Recurring concern

Unreliable transfer of cases between police forces

First to latest report 13 Jun 2018 — 19 Oct 2025

Reports that mention this concern
3
Times this concern has been raised
5
Stated actions linked to this concern
8

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated transfer of cases between police forces, including incomplete or delayed information transfer, lack of receipt confirmation, unclear acceptance or ownership, and failure to ensure the receiving force can safely assess and progress the transferred case.

What is not included
  • Excludes ordinary information sharing between police forces where no case transfer or transfer-of-responsibility process is involved.
  • Excludes delays caused solely by the receiving force's later investigation or operational response after a transfer has been completely and properly accepted.
  • Excludes generic police communications, offender-information sharing or partner-agency coordination that is not part of transferring a case between police forces.
  • Excludes failures in transferring cases between non-police organisations or between police and other agencies unless the assertion specifically concerns the inter-force case-transfer process.

Reports and published responses 3 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Philip MCCORMACK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Philip McCormack was found deceased in a tent at Fermyn Woods Country Park on 27 February 2023 after expressing suicidal thoughts and plans and contacting mental health services with an intention to end his life. The inquest concluded that his death was suicide. Concerns were raised that delays in transferring missing-persons information between police forces could affect risk assessment and the formulation of lines of inquiry, particularly where officers lacked training in importing cases onto the COMPACT system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing the transfer of missing persons case information between forces

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard evidence that when transferring missing persons cases between forces, the transfer is accepted by completion of a signed transfer document. Assuming primacy of an investigation does not depend on the importing of a COMPACT file. However, the court also heard that until a transfer of information is complete, the receiving force may not be able to accurately assess the risk and fully take ownership of the investigation. This gives rise to a concern that this could lead to delay in formulating lines of inquiry. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Philip MCCORMACK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of induction training for transferees from other forces on COMPACT case importing

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard evidence that whilst new recruits to the force, and those promoted internally, are trained on COMPACT and importing cases, this is not covered on the induction training for transferees from other forces at a particular rank. Guidance on how to transfer / import cases is available on the force intranet but this would need to be accessed and followed by the relevant officer at the time of importing the information; essentially leaning through experience. This gives rise to a concern as it could be during a busy night shift where a Reactive Inspector has competing high risk priorities. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Philip MCCORMACK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make missing-person transfer decisions within two hours, sooner for high-risk cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Decisions should be made within two hours”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct direct discussions with other forces about missing-person transfer requests and obtain the National Transfer Form to support decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The process involves both the National Requesting Enquiries/Transfer Form and direct communication between operational supervisors. This dual approach ensures transparency, accountability and timely decision making. Our Duty Response Inspectors actively engage in these conversations to avoid unnecessary delays and to prioritise the safety and wellbeing of those involved.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop updated COMPACT transfer training packages for relevant ranks, including Cadre, control-room and detective inspectors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We recognise the importance of equipping officers with the right knowledge and tools. While Inspectors currently hold responsibility for COMPACT transfers, we are enhancing training across all relevant ranks. Updated training packages are being developed to ensure consistency and confidence in handling these sensitive cases. This includes future transferee Inspectors and ongoing refresher sessions for existing staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide COMPACT transfer training to future transferee inspectors and refresher training to existing staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We recognise the importance of equipping officers with the right knowledge and tools. While Inspectors currently hold responsibility for COMPACT transfers, we are enhancing training across all relevant ranks. Updated training packages are being developed to ensure consistency and confidence in handling these sensitive cases. This includes future transferee Inspectors and ongoing refresher sessions for existing staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident appears isolated rather than evidence of a systemic issue requiring wider remedial action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From my review, this appears to be an isolated incident rather than a systemic issue. Nevertheless, we remain committed to learning from every case and improving wherever possible. Please be”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing transfer procedures, National Transfer Forms and Inspector oversight are relied upon to manage missing-person investigation transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In Northamptonshire Police, our Duty Response Cadre Inspectors will have phone calls and discussions with other forces looking to transfer a missing person. There is then a reliance on the National Transfer Form (NTF) being sent to corroborate the information indicating that the missing person is most likely in the Northamptonshire area.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Acceptance of transfer primacy may be delayed when insufficient information is provided to assess risk accurately and take ownership.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once the National Transfer Form has been accepted and signed by the Inspector, that is when the missing case becomes the responsibility of the accepting force. It is no different to accepting a missing person from a member of the public, so as soon as we accept it, the investigation becomes our responsibility. We can commence actions based on information on the National Transfer Form.”

