Recurring concern

Unreliable capture and onward use of telephone helpline information

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First reported 6 Aug 2014•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a telephone helpline's dedicated information-handling process, including recording calls, callers or outcomes and transferring relevant information to the responsible clinical or operational decision-makers.

Not included

  • Excludes generic documentation failures unrelated to telephone helpline information.
  • Excludes deficiencies in helpline staffing, training or triage unless they directly concern the capture or onward use of helpline information.
  • Excludes failures of non-telephone communication channels and unrelated referral or record systems.
Reports
8

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
8

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England3
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Appello Careline Limited1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Chelsea and Westminster Hospital1
Department for Transport1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Humber Teaching NHS Foundation Trust1
Individual (care of Medical Protection Society)1
NHS Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Integrated Care Board1
Reigate & Banstead Borough Council1
Royal Cornwall Hospital1
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust1
Surrey Police1
Sutton And East Surrey Water PLC1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Thomas Burt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Thomas Burt died at home on 15 May 2025 after a spontaneous rupture of an arterio-venous malformation at the back of his right ankle caused severe bleeding. The report raises concerns about communication between the careline service and ambulance services, including failure to pass on key information, delays in escalating the emergency, inadequate recording of information, and the loss of opportunities to provide basic first-aid advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain and pass on key emergency information from careline callers

    Wider context from the report

    “3) I also remain concerned that the first careline operator did not pass on a key piece of information to the EMA, namely that the caller did not have access to a phone. Nor did she ask if the blood was spurting or dribbling. Although, it was relayed that Mrs Burt was bedbound, the EMA would not have realised that Mrs Burt couldn’t get to the phone as it was in another room. ”

    Source location

    Derek Thomas Burt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a triage enhancement requiring operators to establish telephone access and explicitly communicate its absence to emergency services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, Appello Careline Limited has identified an opportunity to strengthen the information provided to emergency services in circumstances where direct telephone contact is not possible. Appello Careline Limited therefore intends to introduce a proportionate enhancement to its triage process.”

    Source location

    Response from Appello Careline Operations Director
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce information capture and communication through continuing operator training, call audits, supervision and operational reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 3 Appello Careline Limited will continue to reinforce adherence to established procedures through its ongoing training, audit and supervision processes, including the use of call audits and operational review mechanisms to ensure that relevant information is consistently captured and communicated.”

    Source location

    Response from Appello Careline Operations Director
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen CPD and learning programmes for QSF-certified organisations, covering records, operator competence, training, decision-support tools, escalation, and information-sharing with emergency services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Opportunities exist to strengthen guidance and operational procedures in these areas to help reduce the risk of similar issues occurring in the future and these will be addressed through future TEC Quality CPD e-learning programme and through strengthened QSF criteria for all certified TEC Monitoring Auditees to ensure the quality of TEC call monitoring and response.”

    Source location

    Response from Telecare Services Association
    Page 8 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing triage processes are considered appropriate for identifying and communicating relevant information to emergency services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 1 Appello Careline Limited’s existing triage processes require operators to gather and communicate relevant information to emergency services. Those processes remain in place and are considered appropriate to ensure that relevant information is identified and communicated to emergency services.”

    Source location

    Response from Appello Careline Operations Director
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing procedures, training, auditing and continuous improvement provide a robust framework for managing the identified risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Appello Careline Limited considers that its existing procedures, supported by ongoing training, audit and continuous improvement processes, provide a robust framework for managing the risks identified in this case.”

    Source location

    Response from Appello Careline Operations Director
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The specific case concerns should be addressed by Appello and SECAMB, rather than by the national ambulance membership organisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With respect to the matters of concern in relation to the care of Derek Burt, AACE is not in a position to respond; the specific details relate to and should subsequently be addressed by both Appello and SECAMB.”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational concerns about ambulance care are the responsibility of SECAMB, which is best placed to respond directly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England’s Ambulance Team have reviewed this Report and have advised that the concerns raised relate to operational matters, which are the responsibility of the local ambulance service; SECAMB NHS Foundation Trust, who will be best placed to respond to the concerns raised. We note that SECAMB have also been addressed in your Report and will respond directly to the concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Eden Anna Street · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eden Anna Street, aged 13, was found suspended by her sister and could not be revived; she was declared deceased on 27 June 2021. The report describes concerns that information provided by parents of autistic children through a Trust telephone helpline was not fed back to the Trust’s weekly audit meeting, meaning potentially worsening information might not reach those able to alter clinical priorities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to feed back telephone helpline information about autistic children to the weekly audit meeting and clinical priority decision-makers

    Wider context from the report

    “Whereas the Humber Teaching NHS Foundation Trust has implemented a number of measures following the publication of a Serious Incident Investigation Report in light of admitted failings, evidence was heard that information provided by parents of autistic children via a telephone helpline operated by the Trust, is not fed back to the weekly audit meeting convened by the Trust. As a result, information about children with neurodiversity issues that might have altered for the worse, may not be available to those who can alter their clinical priorities. ”

