Recurring concern

Unsafe anticoagulant management

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First reported 5 Sep 2013•Latest report 28 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to anticoagulant management, including prescribing clarity and reconciliation, anticoagulation-chart accuracy, INR or other required monitoring, senior clinical review, risk-sensitive guidance, escalation and consideration of anticoagulant treatment in relevant clinical circumstances.

Not included

  • Excludes generic medication-prescribing, record-keeping, staffing, training or communication deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to anticoagulant management.
  • Excludes general bleeding-risk controls for patients taking antithrombotic medication when the assertion does not concern anticoagulant management itself.
  • Excludes medication administration, supply or continuity failures where anticoagulant treatment management is not the identified unsafe condition.
  • Excludes unrelated thromboprophylaxis, venous-thromboembolism prevention and non-anticoagulant medication concerns.
Reports
25

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
34

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
28

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

National Institute for Health and Care Excellence5
NHS England4
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board3
Department of Health and Social Care3
Recipient name withheld3
Senedd Cymru3
Welsh Government3
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust1
Birmingham Women'S and Children'S NHS Foundation Trust1
British Cardiovascular Society1
Care Quality Commission1
East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust1
Frimley Health NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Marion Hilda Prance · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marion Hilda Prance, aged 82, suffered a head injury after an unwitnessed fall at her care home and was given her usual morning dose of Rivaroxaban on the advice of paramedics. She was later diagnosed with a subdural haematoma, developed a catastrophic brain bleed and died the next day. The principal concerns were paramedic awareness and training regarding Rivaroxaban and the need for caution after head injuries caused by falls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate training of paramedics about bleeding dangers in patients prescribed newer anticoagulant drugs after a fall

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The training of paramedics in relation to the dangers of bleeds in patients who have fallen and are prescribed Rivaroxaban and other similar new style anti-coagulant drugs; ”

    Source location

    Marion Hilda Prance · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish Clinical Notice 18 to clinicians, covering Novel Oral Anticoagulants including Rivaroxaban and providing advice on their use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the Trust acknowledges that during the Inquest you heard verbal evidence from the paramedic who attended Mrs Prance, I would like to take the opportunity to confirm with you that during 2014 a Clinical Notice number 18 entitled, Novel Oral Anti-coagulant, was published to all clinicians. In that document anti-coagulant therapies including Rivaroxaban were referred to and advice was supplied to staff regarding their use. I attach for your reference a copy of that Clinical Notice.”

    Source location

    2019-0154-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2019

    Open published response
  2. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Marie Hilda Millward Winter · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marie Hilda Millward Winter fell at a nursing home on 19 August 2017, sustained a head injury and developed an intracranial bleed. The report states that Apixaban was administered after the fall and that this worsened the bleed and contributed to her death at hospital on 2 September 2017. The principal concern was the administration of anticoagulant medication after a head injury, reportedly on the advice of or in the presence of ambulance technicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Administration of anticoagulation medication following a head injury

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence was that the medication (Apixaban) was given to Mrs Millward Winter at Each Step Nursing Home on the advice of and/or in the presence of the Ambulance Technicians from North West Ambulance Service after she had sustained a head injury and prior to transporting her to hospital. The concern is that the administration of this anticoagulation medication on the morning of the 19th August 2017, following a head injury, worsened an internal bleed and contributed to Mrs Millward Winter’s death. It is of concern that such medication has been given when the patient has suffered a head injury (and is at risk of an internal bleed). It is of concern that the medication has been given on the advice of and/or in the presence of the ambulance technicians. ”

    Source location

    Marie Hilda Millward Winter · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advising on Apixaban and other medications beyond six authorised medications falls outside an EMT’s scope of practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ recollection is that there was no discussion in relation to the administration of anti-coagulant medication for two reasons; firstly, Mrs Millward-Winter was being conveyed to the hospital because she had suffered a head injury and was taking blood thinning medication and secondly, advising on the administration of an anti-coagulant was outside of his scope of practice as an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT).”