    Source location

    Response from Northamptonshire Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response

  2. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Dominic Boughton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Dominic Boughton left home on 3 November 2021 and was later found deceased in a wooded location in Oxshott, Surrey, after friends searched areas he was known to visit. The inquest found that he took his own life by hanging at some point between being dropped off by taxi on 3 November and being found on the morning of 5 November. The principal concern was insufficient direct communication and coordination between bordering police forces when tasking and transferring investigations, which could delay effective action and the sharing of relevant information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of requirements for direct discussion between police forces during investigation tasking and transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence of Detective Inspector ████████, Tactical and Policy Lead for MPS, highlighted a concern that in tasking and transferring investigations between bordering Police forces, there is a lack of ownership and discussion between officers at Inspector level or above between forces, which would ensure effective tasking and, when necessary, smooth transfer of investigations. Requests were made by email and CAD, without discussions between officers. This was confirmed in the evidence of Detective Chief Constable ████████ of SP, who stated that from her perspective there was a lack of feedback from SP to manage MPS’ expectations regarding a search for Mr Boughton. In respect of the initial search, this meant that SP did not advise MPS that they considered the search request unfeasible given the extent of land outlined and the limitations on searching wooded areas during winter night hours. In respect of the request for a further search with more precise location detailed provided, MPS did not disclose all of the information available regarding Family and friends potentially being able to assist in finding the location based upon where Mr Boughton used to visit. There was no feedback from SP regarding when a search might take place, leading MPS to consider deploying its own search team. Whilst contact telephone numbers for Officers at MPS and SP were provided on the CAD, there is no evidence that direct contact was made between the forces to discuss the investigation and how best to move this forward. A SP officer recorded on the CAD that until the transfer document was received from MPS, SP were unable to arrange a search or contact the specialist search team. Whilst DI ████████ gave evidence that he is aware the NPCC is reviewing issuing guidance around tasking and transfers between bordering Police forces, at present there appears to be no requirement for appropriate Police Officers to make telephone contact between forces to ensure effective tasking and transferring, in addition to the required written requests. This means an opportunity to discuss and pass on all relevant information between forces may be lost. 1. The lack of any detailed requirement for telephone discussion between appropriate police officers on sending through written tasking requests and considering transfers of investigation means that an opportunity to discuss and ensure smooth transition and passing on of relevant information is lost. This may cause delay in effective action being taken by the tasked Force, or (in the case of transfers) by the Force to whom it is considered a transfer will be made. Consideration should be given to whether any steps can be taken to address the above concerns. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Dominic Boughton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Initiate a Task and Finishing Group focused on cross-border missing-person investigations and investigation transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further to the APP guidance a Task and Finishing Group has been initiated focusing on the very issue you have outlined. Draft NPCC advice on ‘Requesting Missing Person Enquiries in Another Force and Transfers of Investigations’ has been developed and has now been circulated for comment prior to finalisation and wider circulation.”

    Source location

    2022-0235 - Response from NPCC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and circulate draft NPCC advice on requesting missing-person enquiries in another force and transferring investigations for comment before finalisation and wider circulation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further to the APP guidance a Task and Finishing Group has been initiated focusing on the very issue you have outlined. Draft NPCC advice on ‘Requesting Missing Person Enquiries in Another Force and Transfers of Investigations’ has been developed and has now been circulated for comment prior to finalisation and wider circulation.”

