Recurring concern

Unreliable consolidation and access to patients’ cross-service clinical risk information

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First reported 28 Nov 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to consolidate, link, flag, transfer, retrieve or provide access to clinically significant patient history and risk information across healthcare services, including information from different NHS Trusts, GP practices, emergency departments and receiving hospitals where the information is needed for safe assessment, treatment or risk management.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, documentation or coordination deficiencies where cross-service clinical history or risk information is not the material unsafe object.
  • Excludes failures to act on complete and accessible clinical history or risk information when the information-access process itself was reliable.
  • Excludes condition-specific information systems or pathways, such as allergy, mental-health, oxygen or medication systems, when that named concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes failures confined to creating, completing or maintaining a record within one service where no cross-service consolidation, transfer or access deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes non-clinical, administrative or operational information that is not needed for patient assessment, treatment or safety-risk management.
Reports
20

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
20

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
35

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England8
Department of Health and Social Care7
Care Quality Commission2
Recipient name withheld2
Bedford Hospital South Wing1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Cornwall Health Limited1
Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Dr Simon Chapple1
East Cheshire NHS Trust1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Holderness Health1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Milton Keynes University Hospital1
Mr Simon Wright1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Marsland · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs. Marsland died in hospital on 14 November 2025 after a urinary infection progressed to sepsis, septic shock and multiorgan failure. The principal concerns were that abnormal blood results were not reviewed or escalated, she was discharged without antibiotics, and key action-plan measures for structured handover and named clinical responsibility had not been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a structured cross-team handover from ED to speciality departments

    Wider context from the report

    “4) ████████ evidence was that key aspects of the PSII action plan that are intended to mitigate the risk of future deaths are yet to be implemented by the Trust. In particular addressing the need for a structured cross-team handover from ED to speciality departments capturing clinical concerns, abnormal results, escalation plans, and creating named responsible clinicians. ”

    Source location

    Judith Marsland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Theresa Lydon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Theresa Lydon had severe ulcerative colitis and was admitted to hospital on four occasions before her death following complications of surgery, including an intra-abdominal haemorrhage. The report identifies concerns about delayed prescribing, unclear communication of treatment plans, inadequate access to medical records between NHS Trusts, and the absence of repeated blood tests that contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide prompt access to patient medical records across NHS Trusts

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) On Mrs Lydon's admission to hospital in Gateshead in July 2022 certain investigations, treatment and diagnosis were made. She was then discharged and returned to hospital in South Tyneside, a neighbouring NHS Trust in August for what amounted to a further 3 hospital admissions there before her death. Evidence was heard that the doctors in South Tyneside whilst aware of her recent admission in Gateshead could not access her medical records for that admission. They requested them in August, but they were not supplied until November, after she had died. I understand much work regionally has been undertaken since 2022 with North East England based NHS Trusts to make 'real time' access to patient records possible, but whilst improved it is not complete and this is also a national issue I understand. Given the two hospitals Mrs Lydon was a patient in are only 6 miles apart it raises a concern that doctors attending Mrs Lydon in one location are denied access to another hospital records so close at hand and I understand this is not a position unique to these hospitals. To me, the inability of doctors to promptly access a patient's medical records from other NHS Trusts to provide the best possible care creates a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Theresa Lydon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop the Red Tape Challenge to improve primary-secondary care communication, interface working, prescribing, records access, interoperability, and process standardisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An initiative called the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ was developed to improve the interface between primary and secondary care, such as how referrals are made and managed, patient discharge and how different parts of the health service communicate with each other. The Red Tape Challenge led to 10 recommendations, which were cascaded through Regional Medical Directors. The focus of the Red Tape Challenge is on reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, improving communication and understanding, strengthening culture and interface working between primary and secondary care, improving digital and estates infrastructure, streamlining healthcare delivery, enhancing patient experience, and freeing up clinical time. Those especially relating to this case include:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a Single Patient Record across England to enable consistent sharing of patient information among relevant health and social care providers from 2028.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to highlight action we are taking at a national level which will radically improve data sharing between NHS service providers, whether they are neighbouring hospitals as was in Mrs Lydon’s case, or at opposite ends of the country.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

