Recurring concern

Unreliable medication reconciliation across care transitions

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 19 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures dedicated to reconciling, verifying, correlating, transferring or maintaining a patient’s medication information across clinical records or transitions of care, including medication lists, problem lists, admission or discharge records, community-to-hospital records and medication administration documentation.

Not included

  • Excludes generic failures in documentation, communication, staffing or clinical review that are not specifically tied to medication reconciliation.
  • Excludes medication prescribing or administration errors unrelated to an information-reconciliation failure.
  • Excludes reconciliation of non-medication items, such as property, race participants or general patient accounts.
  • Excludes failures concerning a different named safety system or hazard unless the report directly identifies medication reconciliation as the unsafe process.
Reports
18

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
20

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
39

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England3
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Bow School1
Bristol NHS Foundation Trust1
Bromley by Bow Health Centre1
Cardiff & Vale University LHB1
Care Quality Commission1
Carewatch (Mid Bucks)1
Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust1
Coastal Homecare – Hove Branch1
Compass Wellbeing Tower Hamlets1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Good Hope Hospital1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    John Malcolm FISHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Malcolm Fisher was admitted to hospital on 22 April 2025 with persistent focal seizures that developed into status epilepticus, and he died on 4 May 2025 after the seizures could not be controlled. The report raises concerns about inaccurate or incomplete medication information during transfers between community services and the omission of sodium valproate from the care agency’s medication record, resulting in six days without that medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer all prescribed medication into the electronic MAR and cross-check it at agency handover

    Wider context from the report

    “5) Coastal Healthcare indicated that a mistake was made when documenting the medications in that although the UCR handwritten forms included sodium valproate oral solution, this was not added at all into the Coastal Homecare electronic MAR chart. As a result, Coastal Homecare accepted that between 16 April to 21 April (6 days) Mr Fisher did not receive any sodium valproate oral solution. This was one of three liquid antiepileptic drugs Mr Fisher should have received to help control possible seizures. This mistake was not spotted at all and there is no system in place to cross check what has previously been given when there is a handover between different care agencies nor was there any liaison with the community pharmacy who regularly dispensed Mr Fisher's medication. ”

    Source location

    John Malcolm FISHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a formal review of the MAR chart SOP for UCR and Home First services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action taken and planned:”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the MAR chart SOP with guidance on discontinued medicines remaining in patients’ homes and mandatory GP second checks for discrepancies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The SOP is being updated to include explicit guidance on the management of recently discontinued medications that remain physically present in the home, including a mandatory second check with the GP where discrepancies arise.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and implement UCR referral documentation to require receiving agencies to reconcile medicines with prescribers and pharmacies and clarify that UCR MAR charts are for SCFT staff only.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• UCR referral documentation is being revised to clearly reinforce current agreements that receiving care agencies must undertake their own medicines reconciliation directly with the prescriber and community pharmacy.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen referral-pathway expectations that medicines reconciliation is confirmed when care responsibility transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• SCFT has strengthened expectations within referral pathways that medicines reconciliation must be confirmed at transitions of care, particularly where responsibility for medicines administration is transferring.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a themed review of UCR medication incidents involving MAR charts and report findings through Trust governance structures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A themed review of medication incidents involving MAR charts within UCR is underway to inform ongoing quality improvement, training, and assurance.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Photograph all medicines present at assessment and onboarding for every new care package.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following changes have now been implemented:”

    Source location

    Response from Coastal Homecare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to cross-check medicines against prescribing records, administration records, and referral documentation during handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following changes have now been implemented:”

    Source location

    Response from Coastal Homecare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Receiving care agencies are responsible for medicines reconciliation with prescribers and pharmacies; SCFT MAR charts are not definitive records for external providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• UCR referral documentation is being revised to clearly reinforce current agreements that receiving care agencies must undertake their own medicines reconciliation directly with the prescriber and community pharmacy.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paolino Amico, who had metastatic bladder cancer and advanced clinical frailty, was admitted with severe bilateral pneumonia and died in hospital on 12 June 2024. He received multiple overdoses of slow-release morphine following a prescription error, with concerns also raised about medication administration, delayed emergency escalation, oxygen provision after discharge, and the management of morphine reversal and pain relief.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to scrutinise prescribed medication and medication-system information

