Recurring concern

Unreliable patient observation arrangements

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First reported 28 Mar 2013•Latest report 24 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes observation-level assessment, observation policies and support plans, staff allocation and reliable delivery of required intermittent or enhanced patient observations.

Not included

  • Condition-specific physiological or neurological monitoring
  • Management auditing of observations where frontline observation arrangements are otherwise reliable
  • Continuous eyesight or one-to-one observation where that dedicated control supplies a narrower parent
Reports
139

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
174

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
328

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission11
Department of Health and Social Care11
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust7
NHS England7
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust5
Devon Partnership NHS Trust4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
North London NHS Foundation Trust3
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital, King's Lynn3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust2
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Coventry

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Adam Yafai · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Adam Yafai was arrested in the early hours of 1 July 2015 after disclosing recent cocaine use, and was found convulsing and frothing at the mouth in his cell. He suffered cardiac arrest and died at hospital; the stated cause of death was acute cocaine toxicity. The report raised concerns that custody policies used unclear terminology and gave too much discretion over healthcare assessment, risk assessment and observation for detainees who had disclosed drug use.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear and consistent drug-related risk assessment and observation guidance

    Wider context from the report

    “i. The Safer Detention Policy and Handling of Person in Custody Composite Policy as updated August 2014 was replaced by the WMP Detention and Custody Policy Inc. Standard Operating Procedure with effect from the 22nd December 2015. The earlier policy was in operation at the time Mark Yafai died. The earlier policy lacked clarity or guidance in how the phrase “under the influence” must be interpreted. The phrase is unsuitable since it confers a very broad discretion upon a custody officer to not have the detainee examined by a Health Care Professional, despite a detainee has disclosed recently consuming drugs. The impact upon risk assessment and levels of observation is clear and significant. A broad discretion of an officer when determining risk concerning medical matters including drug use is inadequate. The jury made a determination in similar terms. ii. The evidence was the policy is accessible. Accordingly, it is paramount that the policy must provide clear unambiguous guidance/ direction to custody officers particularly in relation to drugs which can have serious consequences for an individual who has consumed. The circumstances of this inquest touching upon the death of Mark Yafai accentuated this point. The evidence was that cocaine can have toxic effects even from small quantities (as little as 0.03g). Consumption can be via a number of means and the effects delayed depending upon the method of ingestion. There is no antidote to cocaine toxicity. The evidence was custody officers range of knowledge about drugs and the effects can and do differ and this can have a bearing upon risk assessment given the terminology in the policy and broad discretion officers have. iii. The 2015 policy retains that same unclear terminology i.e. “believed to be under the influence of drugs or withdrawing from drugs” and “will be seen by a Health Care Professional (HCP) as a matter of course”. iv. It does not deal with the instances in which a detainee irrespective of presentation (which is not itself any easy assessment when a detainee is being observed by an officer most likely for the first time with no information against which a comparison may be made as whether their current presentation is indeed “normal”) has disclosed the recent consumption of drugs. What is “a line” or any quantitative opinion on drugs consumed is a very subjective assessment by the detainee and/ or the custody officer. v. An assessment as to the effect of any drugs is best assessed a by a Heath Care Professional. That was the evidence and information that emerged in the inquest. Standard medical observations can be undertaken ranging from a check as body temperature to elevated heart rate or blood pressure which may be indicators that drugs are having an adverse effect upon the body. vi. Earlier identification of these matters may prevent death particularly since treatment for many drugs, particularly cocaine, is symptomatic. Close observation of a detainee is clearly significant since early treatment of symptoms can have an impact upon an individual’s survivability. vii. The policy in other respects does use directional/ non discretion type terminology in some respects when dealing with drug issues. It is thus currently inconsistent in this respect on this topic and in interrelation with Risk assessment and appropriate observation levels which are a focus of custody personnel. ”

