Recurring concern

Inadequate mental health risk assessment

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First reported 3 Dec 2013•Latest report 1 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes deficiencies in the mental health risk-assessment process, including incomplete assessment, inadequate documentation or formulation, failure to gather relevant information, and reliance on insufficient indicators when assessing patients with mental health concerns.

Not included

  • Excludes failures in communication, handover, escalation, review, or safety planning unless the report explicitly presents them as a component failure of the mental health risk-assessment process.
  • Excludes risk assessments concerning unrelated hazards, settings, or beneficiary groups, such as antenatal growth risk, roadside trees, or general safeguarding.
  • Excludes generic workforce training or staffing deficiencies that are not specifically tied to inadequate mental health risk assessment.
Reports
118

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
135

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
234

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England20
Department of Health and Social Care19
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust8
North East London NHS Foundation Trust7
North London NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust6
East London NHS Foundation Trust5
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust5
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust4
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board4
Care Quality Commission3
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Gary Etherington · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gary Etherington was found dead in his van after taking an overdose of his wife’s Amitriptyline; the inquest concluded that his death was suicide. The coroner identified failures in the mental health assessment and discharge process, including inadequate investigation of psychotic symptoms and suicide risk, insufficient communication with the GP, and an unreliable Root Cause Analysis that failed to identify these care problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly assess suicidal symptoms and risks before discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “The coroner found that there were two failures in medical care, namely 1. The failure to contact ████████ at the Mental Health Act assessment in April 2. The failure to take and consider the history of ████████ before discharge and to discharge to GP care, without proper consideration of the voices telling him to commit suicide, delusions of people being present, their cause and relation to drug misuse, or the risks to ████████, about which there was an inadequate plan communicated to the GP. ”

    Source location

    Gary Etherington · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Jason Pendlebury · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jason Pendlebury, a known cocaine user, fell from the roof of a block of flats on 29 September 2018 and died in hospital on 2 October 2018 after sustaining serious injuries. The principal concerns related to communication and information-sharing between Greater Manchester Police, North West Ambulance Service, the GP and mental health professionals about his potential mental health needs and risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide Approved Mental Health Practitioners with full information about relevant mental-health contacts

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that between 13 August and 22 August 2018 telephone calls were made to Greater Manchester Police (GMP) on 8 separate dates by the Deceased, his wife and his business partner. On all but one of those dates those concerns related to the Deceased's mental health. Of the calls that were made by the Deceased, the call handler reached the conclusion that he had mental health issues. On 3 of the occasions, GMP referred the matter to North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) which resulted in telephone assessments by mental health nurses. The purposes of those telephone assessments was to determine whether an ambulance should attend the Deceased. On two occasions a decision was taken that no ambulance was required. On one occasion an ambulance was dispatched although the deceased refused medical assistance and was not taken to Hospital. It was not clear from the evidence that the mental health nurses carrying out the telephone assessments were aware of the number of calls that had been made to GMP or of the previous telephone assessments. None of the calls made to GMP or the fact that telephone mental health assessments had taken place was communicated to the deceased's GP. This meant that when the Deceased's wife contacted the GP on 6th September 2018 with concerns about his threats of suicide, the GP did not have all the information that he might of had to determine what action to take. I also heard that a Multi-Agency Adult Care Safeguarding Team meeting was held at Rochdale Police Station on 28th August 2018. The Approved Mental Health Professional (AMHP) who attended the meeting was not provided with the full details of the telephone calls that had been made to GMP regarding the Deceased's mental health and consequently assessed the risk of harm to himself and others as low. Had the AMHP been provided with full information, it would have automatically generated a referral to the Single Point of Access and led to the involvement of the mental health services. A further contact with GMP was made on 19th September 2018 and I heard that this triggered a referral to the mental health services. However, GMP were unable to confirm what had happened to the referral and the Mental Health Trust confirmed that they had no knowledge of any referral being made. In addition, GMP did not notify the Deceased's GP that a referral to mental health services had been made. The matters of concern relate to the quality and systems of communication regarding concerns relating to potential mental health needs between GMP and NWAS and onward communication to General Practitioners and Approved Mental Health Practitioners tasked with assessing risk levels. ”

    Source location

    Jason Pendlebury · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider the effectiveness of current information-sharing arrangements with partners and brief the Greater Manchester Health and Justice Board on the concerns raised.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP’s Public Service Reform leads, Chief Supt. ████████ and DCI ████████ are to consider the effectiveness of the current arrangements regarding this type of information sharing with partners and the Greater Manchester Health and Justice Board will be briefed on the concerns raised here (additional information on this body is included in the Summary below).”