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Amico did not receive his prescribed medications during his second admissions when he was readmitted to hospital on 9 June. a. On 9 June a doctor in Accident & Emergency had reviewed Mr Amico’s prescribed medications and increased liquid oral morphine sulphate 10 mg in 5mL Solution 4 hourly as required with 2.5 -5 mg max 6 doses at 22:57 hours with slow released morphine sulphate (MST) continued 2 times daily. Trust staff did not administer any morphine to Mr Amico although he and his family were raising concerns about his high level of pain. b. The family was informed incorrectly that medications had not been prescribed. On the morning of 10 June, the family were given permission by a nurse to dispense from Mr Amico’s own supply of medications that he had brought to the hospital due to his level of pain. This was not accurately recorded in Mr Amico’s record. Mr Amico took his prescribed morning dose of MST. c. On 10 June the nurse in Accident & Emergency did not escalate to the nurse in charge or a senior doctor that she could not locate the doctor allocated to Mr Amico and instead approached a foundation year 1 doctor to prescribe pain relief for Mr Amico. The nurse informed the doctor who was junior and very busy that the frequency of the morphine needed to be increased for Mr Amico. The doctor did not escalate the matter and did not review Mr Amico before prescribing a controlled drug. d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9 June or on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management. e. Mr Amico then moved to a ward. Multiple nurses were involved in checking and administering a controlled drug morphine sulphate slow release (MST) on 5 separate occasions between 10 and 11 June 2024 and did not raise concerns about the potential for a prescription error or note that Mr Amico had already received 1 dose of MST that morning. ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate networks for Controlled Drugs Accountable Officers and Medication Safety Officers to receive and spread learning from medication errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide guidance and tools to NHS Trusts for learning from patient safety incidents and improving controlled-drug safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove the option to modify existing prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system, requiring cancellation or discontinuation and reordering with clinical warnings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9th June on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify morphine product names and predefine twice-daily frequency for modified-release morphine prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have recognised there is a huge variation in morphine formulation and type and have made the naming of products clearer. For example, MST is noted as ‘Morphine MODIFIED RELEASE 12 HOURLY tablets’ on the system. We have also pre-defined the frequency as twice a day.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Education and training alone would not sufficiently mitigate recurrence; systems improvements and mechanisms are also required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NICE medicines optimisation guidance NG 5 (2015) referenced above recommends that organisations support healthcare professionals through training and education to ensure safe prescribing, dispensing and administration. In this specific case, education and training alone would not prevent these types of safety system issues and would not be sufficient to mitigate the risk of reoccurrence. Systems improvements and mechanisms will need to be implemented to ensure lessons are learnt and that the current organisational and systems factors and processes highlighted in this case are addressed, to ensure the safe and effective checking and administration of medications. This has been substantiated by safety research and incident analysis.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital trust is responsible for providing the response and addressing the reported concerns through its governance arrangements and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust will be providing their own response to this Report, however, the Hertfordshire & West Essex ICB have advised NHS England of the Trust’s governance arrangements and actions being taken to address the concerns raised. It is understood that the Trust’s Patient Safety Group (PSG) has active oversight of several of the areas highlighted in the Report, particularly medicines safety, recognition of deterioration, and incident learning.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes was admitted to hospital after a fall and received paracetamol in excess of the recommended dose because paracetamol was prescribed alongside co-codamol. The overdose was not recognised until she had developed fulminant acute liver failure, and timely treatment was not provided. The principal concerns included preventing duplicate paracetamol prescriptions and administration, recognising and managing therapeutic excess, accurately assessing confusion, recording over-the-counter medicines, mitigating confirmation bias, and providing guidance for virtual patient reviews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a mechanism for consistently recording pre-admission over-the-counter medications

