Recurring concern

Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deterioration

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First reported 24 Sep 2013•Latest report 24 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to recognise, monitor, escalate, obtain clinical review for or respond to acute physical deterioration when the deterioration hazard itself is directly asserted.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, training or senior-oversight failures not directly tied to an identified deterioration episode or control.
  • Excludes deterioration in mental health, and condition-specific systems that do not establish a wider acute-deterioration failure.
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
127

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
169

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care14
NHS England10
Care Quality Commission6
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust6
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust4
Recipient name withheld3
Royal Sussex County Hospital3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
College of Policing2
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
Metropolitan Police Service2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Harry Arthur STOBIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Harry Arthur STOBIE suffered a stroke, underwent thrombectomy and later had a PEG tube inserted, which caused a large haemoperitoneum that was not recognised at the time. The concerns were that his deteriorating condition and abdominal pain were not monitored or escalated promptly after the procedure, and that PEG insertion procedures and protocols should be reviewed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to closely monitor deteriorating patients after PEG insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “That once the PEG tube was inserted at Milton Keynes Hospital it seems that the deceased's deteriorating condition was not monitored closely even though he was complaining of abdominal pain soon after the procedure was completed . His concerns were not escalated to a senior doctor for consideration of a possible bleed. The procedures and protocols following PEG insertions should be reviewed. ”

    Source location

    Harry Arthur STOBIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Vizard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Vizard, aged 58, died from a pulmonary embolism on 14 July 2022 after suffering cardiac arrests while detained in hospital under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The report identified delays in obtaining monitoring equipment, a ward doctor attending, and calling an ambulance when concerns arose about his breathing. It also raised concern that existing staff training and emergency-response systems may not ensure an immediate and effective response in similar life-threatening situations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in obtaining and utilising physical monitoring equipment for patients with concerns for their breathing

    Wider context from the report

    “Despite there being concerns for an unresponsive patient’s breathing, it took: a) At least 6 minutes to obtain and utilise physical monitoring equipment. b) Nearly ten minutes for a ward doctor to attend the patient. c) Over 10 minutes for an ambulance to be called. Existing staff training and systems of emergency response do not appear to ensure an immediate and effective response in circumstances where there are concerns for a patient’s breathing. Although the delays did not cause or contribute to death in this case, I am concerned that if there are similar delays in similar life-threatening situations in future, deaths will occur. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Vizard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Howard SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Howard Smith was a serving prisoner at HMP Lowdham Grange who died at Queen’s Medical Centre on 19 May 2019 from cardiac arrest due to a massive pulmonary embolism, predisposed by deep vein thrombosis. The report describes progressive deterioration, inadequate monitoring and clinical assessment, delayed escalation and ambulance transfer, and failures in communication and care. It also identifies concerns about unsafe clinical-care practices, inadequate record keeping and disclosure, and a lack of candour in post-death investigations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of senior healthcare leadership oversight of care planning and deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. An inability to provide prisoners at HMP Lowdham Grange with safe clinical care I heard evidence, and the jury reached findings, that there was an unsafe practice of staff conducting important healthcare and wellbeing observations via the cell door observation hatch. Observing an unwell prisoner through a hatch slightly larger than a letterbox undermines the safety of the clinical assessment. Healthcare staff did not utilise the NEWS2 system of monitoring the condition of an acutely unwell prisoner, despite the Trust having adopted this recognised healthcare tool many years prior. The Forensic Directorate has continued to lag behind other areas of the Trust where NEWS2 is fully embedded and this has previously been identified as an issue linked to other deaths. There was a lack of robust GP visits, despite such being mandated by the Prison Rules. When visits did take place, they were often via the cell door observation hatch and conducted as “fleeting glances” rather than robust clinical assessments. Again, this is unsafe. There was a lack of effective leadership of the healthcare department to ensure that staff had created a safe plan of care for Christopher. Senior personnel were not aware of Christopher’s week-long deterioration in the segregation unit until very late in the chronology of events, nor were they aware of a dispute between the mental health and physical health teams as to the differential diagnoses that might be causing his concerning symptoms and deterioration. Despite daily lunch time meetings, there was a stark lack of professional curiosity from senior staff as to the plan of care for Christopher and what safety netting, if any, was in place. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Howard SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide dedicated Resus Lead support, onsite training, scenario coaching, code-call shadowing and feedback for deteriorating-patient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of identifying a need to develop a training programme and approach that would ensure our staff have a greater understanding of NEWS 2 and the application of NEWS2 in a patient setting, a number of actions have been undertaken in order to address this:”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 18 March 2021, the deceased took cocaine, developed features of acute behavioural disturbance, arrested before an ambulance arrived, and died in hospital the following day after resuscitation. The substantive concerns were the delay in moving him to the floor and commencing CPR, and insufficient proactive support from officers not directly monitoring his vital signs during the resuscitation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise deterioration and commence CPR promptly