    Source location

    2020-0069-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police_Redacted-2
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a common, documented GMP-wide procedure with partners for responding to mental-health-related risk to life presented to blue-light services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2019 The Greater Manchester Health and Justice Board oversaw work to develop and implement a common approach to people in mental health crisis. The involved a working group, Health and Justice Task and Finish Group, which included senior representatives form GMP and the North-West Ambulance Service, in addition to the mental health trusts serving Greater Manchester, local authority approved mental health practitioners and Greater Manchester Combined Authority.”

    Source location

    2020-0069-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police_Redacted-2
    Page 5 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Jointly chair a pan-Greater Manchester task and finish group improving risk assessment, management, inter-agency communications and procedures for mental health crisis responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust jointly chaired a task and finish group with GMP, which was set up last year in response to a Regulation 28 report issued by Ms Joanne Kearsley in December 2018 to Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership, Greater Manchester Combined Authority, Greater Manchester Police, North West Ambulance Service and Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust. It was agreed that enhancements to the response around concern for welfare, and particularly risk to life, must be applied on a pan-GM basis, therefore Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust and North West Boroughs Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust are also partners, despite not being involved in the specific case in question.”

    Source location

    2020-0069-Response-from-North-West-Ambulance-Service_Redacted-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The relevant incidents were not coded as mental-health or safeguarding concerns, so there was no requirement to refer them to the CRT.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “FWIN 425 19/09/18 came in as a domestic and was finalised as a domestic. There was nothing on the FWIN to indicate any mental health issues and therefore no requirement to switch the incident through to the CRT.”

    Source location

    2020-0069-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police_Redacted-2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response
  3. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Billy James Jenkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Billy James Jenkins was found hanging by the neck in a hotel room bathroom on 12 August 2019, following a history of low mood, alcohol and cocaine abuse, suicidal ideation and previous suicide attempts. The concerns included limited information gathering during his mental health assessment, a decision that he did not have a mental health condition without further assessment, inadequate documentation and planning, and possible over-reliance on alcohol and drug use as the explanation for his suicidal ideation. The inquest concluded that he took his own life following an assessment after which he felt helpless because there had been no clear mental state examination and a potential missed opportunity to consider an appropriate referral.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete assessment sufficient to identify mental health diagnosis requiring treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) As a direct consequence of the limited information gathering Billy Jenkins was not properly assessed and it was not known whether he had a mental health diagnosis which required treatment. ”

    Source location

    Billy James Jenkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen community mental-health assessment oversight, including further face-to-face assessment where diagnoses differ and monthly quality audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this incident we have taken further measures to ensure the assessment of patients within the community mental health team are robustly managed in order to ensure that the MDT has sufficient information to review an assessment and to ensure that where there is any disparity in diagnosis that a further face to face assessment is conducted. The operational team manager is monitoring this practice through discussions in Team meetings, supervisions and MDT case discussions.”

    Source location

    2020-0068-Response-from-Oxleas-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct reflective-practice sessions focused on assessment, risk documentation, record keeping and formulation, with impact monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the incident the community mental team core induction tool was sent to all CMHT managers to go through with all the new starters and other established colleagues to reinforce the expectations of their roles and the assessment process. This was shared with all staff in supervision and an email has also been sent to all members of staff. Reflective practice sessions have also been conducted focusing on documentation and record keeping, particularly assessment (needs and risk) and formulation. The impact of this is being monitored in Team meetings and in reflective practice meetings. This will be reviewed again after the current unusual working practices in relation to Covid 19.”