    Source location

    Eden Anna Street · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require increased-risk contacts handled by duty workers to be discussed within three working days at the next waiting-list or multidisciplinary team meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An additional safeguard is that where contact about a young person has been received and dealt with as above by the duty worker, then where there is an increase in risk (e.g. expressions of suicidality of any degree, or a change in known risk profile, no matter what the outcome of that contact, the contact is referenced within a clinical discussion within three working days at the weekly waiting list or weekly MDT meeting (whichever is next due to take place). This gives an opportunity for any further input into the information and decision-making to be provided by the broader professional group. This would include cases where the outcome of the contact is that there will be no change to clinical prioritisation, and this gives an opportunity for this decision to be “double checked” by the wider group and safeguarding responses provided if required.”

    Source location

    Response from Humber Teaching NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a duty-team risk review form capturing waiting-list calls, information received, actions, and clinical rationale for meeting-based review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, the Trust is implementing a new electronic record keeping system and as part of that, is introducing a risk review form for use by the duty team which will capture calls made to the service. The form will outline the nature of the call and the information provided, and the agreed actions with the supporting clinical rationale. This form will be used as the basis for review of such contacts in the weekly waiting list or weekly MDT meetings. (The use of these forms is just being introduced now with the new electronic system and in the future record keeping audits will include checks to see they are being utilised.)”

    Source location

    Response from Humber Teaching NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include checks of risk review form use in future record-keeping audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, the Trust is implementing a new electronic record keeping system and as part of that, is introducing a risk review form for use by the duty team which will capture calls made to the service. The form will outline the nature of the call and the information provided, and the agreed actions with the supporting clinical rationale. This form will be used as the basis for review of such contacts in the weekly waiting list or weekly MDT meetings. (The use of these forms is just being introduced now with the new electronic system and in the future record keeping audits will include checks to see they are being utilised.)”

    Source location

    Response from Humber Teaching NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that the reported case involved its services or provides evidence of a systemic issue affecting CAMHS waiting-list contacts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust made further enquiries via those representing Eden’s family and sought detail of the case that had been referred to during the Inquest, which we understand was the basis for the PFD report. Helpful information was forthcoming including the name of the child, which enabled the Trust to review that matter. It transpires that child was not and is not on the Trust’s Core CAMHS waiting list and the circumstances pertaining to that child do not in any way relate to the substantive issue raised within the PFD report.”

    Source location

    Response from Humber Teaching NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Anna Vivien Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anna Vivien Elliott, who had severe recurrent depression with psychotic features and autism spectrum disorder, was detained under the Mental Health Act after having thoughts and plans to end her life. She was found deceased in her room on 24 November 2021 after safe and supportive observations were missed and her safety plan was ended without an adequate risk assessment. Concerns included inadequate handover and staffing, missed and falsified observation records, poor record keeping, and uncertainty about the management of safety plans.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record and pass on safety-relevant information

    Wider context from the report

    “Concern 1 There were issues with record keeping across the board. Including, a telephone call from Anna’s mother reporting concerning messages was not recorded or passed on; an entry relating to a different patient was recorded in Anna’s records; staff were sharing log on details or not logging off from their account (also raising data protection concerns); and the written handover document was inadequate, failing to record vital information. ”

    Source location

    Anna Vivien Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cover the administrators’ office during handover and allocate the patient/carer phone to a named, logged staff member.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Steps are now in place to ensure calls are not missed: the administrators’ office will now be covered with admin staff during the team handover from 14:00 to 16:00 to ensure calls are not missed.”

    Source location

    Response from ELFT
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Freeda GLAUSIUSZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Freeda Glausiusz died after jumping from her home on 15 May 2021. The report describes concerns that her father’s crisis-line call the previous day was not treated seriously, that the call was not documented appropriately, and that relevant information was not provided promptly to the coroner’s office.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record crisis-line calls in the medical record

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I was shocked when I listened to the recording of the call that █ ████████ made to the crisis line the day before his daughter died. The East London NHS Foundation Trust (ELFT) serious incident (SI) report observed that the clinician did not elicit clear risks during the conversation; did not listen to ████████; talked over him; did not appear empathic; and dismissed his distress about his daughter, even though she was a patient known to services after a first episode of psychosis. In reaching my conclusion at inquest that the call was not treated with the seriousness it deserved, I agreed with all of those observations. ████████ was not taken seriously, he was not treated respectfully and he was not treated kindly. He was clearly desperate about his daughter’s mental health and, as we now know, he was right to be desperate. He rang the crisis line and he was belittled. The clinician then made no note of the call in the medical records, even retrospectively. I note the many recommendations of the thoughtful SI report, but I remain concerned on three counts. • This is not the first time that I have made a PFD report to ELFT about its crisis line. • Not only did the clinician in question not make a note of the call in the medical record, he told me in court that, after Freeda Glausiusz’s death his manager had told him not to make an appropriately dated retrospective note in the record. He said that he had made a note on a piece of paper, but he did not now have that piece of paper. • When I asked the lead SI reviewer if the trust is confident that it has taken all appropriate actions in respect of that clinician, she was not able to give me that assurance. ”