    Wider context from the report

    “1. What was particularly challenging for the officers was knowing when to move ████████ to the floor and when to commence CPR. ████████ was in peri arrest/arrest for probably around three and a half minutes before CPR was commenced. Although earlier CPR would not have changed the outcome for him, it might for another casualty. The intensive care consultant giving evidence at inquest articulated his view of the point at which ████████ was in peri arrest. He recognised that this was a difficult call to make, but told me that if in doubt about such an arrest situation, first aiders should move straight to CPR. I am aware of the work the MPS has undertaken to improve the first aid training of its front line officers. The recognition of the deteriorating patient is notoriously difficult, sometimes even in a hospital setting. However, given that it is a difficulty I have seen recur for the MPS, it seems to me that it would benefit from further consideration. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require all officers to complete digital training on recognising agonal breathing to support earlier CPR.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since this incident in March 2021, the MPS has introduced the following changes to the MPS Emergency Life Support (ELS) training, which will assist in reducing any delays in administering CPR.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Standardise jaw-thrust airway management, retain casualties on their backs, limit recovery-position use to clearing fluids, and commence CPR when noisy breathing persists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since this incident in March 2021, the MPS has introduced the following changes to the MPS Emergency Life Support (ELS) training, which will assist in reducing any delays in administering CPR.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver expanded Emergency Life Support Module 2 and refresher training, including additional practical scenario-based drills and techniques.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May 2023, the National Police Chief Council endorsed recommendations from its First Aid Forum’s review following the Manchester Arena public inquiry. This increased ELS Module 2 training from 9-12 hours (and increased refresher training by 2 hours). This training will introduce techniques such as the ‘jaw thrust’ and also provide more practical scenario-based drills with the aim of improving officers’ confidence in dealing with casualty situations. The MPS will start to deliver this additional training from April 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 July 2023

    Open published response
  5. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carol Ann Hatch underwent repeat hiatus hernia surgery at a private hospital on 31 August 2022 and became unwell overnight. She was transferred to an NHS hospital, treated for septic shock and organ failure for six weeks, and died on 18 October 2022. The report identifies concerns about overnight monitoring, escalation, staffing competence, record-keeping, and delays in investigations and treatment; evidence at the Inquest indicated that the failings contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by the reviewing doctor to escalate patient deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The RMO was called to review Mrs Hatch twice during the night but failed to appreciate the deterioration in her condition necessitated an escalation to the surgeon and/or anaesthetist. ”

    Source location

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert senior clinicians to unexpected patient deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mrs Hatch’s condition deteriorated markedly during the night of 31 August/1 September 2022 (some hours after surgery). Neither the surgeon nor the anaesthetist were alerted to this unexpected deterioration. The Surgeon only became aware of the position when he contacted the hospital and came in around 7 am. ”