    Open published response
  3. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Colin Richard BROWN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Colin Richard Brown attended York Hospital Emergency Department on 28 March 2025 and choked on food provided by the hospital, leading to a cardiac arrest and transfer to intensive care. He died on 31 March 2025. The concerns were that his care plan was not transported to hospital and that information about his choking risk might not be reliably communicated or checked during the handover period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in making electronic patient information accessible to receiving hospital staff

    Wider context from the report

    “During the inquest I heard evidence that confirmed that a copy of Mr Brown's care plan was not transported with him to hospital. There was mention in the notes from Yorkshire Ambulance Service (YAS) that Mr Brown was a choking risk but there was a delay of approximately 25 minutes between Mr Brown being verbally handed across to hospital staff and the YAS Electronic Patient Form being uploaded to the Core Patient Database and accessible to staff dealing with Mr Brown. Such a delay is usual and inevitable in these circumstances, allowing time, for example, to access a device to action the upload. However, during this 25 minutes the only information that is available is what is shared orally in the handover and noted down by hospital staff. This may not include reference to a patient being a choking risk either because it is not mentioned by the ambulance crew or, because it is not deemed necessary by the hospital staff to check or to note, particularly in circumstances where this is entirely unrelated to the presenting concern. The evidence before me was that a patient being a choking risk is not routinely checked during all handovers. It was accepted in evidence that patients may not reliably draw attention to this crucial information themselves, as was the case here. ”

    Source location

    Colin Richard BROWN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore through digital governance whether electronic patient records can present swallowing or choking risks more rapidly and consistently.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Electronic record development (subject to system constraints) YAS will explore, through its established digital governance processes, whether existing EPR systems can more rapidly share swallowing or choking risk in a consistent location, recognising that any such development is dependent on”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The ePR upload delay could not reasonably have influenced the choking event because the event occurred after the ePR became available to hospital staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Delay between handover and ePR upload”

    Source location

    Response from Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 December 2025

    Open published response
  4. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Suzanne EDWARDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Suzanne EDWARDS became unwell on 29 November 2024, was assessed by her GP and at Milton Keynes Hospital, admitted to Bedford Hospital for surgery to insert a kidney stent, and died there of sepsis on 1 December 2024. The principal concern was that emergency departments lacked reliable access to patients’ primary care records, and the inquest identified a failure to recognise signs of urinary tract obstruction, resulting in a lost opportunity to treat the condition before sepsis developed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unreliable access to patients' primary care records in Emergency Departments

    Wider context from the report

    “Emergency Departments at hospitals in this and surrounding jurisdictions do not have reliable access to patients' primary care records, including recent GP consultations, investigations or concerns. This means that clinicians are frequently treating acutely unwell patients without full access to their recent medical history, which can delay or misdirect diagnosis and undermine patient safety and continuity of care and lead to avoidable deaths. Without access to a patients full records further lives may be put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Suzanne EDWARDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Emergency Department clinicians access to Shared Care Records, GP Connect and Summary Care Records for patient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I do of course recognise the risk you have identified that can result when primary and secondary healthcare providers cannot access each other's medical records. I welcome the opportunity to explain what access to Shared Care Records (including GP records) our A&E clinicians have at both the Bedford and Luton & Dunstable hospital sites. I hope this will assure you that Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust clinicians do, as far as is possible, have access to primary care records to assist them in the diagnosis of conditions thus reducing the overall risk to patient safety and further mitigating the risk of future deaths.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with healthcare partners to ensure necessary patient data sharing occurs for effective treatment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Thank you for bringing this important patient safety concern to my attention. As a Trust we are committed to working closely with our healthcare partners to ensure that data sharing happens, we all recognise the vital information sharing that is needed to effectively treat our patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Optimise the eCare record for sharing through the Health Information Exchange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At MKUH, we continue to:”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish Health Information Exchange links with providers serving significant numbers of common patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MKUH has developed HIE linkages with many other providers.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage other providers to share more pertinent record content through the Health Information Exchange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At MKUH, we continue to:”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Link Summary Care Record visibility into the Acute Electronic Patient Record front screen when it launches.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In Buckinghamshire we are fortunate to have a Summary Care Record which contains a record of encounters with all health services. This includes primary care diagnosis codes and lists, medication lists and brief summaries of primary care appointment outcomes. The Summary Care Record is visible to all hospital colleagues and access will be linked into our Acute Electronic Patient Record front screen when this launches in September / October 2025. This visibility would I believe mitigate against the issues noted in the Report although at the moment some patients have opted out across the system as a matter of personal choice.”