    Source location

    2020-0068-Response-from-Oxleas-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response
  4. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Karis Florence Braithwaite · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karis Florence Braithwaite, aged 24, died after stepping in front of a fast train on 24 September 2018 following discharge from a Section 136 mental health assessment. The concerns included important risk information from the paramedic and police not being available to the assessment team, and handover information not being adequately documented or transferred into the Trust’s records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to elicit relevant information from first responders during assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Important risk information was provided to the Trust by a first responder (paramedic) but was not available to the MHA assessment team. 2. A copy of the PRF form was left with staff but does not appear to have been uploaded to the electronic records or a paper copy provided to the assessing team. 3. The paramedic provided a verbal handover to staff which does not appear to have been documented in the patient’s records. 4. The police officer who attended with Karis also gave evidence as to difficulties in providing a handover to the receiving mental health team. 5. A PFD report was written to the Trust on the 2nd December 2016 noting: There was also relevant information available to the paramedics and police that was not elicited by the assessing team. It became apparent during the course of the Inquest that the police also had access to information which was relevant to the circumstances of the preceding events which would have been relevant to the mental state of the deceased. It would appear that inadequate questions were asked by the receiving hospital team in relation to the circumstances leading to admission. In light of the evidence heard at Ms Braithwaite’s inquest, there is a concern that insufficient steps have been taken by the Trust to improve the handover process from first responders to Trust staff following serious incidents in the community. ”

    Source location

    Karis Florence Braithwaite · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Tony Mark DUNNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tony Mark Dunne, who had alcohol dependence disorder, extreme anxiety and mild depression, died after jumping from a seventh-floor window on 20 February 2019. Earlier that evening, he had been found by police intending to jump and was assessed in an emergency department, but was discharged after refusing informal admission and being deemed not detainable. The principal concern was that, when he later called the Crisis Line, the call taker knew this history but did not ask whether he was feeling suicidal or arrange further hospital support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ask Crisis Line callers about current suicidal feelings

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Dunne rang the Crisis Line a little over an hour after he had been discharged from the emergency department. He had been seen at the emergency department because he had been found by police standing by an 8th floor window intending to jump. The Crisis Line call taker read his medical notes and so knew this history, but nevertheless did not ask him if he was now feeling suicidal. If she had asked him and he had said yes, she could have asked him to come in to the hospital again or she could have called an ambulance for him. ”

    Source location

    Tony Mark DUNNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide crisis-line clinicians with training on risk-assessment competencies and required medical-record standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The importance of good quality, full, complete and appropriate risk assessments is a key skill for all our clinical staff at the Trust. In order to reinforce this, the City and Hackney HTT will be providing additional training during its away days scheduled for 4 and 5 December 2019. This will include:”

    Source location

    2019-0265_Response-by-East-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 October 2019

    Open published response
  6. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Alistair Patrick McDonald · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alistair Patrick McDonald, who had disclosed suicidal thoughts and a history of deliberate self-harm, was found dead on 14 May 2018, hanging by a ligature secured to a door frame. The concerns included the assessment and management of his suicidal ideation and self-harm, lack of follow-up and clear referral plans, communication with him and his family, and failure to recognise the wider significance of his presentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain a broad assessment by an experienced psychiatrist

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Whether or not the specific deliberate self-harm or suicidal ideation criteria need to be reviewed and redrafted 2. The lack of a specific plan for referrals to other services which proved unsuccessful 3. The opportunity to take a broader view of the whole position and have an assessment by an experienced psychiatrist. 4. Ensuring a proper line of communication with the patient and the patient’s family to ensure appropriate reviews if the patient’s mental state deteriorates 5. Obtaining detailed feedback from services the patient is referred to, to check on attendance and progress 6. Recognising that some patients will only make partial disclosure of their true symptomology and history. 7. Loss of opportunity to see the bigger picture, which was of an academically bright student but who nonetheless was disclosing physical self-harm and suicidal intent, as well as an inability to deal with stress or pressure; and have a plan to review and deal with this 8. Ensuring if there were any failed communications with the patient or the family, to have a plan to take specific action to deal with this. ”

    Source location

    Alistair Patrick McDonald · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all Choice assessments in a weekly multidisciplinary team meeting to support shared outcome decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since 2017 the service has introduced a process whereby all Choice assessments are reviewed in the weekly Multidisciplinary Team Meeting (MDT). This meeting is attended by all the disciplines working within the service which includes nurses, psychologists, psychotherapists and psychiatrists. This provides a forum for case discussion with a shared outcome decision.”