    Source location

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide NEWS refresher training to relevant colleagues and conduct regular audits of NEWS compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to addressing NEWS training with agency staff, the hospital have ensured a NEWS update refresher has been provided to all relevant colleagues and have conducted regular audits to provide assurance in relation to compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 4 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver training to RMOs on recognising deteriorating patients and signs of gastric perforation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This matter was recognised in the RCA, has been discussed with the RMO and there is a plan in place for training to be delivered to RMOs on recognising signs of a deteriorating patient and recognising signs of gastric perforation. In addition, Spire has received confirmation that the RMO has undertaken a recent appraisal. We refer the Coroner to evidence file relating to the RMO which includes evidence of action taken in relation to this concern.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce deteriorating-patient stickers for clinical use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ADDITIONAL ACTIONS EVIDENCE”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 11 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Referral of the RMO to the GMC was considered unnecessary because the RCA findings and known practice did not meet the referral threshold.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Evidence was heard at the inquest that consideration was given to referring the RMO to the GMC following this incident. The RMO’s skill set, and competency were discussed at a Scrutiny Panel on 17th February 2023 attended by hospital and senior clinical and medical management at Spire. It was concluded that the findings of the RCA and the known practice of the RMO did not meet the threshold for referral to the GMC. It was agreed that the hospital team would share the RCA with the RMO’s agency, which was completed on 16th March 2023. It was agreed that the RMO’s agency were best placed to assist us in understanding whether this was an isolated episode or not, whether there were any wider performance concerns that needed to be addressed or matters requiring escalation to the GMC.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 8 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The RMO’s agency was considered best placed to assess whether the incident was isolated or required wider performance action or GMC escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Evidence was heard at the inquest that consideration was given to referring the RMO to the GMC following this incident. The RMO’s skill set, and competency were discussed at a Scrutiny Panel on 17th February 2023 attended by hospital and senior clinical and medical management at Spire. It was concluded that the findings of the RCA and the known practice of the RMO did not meet the threshold for referral to the GMC. It was agreed that the hospital team would share the RCA with the RMO’s agency, which was completed on 16th March 2023. It was agreed that the RMO’s agency were best placed to assist us in understanding whether this was an isolated episode or not, whether there were any wider performance concerns that needed to be addressed or matters requiring escalation to the GMC.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 8 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response
  6. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Felice Eileen Grace Banfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Felice Eileen Grace Banfield was admitted with a painful knee and required non-invasive ventilation, but there was a lack of clarity about where and when this could be provided. She was not brought to the attention of respiratory clinicians, deteriorated with mixed respiratory and metabolic acidosis and an acute kidney injury, and died despite treatment. The principal concerns were failures concerning access to non-invasive ventilation, recognition of respiratory risk and deterioration, and provision and monitoring of adequate food, fluids and continuity of care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise deterioration in a patient's presentation promptly

    Wider context from the report

    “A failure to recognise a deterioration in the presentation of a patient which could have triggered a request for repeat bloods and revealed the worsening acidosis before an AKI developed. There appear at least two elements to this: i) the use of food and fluid charts to make sure a patient is not becoming dehydrated and is having adequate calorific intake; ii) for patients who stay on AMU longer than usual, ensuring there is some continuity in medical or nursing care, so a deterioration in presentation can be recognised promptly. Would there be value, for example, in requiring a patient who is on AMU for longer than say, 48 hours, to become the responsibility of a single, named consultant who will be responsible for regular review starting at the 48 hour mark? ”

    Source location

    Felice Eileen Grace Banfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement early-morning bedside review of AMU patients to identify deterioration and refer patients to appropriate clinical teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The improvements also include ensuring that all AMU patients are reviewed early each morning at the bedside, identifying patients who are deteriorating and referring them to the correct clinical teams. In addition the project team will also review and update existing policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for all admitting areas to ensure they are up to date and support the principle of the right patient in the right bed at the right time.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Cornwall Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 30 January 2023

    Open published response
  7. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Rita Maureen TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rita Maureen TAYLOR suffered an unwitnessed fall at home and a head injury. Multiple ambulance calls were made, but an ambulance was delayed because no resources were available; she arrived at hospital with a Glasgow Coma Score of 3 and died the same day. The principal concern was insufficient ambulance service resources and the resulting delay, which the inquest conclusion described as causing lost opportunities to admit her and begin treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to upgrade emergency incident categorisation when clinical deterioration warranted a higher priority

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that there are insufficient ambulance service resources to meet the needs of the City of Milton Keynes. The first call to the 111 service was made at 10.28 and the call was deemed a category 3 incident. [At] that time there were "no available resources to send." At 11.12 a 999 call was made by a passer by but there were still "no available resources ". At 12.16 there was a further 999 call. The incident remained a category three and was "still pending in the dispatch queue waiting for resources to become available ". At 12.41 a call was made to Mrs. Taylor’s location but there were " still no available resources to send". At 13.12 A further 999 call was made " awaiting resources to become available" At 13.48 Patient location was called she was now in and out of consciousness and although she remained a category 3 an audit of the call decided that she should have been upgraded to a category 2 or 1. "Still no available resources". At 14.42 further 999 call but again "no available resources". At 15.25 Case reviewed to a category 2. At 16.29 An ambulance was dispatched arriving at 17.15. This was 6hours 47 minutes after the original call and 1hour 49 minutes after category 2 upgrade. Mrs Taylor arrived at the hospital at 17.57 and when assessed in the emergency department her Glasgow Coma score was recorded as 3.She died later the same day. ”

    Source location

    Rita Maureen TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Allen, an otherwise healthy man, was admitted to Milton Keynes University Hospital with gallstone pancreatitis and died there on 11 April 2021 from acute pancreatitis and liver necrosis resulting from gallstone disease. The report identified concerns about ineffective monitoring, inadequate senior surgical supervision, failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively, and delay in calling the ITU team after his deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide effective senior review of deteriorating patients