    Source location

    2022-0235 - Response from NPCC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing APP guidance and information-transfer procedures address the concerns about cross-border investigation tasking and transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Difficulties can arise when a person reported missing resides outside the area where the report is being made, for example, a student in temporary accommodation or a day trip visitor. The police area that receives the report must record it and carry out all necessary initial actions. If the responsibility for a case is subsequently transferred to another force area, the rationale for doing so must be recorded. Written acknowledgement from the receiving force should be obtained. When deciding where ownership of the investigation lies, the principal issue is to consider where the majority of the enquiries are and who has the greatest opportunity of locating the missing person. It is probable that the area where the person was last seen would generate the majority of the initial enquiries (although this is not always the case, see also Out-of-area placements).”

    Source location

    2022-0235 - Response from NPCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 September 2022

    Open published response

  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Keiron Christopher Bould · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keiron Christopher Bould left home on 17 September 2017 after taking his girlfriend’s morphine tablets and was later found in his parked vehicle. He was taken to hospital and pronounced deceased on 18 September 2017; the medical cause of death was recorded as a morphine overdose and the inquest concluded suicide. Concerns were raised about the lack of clear communication over which police force had primacy for the missing-person inquiry and about a four-hour delay in actioning the transfer email.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verbally confirm transfers of cases between police forces

    Wider context from the report

    “2. When Warwickshire police decided to transfer the case to West Midlands police an email was sent at 01.53 to a generic email address. There was a 4 hour delay in this email being picked up and actioned. There should be a system in place to ensure verbal confirmation about a transfer so the receiving force is aware of the referral. ”

    Source location

    Keiron Christopher Bould · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verbally confirm which force has primacy for an incident

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When each force received a missing person report soon after 12 midnight on 18/09/17, there was no communication about who would take primacy of the inquiry. There should be a system in place to ensure verbal communication confirms who is dealing with any incident. ”

    Source location

    Keiron Christopher Bould · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a mandatory follow-up telephone call to confirm receipt when transferring missing-person reports to another force before closing the log.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having learnt that West Midlands system is different to the Warwickshire system (where call handlers have a separate screen to monitor emails as well as a system showing the calls and incidents logs) changes were made to our policies and procedures as detailed in the witness statement of Chief Inspector Kent from Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police, including the need for telephone contact with the other force in respect of transfer of primacy. These changes were implemented in February 2018.”

    Source location

    2018-0178-Response-by-Warwickshire-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Re-circulate College of Policing guidance on missing-person ownership to control-room managers, supervisors and staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we are aware of the response you have received from Chief Constable Thornton on behalf of the NPCC and would clarify that the College of Policing Approved Professional Practice (APP) direction around ownership of missing people has been re-circulated to our Control Room Management, supervisors and staff to remind them of what should be done to provide clarity on ownership of missing persons enquiries, and the importance of that ownership.”

    Source location

    2018-0178-Response-by-Warwickshire-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The communication issues did not appear to affect the outcome because the overdose likely occurred before Mr Bould was reported missing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note the matters you raise as concerns, and would say at the outset that we acknowledge that there were issues with the communication between Warwickshire Police and West Midlands Police at the initial stages of the police involvement in this tragic case. However we also note that, based on your findings that the evidence indicates it is likely that Mr Bould took the morphine overdose at around midnight – shortly before the time he was reported missing to both forces – the matters giving rise to concern in this case would not appear to have affected the outcome in relation to Mr Bould.”

    Source location

    2018-0178-Response-by-Warwickshire-Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Telephone contact did occur to confirm which police force should deal with the case, despite the concern seeking verbal confirmation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It can be seen therefore, that at 00:59 Warwickshire Police did make telephone contact with West Midlands in respect of confirming who should best deal with this case. There was confusion as to which Police area Mr Bould lived within, and therefore Warwickshire confirmed that we would make further enquiries, including travelling to the West Midlands police area to do so.”

    Source location

    2018-0178-Response-by-Warwickshire-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026