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Mechanism for recording over the counter medications taken prior to attendance at the Emergency Department (LGT) This concern has arisen out of my finding that Mrs Hughes had taken an over the counter (OTC) drug containing paracetamol before her admission to hospital but that this had not been recorded as part of her medication history. The Trust’s Medicines Reconciliation Policy requires that patients should be asked about OTCs. The Trust relies on individual clinical practice. There is no mechanism to ensure that pre-admission OTCs are consistently recorded such that the risk of therapeutic excess of paracetamol (or other drugs available OTC) in those circumstances continues to exist. ”

    Source location

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend Emergency Department and ambulance handover documentation to prompt recording of over-the-counter medicines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Some actions identified through discussion with senior pharmacy staff to address some of the challenges of completing a medicines reconciliation in the Emergency Department (ED) are as follows:”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review medicines-reconciliation policies and checklists to clarify discussion and documentation of over-the-counter medicines and ambulance handover information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Review the Medicines Reconciliation Policy”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a Medicines Reconciliation Quick Reference Guide for Emergency Department staff covering information sources and over-the-counter medicine prompts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A Medicines Reconciliation Quick Reference Guide for ED staff highlighting sources of information and including prompt for OTC products”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess options for adding over-the-counter medicine prompts and fields to iCare pharmacy medication-history processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There are some options for reviewing pharmacy specific processes on iCare in relation to documenting the use of OTC products that the Trust will explore. The feasibility of these options and an appraisal of these would be required, including: o Introduce a question: ‘The patient has been asked about OTC products’ and a yes/no button as part of Pharmacy Medication History. This would act as a prompt for those completing medication histories to specifically ask about OTC products o Include the field, ‘OTC medication – yes/no/NA’ as part of ‘Document Medication by History’ form. This would allow the documentation of regularly used OTC items to be included as part of the medication history.”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Rhys Lennon Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rhys Lennon Hill underwent spinal surgery and was discharged from Royal Preston Hospital on 30 January 2023. He collapsed at home on 9 February 2023 and attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful; a post-mortem examination found that he died from a pulmonary embolus due to a deep vein thrombosis. The principal concerns included failure to escalate his refusal of Dalteparin or assess the associated risk, failure to provide required VTE information at discharge, and wider problems with communication, documentation, medication reconciliation, and discharge processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear responsibility and system for reconciling community and hospital medications

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The evidence was that the system and responsibility between the hospital pharmacy and clinicians for reconciling medications given in the community with those given in the hospital to ensure all necessary medications were given was unclear. As a consequence, Rhys did not receive his ADHD medication; ”

    Source location

    Rhys Lennon Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust is the appropriate organisation to respond to concerns one to seven.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This response focuses on the issues raised in your Report within the remit of NHS England national policy and programmes. Concern numbers one to seven in your Report fall under the remit of Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. I note that you have also addressed your Report to the Trust, who are the appropriate organisation to respond. NHS England has requested to be sighted on this and will carefully consider their response to the coroner. My regional Quality colleagues within the North West have been engaging with Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (ICB) to seek assurance for the local concerns raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Mohammed Zeeshan Akram (Zee) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mohammed Zeeshan Akram, known as Zee, had a history of suicidal ideation and a psychotic disorder. He died at Whittington Hospital on 21 March 2023 after being found unresponsive at his flat. The principal concern was that GPs were not routinely informed when patients stopped taking prescribed medication, including where suicidal ideation or a risk of stockpiling might be present.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of routine cross-referencing between prescribed and collected medication

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that there was no routine mechanism to cross reference what people are prescribed and what medication they are actually collecting, and no automatic notification to GPs who are responsible for the medication prescribing. Zee informed BEH that he had not taken his olanzapine and fluoxetine for two weeks. His GP, who was prescribing that medication, was not informed. I am concerned that GPs are not updated, particularly where patients have expressed suicidal ideation, and may not be aware that people are not taking medication and/or that there may be a risk of stockpiling. ”

