Recurring concern

Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication

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First reported 30 Jul 2013•Latest report 16 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dosage verification, clarification, read-back, discussion or communication when they directly concern medication dosage safety across prescribing, dispensing, administration or transitions of care.

Not included

  • Excludes medication safety concerns unrelated to dosage verification or communication, such as failures to refer for non-medication care.
  • Excludes generic staffing, documentation or communication deficiencies that are not directly tied to medication dosage safety.
  • Excludes failures concerning medication choice, monitoring or adherence where dosage verification or communication is not the unsafe condition.
Reports
16

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
20

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
26

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England4
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Boehringer Ingelheim Limited1
Brace Street Health Centre1
Brook Medical Centre1
BTCM Limited1
Care Quality Commission1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Doncaster Royal Infirmary1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
Godfrey Care1
Inmind Healthcare Group1
Manor Field Surgery1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    James Robert Quinton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Robert Quinton collapsed after a period of vomiting and abdominal pain, with the inquest recording splenic rupture and combined morphine and methadone toxicity, alongside rivaroxaban therapy, as the cause of death. He did not respond to resuscitation and supportive measures. Concerns included poor-quality nursing and observation records, and noradrenaline intended as an infusion being administered as an intravenous bolus during resuscitation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of checking of verbally prescribed drugs before administration

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Furthermore, during the course of the resuscitation a decision was made for Mr Quinton to be given 4 mgs of Noradrenaline. This was to be given as an infusion. Unfortunately, this was actually given as a 4 mg iv bolus. Although the records suggest this did not have a detrimental effect on Mr Quinton (his blood pressure had been exceptionally low) this clearly could be highly significant for other patients. It also raises the question of other patients being given either the wrong drug or the wrong amount of drug or the wrong method of administration when the procedure for drugs to be prescribed in this scenario is on a verbal basis only. It would seem sensible to have some checking procedure by the person administering the drugs checking with the person who had prescribed it to make sure their understanding is correct. From the evidence I heard it seems there are no such procedures in place. ”

    Source location

    James Robert Quinton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a working group with Emergency Department and Anaesthetics representation to address emergency intravenous drug administration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am informed by ████████ that a working group has been set up with representation from ED and Anaesthetics to explore further the issue of IV drug administration in emergencies during resuscitation. The first meeting is scheduled for the end of April to look at systems and processes for working together within the Resus area. I understand that the IV Drugs Administration Policy has also been sent to all qualified staff in the emergency department.”

    Source location

    2018-0056-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold the working group’s scheduled meeting to examine resuscitation-area systems and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am informed by ████████ that a working group has been set up with representation from ED and Anaesthetics to explore further the issue of IV drug administration in emergencies during resuscitation. The first meeting is scheduled for the end of April to look at systems and processes for working together within the Resus area. I understand that the IV Drugs Administration Policy has also been sent to all qualified staff in the emergency department.”

    Source location

    2018-0056-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribute the Intravenous Drugs Administration Policy to all qualified Emergency Department staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am informed by ████████ that a working group has been set up with representation from ED and Anaesthetics to explore further the issue of IV drug administration in emergencies during resuscitation. The first meeting is scheduled for the end of April to look at systems and processes for working together within the Resus area. I understand that the IV Drugs Administration Policy has also been sent to all qualified staff in the emergency department.”

    Source location

    2018-0056-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response
  2. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Stuart Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Stuart Hamilton died on 8 December 2016 from acute tramadol toxicity after taking excess Tramadol to relieve chronic pain and sleep before working the next day. The principal concerns were the absence of clear procedures for managing patients who obtain or take more medication than prescribed, and insufficient exploration of medication regimes, alternative pain management, and discussions about exceeding prescribed dosages.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to discuss with patients the implications of exceeding prescribed dosages

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Consideration for improved systems for discussing with patients the implications of them attempting to exceed prescribed dosages and recording that such discussions have taken place. ”