    Source location

    Mark Adam Yafai · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Thomas McManus · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Thomas McManus, who was detained under Section 37 of the Mental Health Act and resident at Chadwick Lodge, was found hanging from a bathroom door using a draw string bag after he was not visible during overnight checks on 8 December 2015. Concerns were raised about the unit’s observation system, including observations being conducted at fixed times, some not being carried out, and charts being completed retrospectively.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out required observations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The system of observations carried out within the unit, particularly at night is in need of reform. (2) Many of the nurses were conducting hourly observations every hour at the same time each hour, rather than randomly. (3) Some observations were not carried out and the observation chart completed at the end of the shift. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Thomas McManus · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct observations at varied times

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The system of observations carried out within the unit, particularly at night is in need of reform. (2) Many of the nurses were conducting hourly observations every hour at the same time each hour, rather than randomly. (3) Some observations were not carried out and the observation chart completed at the end of the shift. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Thomas McManus · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Llewellyn-Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Llewellyn-Jones, who had been detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act after becoming acutely unwell with psychosis, left a locked hospital ward unaccompanied and was later found hanging by a ligature in the hospital grounds. The concerns included breaches of the ward’s locked door, predictable observations, inadequate collection of information from family and carers, insufficient assessment and observation, inadequate staff induction, and staffing levels that contributed to failings in his care and security.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ward policy to require unpredictable and irregular observations

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Observations when carried out in the context of a secure mental health environment should not be predictable or entirely regular. This is not currently part of the ward policy, although it appeared to be accepted by senior staff at inquest. The Trust should consider further measures to ensure that training and instruction given to all staff in relation to observations is clear, constantly reinforced, and in line with best practise. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Llewellyn-Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Finalize and implement revised Engagement Policy requirements for documenting and varying intermittent engagement and observation intervals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ‘Engagement Policy’ has been reviewed by the Deputy Director of Nursing and is currently being finalised, it has been changed to include the following -”

    Source location

    2016-0385-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 October 2016

    Open published response
  4. Central Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Haydn James Burton, a prisoner at HMP Winchester, was found suspended from a ligature point in his cell on 15 July 2015 and died in hospital on 18 July 2015 from the delayed effects of ligature suspension. The concerns included inadequate implementation of ACCT plans and observations, uncertainty about confidentiality rules in the Prison Listener scheme, and limitations in recording and communicating information about closed ACCT plans.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate observations under ACCT plans

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence in this case indicated that prison staff at Winchester Prison are not implementing ACCT plans in accordance with national policy notwithstanding the training they have received and in particular the observations conducted are inadequate. I therefore consider that the process and future training needs to be reviewed ”

    Source location

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver local ACCT refresher training to 48 staff on 13 and 20 December 2016, then provide it at least monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note your concern that evidence at the inquest suggested that staff at Winchester are inconsistent in their implementation of the Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) process, and that the practice of undertaking ACCT observations is inadequate. I am grateful to you for raising this concern, and would like to reassure you that the Governor of Winchester, ████████, is committed to ensuring that all operational staff are successfully trained in ACCT procedures to enable them consistently to follow national ACCT policy contained within Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 64/2011 Safer Custody. Local ACCT refresher training is due to take place on 13 and 20 December 2016 for 48 members of staff and will be delivered at least monthly thereafter. HMP Winchester is also holding a Safety Awareness Day on 21 December 2016.”

    Source location

    2016-0346-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit and deploy 12 new Prison Officers who complete entry-level training covering suicide, self-harm awareness and the ACCT process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, more staff are being recruited, and 12 new Prison Officers are expected to complete the Prison Officer Entry Level Training (POELT) course that includes training on suicide and self-harm awareness and the ACCT process and start work at Winchester by March 2017.”