    Source location

    Mohammed Zeeshan Akram (Zee) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Ms Cherry Lynne GARLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms Cherry Lynne GARLAND died on 11 October 2022 in the Bristol Royal Infirmary from sepsis and right-sided heart failure after cardiac treatment, vascular injury, Covid and pneumonia. During her transfer from the Cardiac High Dependency Unit to the Cardiac Ward, a transcription error omitted antibiotics from her medication list, although the evidence accepted was that discontinuing them would have been reasonable at that time. The report raises concern that incompatible medication systems, manual transcription and insufficient pharmacist capacity create a known risk of future medication errors and deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient pharmacist capacity and medicines reconciliation checking

    Wider context from the report

    “My concerns • I heard evidence from an ICU Consultant (who I found to be both a reliable and an impressive witness), who told me, among other things, that: - “... Transcription errors have always been a problem…” the ideal way to get rid of them would be to have a system [in the rest of the hospital] that speaks to ours - The ICU retains lists of its patients’ medication on a computerised/electronic system - The rest of the wards in the hospital do not operate the same system - The available systems do not speak to each other (to put it in somewhat colloquial terms) - Efforts to address that problem have proved fruitless - As a result, every time an inpatient moves from ICU to another department in the hospital, an appropriately qualified member of staff has to physically transcribe that patient’s medication list - With (for instance) 10 patients moving per day, 15-20 medications per patient, and multiple elements for each medication (name; dose; timing; indication; start date; signature etc.), “at a conservative estimate 1,500 to 2,000 elements [are transcribed daily]” (Coroner’s comment: for obvious reasons this creates enormous potential for human error) - There are a limited number of people who can prescribe (and are therefore able to perform this task); in critical care they are the same people who are responsible for providing care - “We really need a second check… funding for more pharmacists… as a Trust we’re falling short of ICU national standards for years in terms of the number of pharmacists per bed and medicines reconciliation” - “I spoke to the Chief Pharmaceutical Officer – he has submitted 5 proposals in the last 7 years to try to get the deficit funded… [without success]” In summary, my view is that the circumstances currently in place create a very real (and known) risk that transcription errors will continue to occur. This in turn endangers patients, and creates a risk that people will die in the future as a result of such errors. It is, sadly, very easy to envisage circumstances in which a patient might not receive essential medication at all, might receive the wrong dose of the medication they need, or might receive the wrong medication altogether, because of a transcription error. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken, and in the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. ”

    Source location

    Ms Cherry Lynne GARLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of hospital medication systems to exchange information, requiring manual transcription during ICU transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “My concerns • I heard evidence from an ICU Consultant (who I found to be both a reliable and an impressive witness), who told me, among other things, that: - “... Transcription errors have always been a problem…” the ideal way to get rid of them would be to have a system [in the rest of the hospital] that speaks to ours - The ICU retains lists of its patients’ medication on a computerised/electronic system - The rest of the wards in the hospital do not operate the same system - The available systems do not speak to each other (to put it in somewhat colloquial terms) - Efforts to address that problem have proved fruitless - As a result, every time an inpatient moves from ICU to another department in the hospital, an appropriately qualified member of staff has to physically transcribe that patient’s medication list - With (for instance) 10 patients moving per day, 15-20 medications per patient, and multiple elements for each medication (name; dose; timing; indication; start date; signature etc.), “at a conservative estimate 1,500 to 2,000 elements [are transcribed daily]” (Coroner’s comment: for obvious reasons this creates enormous potential for human error) - There are a limited number of people who can prescribe (and are therefore able to perform this task); in critical care they are the same people who are responsible for providing care - “We really need a second check… funding for more pharmacists… as a Trust we’re falling short of ICU national standards for years in terms of the number of pharmacists per bed and medicines reconciliation” - “I spoke to the Chief Pharmaceutical Officer – he has submitted 5 proposals in the last 7 years to try to get the deficit funded… [without success]” In summary, my view is that the circumstances currently in place create a very real (and known) risk that transcription errors will continue to occur. This in turn endangers patients, and creates a risk that people will die in the future as a result of such errors. It is, sadly, very easy to envisage circumstances in which a patient might not receive essential medication at all, might receive the wrong dose of the medication they need, or might receive the wrong medication altogether, because of a transcription error. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken, and in the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. ”