    Source location

    Response from Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expanding the patient information shared through existing records is outside the Trust’s control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within the Trust's control to expand upon what patient information is shared on the services outlined above as the record is taken from the Summary Care Record and GP Connect. The extent of what is contained in the Summary Care Record is regulated by NHS Digital which forms part of NHS England.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England regulates the extent of information contained in the Summary Care Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within the Trust's control to expand upon what patient information is shared on the services outlined above as the record is taken from the Summary Care Record and GP Connect. The extent of what is contained in the Summary Care Record is regulated by NHS Digital which forms part of NHS England.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Summary Care Record visibility and some EMIS access are considered sufficient to mitigate concerns about hospital clinicians’ visibility of primary care records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In Buckinghamshire we are fortunate to have a Summary Care Record which contains a record of encounters with all health services. This includes primary care diagnosis codes and lists, medication lists and brief summaries of primary care appointment outcomes. The Summary Care Record is visible to all hospital colleagues and access will be linked into our Acute Electronic Patient Record front screen when this launches in September / October 2025. This visibility would I believe mitigate against the issues noted in the Report although at the moment some patients have opted out across the system as a matter of personal choice.”

    Source location

    Response from Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response
  5. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    John Charles Spencer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Charles Spencer became unwell on 17 May 2024 and died on 21 May 2024 after a bowel perforation caused by obstruction within a recurrent right inguinal hernia, resulting in purulent peritonitis. The principal concern was that the GP out-of-hours surgery could not access his relevant GP medical history because different computer systems prevented the exchange of information, potentially affecting the examinations undertaken when patients do not report relevant history.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of GP out-of-hours surgeries to access key GP medical history information after patient consent

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The GP medical history summary, populated by the GP that a patient is registered to, is not always accessible to a GP out of hours surgery. Evidence was given that there are various reasons for this, including the patient not providing consent for the exchange of this information. However, on some occasions, even when a patient has consented, the patient record systems utilised by the GP registered practice and the GP out of hours surgery, insofar as being different computer systems or for whatever other technological reason, prevented the exchange of information into the GP out of hours surgery. In this case, evidence was heard that the GP practice was using the EMIS system and that the urgent treatment centre (GP out of hours surgery) was using SystmOne. That fact caused the GP out of hours surgery to not be able to access Mr Spencer’s GP medical summary. This situation generates a concern that, providing the patient has consented, key medical information may not be conveyed to the GP out of hours surgery which should be accessible to allow the appropriate exchange of medical information to inform what examinations should take place in an out of hours setting. This concern is particularly significant in circumstances where the patient does not say and/or present with the points in the medical history relevant to the GPs determination about what further examinations should occur flowing from the medical history of the patient. ”

    Source location

    John Charles Spencer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support greater integration and awareness of record sharing between in-hours and out-of-hours providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is aware of the challenge in sharing medical records between providers during the in-hours and out-of-hours period and the variability between areas using different technologies. We are also aware that use of the NCRS is variable across different care settings.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the Shared Care Records Programme to support wider access to relevant patient information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are therefore working across the health system to support greater integration and awareness of record sharing between in-hours and OOH providers. We are also working with the ShCR Programme to support wider access to relevant patient information.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Scrutinise providers’ handling of correspondence, clinical coding, information sharing, patient pathways and significant-event learning during inspection and monitoring activity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As CQC is aware that computer systems across healthcare providers are often unable to communicate with each other we have taken steps to mitigate this issue. For example, we ensure that we look closely at how providers deal with incoming correspondence (e.g. letters from secondary care or other health and social care providers), coding, sharing of information with other healthcare providers and patient pathways during our inspection and monitoring activity. We also look closely at how they identify, record and learn from significant events such as this one and were satisfied with the significant event analysis undertaken by City Health Care Partnership in relation to this matter.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Migrate clinical IT from EMIS to TPP SystmOne and enable GP Connect to support consent-based access to medical summaries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Relating to the matters of concern raised in your report, I can confirm that Holderness Health had a planned clinical IT system migration from EMIS to TPP SystmOne on 13th May 2024, with GP Connect enabled.”