    Source location

    2019-0257-Worcestershire-Health-and-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Systems and processes introduced since 2017 are considered sufficient to address the overall position and psychiatry concern.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since 2017 the service has introduced a process whereby all Choice assessments are reviewed in the weekly Multidisciplinary Team Meeting (MDT). This meeting is attended by all the disciplines working within the service which includes nurses, psychologists, psychotherapists and psychiatrists. This provides a forum for case discussion with a shared outcome decision.”

    Source location

    2019-0257-Worcestershire-Health-and-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2019

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    David Jonathon Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Jonathon Jukes was declared deceased on 9 October 2018 after being found hanging from a ligature fixed to a garden gate. The report identified concerns about inadequate information sharing, mental-health assessment and follow-up, attempts to locate and engage him, risk assessment, and clinical record keeping, with associated risks to life.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide material arrest information for mental health assessments in custody

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The psychiatric liaison and diversion practitioner employed by BCPFT who attended to review Mr. Jukes in Oldbury custody suite on the 28th September 2018 did not have sufficient information about the history of arrest to inform her decision making on assessment in custody. She was provided with a print out of the first two pages of the custody record which included the statutory arrest reason and the circumstances of arrest but nothing that indicated that he had barricaded himself in the loft, threatened suicide and harm to others and not come out in response to police negotiators. This information was not included in a verbal handover according to the nurse’s evidence and there is no record of it being handed over to her. She stated in evidence that if she had been aware of the extent of the events overnight on the 27th into the 28th she would have arranged a Mental Health Act assessment when he did not engage with her. There is a risk to life if assessments of mental health in custody are not informed by material information about circumstances connected with arrest. ”

    Source location

    David Jonathon Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to attempt timely assessment after a high-risk patient re-establishes contact

    Wider context from the report

    “6. On the 9th October 2018 an HTT clinician talked to Mr. Jukes on the phone at which time he sounded intoxicated, was calm and polite, gave his location and agreed to attend an appointment for a medical review on the 12th October 2018 if a bus pass were provided to his location for him to attend. No arrangements were made in an attempt to assess Mr Jukes before the 12th October 2018. By this time he was reason to suspect Mr. Jukes was at risk of harm to self or others, was under the influence of substances, had not had a full assessment by the team, had recently not been engaging with services and his location had been unknown for over a week. This evidence indicates that those making the decision to ask Mr. Jukes to attend on the 12th underestimated his risk and were not pro-active in making contact. The staff involved maintained in evidence that they acted appropriately, evidence was given that this was not the finding of the Root Cause Analysis investigation review panel. In these circumstances to fail to attempt to assess as soon as reasonably practicable a patient who has come back into contact with the team as soon as reasonably practicable puts lives at risk. No evidence was given of specific action to address the decisions that were made on the 9th October 2018 with the individuals involved or the team generally and therefore the risk continues. ”