    Source location

    Freeda GLAUSIUSZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide medical-records training for senior nurses and Trust managers on record keeping, observations and retrospective entries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To address this matter, medical records training for all senior nurses was provided on 24 November 2021 to all senior nurses and managers at the Trust. The focus of the training was good record keeping, observations and retrospective record keeping.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
  5. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Edward Joyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edward Joyce suffered an accidental scalding injury on 19 November 2017 and later developed septic shock from infected burns. He became severely unwell on 22 November and died despite attempts at resuscitation. Concerns included that a temperature of 38.9°C did not trigger an urgent hospital referral and was not recorded when his mother telephoned the hospital, and that parents were not advised to bring him back to hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record reported high temperature in telephone notes

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence at the inquest was that a temperature reading above 38°C following a burn to a young child is highly concerning, and could be an early sign of septicaemia and toxic shock syndrome. (1) The temperature reading of 38.9°C at the GP did not trigger an urgent referral to hospital. (2) Eddie’s mother was clear that she reported this temperature reading to the nurse at Chelsea & Westminster when she telephoned soon after the GP appointment. This reading is not recorded in the telephone note and the parents were not told to bring Eddie back to hospital. (3) The evidence was that scalding injuries amongst children are very common but that toxic shock syndrome is very rare. In their evidence the hospital witnesses helpfully considered whether the information leaflet could be reviewed so as to assist other health professionals who may be less aware of the potential significance of high temperature following a burn and availability of a 24 hour telephone advice from the burns unit. ”

    Source location

    Edward Joyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There was no suggestion that a temperature spike was mentioned during the telephone call and then not recorded or acted upon.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is the Trust’s understanding that the evidence from Nurse ████████ explained the action that would have been taken if a spike in temperature was mentioned during the relevant telephone call but there was no suggestion that a spike in temperature was mentioned and not recorded / acted on.”

    Source location

    2018-0142-Response-by-Chelsea-and-Westminster-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 July 2018

    Open published response
  6. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Kirsty Childs · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kirsty Childs, aged 20, developed severe abdominal symptoms and repeatedly sought advice from NHS Direct and other services between 31 December 2012 and 2 January 2013. She was not admitted to hospital and was later found dead at home; the inquest recorded septic shock caused by an undiagnosed and untreated mesenteric venous thrombosis. The principal concerns included incorrect telephone triage, failure to review earlier calls, medically unqualified staff selecting questionnaires, the ability to override recommended outcomes, and poor information-sharing between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record conclusions and advice from earlier calls

    Wider context from the report

    “5. It was not possible at the inquest to review what details were recorded. I was concerned that details of earlier calls may not contain the conclusion and advice given to the patient. This information may be of significant assistance to ensure that if the patient calls again, appropriate care and advice is given. ”

    Source location

    Kirsty Childs · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Charlie Mark Jermyn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Charlie Jermyn was born at home on 9 May 2015 and developed sleepiness, feeding difficulty and possible respiratory distress. He stopped breathing during a routine visit the following day and died in hospital despite resuscitation attempts. The principal concerns were delayed recognition and referral for suspected sepsis, inadequate telephone triage and recording, insufficient observations, and wider shortcomings in midwifery guidance, equipment and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to formally record Maternity Helpline calls and outcomes

    Wider context from the report

    “7. The telephone Maternity Helpline was inappropriately triaged by unregistered inappropriately trained and qualified staff, who were unable to identify obvious and significant sepsis markers indicating the seriousness of the deterioration in Charlie’s health. No structured note taking or recording of the call was made for future referral. Nor was the call/caller recorded. Helpline triage is a complex task and should only be undertaken after specialist training by an appropriately qualified person and the outcome of the conversations should be recorded formally in line with best practice. ”

    Source location

    Charlie Mark Jermyn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Michael FRIEND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Michael Friend died on 21 February 2013 after his motorcycle collided with stationary traffic near temporary road works on a blind bend. The report raised concerns about the positioning and visibility of temporary traffic lights, the adequacy of risk assessments and training for road works, the response to public safety concerns, and Surrey Police’s procedures for identifying and reporting risks created by road works.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass public calls about serious road-network safety issues directly to those responsible for action

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Action is required by Reigate and Banstead Council to ensure that any calls from members of the public to the Council about serious safety issues relating to the road network are passed directly to those with responsibility to take action. ”

    Source location

    Lee Michael FRIEND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026