    Source location

    Response from Holderness Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight the concerns to the Professional Record Standards Body regarding interoperability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a College our action shall be to highlight this tragic case to our health informatics group so they can use it in future discussions with NHS England. It is important that the area of Health informatics is not lost with the reorganisation of NHS and that the government both prioritise and progress action in this work. We shall also highlight your concerns to The Professional Record Standards Body (PRSB) who are dedicated to the development and implementation of health and care information standards and for whom this area on interoperability is relevant.”

    Source location

    Response from RCGP
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Dictating providers’ computer systems and IT infrastructure is outside CQC’s role and remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within the CQC’s role or remit to dictate the computer systems that providers operate or the IT infrastructure in use as this is a commissioning matter and not something we have any direct control over.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Decisions about providers’ computer systems and IT infrastructure are a commissioning matter, not under CQC’s direct control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within the CQC’s role or remit to dictate the computer systems that providers operate or the IT infrastructure in use as this is a commissioning matter and not something we have any direct control over.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The remote surgery was not a significant or currently active problem and therefore would not generally appear in GP Connect’s limited summary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Relating to the matters of concern raised in your report, I can confirm that Holderness Health had a planned clinical IT system migration from EMIS to TPP SystmOne on 13th May 2024, with GP Connect enabled.”

    Source location

    Response from Holderness Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Making all GP IT systems identical is not possible because government policy promotes plurality among GP IT providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The innovation in General Practice IT systems has been led partly by a government strategy to create a Plurality of GP IT Providers by increasing the diversity in the marketplace through NHS frameworks like the GP IT Futures Framework and more recently the Tech Innovation Framework. The new Tech Innovation framework has even brought in a new provider into the marketplace in the last few weeks called Medicus Health. It is therefore not possible for all GP IT systems across both the in and out of hours period to be the same. Recognising that there would be patient benefit to other areas of the health system such as the Hospital Emergency Departments for access to the GP Summary work has been carried out to provide interoperability.”

    Source location

    Response from RCGP
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England owns the interoperability strategy and GP Connect, so responsibility for this work lies with NHS England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This work currently falls under NHS England who own the dedicated Interoperability strategy as well as GP Connect which is a new national service which enables healthcare staff to view GP patient records significantly improving data sharing between General Practice and other parts of the NHS. It is recognised that as technology progresses the sharing of records improves but within a robust information governance structure and data sharing agreements.”

    Source location

    Response from RCGP
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response
  6. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Regan Smith died at Kings College Hospital on 31 January 2023 after previously undiagnosed diabetes led to severe metabolic acidosis, multiorgan failure and acute liver failure. An abnormal blood glucose reading obtained by ambulance staff was not effectively handed over or recorded at hospital, resulting in his discharge without further glucose testing or treatment. The report identifies concerns about incompatible information systems, reliance on verbal handover during a period of high acuity, and the absence of national standards for emergency department handovers and confirmation of basic observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient handover processes to ensure significant clinical findings are available to receiving clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “The information to save Regan’s life (his abnormal blood glucose reading) was in the possession of the NHS at a time when lifesaving treatment could have been given to him on the 25th January 2023. Regan’s death occurred as the result of an identifiable single point of failure (the ineffective handover process), as this led to a significant and known clinical finding being unavailable to his treating clinicians. Evidence heard that the handover system in Regan’s case was reliant on both ambulance and Accident and Emergency personnel making and receiving a verbal handover. The IT systems used by the Ambulance and Hospital Trusts are not directly compatible, and therefore clinical information (such as blood glucose level test results) are not immediately available to hospital personnel in every case. It was heard that Regan’s verbal only handover occurred during a period of very high acuity. On the 25th January 2023 the unit was exceptionally busy, the staff there had a high number of other sick children to care for, there was no cubicle space available, and the staff had not been able to take any of their scheduled breaks. When Regan did see a clinician, it was in the corridor. It was heard in evidence that there was no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, in relation to the conduct of patient handovers at Accident and Emergency Units. In addition, there is no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, to ensure basic observations are confirmed as being received by the receiving Accident and Emergency personnel. ”