    Source location

    David Jonathon Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement CONNECT access for Liaison and Diversion staff, including wider custody information and nursing read-write risk recording.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At present Liaison and Diversion (L&D) nursing staff have read access only to the current electronic custody record (ICIS) and in line with standard operational procedures are instructed to ensure checks are undertaken and all available content on ICIS is reviewed. This is further supported by obtaining a verbal update from the police. To improve”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the report’s outcome and learning with police through quarterly Joint Operational Group meetings, stressing full handover before every assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “L&D leads will raise awareness of the outcome and learning from the regulation 28 PFD report through the Joint Operational Group held with police on a quarterly basis to engage with police colleagues and stress the need for a full handover prior to assessment in each and every case.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a joint operating protocol with the Sandwell Liaison and Diversion Service for custody-based patient assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are grateful to you for raising this matter with us as it has identified the need for a joint operating protocol to be developed between BSMHT and the Liaison and Diversion Service in Sandwell. We have been in liaison with this team and are scheduled to meet and develop this protocol in late September 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with police forces to ensure liaison and diversion practitioners receive relevant arrest and presentation information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Sufficient information regarding arrests was not provided to liaison and diversion practitioner:”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a national event to debrief information-sharing issues and share lessons with liaison and diversion practitioners, commissioners and police representatives.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will commit to a national event by the end of March 2020 to debrief on this matter and any other information sharing/exchange issues that have been raised in other reports. We will invite liaison and diversion practitioners as well as NHS Commissioners and police representatives in order to share lessons learnt. Additionally, there has been work to address this concern at a regional level:”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support development of the Connect police IT system and liaison and diversion functionality to improve custody information access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• NHS England and NHS Improvement has been working with West Midland Police regarding their new IT system (‘Connect’) which the police are implementing in the summer 2020”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide information-sharing training to liaison and diversion teams and offer it to police healthcare providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All liaison and diversion teams have had information sharing training and this training offer has also been made to Police Healthcare providers”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase Home Treatment Team workforce capacity through additional managers, practitioners, medical staff, psychologists and administrative staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are conscious that our Home Treatment Teams have been operating within an environment of high demand and acuity and that may at times compromise their ability to consistently meet the important standards that we expect of staff. We are investing a significant amount of new financial resource into our Home Treatment Team to increase workforce capacity. This includes:”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Home Treatment Team operating protocol to strengthen nurse-led triage, assessment screening and escalation to consultant psychiatrists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In direct response to this matter of concern we are now reviewing our Home Treatment Team Operating Protocol to strengthen the requirement for nurse led triage and assessment screening and appropriate clinical escalation to a Consultant Psychiatrist. Consultant Psychiatrist overview and scrutiny of each case would either be through direct clinical assessment or review or through input and direction within the multi-disciplinary team or through formal or informal supervision of doctors and other home treatment staff. We note the view of the team that they felt they acted appropriately and are therefore also using this very sad incident as a Case Study in our new Clinical Risk Assessment and Management Training so that staff are fully alert to accumulative risk factors. This training is mandatory for all clinical staff in the Trust irrelevant of clinical profession or team.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other concerns concerned NHS bodies and services not provided by the respondent, so the respondent did not comment on those outcomes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note that all other concerns raised within the Regulation 28 report affected other NHS bodies and services not provided by BCPFT and therefore we have not commented on these outcomes. We have however approached both BSMHT and CWPT to consider”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing custody record and available information access adequately inform Liaison and Diversion assessments, so no future-death risk exists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Therefore, it is submitted that some information was readily available on the custody record.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Staffordshire-and-West-Midlands-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An adequate system records arrest circumstances and gives Liaison and Diversion practitioners access to relevant custody information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Liaison and Diversion team can make verbal requests for further information. This would include access to the full custody record which is available in custody and would extend to call out logs and ‘crime investigation logs that can be obtained by the custody staff. It would however be unlikely to extend to all the logs.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Staffordshire-and-West-Midlands-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No action is required because the existing system addresses the identified risk in this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is our position that there is an adequate system in place which ensures that the circumstances of an arrest are accurately recorded on the custody record and that a Liaison and Diversion practitioner has access to a wide range of information within the custody setting. Therefore, it is submitted that there is no risk of future death to be addressed and no action is required in this case.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Staffordshire-and-West-Midlands-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local NHS agencies are expected to address the report’s local concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note this response will address the matters of concern from a national level and we would expect the local NHS agencies, which I note are copied in to the letter, to address the local concerns raised.”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Care and treatment concerns are largely for provider organisations to resolve.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.8 These issues are largely within the remit of the provider organisations to resolve, and the CCG confirms that an appropriate action plan has been drawn up and completed by BSMHFT.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response
  8. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Matthew Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Matthew Jones, who had paranoid schizophrenia and polysubstance misuse, was discharged from hospital to minimally supported temporary accommodation and suffered a cardiac arrest shortly afterwards; his death was attributed to cocaine toxicity. The report identified concerns about inadequate training and poor coordinated, multi-agency working, including insufficient attention to housing in hospital discharge planning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor appreciation of the likely risks of non-compliance with treatment linked to Community Mental Health Treatment Orders