    Source location

    Ms Cherry Lynne GARLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply a doctor’s second check when prescribers complete ward drug charts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions already in place to reduce the risk of transcription errors between ITU and the wards:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide routine training for junior and rotational ward pharmacists receiving intensive-care step-down patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions already in place to reduce the risk of transcription errors between ITU and the wards:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement Careflow Medicines Management across most clinical areas to standardise prescribing and support electronic medicines reconciliation and medication-error controls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For patients in the ward areas of our hospitals, medicines are currently prescribed using paper drug charts. A Trust-wide system for electronic prescribing and medicines administration, Careflow Medicines Management (CMM), for ward based patients is currently being implemented across”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review pharmacy funding requests and relevant Trust risk-register entries to provide assurance about medicines-reconciliation safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• You heard in evidence that proposals for additional resource in Pharmacy were presented but, regrettably, there were competing proposals from higher risk areas, which the Trust had to prioritise. I asked the Chief Medical Officer to oversee a review of the funding requests, and entries on the Trust’s risk register, to provide further assurance around this. I confirm that the Trust will invest in additional pharmacy staff for adult ITU to ensure all medicines reconciliation at step down is completed by a suitably trained individual. This will provide a pharmacy medicines reconciliation five days a week. In addition, this investment will provide a safety net review of weekend medicines reconciliation previously undertaken by doctors and advanced nurse practitioners at the weekend at the time of transfer out of ITU.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Invest in additional adult intensive-care pharmacy staff to provide trained-individual medicines reconciliation five days weekly and weekend safety-net reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• You heard in evidence that proposals for additional resource in Pharmacy were presented but, regrettably, there were competing proposals from higher risk areas, which the Trust had to prioritise. I asked the Chief Medical Officer to oversee a review of the funding requests, and entries on the Trust’s risk register, to provide further assurance around this. I confirm that the Trust will invest in additional pharmacy staff for adult ITU to ensure all medicines reconciliation at step down is completed by a suitably trained individual. This will provide a pharmacy medicines reconciliation five days a week. In addition, this investment will provide a safety net review of weekend medicines reconciliation previously undertaken by doctors and advanced nurse practitioners at the weekend at the time of transfer out of ITU.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide a designated quiet space for medication transcription.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions already in place to reduce the risk of transcription errors between ITU and the wards:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in regional auditing to share learning and identify opportunities to reduce medication errors during intensive-care step-down.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions already in place to reduce the risk of transcription errors between ITU and the wards:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A unified electronic prescribing system cannot be introduced because ward and intensive-care systems have incompatible specialised requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addressing transcription challenges within the different clinical areas of UHBW, it may seem desirable to have a unified prescribing system. However, it’s important to acknowledge that the Electronic Patient Record system used for ward-based patients would not be suitable for use on ITU given the specialised requirements of the Intensive Care system. This challenge is not unique to UHBW; across the NHS, different clinical areas, including ITU, maternity, and pathology, often operate with disparate systems due to their complex, individual requirements.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Interoperability between prescribing systems cannot be achieved because it requires technical input from competing external providers outside the Trust’s control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, achieving interoperability between the two systems would require extensive technical input from and between the two external competing commercial providers, which would be outside of the Trust’s control.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Bristol and Weston NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response
  7. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jessica Hodgkinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jessica Hodgkinson died on 14 May 2021 at Chesterfield Royal Hospital shortly after giving birth, following a pulmonary embolism arising from a deep vein thrombosis and acute anaphylaxis of unknown cause. The inquest identified failures to communicate and follow up the plan for prophylactic tinzaparin until birth, and concerns about consideration and documentation of her Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome during pregnancy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify non-receipt of prescribed tinzaparin during transfer of care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I heard evidence from Jess’ consultant that she intended that tinzaparin would be taken by Jess up until birth. When Jess was discharged from Sheffield back into the care of Chesterfield, nobody in Chesterfield identified that Jess was not receiving the tinzaparin which the consultant told the inquest ought to have been in place until birth. ”

