Recurring concern

Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learning

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First reported 3 Dec 2013•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of reporting, review, investigation or organisational-learning processes to recognise substantive safety issues, retain learning from prior concerns, or ensure that identified recurring issues are addressed across the organisation.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing a specific already-defined safety action where no broader failure of organisational learning or issue recognition is identified.
  • Excludes failures of a named clinical, operational or safeguarding system where that system itself supplies the more specific parent boundary.
  • Excludes deficiencies limited to the quality of an individual incident investigation without evidence that safety issues or learning were not identified or addressed more broadly.
  • Excludes generic governance, culture or management concerns without a direct failure to identify, retain or address substantive safety issues.
Reports
62

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
68

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
163

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care14
NHS England10
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB4
Care Quality Commission4
Home Office3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Ministry of Defence2
Ministry of Justice2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
The Children's Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kate Louise Pierce became unwell on 29 March 2006 and was discharged from hospital after being diagnosed with viral tonsillitis. She returned approximately 36 hours later in a deteriorated condition, was diagnosed with pneumococcal meningitis, and later died in Florida on 19 March 2013 after suffering brain damage and other health conditions. The principal concerns were uncertainty about when a sick child should receive senior paediatric assessment before discharge, and a lack of clearly defined and consistently applied processes for identifying and acting on learning opportunities after adverse events or re-presentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably identify matters requiring investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of defined and consistently applied criteria for identifying and acting on learning opportunities

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure timely learning and action from investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Glenys Pollitt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Glenys Pollitt was admitted to Stepping Hill Hospital with community acquired pneumonia, but surgical emphysema and an oesophageal rupture were not identified on an initial x-ray and subsequent reviews. She underwent emergency surgery after the rupture was identified, deteriorated, and died from multi-organ failure on 16 February 2017. Concerns included inconsistent use of high-resolution x-ray screens, unclear reinforcement of clinical learning, and unclear escalation processes to consultant and critical care levels.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an ongoing programme for reinforcing clinical lessons

    Wider context from the report

    “2. At the inquest, the evidence given was that the clinicians had seen what they expected to see on the x ray rather than seeing the whole picture shown on the x ray. It was unclear what ongoing programme was in place for reinforcing the lessons learnt from this case amongst clinicians; ”

    Source location

    Glenys Pollitt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete morbidity and mortality discussions in Emergency Department and Acute Medicine to share and learn from the case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both the Emergency Department team and the Acute Medicine team have completed morbidity & mortality discussions regarding this case – completed on 15/02/2017 and 24/05/2017 respectively. These are perfect opportunities for cases to be shared with clinicians across all grades to review and learn from a case.”

    Source location

    2017-0228-Response-by-Stockport-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 October 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the case in future training programmes for junior clinical staff in Emergency Department and Acute Medicine.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both departments have confirmed that they intend to use this case for future training of junior clinical staff in their ongoing training programmes.”

    Source location

    2017-0228-Response-by-Stockport-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 October 2017

    Open published response
  3. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Parke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Parke, who had chronic liver disease, was admitted to West Cumberland Hospital and had a nasogastric tube inserted. The tube was misplaced into his left lung, an x-ray showing this was misinterpreted, and feeding and medication were administered through the tube before he developed aspiration pneumonia and died. The concerns included staff not following nasogastric-tube policy and systemic failures in policy implementation, training, competency checks, auditing and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from deaths and incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “I have now held inquests into 3 deaths as a result of misplaced nasogastric tubes at North Cumbria Hospitals which occurred over a period of a little over 7 years. These types of death are described as ‘Never Events’. On the facts of these three cases the deaths were avoidable. Common themes in all are: (a) Staff not being aware of the policy. (b) Staff not reading the policy. (c) Staff not applying the policy. (d) Staff not following good practice. (e) The Trust not ensuring compliance nor rolling out training to all who needed it. (f) Lack of checks and audits to establish competence and adherence to policy. (g) Failure of the Trust to learn from the first death. (h) Lack of Corporate Memory (the issue of NGTs was not on the Risk Register). (i) The Trust not fully implementing the 2011 NPSA Alert for over two years and only as a result of the second death. (j) Even after the second death not having systems in place to ensure compliance on the ward which contributed to the third death. (k) The Trust Policy growing in size from 20 to 36 pages in 7 years, making it difficult for busy practitioners to absorb (there are some 200 Policies in the Trust). (l) The current Policy has cross-references to paragraphs which do not exist. These errors have been carried through three versions, and raise the risk of misinterpretation by staff and undermining their confidence in such an important document. ”