    Source location

    Craig Stuart Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Tanya Rosemary Marion Oladejo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tanya Rosemary Marion Oladejo was found collapsed and unresponsive on her bed after a friend had not heard from her for approximately one week; police confirmed there were no suspicious circumstances. The inquest concluded misadventure, with the medical cause of death recorded as amitriptyline intoxication. The principal concern was inadequate communication between the GP practice and the responsible clinician about medication, including unilateral changes to amitriptyline prescribing that were not communicated to the responsible clinician.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure medication directions and labels correspond to the prescribed use

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The responsible clinician had made adjustments to the prescribed medication regime including allowing the GP to vary the amount of sertraline according to the patient’s presentation. (2) The GP, in fact, also on occasion titrated the amount of amitriptyline prescribed according to the patient’s presentation. (3) The responsible clinician was not made aware of the unilateral titration of amitriptyline so, accordingly, was unaware that a drug she had (in discussion with the patient) prescribed to be used as a sleeping draft was, in fact, being prescribed clearly labelled to be taken in the mornings. (4) In this case, there was a worrying lack of adequate communication between the GP practice and the responsible clinician about medication prescribed to assist in controlling Tanya’s condition ”

    Source location

    Tanya Rosemary Marion Oladejo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review processes for recording medications across different healthcare sectors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Review the current processes for recording medications in the different sectors by August 2014”

    Source location

    2014-0203-Response-by-Hillingdon-Commissioning-Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with CNWL and Hillingdon Hospitals pharmacy leads the possibility of developing a standard cross-sector medication letter or form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Discuss with the Pharmacy Leads in CNWL and the Hillingdon Hospitals Trust the possibility of developing one standard letter or form for use across all sectors in July 2014”

    Source location

    2014-0203-Response-by-Hillingdon-Commissioning-Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have practice pharmacists review and improve medicines-reconciliation processes in GP practices.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Ensure our practice pharmacists review and improve medicines reconciliation processes in practices starting in July 2014 and on-going thereafter.”

    Source location

    2014-0203-Response-by-Hillingdon-Commissioning-Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 April 2014

    Open published response
  4. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    MRS KERRY JACOBS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Kerry Jacobs died on 8 July 2013 from a pulmonary embolism arising from a deep vein thrombosis in her right calf. Concerns included the prescription of a steroid dose outside usual ENT practice and BNF guidelines without adequate documentation or confirmation with the consultant, and the lack of a protocol requiring discussion between pharmacists and clinicians when prescriptions are queried.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a protocol for pharmacist-clinician discussion of queried drug dosages

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was no discussion between the pharmacist and either the prescribing doctor or the patient’s consultant regarding the dosage when the query was raised by the pharmacist. I was informed by the consultant physician who conducted the SUI that, where a pharmacist queries the intended prescription of a drug, it is good practice for the clinician and pharmacist to discuss the matter and consider together the risks and benefits of the prescription. He stated that it “would clearly be of value” to have a protocol requiring such a discussion to take place, where practicable. The Trust has no such protocol. I consider that, although I did not find that Mrs Jacobs’ death would have been prevented by correction of her prescription, there is a risk that future deaths may occur in similar circumstances and action should be taken to reduce the risk that the prescription of an unintentionally high dose of a drug is not identified and corrected. ”

    Source location

    MRS KERRY JACOBS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a directive requiring clinicians to document the rationale for prescribing outside BNF or usual-practice guidance and record pharmacist prescription-query discussions and outcomes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: It is correct that there is no formal Trust policy in place, however, ████████ Chief Medical Officer, has issued a directive to the Chiefs of Service in the Divisions (see attached email dated 4 June 2014) that all staff should record and specify the rationale for the decision to prescribe a medication dosage that is outside guidance within BNF, or usual practice. In addition, when a query is raised by a pharmacist regarding a patient’s prescription, an entry must be made within the patient’s medical records, noting the discussion and outcome. This directive will be disseminated to the clinical staff within each Division, at Multi Disciplinary Team (MDT) meetings each week, and departmental meetings; and will be added to the Trust’s Audit Programme for 2014/2015.”