    Source location

    2016-0346-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2016

    Open published response
  5. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Maxine Ritchie was recovering from major surgery when she deteriorated overnight on 5–6 March and suffered a cardiac arrest at around 12.20 hrs on 6 March. Concerns included missed opportunities to escalate care in response to raised NEWS scores, inaccurate or potentially delayed observations, and failures in the use of NEWS across the Trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to increase observation frequency during clinical deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The other area of concern I have is that the observations were not taken more regularly during the night of the 5th/6th March when it was clear that Mrs Ritchie's condition was deteriorating – it should not have needed any form of direction from the doctors attending for these observations to be taken more regularly. The Nurse in charge of the ward should have been informed and should have made a direction for the appropriate timing of these observations. ”

    Source location

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Olive Wilmott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Olive Wilmott was found on the floor of a communal area of a residential care home after suffering a hip fracture. The Inquest concluded that she died from the effects of a urine infection and severe dementia, with the hip fracture a contributory factor. Concerns included possible pushing that was not effectively investigated or referred for safeguarding, and a lack of evidence that required 15-minute observations were provided amid insufficient night-shift staffing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain required 15-minute observation of residents

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That Miss Wilmott was assessed as requiring observation at 15 minute intervals, but there was no evidence that this had been in place and at the time of the event there were insufficient staff in place for her and other residents’ needs (one staff member dedicated per floor of the dementia unit during the night shift). ”

    Source location

    Olive Wilmott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Danielle Rhian Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Danielle Rhian Robinson, a 21-year-old detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act, was found unresponsive with a ligature around her neck at the Heddfan Unit on 13 November 2014 and died on 16 November 2014 despite resuscitation attempts and subsequent treatment. The concerns identified were that observation policies were not being rigorously followed, resulting in missed opportunities to increase observation levels, and that the policy should provide an automatic safety-net response after serious events placing a patient at immediate or imminent risk of harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow the Therapeutic Engagement and Observation Policy and escalate observation levels when required

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the Therapeutic Engagement and Observation Policy presently adopted by BCUHB is not being rigorously followed by staff with the result that opportunities to escalate the level of observations when required are being missed. ”

    Source location

    Danielle Rhian Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of automatic escalation of observation levels after serious events placing patients at risk of immediate or imminent harm

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That the current Therapeutic Engagement and Observation Policy there should be reviewed with consideration being given to implementing a system for situations where there is a serious event which places a patient at risk of immediate or imminent harm, that there should be an automatic escalation of observation levels to level 3 or 4 (within eyesight or arm’s length respectively) for a designated period and/or one to one engagement with the patient so as to provide an instant “safety net”. ”

    Source location

    Danielle Rhian Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Therapeutic Engagement and Observation Policy to require automatic escalation of observations after serious self-harm pending full MDT review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the Regulation 28, issued on May 28th 2016 as a result of the inquest into the death of Miss Danielle Rhian Robinson. I can confirm that the BCUHB Therapeutic Engagement and Observation Policy has been reviewed and updated to include the automatic escalation of observations following serious attempt of self-harm until a full multi-disciplinary team (MDT) review can take place, a copy is enclosed for your information.”

    Source location

    2016-0205-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Integrate compliance auditing into the divisional audit cycle and report outcomes and improvement suggestions through divisional governance to QSE.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Roles and responsibilities of all staff are clearly detailed within the policy. In relation to the ongoing monitoring of compliance, an audit process is included which will now form part of the divisional audit cycle with outcomes and suggestions for improvements formally reported through our divisional governance structure to QSE.”

    Source location

    2016-0205-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a learning event and formally relaunch the updated policy at the event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The division has its first learning event planned for September 2016 and the policy will be formally re-launched at this event.”

    Source location

    2016-0205-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 May 2016

    Open published response
  8. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Harold Brand · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Harold Brand, a 53-year-old patient at Broadmoor Hospital, became unresponsive after returning from treatment at Frimley Park Hospital and could not be revived despite resuscitation attempts. Concerns included failures to follow observation procedures, failure to check that he was alive when his room was unlocked, and a delay in starting CPR.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out hospital observation checks correctly and ensure patient safety