    Source location

    Michael Parke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend regulations to require NHS Trusts to summarise published deaths information, learning and resulting actions in Quality Accounts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also amending regulations to require Trusts to summarise the published information in Quality Accounts from June 2018, including evidence of learning and action as a result of that information and an assessment of the impact of actions that a Trust has taken.”

    Source location

    2017-0024-Response
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the deceased patients’ families to obtain personal comments for organisational learning briefings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold organisational briefings in April 2017 to share learning from the Never Events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  4. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Amanda Coulthard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amanda Coulthard, who had multiple sclerosis, died on 26 April 2015 after a nasogastric tube entered her right lung and feed and medication were administered into it. She developed aspiration pneumonia. The concerns included failures to follow and implement nasogastric-tube policies and best practice, inadequate checking and training, and insufficient systems to ensure compliance and learn from previous deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from a prior nasogastric tube death

    Wider context from the report

    “I have now held inquests into 3 deaths as a result of misplaced nasogastric tubes at North Cumbria Hospitals which occurred over a period of a little over 7 years. These types of death are described as ‘Never Events’. On the facts of these three cases the deaths are avoidable. Common themes in all were: (a) Staff not being aware of the policy. (b) Staff not reading the policy. (c) Staff not applying the policy. (d) Staff not following good practice. (e) The Trust not ensuring compliance nor rolling out training to all who needed it. (f) Lack of checks and audits to establish competence and adherence to policy. (g) Failure of the Trust to learn from the first death. (h) Lack of Corporate Memory (the issue of NGTs was not on the Risk Register). (i) The Trust not fully implementing the 2011 NPSA Alert for over two years and only as a result of the second death. (j) Even after the second death not having systems in place to ensure compliance on the ward which contributed to the third death. (k) The Trust Policy growing in size from 20 to 36 pages in 7 years, making it difficult for busy practitioners to absorb (there are some 200 Policies in the Trust). (l) The current Policy has cross-references to paragraphs which do not exist. These errors have been carried through three versions, and raise the risk of misinterpretation by staff and undermining their confidence in such an important document. ”

    Source location

    Amanda Coulthard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend regulations to require NHS Trusts to summarise published deaths information, learning and resulting actions in Quality Accounts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also amending regulations to require Trusts to summarise the published information in Quality Accounts from June 2018, including evidence of learning and action as a result of that information and an assessment of the impact of actions that a Trust has taken.”

    Source location

    2017-0024-Response
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the deceased patients’ families to obtain personal comments for organisational learning briefings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold organisational briefings in April 2017 to share learning from the Never Events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will be reporting this action plan to the public Board meeting in March 2017, please do let me know if you have any concerns regarding this. In addition to this, we are in the process of contacting the families of Michale Parke and Amanda Coulthard in order to include a personal comment from them in the organisational briefings which will be holding in April 2017 to share the learning from these tragic Never Events.”

    Source location

    2017-0025-Response-by-North-Cumbria-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Demi Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Demi Williams was detained under the Mental Health Act after developing psychotic symptoms and disclosed that she had purchased helium gas intending to kill herself. She was later found deceased in her flat from helium inhalation; the principal concerns were that her specific risk of access to helium was not assessed and that this issue was not reflected in the Trust’s investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of investigations to reflect identified risk issues for further learning

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The method that Ms Williams later used to take her own life was specifically described to CANDI during the assessment process in January 2016. I am concerned that, although a general risk assessment was undertaken on several occasions, there was no consideration of the specific risk which Ms Williams had previously described. Furthermore, I am concerned that, as it stands, the Trust’s own investigation does not reflect this issue and that the potential for further learning from Ms Williams’ death could be missed. ”