    Source location

    2014-0133-Response-by-Surrey-Sussex-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 March 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reiterate the medication-screening procedure requiring direct discussion between prescribing clinicians and screening or dispensing pharmacists, with escalation to another prescriber when necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: It is correct there is no formal Trust policy in place, however, ████████ Chief Pharmacist, has re-iterated the medication screening procedure to the Trust’s Pharmacy Technicians and Pharmacists. I attach a copy of his email communication dated 7 May 2014 in which he specifically has instructed the Pharmacy Department that “the prescribing clinician and the screening and dispensing pharmacist must have an inter-professional direct discussion about the prescription (not via secretaries), and if the prescribing clinician is not available, then the pharmacy technician or pharmacist must speak to another prescriber clinician who is able to make a decision.””

    Source location

    2014-0133-Response-by-Surrey-Sussex-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 March 2014

    Open published response
  5. York City

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Judith Lesley Marshall was prescribed morphine sulphate 10mg twice daily, but a pharmacy dispensed 60mg capsules. She took the capsules as prescribed and was found dead on 30 September 2009; the inquest recorded bronchopneumonia and the effects of morphine, with a conclusion of accidental death. The principal concerns were pharmacy dispensing errors, the adequacy of checking and monitoring systems, and the absence of central monitoring of prescription errors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory read-back procedures for dispensing details

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Mandatory procedures requiring a ‘read-back’ of the drug, its dosage, its frequency of administration and its total quantity may prevent such dispensing errors. In so far as the error in this case can be attributable to ‘Human Error’ it is concluded that the dispensing pharmacist focused on the figure of 60 and incorrectly attributed that to the dosage as well as to the number of capsules. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for commissioning pharmaceutical services and has addressed the concerns in its detailed response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As Secretary of State for Health, I am responsible for setting national priorities, monitoring the whole system’s performance and supporting the integrity of the system to protect the best interests of patients, the public and the taxpayer. Since 1 April 2013, most day to day decisions are taken by NHS England. NHS England is responsible for commissioning primary care services, including pharmaceutical services.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandatory read-back procedures are not introduced because definitive evidence that they reduce dispensing errors is lacking.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) Mandatory procedures requiring a ‘read-back’ of the drug, its dosage, its frequency of administration and its total quantity may prevent such dispensing errors. In so far as the error in this case can be attributable to ‘Human Error’ it is concluded that the dispensing pharmacist correctly had the figure of 60 and incorrectly attributed that to the dosage as well as to the number of capsules.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response
  6. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Phillip Arthur Pratt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Phillip Arthur Pratt died on 2 November 2012 at St Richards Hospital after a fall-related fracture, surgery, and a sudden deterioration attributed to bronchopneumonia. The report raised concerns about incomplete medication information, delayed consideration of alcohol detoxification, delayed discontinuation of tramadol after confusion developed, delayed shoulder X-rays, and the unavailability of requested additional nursing staff for a high-risk patient.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete medication reconciliation on admission and pre-assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest, ████████, Head of Nursing for St Richards Hospital, gave evidence in relation to a “Root Cause Analysis Investigation Report”. The stated purpose of the report was “To identify the root causes and key learning from an incident and use this information”. The report covered a number of areas of concern arising from the investigation. ████████ gave evidence to say that a number of practices and additional training have already been put in place to address some of the issues set out in the report. The matters of concern that I raise herein deal with issues raised in the report in respect of which standard action has not yet been taken. (1) On admission to hospital and at pre-assessment stage, there was a note of the patient’s medication but no note as to dosage of medication. The Report indicates no attempts were made to contact the patient’s GP or family to ascertain precise levels of medication; (2) As it was not expected the patient would remain in hospital for a protracted stay, the need for alcohol detoxification was not considered at an early stage and not reassessed when the reason for the patient’s admission changed; (3) The onset of agitation and confusion had been recognized, with a (4) There was a delay in discontinuing the prescription for Tramadol despite the onset of confusion which is one of the contra-indications of that medication; (5) There was a delay in x-raying the shoulder. The report comments (6) Requests were made for nurse special staff to monitor a high risk patient but extra staff were not available. ”

    Source location

    Phillip Arthur Pratt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026