    Source location

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop IT support linking ambulance and emergency department systems to improve electronic clinical information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The rapid exchange of clinical information verbally remains an integral part of communication. However, work is ongoing with NHSE to provide IT support that can deliver improved sharing of electronic information across systems. Linking the ambulance computer aided despatch system and electronic patient record collected by ambulance services with emergency departments data will provide better information about the patient journey.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implementation and oversight of clinical handover protocols across England are the responsibility of local organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the formal clinical handover of patients, there are a number of protocols that should be followed. This includes standards set out by the General Medical Council on how patient information should be shared, and the NHS standard contract which sets out targets on handover delays. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of protocols across England is at a local level. I understand that ESNEFT submitted evidence during the inquest which set out actions being taken locally to improve processes which you have considered and were content with. EEAST advise that in the East of England, all hospital A&Es have information systems to provide records of patients arriving by ambulance and that they are ensuring that ambulance patient care records are available as part of the assessment of patients who arrive at A&E by ambulance.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local process improvements and ambulance information systems provide an adequate response to clinical handover and patient-record concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the formal clinical handover of patients, there are a number of protocols that should be followed. This includes standards set out by the General Medical Council on how patient information should be shared, and the NHS standard contract which sets out targets on handover delays. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of protocols across England is at a local level. I understand that ESNEFT submitted evidence during the inquest which set out actions being taken locally to improve processes which you have considered and were content with. EEAST advise that in the East of England, all hospital A&Es have information systems to provide records of patients arriving by ambulance and that they are ensuring that ambulance patient care records are available as part of the assessment of patients who arrive at A&E by ambulance.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    David Nicholas ALMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Nicholas Almond was diagnosed with thrombophilia and deep vein thrombosis but was not placed on lifelong anticoagulation. After developing breathlessness that was investigated with an X-ray, he collapsed and was found to have a massive pulmonary embolism, dying in hospital on 5 January 2024. The principal concerns were incomplete access to and recognition of relevant GP records, and failure to arrange appropriate follow-up after the negative X-ray.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide clinicians with access to GP records across differing IT systems and geographical boundaries

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard evidence that Macclesfield Hospital was part of East Cheshire NHS Trust and served a wide area a significant part of the area served was outside the footprint of the trust for example the High Peak in Derbyshire. The inquest was told that trust doctors were able to access GP records for patient’s registered with GPs in East Cheshire but not patients registered outside this area. The inquest was told there were discussions about how to try to resolve this but no firm steps or progress on this by the Trust. As a consequence doctors at the hospital were limited in understanding a patient’s history and crucial information was not always fully recognised/available. ”