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There were periods during the observation of Mr Brand by nursing staff where the hospital observation policy was not followed correctly. In particular, one nurse gave evidence that he saw no movement from Mr Brand after 06.50 hours for some 40-50 minutes. His view of Mr Brand was obscured by poor lighting in the room, scratches to the observation window through which he was observing Mr Brand and by the position in which Mr Brand was lying under heavy bedding. He made no effort to ensure that Mr Brand was safe and well, in line with the policy. (2) When the door to Mr Brand’s room was unlocked at 07.15 on 1st July 2015, no attempt was made to check that he was alive and well in breach of the policy at the time. At least a further 10 minutes passed before it was realised that Mr Brand had not moved and checks revealed him to be unresponsive. (3) Having found Mr Brand to be unresponsive, nursing staff did not immediately begin CPR. The evidence shows that it was only the 4th member of staff attending Mr Brand who commenced CPR and there was a delay while the first staff on the scene called for more senior assistance. (4) While the failure to follow hospital policy may not have directly impacted upon the circumstances of Mr Brand’s death, the nature of the breaches are so fundamental that they could be the difference between life and death of a patient on future occasions. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Harold Brand · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct monthly checks of observation windows on every ward and record and escalate damage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the fabric of the ward, the hospital introduced a monthly check of the observation windows of all the rooms on each ward. These are on-going. We have documentary records of these checks and also records of when damage has been identified and reported to our Estates and Facilities. These reports are completed by staff on the ward and are reviewed by the ward manager.”

    Source location

    2016-0154-Response-by-West-London-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct unannounced out-of-hours audits of observation practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A number of initiatives have been undertaken focussing on observations. Following the death and the identified problems with observations, our Practice Development Nurse introduced unannounced out of normal business hours audits of observation practice. We have completed eight such audits since August 2013, the last being in April 2016. If we have identified any concerns with practice during the audits, ward managers have been asked to address these issues with the staff concerned.”

    Source location

    2016-0154-Response-by-West-London-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory clinical risk training on engagement and supportive observations to clinical staff every three years.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In September 2014, the hospital introduced a specific module within our mandatory clinical risk training regarding engagement and supportive observations. This course must be undertaken every three years by all clinical staff and currently 92% of staff are compliant with this training.”

    Source location

    2016-0154-Response-by-West-London-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain ward-level knowledge and skills assessments for staff undertaking enhanced engagement and observations, with annual auditing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2014, we introduced a Knowledge Skills Assessment (KSA) record on each ward, relating to enhanced engagement and observations. The ward managers and team leaders complete KSA records for all ward staff likely to undertake enhanced engagement and observations in their areas. Staff are expected to read the policy relating to enhanced engagement and observations, to discuss this with the ward manager or team leader and sign to say they have done so and also the ward manager/team leader has to confirm that they are happy for the member of staff to carry out observations. A yearly audit is completed and the next due in June 2016.”

    Source location

    2016-0154-Response-by-West-London-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver local and national workshops focused on observation practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have undertaken workshops with the theme of observations, both locally and nationally and from 2014 to 2016 the hospital was involved in a CQUIN regarding the best practice in managing risk using supportive observations. This was in conjunction with the other two high secure hospitals in England.”

    Source location

    2016-0154-Response-by-West-London-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in a cross-hospital CQUIN programme on best practice in managing risk through supportive observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have undertaken workshops with the theme of observations, both locally and nationally and from 2014 to 2016 the hospital was involved in a CQUIN regarding the best practice in managing risk using supportive observations. This was in conjunction with the other two high secure hospitals in England.”

    Source location

    2016-0154-Response-by-West-London-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response
  9. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    David Granville Oswald Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Granville Oswald Hughes was a patient at the Bradgate Unit who was found unresponsive on his bedroom floor at approximately 02:00 on 23 April 2014. The report identified concerns about failures in 15-minute observations, incomplete fluid balance charts, the lack of bedroom call bells, and nursing staff’s understanding of physical illness signs and symptoms.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct Level 2 observations at prescribed intervals