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence at the Inquest, the evidence revealed: (i) an absence of appropriate training for clinicians and healthcare workers involved in the delivery of mental health services who have responsibility for the care of persons subject to Community Mental Health Treatment Orders (linked to Mental Health Treatment Requirement Care-Plans including treatment by Drug & Alcohol Services); and, as a result, (ii) a poor appreciation, including a lack of co-ordinated and multi-agency working, by such clinicians and healthcare workers of the likely risks of non-compliance with treatment linked to Community Mental Health Treatment Orders, and, particularly, of the importance of ensuring that ‘housing’ is part of any hospital discharge planning. ”

    Source location

    Mr Matthew Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The local NHS is responsible for reviewing the case circumstances and taking necessary action to ensure services are safe and high quality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Organisations commissioning and delivering services are expected to take the recommendations within NICE clinical guidelines into account when planning and delivering services. We expect the local NHS to look closely at the circumstances of this case and to take action where necessary to ensure services are safe and of high quality.”

    Source location

    2019-0187-Response-by-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 August 2019

    Open published response
  9. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Mohammed Hussain · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Mohammed Hussain died after setting fire to himself inside a car in Luton on 12 March 2018, following deterioration in his mental health and previous overdoses. Concerns included shortcomings in mental health risk assessments, inadequate application of risk assessment training, and failures to share or highlight important information between staff and care providers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of staff to understand and apply risk assessment training

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Trust had carried out a Serious Incident Investigation (SII) into the circumstances of the Mr Hussain’s death which was critical of both the mental health assessments of Mr Hussain carried out by staff on 30 April and 1 May 2018. This meant that 3 individual staff members had misunderstood or misapplied their risk assessment training. (2) I was informed by the Trust that further risk assessment training was carried out by the Trust following Mr Hussain’s death and yet, at the Inquest, both members of staff (although, one has now moved to another Trust) showed little insight into their actions despite the SII ‘s findings and the further training. (3) It was also apparent at the Inquest that important information required for the risk assessment process had not necessarily been passed and/or sufficiently highlighted in communications both between individual Trust staff members and with other care providers ”

    Source location

    Mr Mohammed Hussain · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain additional risk-assessment training for staff following the Serious Incident Review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am aware that you heard evidence during the course of the Inquest that the Trust has mandatory training in Clinical Risk Assessment in place and that as a result of the concerns highlighted in the Serious Incident Review additional risk assessment training had been put into place and would continue to be delivered on an ongoing basis. However, having heard the evidence of staff, you were concerned that they had potentially misunderstood or misapplied both the mandatory and additional risk assessment training.”

    Source location

    2019-0122-Response-by-East-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver further Bedfordshire crisis-service training on risk assessment and suicide prevention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within the crisis services in Bedfordshire further training has now been organised and is currently being delivered to staff specifically looking at assessment of risk and suicide prevention training.”

    Source location

    2019-0122-Response-by-East-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response
  10. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    John Michael KIRBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Michael KIRBY took his own life, according to the conclusion of the inquest. The concerns included delays in his care, the handling of an ADHD diagnosis and Concerta prescribing, inadequate monitoring, and failures to respond appropriately to information about suicidal thoughts, a reported suicide attempt, substance use and an A&E admission.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider relevant substance use and suicide risk before prescribing Concerta