    Source location

    Demi Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Coventry

    AI-generated summary

    George Watson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Watson fell from his bed at approximately 04:30 on 3 September 2014 after being admitted following a fall, and died on 21 October 2014 from a subdural haemorrhage, skull fracture and compound fracture of his left humerus. The principal concerns included supervision and staffing arrangements, raised bed rails, discharge without necessary oral pain relief and inadequate investigatory processes, including cooperation with police inquiries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to derive wider organisational learning from investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Although UHCW provided oral evidence regarding some steps that have been taken to improve its investigatory processes, given the significance of the issues that were raised, I believe it is necessary to ask the Trust to confirm these in writing and provide further evidence that it has addressed the issues that arose in the investigation of this case. In particular, the need to cooperate with police investigations was noted to be a learning point for one witness but wider learning for the Trust as a whole was not adduced in evidence. ”

    Source location

    George Watson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Roberts and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Roberts, James Dunsby and Edward Maher were reserve soldiers taking part in a specialist-unit selection test march in the Brecon Beacons in July 2013. The report identifies concerns about heat-illness guidance, training and risk assessment, communication of weather information, medical planning, emergency response, tracking of slow or static candidates, and the failure to implement lessons from previous incidents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear pathway for communicating safety lessons

    Wider context from the report

    “(10) A previous fatality, Soldier G see LAIT report October 2012, had identified that treatment for casualties should be within the “golden hour”. In addition following Private Poole’s death in 2009 it was identified that the tracker was not fit for purpose and standard operating procedures were issues dated January 2011. None of these recommendations were implemented by those involved in this exercise. I am concerned that lessons had not been learnt from these previous events. There appears to be no clear pathway for communicating this sort of information. ”

    Source location

    Craig Roberts and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement lessons from previous heat-illness and tracking events

    Wider context from the report

    “(10) A previous fatality, Soldier G see LAIT report October 2012, had identified that treatment for casualties should be within the “golden hour”. In addition following Private Poole’s death in 2009 it was identified that the tracker was not fit for purpose and standard operating procedures were issues dated January 2011. None of these recommendations were implemented by those involved in this exercise. I am concerned that lessons had not been learnt from these previous events. There appears to be no clear pathway for communicating this sort of information. ”

    Source location

    Craig Roberts and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce the formal lessons-learning process through the Training Governance and Assurance Policy review and biannual training reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a formal process in place for the capturing of lessons learnt/identified (Land Forces Standing Order (LFSO) 1118 – Learning Lessons in the Land Environment). Lessons are managed through the Defence Lessons Implementation and Management System (DLIMS) process which provides for a comprehensive way in which to consider that appropriate lessons are learnt, and that all appropriate steps are taken to prevent or minimise a recurrence. There is a clear and well established process, which is now being reinforced through the Training and Governance Policy review referred to under”

    Source location

    2015-0228-Response-by-MOD
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a Service Inquiry into the incident and wider endurance-training safety lessons across Defence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We continue to work with the Health and Safety Executive to take forward their recommendations and seek their advice on implementing improved processes. I have directed that two further inquiries be conducted by the Ministry of Defence. Firstly, a Service Inquiry will look at the events of 13 July 2013 to try and ensure that all safety-related lessons, including those identified in your Regulation 28 report, are learnt for endurance training across the whole of Defence. This will be conducted by a Service Inquiry Panel, convened by the Director General Defence Safety Authority, which will provide an independent, thorough and objective review outside of the chain of command. In order to ensure all relevant issues are captured and considered by the Service Inquiry, I have also written to the Director of Specialist Military Units,”

    Source location

    2015-0228-Response-by-MOD
    Page 7 · response
    Published 20 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A formal, established process already captures and manages lessons learned, with the Training Governance and Assurance Policy review reinforcing it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a formal process in place for the capturing of lessons learnt/identified (Land Forces Standing Order (LFSO) 1118 – Learning Lessons in the Land Environment). Lessons are managed through the Defence Lessons Implementation and Management System (DLIMS) process which provides for a comprehensive way in which to consider that appropriate lessons are learnt, and that all appropriate steps are taken to prevent or minimise a recurrence. There is a clear and well established process, which is now being reinforced through the Training and Governance Policy review referred to under”

    Source location

    2015-0228-Response-by-MOD
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 July 2015

