Recurring concern

Failure to reassess treatment options when clinically indicated

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First reported 30 Jul 2014•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to review, reconsider, escalate or revise treatment options when treatment is significantly delayed, the patient's condition changes, or other clinically relevant circumstances indicate that the existing plan should be reassessed.

Not included

  • Excludes generic delays in treatment where no failure to reassess or escalate treatment options is identified.
  • Excludes failures limited to informed-consent discussions, documentation or communication where treatment options were otherwise appropriately reviewed.
  • Excludes failures concerning diagnosis, referral or treatment delivery when no deficient reconsideration or escalation of treatment options is asserted.
  • Excludes reassessment processes governed by a separately named clinical condition or treatment pathway when that named concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
Reports
7

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
6

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care2
NHS England2
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Care Quality Commission1
Foxhayes Surgery GP Practice1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
Local Care Direct Limited1
Princess Alexandra Hospital1
Queen Victoria Hospital NHS Foundation Trust1
The Foxhayes Surgery GP Practice1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    David Joyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Joyce, who had a history of mental health difficulties, died by suicide at his home on 31 August 2023 after being found having suspended himself. The concerns included a lack of follow-up and consideration of mental health referral after he first sought help, prescribing Quetiapine without specialist input despite his reported symptoms and overdose, and a delay of 15 weeks before a medication review led to a change in treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in amending medication when presenting symptoms indicate a different treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “3. On 31st August 2023, when a medication review was conducted, it was established that David needed a different medication given his presenting symptoms. This medication amendment therefore did not take place until 15 weeks after David had initially sought help from the GP. ”

    Source location

    David Joyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mental health services retain responsibility for prescribing and antipsychotic dose changes when a patient is under specialist care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, had ████████, (a Senior Mental Health Practitioner) felt that David needed support from the Mental Health Team whom she works for I would have expected her to make that referral when she saw him on the 24th June. The practice felt there needs to be improved lines of communication between Primary Care and the Community Mental Health Team including consultants and Home Treatment Team for a patient who is currently under their care. Usually, the Mental Health Team take ownership and responsibility for prescribing and dose changes for anti-psychotic medication as they had for David.”

    Source location

    Response from Foxhayes Surgery GP Practice
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paolino Amico, who had metastatic bladder cancer and advanced clinical frailty, was admitted with severe bilateral pneumonia and died in hospital on 12 June 2024. He received multiple overdoses of slow-release morphine following a prescription error, with concerns also raised about medication administration, delayed emergency escalation, oxygen provision after discharge, and the management of morphine reversal and pain relief.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider or plan alternative pain management during opioid overdose treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) Mr Amico morphine overdose was partially treated: a. There was an immediate response to Naloxone but the opioid reversal for overdose was not in accordance with British National Formulary guidelines or with an NHS England alert previously issued. b. There was no consideration or plan for alternative pain management in a patient who had been receiving morphine pain relief as part of his treatment plan for cancer. c. Mr Amico suffered acute withdrawal syndrome and family complained about his suffering to hospital staff that they stated was not ameliorated. An emergency call would have triggered the attendance of an Anaesthetist who could have given advice on opioid reversal in a palliative patient. Princess Alexandra Hospital & NHS England ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share opioid reversal guidance through palliative-care educational events and hold collaborative opioid-learning events with the integrated care system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The BNF highlights that doses used in acute opioid/opiate overdose may NOT be appropriate for the management of opioid/opiate induced respiratory depression and sedation in those receiving palliative care and in chronic opioid/opiate use. The recommended dose for adults in post-operative respiratory depression and for palliative care and chronic opioid/opiate use by intravenous injection is 100 to 200 micrograms (1.5 to 3 micrograms/kg). If the response is inadequate, give subsequent dose of 100 micrograms every two minutes. Even where doses are given as recommended, there is still a need for careful monitoring of vital observations and maintaining or restoring pain relief.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 7 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital trust is responsible for providing the response and addressing the reported concerns through its governance arrangements and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust will be providing their own response to this Report, however, the Hertfordshire & West Essex ICB have advised NHS England of the Trust’s governance arrangements and actions being taken to address the concerns raised. It is understood that the Trust’s Patient Safety Group (PSG) has active oversight of several of the areas highlighted in the Report, particularly medicines safety, recognition of deterioration, and incident learning.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Malcolm John Garrett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Malcolm John Garrett, who was immunosuppressed following a bilateral lung transplant, was admitted with a vertebral fracture and subsequently developed pneumonia and other complications. He acquired Covid-19 while an inpatient and died at Stepping Hill Hospital on 23 September 2021; the direct causes were Covid pneumonitis and pseudomonas aeruginosa bronchopneumonia. The concerns included the absence of specific guidance for managing high-risk immunosuppressed patients, expediting discharge or using alternative treatment methods, and monitoring kidney function to avoid opiate toxicity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of specific guidance for considering alternative methods of treatment for patients at high risk of acquiring Covid-19