    Source location

    David Nicholas ALMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the National Care Records Service, including national services that enable authorised staff to access relevant patient information across care settings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The National Care Records Service (NCRS) is the successor to the Summary Care Record application (SCRa) and by design removes a large amount of the reported barriers to adoption within many care settings, including the private sector. The NCRS provides a quick, secure way for health and care workers to access national patient information, to improve clinical decision making and healthcare outcomes. It is free to use and includes additional features and services beyond the legacy SCRa product. It provides access to a number of centrally provisioned national digital services that”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement Summary Care Record access for relevant clinical and discharge staff, including smart cards, training, induction, departmental support and troubleshooting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Implementation Plan”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit Summary Care Record use, access incidents, staff feedback and smart-card support data after implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Post-Implementation Review”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen clinical information gathering by prioritising comprehensive patient histories and asking GPs to review older records when relevant information is unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Commitment to Professional Curiosity: Moving forward, the doctor has committed to demonstrating greater professional curiosity. This includes proactively asking the GP to review older records when we do not have access to the relevant information, ensuring that decisions are based on the most complete information available.”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    East Cheshire NHS Trust is responsible for responding to concerns about its recording, sharing and access arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response to your concerns focuses on those areas of concern that fall under the remit of national NHS England policy or programme work. Your concerns relating to East Cheshire NHS Trust’s recording sharing and access arrangements, along with your concerns about the care provided at the GP surgery, are more appropriately answered by the two organisations. The Standard General Medical Services (‘GMS’) Contract also sets out the requirements on GP Practices. Practices should provide enough appointments to meet the reasonable need of their patients, and provision of appointments and advice or care should consider their patients’ preferences where appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local Integrated Care Boards are responsible for delivering Shared Care Records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Responsibility for delivering Shared Care Records sits with local Integrated Care Boards (ICBs). Each ICB’s Shared Care Records are developed in response to the health and care needs of the local area, existing systems, and future planning. This means some of their Shared Care Records are available to neighbouring ICBs, while others are only supported within their own ICB. Future plans include making Shared Care Records link together regardless of where you live or receive care in England. Further information on Integrated Care Boards and Systems can be found here: NHS England » What are integrated care systems?”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is addressing differing NHS IT systems and GP record access, so the Trust will not address this matter further.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust understands that NHS England will be addressing this matter in detail within their response to the PFD and therefore proposes not to address this further.”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response
  8. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Thomas Jordan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samuel Thomas Jordan, aged 25, was imprisoned at HMP Exeter and was found hanging in a single-occupancy cell after an incident with his cell mate on 26 March 2020. The inquest concluded that he died by suicide while suffering from mental illness. The jury identified the lack of access to records from a temporary GP practice, including information about his mental health and current medication, as a contributory factor in his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of access to temporary GP practice records through the NHS Spine

    Wider context from the report

    “During the four months before his imprisonment, Samuel Jordan had been receiving treatment for severe anxiety while registered as a temporary patient with a medical practice in Launceston, Cornwall. Samuel had come to Cornwall from his home in Whitchurch, Hampshire where he was registered with another GP practice. On entering HMP Exeter, the prison Healthcare obtained a summary of Samuel’s GP records from Hampshire via the NHS spine. The records from the Launceston practice were not sent to the prison since the NHS spine only operates to transmit records from the permanent GP practice and not a practice consulted on a temporary basis. As a result, Exeter Prison Healthcare was unaware of Samuel’s mental health issues immediately before coming to Prison and was unaware of a current medication prescription lack of which the jury found contributed to Samuel’s death. The inquest heard that prisoners coming to prison frequently were nomadic and frequently had registered with GP practices on a temporary basis and records from such practices not coming to the notice of prison healthcare as such records are not accessible through the NHS spine. Lack of access through the NHS Spine to the records of the practice where Samuel was registered as a temporary patient was, the jury found, a contributory factor in Samuel’s death. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Thomas Jordan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve information sharing between the detained estate and wider NHS by enabling access to Spine-connected services, including PDS, eRS and GP2GP Transfer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England has been working to improve the processes around information sharing between the detained estate and the wider NHS. This includes enabling access to a range of Spine connected services including Personal Demographics Service (PDS), Electronic Referral Service (eRS) and GP2GP Transfer. As a result of these changes, some patients transferring into the detained estate will have a GP2GP transfer whereby the patient’s electronic GP record is sent from their previously registered GP Practice to the new GP Practice that they register with within the detained estate. Further details are available via the links below:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide GP2GP electronic transfer of community GP records into and out of healthcare systems across the adult male and children’s secure estate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Patients within the adult male and children and young people’s secure estate (adult male prisons, young offender institutions and secure training centres) have the opportunity to register with healthcare at their place of detention. This means a GP2GP transfer can now take place, electronically transferring the patient’s community GP record into the clinical system in place across the secure estate, and then back out to the community when the patient registers with a GP on release. The ability for a GP2GP transfer of a community GP record into the prison healthcare system was rolled out to the male prison estate between February and July 2022, so this option was not available at the time of Samuel’s death, but I hope provides assurance around current practice.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing temporary-registration and detained-estate information-sharing processes are considered sufficient, subject to consent and direct contact where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In summary, there are existing processes around the management of temporary resident patients. These support GP Practices to take over the management of patients by registering them permanently at the new practice where this is appropriate. Where care continues to be provided on a temporary basis, there are existing information flows to send information about the care episode back to the patients’ registered GP Practice via the GMS3 form, where the patient has consented, and for this information to then be integrated into the patients’ registered GP record so that”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response
  9. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    KATHARINE ANNE FOX · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katharine Fox died by hanging in October 2022 after being discharged from hospital, having been unable to access community psychology services during the following months. Concerns related to the lack of handover and continuity between hospital and community psychology services, substantial waiting times, and possible inability of clinicians to access notes held on different computer systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide psychology clinicians with access to clinical notes across hospitals and county locations