    Open published response
  8. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Doreen Wood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Doreen Wood, who had atrial fibrillation and was taking Warfarin, died on 25 September 2014 from an intracerebral haemorrhage after repeated raised INR results. The report raised concerns that her INR was not checked soon enough and that the surgery’s monitoring system relied on healthcare assistants to volunteer relevant clinical information without routinely using standardised questionnaires.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure learning from INR dosing events reaches all GPs at the practice

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I invite Newgate Street surgery to review their system of INR monitoring, in discussion with Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust. (2) Specifically, I invite the surgery to consider the use of standardised questionnaires, and not rely on healthcare assistants to volunteer – or indeed be aware of – relevant clinical information to pass on to the GP when dosing decisions are made. (3) There has been no internal investigation of these matters within the practice, other than a discussion between two of the GPs who treated Mrs Wood. We heard that there are at least six other GPs at the practice who deal with decisions like this on a regular basis. I invite the practice to carry out its own internal investigation, to ensure that the learning from these events includes all GPs at the practice. ”

    Source location

    Doreen Wood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Colour Sergeant Martyn HORTON and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 23 June 2010, four service personnel died by drowning after their Ridgeback vehicle collided with a parked Afghan National Police vehicle, left the road and overturned in a canal in Afghanistan. The report raised concerns about the Ridgeback and related vehicle fleet, including suspension fitness, driver and gunner height restrictions, lighting effectiveness, tyre-pressure equipment, maintenance documentation, emergency lighting and recognition of recurring component failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to capture recurring component bolt retightening as an issue warranting investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “(VII) Component failure awareness. It was clear in 2010 that failures associated with the front suspension and spring hanger assembly in the Cougar fleet were starting to develop and following an incident involving a Ridgeback vehicle in Bovingdon in 2012, Qinetiq were instructed to analyse these failures. During the course of the evidence I heard from those that were maintaining these vehicles back in 2010 that the bolts on the front spring hanger assembly were in need of regular tightening and the vehicle was subject to 21 day inspection checks. The joint opinion of ████████ and members of the team at 1710 Naval Squadron was that it should not be necessary to repeatedly have to tighten the bolts relative to a component such as the spring hanger assembly. The need for the retightening of bolts was in their view indicative of a component issue and I would ask that you review from a learning point as regards raising the awareness of Craftsmen and Technicians and not just in relation to Ridgeback or Mastiff but in relation to any component across the services, that if an issue arises requiring regular or unusually frequent tightening of component bolts that matter ought to be highlighted as a concern warranting proportionate investigation relative to other similar pieces of equipment experiencing the same issue, such as was the case here with the Cougar fleet of vehicles. The retightening of bolts on a regular basis was something that was not captured as an issue in itself. ”

    Source location

    Colour Sergeant Martyn HORTON and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review component-failure-awareness training and direct inclusion of lessons on fault reporting and experienced diagnosis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A review of current training in respect of component failure awareness has been completed. This has resulted in direction to include additional lessons to reinforce the reasons and timeframe for raising fault reports, and the importance of experienced tradespersons diagnosing and reporting equipment failure to effective equipment support.”

    Source location

    2015-0164-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response
  10. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Clive Harold Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Clive Harold Turner was taken to hospital after delays in the response to a call for medical assistance and was discharged after being incorrectly diagnosed as constipated. He was later found deceased at home from a gastrointestinal haemorrhage due to ischaemic bowel resulting from atherosclerosis. Concerns included uncertainty about pain relief provided by the ambulance service, lack of awareness of overnight discharge policies, and the absence of senior clinicians available for a second opinion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to rectify previously identified patient handover delays

    Wider context from the report

    “3. It is of considerable concern to me that item 2 above is a direct repeat of a concern which I raised in a previous Regulation 28 report following the death of Mr Frederick Pring in March 2013, twelve months before that of Mr Turner, the joint response of WAST and BCUHB being received exactly one week before Mr Turner's death. ”