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The evidence before the inquest was that Mr Garratt needed to be discharged as quickly as possible to reduce the risk of acquiring Covid-19. However there was no specific guidance about expediting patients such as him and looking at alternative methods of treatment; ”

    Source location

    Malcolm John Garrett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Dennis Allen Teesdale · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dennis Allen Teesdale underwent surgery including insertion of a PEG tube on 17 October 2016 and subsequently developed severe abdominal pain, multi-organ failure and septic shock. He was found to have peritonitis caused by leakage of bowel contents from the PEG tube passing through the bowel, and died on 20 October 2016. Concerns included the insertion and post-operative management of the PEG, delayed recognition and treatment of deterioration, delayed transfer, and limitations in specialist, diagnostic and laboratory services at Queen Victoria Hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to risk-assess the appropriateness of PEG insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “4. No risk assessment was undertaken as to whether a PEG insertion would have been appropriate, given that a non-invasive alternative of a feeding tube for enteral feeding was available. ”

    Source location

    Dennis Allen Teesdale · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Rewrite the Enteral Feeding Guideline to clarify absolute and relative PEG contraindications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A number of changes have been made to our process prior to the insertion of PEGs at QVH to minimise the risk of this incident ever being repeated. The requirement for enteral feeding and the decision as to the most appropriate route and any contraindications is now a documented decision at the multidisciplinary team meeting prior to surgery. A PEG safety checklist has been introduced, which includes stop points prior to the insertion, with a final check on contraindications and a stop point if poor gastric distention or poor trans-illumination is achieved. The Enteral Feeding Guideline, which includes the guidance on PEG insertion, has been re-written following this incident, widening and clarifying the absolute and relative contraindications to PEG placement.”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 4 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a PEG safety checklist with documented MDT decisions, contraindication checks, stop points and risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A number of changes have been made to our process prior to the insertion of PEGs at QVH to minimise the risk of this incident ever being repeated. The requirement for enteral feeding and the decision as to the most appropriate route and any contraindications is now a documented decision at the multidisciplinary team meeting prior to surgery. A PEG safety checklist has been introduced, which includes stop points prior to the insertion, with a final check on contraindications and a stop point if poor gastric distention or poor trans-illumination is achieved. The Enteral Feeding Guideline, which includes the guidance on PEG insertion, has been re-written following this incident, widening and clarifying the absolute and relative contraindications to PEG placement.”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 4 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit prospective PEG practice, including stickers, MDT documentation, consent and checklist use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A12 Ensure prospective PEG audit in place and capturing all necessary information Owner: BSB/ID Due: 31 Jul 2017 Audit will capture NPSA stickers, multidisciplinary team documentation, consent, checklist. Status: Y”

    Source location

    Dennis-Teesdale-Response-1
    Page 10 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Request and review the trust’s completed prospective PEG audit to obtain assurances about safe care and treatment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The trust have carried out 16 percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube insertions since Mr Teesdale’s death, with two of these taking place since the inquest. The trust’s lead cancer nurse is auditing all PEG insertions since January 2017 to provide assurances patients have received safe care and treatment. The trust have shared their audit tool with us, and we saw that this will allow the trust to provide assurances around areas including multidisciplinary involvement, risk assessment, and contraindications. CQC will request that the trust send us a copy of the completed audit by 30 September 2017. We will subsequently review the audit to obtain assurances of safe care and treatment.”