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Level 2 observations were not conducted at the prescribed time intervals and periods of up to two hours lapsed between observations that should have been conducted every 15 minutes. When observations were conducted they were not always carried out as per the protocol. Assurances have been given at previous inquests that the performing and recording of these observations would be monitored, audited and staff would be trained regarding the importance of such observations. The same assurances were given at Mr. Hughes' inquest. It therefore appears that changes have not been made or if they have they are not working. Alternatively, changes may occur in the short-term but they are not being maintained and therefore the monitoring and auditing systems, if implemented, appear not to be working. ”

    Source location

    David Granville Oswald Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out Level 2 observations in accordance with protocol

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Level 2 observations were not conducted at the prescribed time intervals and periods of up to two hours lapsed between observations that should have been conducted every 15 minutes. When observations were conducted they were not always carried out as per the protocol. Assurances have been given at previous inquests that the performing and recording of these observations would be monitored, audited and staff would be trained regarding the importance of such observations. The same assurances were given at Mr. Hughes' inquest. It therefore appears that changes have not been made or if they have they are not working. Alternatively, changes may occur in the short-term but they are not being maintained and therefore the monitoring and auditing systems, if implemented, appear not to be working. ”

    Source location

    David Granville Oswald Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Therapeutic Observation Policy with competency-based training and competency checks before staff lead patient observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The poor practice demonstrated by staff regarding observations at the time of the incident is unacceptable and is not tolerated. A new version of the Trust's Therapeutic Observation Policy was implemented in 2015 with staff competency based training in the practical application of the policy. The policy is aimed at observing patients in relation to risk of harm, however does include assessment of physical wellbeing. All staff who carry out therapeutic observations are competency checked by a ward nurse or matron before they are allowed to lead on a patient's observations. This is applicable for all ward substantive and bank staff.”

    Source location

    David-Hughes-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report missed observations through the incident system, review them by the ward matron, and interview responsible staff with action taken where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All missed observations should be reported through the incident reporting system and are subsequently reviewed by the relevant ward matron. Responsible clinical staff involved in late or missed observations are interviewed and action taken where necessary.”

    Source location

    David-Hughes-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Therapeutic Observation Policy to determine how physical-health observations should be incorporated or separately guided.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Therapeutic Observation Policy will be reviewed by 30 April 2016 to consider how the completion of therapeutic observation for physical health concerns should be included or if separate guidance is required.”

    Source location

    David-Hughes-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 February 2016

    Open published response
  10. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    CHRISTOPHER JONATHAN HIGGINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Jonathan Higgins died on 2 July 2013 after sustaining a head injury when he dived over railings while being taken outside for a cigarette at the Fermoy Unit. The report identified concerns about staff understanding of patient observations, patient transfers involving other services, risk assessment of the environment, and arrangements for detained patients requiring assessment and treatment at A&E.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of staff to understand required patient-observation practices

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) It became clear during evidence, that members of staff are not aware of what is required of them when they carry out Observations on a patient. This was particularly evident with regard to Observations to be carried out on a "two members of staff to one patient" basis. Areas of confusion include how staff are to engage with a patient, how close they are required to be with regard to the patient, i.e. at arm's length or within eyesight and how to record the information gained from the Observation. ”

    Source location

    CHRISTOPHER JONATHAN HIGGINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the Observation and Engagement of Service Users policy to clarify additional-observation requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report identified that during the inquest staff reported areas of confusion regarding the action of additional observations. The staff conveyed a lack of clarity regarding aspects such as arm’s length or within eyesight. Following the inquest the Trust’s Observation and Engagement of Service Users policy has been reviewed and updated to reflect the need for clarity in applying the observations as intended. I enclose a copy of the policy.”

    Source location

    2015-0480-Response-by-Norfolk-and-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate updated observation requirements through staff emails, the Patient Safety Newsletter, and governance and leadership forums.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Amending policy is one action, which must be followed by communication to ensure its adoption by all staff. The Trust uses a range of communications including updates by email, within a Patient Safety Newsletter and discussion at governance and leadership forums. Through this range of means, staff are updated of the requirement to adapt practice.”

    Source location

    2015-0480-Response-by-Norfolk-and-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026