    Source location

    Clive Harold Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the Ysbyty Gwynedd handover protocol across the Health Board as an interim consistent approach pending formal policy approval.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “BCUHB has developed a protocol for their area to ensure a consistent approach to ambulance handover across North Wales. The Medical Director has mandated the protocol that is currently used at Ysbyty Gwynedd Hospital to be used across the Health Board for use in the interim period until a new Handover Policy for BCUHB can be formally agreed. The revised protocols are currently out for consultation and will require ratification by both BCUHB and the Trust prior to formal implementation.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult on and ratify revised ambulance handover protocols before formal implementation across the Health Board and Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “BCUHB has developed a protocol for their area to ensure a consistent approach to ambulance handover across North Wales. The Medical Director has mandated the protocol that is currently used at Ysbyty Gwynedd Hospital to be used across the Health Board for use in the interim period until a new Handover Policy for BCUHB can be formally agreed. The revised protocols are currently out for consultation and will require ratification by both BCUHB and the Trust prior to formal implementation.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised ambulance handover safety audit across the Health Board and report its results monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The audit of ambulance handover to provide assurance in relation to patient safety during this period of care has been revised by the BCUHB Associate Medical Director for Unscheduled Care. The new process has been piloted at one of the Emergency Departments in North Wales and following some amendment will be implemented across BCUHB and reported monthly. This has already commenced in Ysbyty Glan Clwyd.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish holding areas in each Emergency Department when required to enable safe, timely patient offloading.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Holding areas are being established in each Emergency Department when required to enable patients to be offloaded in a safe and timely manner. Serious incidents where there are joint issues for BCUHB and the Trust are now investigated jointly and learning outcomes shared. Senior Clinical, Nurse and Operational Management Leadership have been enhanced by the Health Board to ensure robust support for the Emergency Departments and patient flow.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate serious incidents involving both organisations jointly and share the resulting learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Holding areas are being established in each Emergency Department when required to enable patients to be offloaded in a safe and timely manner. Serious incidents where there are joint issues for BCUHB and the Trust are now investigated jointly and learning outcomes shared. Senior Clinical, Nurse and Operational Management Leadership have been enhanced by the Health Board to ensure robust support for the Emergency Departments and patient flow.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enhance senior clinical, nursing and operational leadership to support Emergency Departments and patient flow.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Holding areas are being established in each Emergency Department when required to enable patients to be offloaded in a safe and timely manner. Serious incidents where there are joint issues for BCUHB and the Trust are now investigated jointly and learning outcomes shared. Senior Clinical, Nurse and Operational Management Leadership have been enhanced by the Health Board to ensure robust support for the Emergency Departments and patient flow.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult on and ratify a North Wales escalation protocol before implementing it across the area.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “BCUHB has developed an escalation protocol for their area to ensure a consistent approach across North Wales. The protocol is currently out for consultation and will require ratification by the North Wales Unscheduled Care Programme Board prior to implementation. This has included advice issued by the Medical Director to support and encourage NHS Managers and Clinicians to work closely with the Trust staff at the Emergency Departments (ED) ‘front doors’ to jointly assess patients held in ambulances and identify patients that could either safely be transferred to the waiting room or be brought into the department without delay.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue Medical Director advice supporting joint assessment of ambulance patients at Emergency Department front doors and safe transfer of suitable patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “BCUHB has developed an escalation protocol for their area to ensure a consistent approach across North Wales. The protocol is currently out for consultation and will require ratification by the North Wales Unscheduled Care Programme Board prior to implementation. This has included advice issued by the Medical Director to support and encourage NHS Managers and Clinicians to work closely with the Trust staff at the Emergency Departments (ED) ‘front doors’ to jointly assess patients held in ambulances and identify patients that could either safely be transferred to the waiting room or be brought into the department without delay.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate cross-organisational escalation arrangements and conference calls to agree joint action plans for ongoing handover delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is engagement at all levels between the Trust and BCUHB, with conference calls arranged to agree joint action plans to address ongoing delays. Duty Control Managers from the Trust will initially contact the Hospital Clinical Site Managers if ambulances are delayed. The escalation process will continue with the Trusts Locality Managers contacting the Senior Site Operational Managers in BCUHB and then the Trusts Head of Service engaging with the Chief Operating Officer within BCUHB out of hours as there is an ‘On Call’ system Bronze to Bronze, Silver to Silver and Gold to Gold engagement between both organisations to ensure that a seamless escalation process exists.”

    Source location

    2014-0404-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 September 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026