Recurring concern

Failure to prevent public access to closed or restricted hazardous sites

First to latest report 4 Mar 2014 — 6 Mar 2026

Reports that mention this concern
16
Times this concern has been raised
17
Stated actions linked to this concern
27

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated controls intended to prevent or restrict public access to hazardous or officially closed sites, including fencing, gates, locks, barriers, security arrangements, access monitoring and timely implementation of closure measures where the site is not intended for public access.

What is not included
  • Excludes ordinary public access to sites that are open and intended for public use, even where general safety measures are needed.
  • Excludes the underlying drowning, fall, electrical or other site hazard when no failure to control public access is identified.
  • Excludes general site-security or perimeter-maintenance deficiencies without a hazardous or restricted-site public-access context.
  • Excludes failures limited to warning information, route guidance or signage where access prevention or restriction is not the shared unsafe condition.

Reports and published responses 16 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Steven John Key · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven John Key died at the scene after lying on a railway track in front of an oncoming train near Oxenholme Station on 14 September 2018. The principal concern was that a low wooden fence was easy to climb, allowing access to the track, where trains travelled at up to 125 mph; replacing it with a heightened palisade gate and fence was identified as reasonably practicable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent access to the railway line through adequately secure fencing

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) You have a duty under the Railway Safety (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1997 to prevent access to the railway line so far as is reasonably practicable. (2) The fencing at the scene of Mr Key’s death was a low wooden fence which was easy to climb over. (3) The British Transport Police (BTP) report into the death, reference CRUO 2018 1711 & BTP 404-14091, of which you received a copy, recommended replacing the fence and gate with a heightened palisade gate and fence. I agree with that recommendation. (4) Trains regularly travel on this section of the track at speeds of 125 mph. (5) Children and adults would, like Mr Key, be able to climb the wooden fence and be at risk of injury or death on the track from passing trains. (6) It would be reasonably practicable for you to fence the track at this point in the way suggested in the BTP Report. ”

    Source location

    Steven John Key · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install additional meshing and netting at the location to deter climbing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail takes its safety obligations seriously and has taken additional measures beyond those required by its standards, to install additional meshing and netting at this location to act as an increased deterrent to climbing. This is explained in the responses to your matters of concern.”

    Source location

    2019-0102-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review trespass risk around the area and identify the bridge wing wall and track-level safety rail for further mitigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, the risk of trespass cannot be entirely eliminated even with the best of fencing, but I consider that in this particular area the current boundary measures in place meet the reasonably practicable test. That said, Network Rail is constantly striving to improve safety on our network and that is why we create and adhere to standards such as NR/L2/TRK/5100. In the light of Mr Key’s death, we have reviewed the risk of potential trespass in this area in general and have identified the bridge wing wall and the galvanised iron tubular hand rail / safety rail at track level as an area where we could further mitigate any risk of trespass. To this end, the Route Structures Senior Asset Engineer has been”

    Source location

    2019-0102-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate whether attaching mesh to the bridge’s tubular handrail or safety rail would improve security.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, the risk of trespass cannot be entirely eliminated even with the best of fencing, but I consider that in this particular area the current boundary measures in place meet the reasonably practicable test. That said, Network Rail is constantly striving to improve safety on our network and that is why we create and adhere to standards such as NR/L2/TRK/5100. In the light of Mr Key’s death, we have reviewed the risk of potential trespass in this area in general and have identified the bridge wing wall and the galvanised iron tubular hand rail / safety rail at track level as an area where we could further mitigate any risk of trespass. To this end, the Route Structures Senior Asset Engineer has been”

    Source location

    2019-0102-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The line speed at this location is 110mph, not 125mph, although trains still travel at high speed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While our records indicate that the line speed at this location is 110mph, I nevertheless accept that trains do travel at high speed along this section of the track.”

    Source location

    2019-0102-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current boundary measures meet the reasonably practicable obligation, and no further assessment is triggered because there is no prior evidence of trespass.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As this area has no prior evidence of trespass, a Class III boundary measure would be appropriate as per the Standard, and in effectively having a Class III equivalent barrier in place I consider that Network Rail has met its obligation to prevent unauthorised access to the railway in so far as reasonably practicable.”

    Source location

    2019-0102-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replacing all fencing with palisade is not reasonably practicable given the scale of the railway network and local risk assessment requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While I understand the British Transport Police’s recommendation to replace the fence and gate with a heightened palisade gate and fence, Network Rail is responsible for looking after some 20,000 miles of track and 30,000 bridges and it is not reasonably practicable to fence all of it with palisade. Our risk assessment process takes account of all local factors in determining the most appropriate boundary measure to implement, bearing in mind what is reasonably practicable.”

    Source location

    2019-0102-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2019

    Open published response

  2. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles, who was intoxicated, dismounted from a train in the wrong direction at Herne Bay Station, stumbled down an un-barriered platform slope and made contact with a live rail, resulting in her death. The principal concerns were the absence of an end-of-platform barrier and the accessibility of a ground-level live rail, with similar barriers absent on other platforms in the area.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent public access to live rails at ground level

    Wider context from the report

    “The absence of an end of platform barrier and the existence of a live rail at ground level that might be accessible to members of the public may in my opinion create a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. The Assistant Coroner understands that a barrier has since been constructed at Herne Bay Station to help prevent deaths in similar circumstances but that other platforms in the area have no such barrier. His further understanding is that in other parts of the country trains are powered by electric current supplied by way of overhead cables rather than live rails at ground level thereby making contact with the power supply less likely ”