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The delay in dealing with Mr Kirby between August 2017 and March 2018. (2) I am concerned about the decision to ask him to complete ADHD questionnaires and apparently suggest that he should be prescribed Concerta. (3) I am concerned that although ████████ told me he had made a diagnosis of ADHD in October 2017 he did not follow the NICE Guidance, inform the GP, start prescribing, consider alternatives to prescribing, have a formal note made of the consultation with John when the impact of this diagnosis was discussed with him or discuss the diagnosis with his immediate next of kin. (4) On the last occasion when John was seen, ie. on March the 20th diagnosis of ADHD was discussed and ████████ decided not to prescribe Concerta. A few weeks later, in April, he received a letter from Mr Kirby’s GP explaining that John wanted to be prescribed Concerta and also saying that he had had an admission to A&E. This did not provoke any further review of Mr Kirby, he was simply prescribed the medication without any discussion as to his previous drug abuse or current dependence on Diazepam, suicidal tendencies or binge drinking. This is outwith the Guidance issued by NICE. (5) Why was Mr Kirby prescribed Concerta without any (further) review? (6) Why was he not properly monitored as he should have been had the NICE Guidance been adhered too? (7) Even if Concerta had not been prescribed the GP letter and the information in the electronic records as to the A&E admission on the 4th-5th April should have alerted the Trust to the information John had given that he was suicidal and “wanted to die”. (8) Why did those interviewing John in A&E not take more details of the suicide attempt when he said that recently he had tried to hang himself and only failed because the rope broke? ”

    Source location

    John Michael KIRBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain sufficient details of a reported suicide attempt

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The delay in dealing with Mr Kirby between August 2017 and March 2018. (2) I am concerned about the decision to ask him to complete ADHD questionnaires and apparently suggest that he should be prescribed Concerta. (3) I am concerned that although ████████ told me he had made a diagnosis of ADHD in October 2017 he did not follow the NICE Guidance, inform the GP, start prescribing, consider alternatives to prescribing, have a formal note made of the consultation with John when the impact of this diagnosis was discussed with him or discuss the diagnosis with his immediate next of kin. (4) On the last occasion when John was seen, ie. on March the 20th diagnosis of ADHD was discussed and ████████ decided not to prescribe Concerta. A few weeks later, in April, he received a letter from Mr Kirby’s GP explaining that John wanted to be prescribed Concerta and also saying that he had had an admission to A&E. This did not provoke any further review of Mr Kirby, he was simply prescribed the medication without any discussion as to his previous drug abuse or current dependence on Diazepam, suicidal tendencies or binge drinking. This is outwith the Guidance issued by NICE. (5) Why was Mr Kirby prescribed Concerta without any (further) review? (6) Why was he not properly monitored as he should have been had the NICE Guidance been adhered too? (7) Even if Concerta had not been prescribed the GP letter and the information in the electronic records as to the A&E admission on the 4th-5th April should have alerted the Trust to the information John had given that he was suicidal and “wanted to die”. (8) Why did those interviewing John in A&E not take more details of the suicide attempt when he said that recently he had tried to hang himself and only failed because the rope broke? ”

    Source location

    John Michael KIRBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a senior medical decision-making group to review ADHD assessment, diagnosis, questionnaire use and prescribing practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As your concern centres on clinical decision-making I asked the Trust’s Chief Medical Officer ████████ to set up a group of senior medical colleagues to review ████████ medical practice in relation to ADHD. The terms of reference of that medical decision-making group (DMG) included consideration of the use of ADHD questionnaires for diagnosis as well as consideration of the assessment and diagnosis of ADHD and recommended prescribing.”

    Source location

    2018-0379-Response-by-Sussex-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a Patient Safety Matters story covering the case and issues surrounding co-morbid substance misuse.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the above, the DMG took a number of further steps to establish wider learning. Firstly, the ADHD NICE guidance was shared with all doctors via Mediconnect which is our doctors’ intranet forum for highlighting items of importance/interest/learning etc. Additionally, the issues arising from this case are to be presented for learning and discussion at the Trust’s forthcoming Effective Care & Treatment Conference next month. Furthermore, we are to publish a story, based on this case and to specifically include the issues surrounding co-morbid substance misuse, in our Patient Safety Matters; this is an internal learning publication that we use to improve patient safety.”

    Source location

    2018-0379-Response-by-Sussex-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026