Never Events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Ms Michelle Ann Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms Michelle Ann Lawrence died at home on 2 May 2015 from respiratory failure after taking multiple prescription and illegal sedative drugs, following periods in police and private custody. The principal concerns included failures to identify concealed drugs, limited strip-searching and CCTV facilities, inadequate checking of custody-suite toilets, insufficient detail in risk records, and the lack of independent investigation into deaths following release from private custody providers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of independent investigation into deaths following release from private custody providers

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That there is no independent investigation into the deaths of persons following release from private providers of custody analogous to the IPCC such that important evidence is lost that upon analysis may be used to learn lessons and thus prevent future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Ms Michelle Ann Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jake Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jake Robinson died at home on 23 August 2015 after taking his own life; the recorded cause of death was hanging and illicit drug use. Concerns included failures to share information about prescribing diazepam, the failure to identify this issue in the review of his death, fragmented substance-misuse services, and the unexplained rearrangement of a Community Mental Health Team appointment shortly before his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify relevant safety issues in reviews of deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “2) The failure to identify the above issue as part of the review into the death of Jake Robinson is a concern as it highlights a missed opportunity to potentially learn lessons. ”

    Source location

    Jake Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue highlighting through training and local guidance the importance of inviting relevant agencies and professionals to serious incident reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust encourages reviewer leads to give all parties, who maybe involved in the serious incident, the opportunity to be involved in Serious Incident Review process, including GPs. If the reviewers had invited the GP to contribute to the process and the GP took this opportunity, it is likely the issue of the missing letter would have come to light and been included in the review. The Trust will continue to highlight to review leads through training events and local guidance the importance of ensuring all key agencies and professionals such as GPs are invited to contribute to the GMW review process where appropriate.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-West-NHS-Mental-Heath-Foundation-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send all mental health service commissioners NHS England expectations for commissioned arrangements covering urgent correspondence, clinical risk assessment, shared care, incident learning, and vulnerable patients who miss appointments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to reduce the risks of recurrence of a similar incident at these and other organisations across Greater Manchester so that referrals are managed and monitored by the responsible commissioning and provider organisations I intend to undertake the following actions by 29 April 2016.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record Jake’s death as a significant event and discuss the circumstances fully within the practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a practice we have obviously recorded Jake’s death as a Significant Event and have discussed the situation fully. We found that a request to discuss Jake’s situation with his mother in June of 2015 was overlooked due to emails from her being received whilst I was on holiday, a written apology has already been sent to Jake’s mother regarding this. The only other action that the practice in our opinion should perhaps have taken was to arrange a visit or consultation with Jake after his second admission to A&E on the 17th of July 2015.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Bodmin-Road-Health-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Carl Robert FOOT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carl Robert Foot was found hanging in his cell at HMP Pentonville after repeatedly ringing his cell bell. He was found at 3.18pm, resuscitated and died four days later in hospital. The jury found that prison officers responded inadequately to the cell bells, contributing to his death, and identified difficulties in determining how long a prisoner had been waiting and in reviewing the incident promptly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly examine cell bell logs and identify those who heard or answered bells

    Wider context from the report

    “3. In terms of learning lessons for the future, which may include learning by individual officers as well as on a systemic basis, there was no exploration immediately after Carl Foot’s death of the cell bell log and all those who heard/answered his bell that afternoon. By the time of inquest, memories had faded. ”

    Source location

    Carl Robert FOOT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Warren · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Warren, an elderly and deaf tenant with no known family or friends, was found deceased at home on 29 January 2015 after apparently falling around 24 January and suffering broken ribs, bronchopneumonia and signs of hypothermia. Concerns included the failure to address a hazardous electric heater, the use of a non-urgent police welfare check, insufficient guidance and training for social-work staff, and the absence of a formal review by the relevant councils.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of formal review of safeguarding-related deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That neither CBC nor WSCC have a yet undertaken any formal review of this case despite the death of someone known to both organisation and subject to a safeguarding alert at the time of his death. An opportunity to learn lessons from the above events has hence been delayed and potentially been lost. ”

    Source location

    Mr Warren · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Follow and report safeguarding alerts to senior managers and immediately review future deaths involving such alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, the Council did not have a procedure for immediately reviewing a death where a safeguarding alert had been made. The Council’s review was prompted by being contacted by the Coroner’s office on 11 February 2015. Safeguarding alerts will be followed and reported to senior managers and any future deaths where a safeguarding alert has been made will immediately be subject to review. This has been actioned.”

    Source location

    Crawley-Borough-Council-Response-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a detailed review of the circumstances surrounding Mr Warren’s involvement with the Council.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that we have now completed a detailed review (copy attached) of the circumstances relating to our involvement with Mr Warren. We involved Crawley Borough Council in the review process.”

    Source location

    2015-0307-West-Sussex-County-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Council disputes that its review and recommendations were absent, stating they arose from an earlier case review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• At the time of the Inquest the Council had carried out a Review, had spoken to the staff involved and reviewed all of the case notes. The manager of the housing management team initially carried out this review as part of the preparation of the report for the Inquest and this was then reviewed by the Head of Service with the service recommendations coming from further discussions. The recommendations were not contained in the report for the Inquest. Recommendations 1 and 2 below had come out of this Review. We are of the view that the line out of the Housing of the Council witness TSO1 meant that she thought there was something other than the discussion she had had with her line manager.”

    Source location

    Crawley-Borough-Council-Response-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026