    Source location

    Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue developing reasonably practicable safety solutions for the ground-level conductor rail system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ground level conductor rail system on the South East route was installed in the 1950s and, although Network Rail has no future plans to install new conductor rail systems, it is not reasonably practicable to convert the system to an overhead contact line due to the complexity and cost to the railway industry. Whilst the ground level conductor rail cannot be replaced, Network Rail is committed to continue to develop reasonably practical solutions to improve the safety of the system wherever possible.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install platform-end gates and anti-trespass measures at more than 50 South East route stations, with works already completed at 30 locations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to platform-end fencing, historically the fencing has not been installed as standard practice. The risks involved in intentional and unintentional accessing of the rail network were controlled via warning notices at the platform-end. The platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels that have been installed at Herne Bay are part of a wider program of mitigations that are being applied to locations across the South East route to address the risks associated with members of the public either intentionally or unintentionally accessing the rail network. There are currently two programmes of activity which will see platform-end gates installed at over 50 stations on the South East route. We have already completed works on 30 locations over the Kent and Sussex areas. We expect the majority of works to be completed by the end of 2018 with some being finished in early 2019.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve fencing at higher-risk locations through a programme including £800,000 of work due for completion by April 2019.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are also programmes to improve our fencing at areas we consider to be at higher risk of intentional or unintentional public access and this includes £800,000 of work which is due to be completed by April 2019.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Converting or replacing the ground-level conductor rail is not reasonably practicable because of the railway system’s complexity and cost.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ground level conductor rail system on the South East route was installed in the 1950s and, although Network Rail has no future plans to install new conductor rail systems, it is not reasonably practicable to convert the system to an overhead contact line due to the complexity and cost to the railway industry. Whilst the ground level conductor rail cannot be replaced, Network Rail is committed to continue to develop reasonably practical solutions to improve the safety of the system wherever possible.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

  3. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Sean CAHILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Sean CAHILL died after being struck by a train while lying across the track near Sandy Railway Station on 29 March 2016. The principal concern was that the access gate and fencing provided little deterrence or hindrance to people seeking to access the railway line, and a recommended review had not been undertaken.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate deterrence and hindrance provided by railway access gates and fencing

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The British Transport investigation revealed that the deceased gained access to the railway line through an access gate. Both the gate and fence provide little deterrence or hindrance to someone wanting to gain access to the railway. (2) The Investigation recommended a review of the fencing and access gates be undertaken at the location as it is relatively easy to access the track from both sides of the line. It is understood that this has not been undertaken. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Sean CAHILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver over 600 metres of fencing and upgrade nearby gates to deter unauthorised railway access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We have commissioned works to enhance the fencing and gates in this area. These works will be delivered by 15th January 2017 and will be to install over 600m of fencing and upgrade the gate height and construction to deter unauthorised access to the railway in the area.”

    Source location

    2016-0304-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2016

    Open published response

  4. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Lee Connelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Lee Connelly was found deceased beside railway tracks near footbridge 57 between Walkden and Atherton after sustaining injuries consistent with being struck by a train. The principal concern was that the approximately five-foot walls of the steps leading to the footbridge could allow a person of reasonable athletic ability to access the railway track, creating a risk of future fatalities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate restriction of public access to the railway track from the steps accessing footbridge 57

    Wider context from the report

    “i. Due to the height of the walls of the steps which are used to access footbridge 57 on the railway line between Walkden and Atherton train stations, a person of reasonable athletic ability could gain access to the railway track, which could lead to future fatalities at this location on the railway ”

    Source location

    Adam Lee Connelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install shorter palisade pales on the lower flight to connect with the boundary fence and raise the parapet to at least two metres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bridge is not known to Network Rail as being used by members of the public to gain access to the infrastructure. However, as a consequence of this event, I can confirm that we intend to undertake the following works:”

    Source location

    2015-0284-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the upper-flight stepped parapet with engineering brick and bullnose units to prevent scaling and access behind the lower-flight palisade.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bridge is not known to Network Rail as being used by members of the public to gain access to the infrastructure. However, as a consequence of this event, I can confirm that we intend to undertake the following works:”

    Source location

    2015-0284-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2015

    Open published response

  5. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Fred Hudson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Fred Hudson died after falling approximately 25 metres from disused railway bridge AB08 in Leeds during the early hours of 28 January 2014. The bridge was accessible by several routes, had no measures to prevent access, and was next to a main road and frequently visited by members of the public, including children.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of measures preventing public access to the disused railway bridge

    Wider context from the report

    “Railway bridge number AB08 has been disused for many years. It is accessible by a number of routes. No steps have been taken to prevent access to the said bridge. It is located next to a main road and is visited frequently by members of the public including children. ”

    Source location

    Fred Hudson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

  6. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    RYAN JAMES PETTENGELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 16 July 2013, Ryan James Pettengell entered a lake at a disused quarry and drowned while attempting to swim to a nearby island. Concerns included continued public access, absent or damaged swimming-prohibition signage, and no action having been taken six months after safety recommendations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent public access to the officially closed site

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The site has been officially closed since this incident (and another drowning on the same day) whilst meetings are ongoing with the community as to the best way to provide recreational facilities to the public whilst having regard to the public’s safety; (2) Recommendations were put forward by the King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Council on 20 August 2013 with regard to increasing safety at the site; (3) Six months later, no action has been taken with regard to increasing safety at the site; (4) Evidence was given at the inquest that the public are still gaining access to the site; ”

    Source location

    RYAN JAMES PETTENGELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026