    Source location

    2017-0202-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Improvement, NHS England, and the Care Quality Commission, working with the Trust and commissioners, were responsible for ensuring appropriate action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, I am satisfied that the regulators are alert to the risks you have highlighted, and it is for NHS Improvement, NHS England and the Care Quality Commission, working with the Trust and its commissioners, to ensure sufficient and appropriate action is taken to address the concerns raised. My officials have asked to be kept informed of developments.”

    Source location

    2017-0202-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pre-operative assessment considers suitability for surgery based on available facilities, while the laboratory agreement requires urgent specimens to be processed within one hour.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All patients having major surgery at QVH have an individual pre-operative assessment with a surgeon. This determines their suitability for surgery at the hospital, in view of the available on-site facilities. This is recorded in the patient record.”

    Source location

    2017-0202-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 10 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response
  5. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    James Paul COLTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Paul COLTON was a serving prisoner who became critically unwell on 29 August 2013 after a period of deteriorating health and died two days later in hospital. Concerns included failure to revisit his diagnosis or escalate treatment, inadequate analgesia, poor continuity and communication of care, and an extremely heavy workload affecting healthcare provision.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reassess diagnoses and escalate treatment despite continuing clinical decline

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The doctors and nurses at the prison failed to properly diagnose, treat and care for Mr Colton in that they assumed that the diagnosis of mechanical back pain was accurate and took no steps to revisit the diagnosis or to escalate his treatment despite his obvious continuing decline. The failure to consider alternate diagnosis led to him missing his developing cancer and which may, therefore, have contributed to his early death. ”

    Source location

    James Paul COLTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold staff study sessions to discuss case learning and encourage curiosity in clinical situations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Importantly, a couple of study sessions were held in which staff were taken through the case notes of Mr Colton and had an opportunity to discuss learning identified and how they may act in future situations. Whilst there are a number of learning objectives for the day, principally, staff were asked to be open and to be curious in clinical situations. I understand from my Deputy Head of Healthcare at HMP Long Lartin that staff still talk about the learning generated from this case and in the last week there has been an example of staff raising an issue and being encouraged to consider alternative options.”

    Source location

    2015-0021-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 January 2015

    Open published response
  6. London (East)

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Pether · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Pether was admitted after a fall that caused a right femur peri-prosthetic fracture, with a pre-existing infection and an open fracture increasing the risk of infection. Transfer for complex surgery was delayed, and records identified no focused medical or nursing checks of limb viability between 11 and 20 December 2012. The wound was found to be infected and necrotic on 20 December; despite surgery, amputation and intensive care, Mr Pether deteriorated and died from left ventricular failure after developing multi-organ failure.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reassess treatment options in response to significant treatment delays

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Between the 11 December and the 20 December 2012 the only medical entries for plan of care related to the fact that Mr Pether was “awaiting Stanmore”. There is no evidence of any discussion as to the effect of this significant delay in the provision of treatment and whether the options for his treatment should have been re-considered. ”

    Source location

    Mr Pether · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct detailed assessment and re-consult treatment options during clinical deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “3. By the 19 December 2012, there was a raised CRP and evidence of an acute kidney injury. It is certainly arguable that a more detailed assessment of the patient at that time and a re-consultation of options by the orthopaedic team should have taken place at that time. ”

    Source location

    Mr Pether · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. West Yorkshire (East)

    AI-generated summary

    Anne Whitworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anne Whitworth developed worsening abdominal symptoms and became acutely unwell on 8 September 2013. She suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest while being taken to hospital and died later that evening; a post-mortem examination identified aspiration of gastric contents due to intestinal obstruction caused by volvulus of the sigmoid colon. Concerns included the failure to access her prior GP records out of hours and a missed opportunity to escalate her treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate treatment options when clinically indicated

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Out of Hours GP conceded that there was a missed opportunity to escalate Mrs Whitworth’s treatment options. ”

    Source location

    Anne Whitworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026