    Source location

    Jessica Hodgkinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    IAN JAMES WEEKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ian Weeks was remanded into custody at HMP Cardiff and was later found to have hung himself from the shower rail in his cell, sometime between 20 and 21 October 2017. The concerns included that healthcare staff did not check records showing a recent suicide attempt or notice that he had been prescribed antidepressants, and that there was no effective process for reviewing System 1 records or a suicide and self-harm warning flag.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and continue prescribed antidepressant treatment on admission

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Although it was recorded on System 1 that Mr Weeks had recently attempted suicide in another prison shortly before his admission to HMP Cardiff no member of Healthcare staff checked the medical records and further that although the GP records which were sent to the prison confirmed that Mr Weeks was prescribed anti-depressants in the community no member of Healthcare staff noticed this and as a consequence Mr Weeks was not given anti-depressants in HMP Cardiff. The Healthcare witnesses, including the Head of Healthcare, indicated that a red flag for suicide or self-harm would be of great value for staff who because of insufficient staff and a heavy workload did not have time to review the System 1 record in any or any sufficient detail. Further it was considered that all System 1 records should be reviewed when an individual is admitted into the prison and that there should be in place a process for doing so. ”

    Source location

    IAN JAMES WEEKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Doris Daisy Laura Clark · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Doris Daisy Laura Clark fell at home on 3 November 2018 and remained on the floor for around six hours before being taken to hospital with a suspected fractured neck of femur. She received multiple doses of morphine, including an intravenous dose that was not titrated, and was not monitored in accordance with Trust policy; concerns included inconsistent use of millilitres and milligrams between pre-hospital and hospital services when recording opiate medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify pre-hospital opiate doses and unit discrepancies

    Wider context from the report

    “The doctor who prescribed the morphine at Queens Hospital had not appreciated that the London Ambulance Service paramedics had administered 20 milligrams of morphine. If he had been aware of this he would have administered a further 10 milligrams. The doctor did not note that the paramedics had referred to mls as opposed to mgs in the medication section of the Patient Report Form. The doctor confirmed that the units used in hospital are mgs. It was agreed by all witnesses that great care needs to be taken in the administration of opiate medication. It was agreed that the use of different units by the pre-hospital service and the hospitals themselves creates risk and creates concern as to the risk of future deaths. It is requested that the Trust liaise with the London Ambulance Service to determine whether the units for administration of opiate medication can be standardised between the hospitals and pre-hospital services. ”

    Source location

    Doris Daisy Laura Clark · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Theresa Margaret Feehan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Theresa Margaret Feehan, who had severe oxygen- and steroid-dependent allergic asthma, was found deceased at home on 12 March 2018. The court recorded aspiration pneumonia and ingestion of amitriptyline and dihydrocodeine as the medical cause of death, with natural causes combined with side effects of prescribed medication. Concerns included inadequate medication review, incomplete medical-history recording, poor correlation between medication and problem lists, insufficient systems for identifying harmful medication interactions, and inadequate supervision of administrative work.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to correlate the medication list with the active problem list

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That there appears to be little correlation between the medication list and the active problem list such that it would make it difficult for a reviewing doctor to understand why a patient was on a particular medication and thus challenge its continuation or dosage appropriately, thus putting patients at risk. ”

    Source location

    Theresa Margaret Feehan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inspections ultimately found no concerns in the areas identified, so there was no basis for enforcement action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The provider made significant challenges to the findings we made. We accepted those challenges and decided there was no basis for us to take enforcement action. We also carried out a full and comprehensive rated inspection in June 2019. I attach copies of the reports of both of these inspections. They are also available on our website under the “All reports” link at https://www.cqc.org.uk/location/1-549237033.”

    Source location

    2019-0070-Amended-Response-from-Care-Quality-Commission-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026