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I am concerned about the fact, if that is indeed right, that some clinicians in the psychology service may not be able to access notes made by clinicians in either other hospitals or other parts of the county. I was told that the deceased actually managed to procure psychology sessions that the new psychologist may not have been able to read the notes of their predecessor if they were on a different computer system. ”

    Source location

    KATHARINE ANNE FOX · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable Adult Community Psychological Services clinicians to access PARIS, MOBIUS, and Health Information Exchange records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Court is respectfully advised that EPUT (like a number of NHS Trusts) uses multiple Electronic Medical Records Systems, which includes PARIS and MOBIUS. Staff within the Inpatient Psychological Services team have access to both systems, as well as Health Information Exchange (HIE) and can therefore access all records/reports. Our IT department has recently confirmed that all clinical staff in Adult Community Psychological Services can also access both systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed a clinical information-sharing mechanism through a joint forum incorporating formal handover of required inpatient and community information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, the Court is advised that it is commissioning a unified Electronic Medical Records System, in the interim Psychological Services will now have access to all of the required clinical systems and will also embed a new mechanism to ensure robust clinical information sharing between inpatient and community clinicians. This will be achieved through the aforementioned joint forum which will incorporate a formal handover of all required information. Should access to more detailed clinical information be required, this can be requested.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission a unified electronic medical records system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, the Court is advised that it is commissioning a unified Electronic Medical Records System, in the interim Psychological Services will now have access to all of the required clinical systems and will also embed a new mechanism to ensure robust clinical information sharing between inpatient and community clinicians. This will be achieved through the aforementioned joint forum which will incorporate a formal handover of all required information. Should access to more detailed clinical information be required, this can be requested.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Relevant clinical records are accessible to inpatient and community psychological staff through existing electronic systems and the Health Information Exchange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Court is respectfully advised that EPUT (like a number of NHS Trusts) uses multiple Electronic Medical Records Systems, which includes PARIS and MOBIUS. Staff within the Inpatient Psychological Services team have access to both systems, as well as Health Information Exchange (HIE) and can therefore access all records/reports. Our IT department has recently confirmed that all clinical staff in Adult Community Psychological Services can also access both systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response
  10. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Patrick Soames · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patrick Soames died by suicide on 21 June 2021 after a final month involving repeated serious self-harm, including cutting, medication overdose and excessive alcohol misuse, with multiple hospital attendances. The principal concerns were that information about his risk was fragmented across NHS Trusts, police forces, local authorities and geographical areas, with no effective system to consolidate or flag his recent self-harm history nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of GP-held clinical history to accident and emergency departments outside surgery hours or across geographic areas

    Wider context from the report

    “1. 5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with Patrick in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about Patrick’s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear picture of Patrick’s pattern of behaviour (which was particularly necessary in circumstances where he was not engaging and therefore not assisting in providing a complete history himself). 2. GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP outside of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department. Several of Patrick’s attendances at accident and emergency departments were out of GP surgery hours. 3. I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area Patrick resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to Patrick following one of his self-harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but Patrick did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with Patrick were never made aware of that piece of information nor had any means of accessing it. 4. I heard evidence that there is no national ‘risk flagging’ system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self-harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up. 5. In summary, there was no single effective global focus consolidating the information which was flowing into the various agencies about Patrick; no global focus to which those agencies could in turn refer in emergency to obtain the totality of information about Patrick’s recent pattern of behaviour; no national ‘risk flagging’ system to alert those agencies to his significant recent history. ”

    Source location

    Patrick Soames · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026