    Wider context from the report

    “An FY1 doctor was effectively left to her own devices to manage Mr Allen, despite her being only 8 months or so in a post qualification position. In my mind this was a wholly unacceptable lapse on the part of her senior clinicians. She was, despite her efforts, out of her depth. This is not a criticism of the FY1 doctor, simply a reflection that she had only a few months junior surgical experience at that time. All clinicians, ████████ gave evidence that they were aware of the MKUH Sepsis protocol. However, none of them was able to describe it fully – the nearest being the most junior of the team, ████████. As a result there was a failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively. There was no effective senior involvement in the care of Mr Allen from the end of the 0800 am ward round to his deterioration at around 1800 or so. There was a failure to effectively or consistently monitor Mr Allen between 1059 am and his deterioration around 1800. Even at that point despite, in my mind, a critical emergency, there was a further delay of one hour before the ITU team were called. Overall, I find that the surgical team in charge of Mr Allen had no effective knowledge of the Sepsis protocol, they failed to monitor him effectively or consistently despite clear signs of deterioration, they failed to provide adequate support and supervision to ████████ and they failed to institute an effective senior review at any point on the 9th April 2021 until critical deterioration by which time his chances of death due to his rapid deterioration and multi-organ failure were 80 to 100%. ”

    Source location

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to effectively and consistently monitor patients for deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “An FY1 doctor was effectively left to her own devices to manage Mr Allen, despite her being only 8 months or so in a post qualification position. In my mind this was a wholly unacceptable lapse on the part of her senior clinicians. She was, despite her efforts, out of her depth. This is not a criticism of the FY1 doctor, simply a reflection that she had only a few months junior surgical experience at that time. All clinicians, ████████ gave evidence that they were aware of the MKUH Sepsis protocol. However, none of them was able to describe it fully – the nearest being the most junior of the team, ████████. As a result there was a failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively. There was no effective senior involvement in the care of Mr Allen from the end of the 0800 am ward round to his deterioration at around 1800 or so. There was a failure to effectively or consistently monitor Mr Allen between 1059 am and his deterioration around 1800. Even at that point despite, in my mind, a critical emergency, there was a further delay of one hour before the ITU team were called. Overall, I find that the surgical team in charge of Mr Allen had no effective knowledge of the Sepsis protocol, they failed to monitor him effectively or consistently despite clear signs of deterioration, they failed to provide adequate support and supervision to ████████ and they failed to institute an effective senior review at any point on the 9th April 2021 until critical deterioration by which time his chances of death due to his rapid deterioration and multi-organ failure were 80 to 100%. ”

    Source location

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Ebere Nwanyonyiri · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Ebere Nwanyonyiri was admitted to Goodmayes Hospital after deterioration in her mental state and was found unresponsive on 19 April 2021; post-mortem investigations found that she died from Covid-19 infection. The report raised concerns about the absence of a written care plan and completed risk assessment, the lack of clear assessment of her capacity to refuse physical observations, and failures to recognise and respond urgently to the severity of her condition.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to respond to concerning clinical states with necessary urgency

    Wider context from the report

    “2. A number of nurses failed to recognise the acute clinical severity of Mary’s condition on the morning of the 19th April 2021. They did not respond to her very concerning clinical state with the necessary urgency. ”

    Source location

    Mary Ebere Nwanyonyiri · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Peter Antony Joseph Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Peter Antony Joseph Pearson died at Worcester Royal Hospital on 6 December 2021 from aspiration pneumonia, which was in all probability acquired while he was resident at Corbett House Nursing Home. Concerns included a delay in calling an ambulance despite his critical condition, incomplete nursing and medication records, failures in oral-cavity checks, shortcomings in management oversight, and an ineffective investigation into his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling an ambulance when a resident’s condition requires emergency assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Mr Pearson’s condition on 5 December 2021 was such that his daughter asked the agency nurse on duty for an ambulance to be called at 12.30 pm. None was called until 6.10 pm. The nurse did not complete the nursing notes for the day from 5am onwards so there is no written record of Mr Pearson’s medical condition that day. Mr Pearson was found by paramedics alone in his room in a critical state. The staff on duty knew very little about him or his condition. No record of medications dispensed to Mr Pearson that day has been lost or is missing. He was found with medication in his mouth by paramedics. No records were kept of the checks of his oral cavity that were required to be undertaken twice a day. The Agency nurse has not been traced by the Home. The inquest found as a fact that the failure to call an ambulance earlier amounted to a missed opportunity. ”

    Source location

    Mr Peter Antony Joseph Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026