    Source location

    2019-0020-Response-by-North-West-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response
  3. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Annette KRASINSKY-LLOYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Annette KRASINSKY-LLOYD died at Royal Surrey County Hospital on 20 April 2016 after an unwitnessed fall caused a pelvic fracture and retro-peritoneal haemorrhage, resulting in hypovolemic shock. The report identified inadequate A&E governance and delays in consultant involvement, investigations, reversal of anticoagulation and blood transfusions, as well as inadequate monitoring that contributed to poor intravenous access.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in reversing anticoagulation and administering blood transfusions

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Notwithstanding (1) there were additional delays in obtaining results of tests and the conduct of an appropriate assessment of the deceased’s condition. This in turn led to delays in reversing the deceased’s anti-coagulation therapy and administering blood transfusions. ”

    Source location

    Annette KRASINSKY-LLOYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Captain James Michael Bedford · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Captain James Michael Bedford, a senior long-haul airline pilot, developed a left-leg deep vein thrombosis and later collapsed after a flight from China. He suffered a pulmonary embolus and cerebral events, followed by an acute cerebral haemorrhage after treatment with heparin, and died on 30 June 2015. Concerns included differing hospital practices regarding lower-leg scanning for DVT and whether a full-leg scan at his first attendance might have provided an opportunity for treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in Heparin-level testing and result availability

    Wider context from the report

    “5. There was no criticism of the use of 50mg Alteplase but there was a lack of clarity as to whether this was followed by an infusion. A further expert witness (a haematologist) criticised the subsequent use of unfractionated Heparin and a test of Heparin level seems to have taken a long time from sampling to delivery to the laboratory and later result. The evidence was strongly suggestive of over-anticoagulation by Heparin. ”

    Source location

    Captain James Michael Bedford · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unsafe use of unfractionated Heparin

    Wider context from the report

    “5. There was no criticism of the use of 50mg Alteplase but there was a lack of clarity as to whether this was followed by an infusion. A further expert witness (a haematologist) criticised the subsequent use of unfractionated Heparin and a test of Heparin level seems to have taken a long time from sampling to delivery to the laboratory and later result. The evidence was strongly suggestive of over-anticoagulation by Heparin. ”

    Source location

    Captain James Michael Bedford · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Alter the thrombolysis pulmonary embolism guideline to prompt checking prior heparin administration and careful APTT monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. The Trust has altered the Thrombolysis PE guideline – amongst the changes we have addressed the concerns about checking whether heparin had been administered previously and to carefully check and monitor the APTT ratio. A copy of the revised guidance is attached for your information.”

    Source location

    2016-0368-Barnsley-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The apparent 2-hour-37-minute APTT delay was actually 1 hour 20 minutes because the form was pre-prepared.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““The sample for APTT testing was timed as being collected from ICU at 19.58hrs, but the sample was not taken until 21.15hrs and not received by pathology until 21.24. The results were reported to ICU at 22.35hrs, so an apparent delay of 2 hours and 37 minutes seemed to have occurred.”

    Source location

    2016-0368-Barnsley-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2016

    Open published response
  5. Blackburn, Hyndburn and Ribble Valley

    AI-generated summary

    David Wade · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Wade, who was receiving Warfarin therapy for atrial fibrillation, developed severe headaches, vomiting and collapse on 14 June 2016. A CT scan showed a non-survivable cerebellar haemorrhage; the report identified concern that there was no system for providing anticoagulant patients with information about brain-bleed symptoms and what action to take.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of literature informing anticoagulant therapy patients about the symptoms of a brain bleed

    Wider context from the report

    “Patients who are provided with anti-coagulant therapy are at an increased risk of the development of haemorrhagic strokes. There appears to be no system in place to provide patients with literature setting out the symptoms of a bleed on the brain and the steps that patients should take in response. ”

    Source location

    David Wade · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing anticoagulant information, including the Yellow OAT book, NHS Choices guidance and NICE support, addresses patients’ need for bleeding-symptom advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of your concerns I would wish to bring to your attention the standard anticoagulant booklet (more commonly known as the “yellow book” – which is warfarin specific) given to patients as recommended by the former National Patient Safety Agency. A link to its content is below: http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?EntryId45=61777”

    Source location

    david-wade-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 September 2016

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Guy Hutchence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Guy Hutchence broke his lower leg after slipping on an icy pavement and died in hospital on 28 January 2016. The report raised concerns about repeated ward moves, staffing and record-keeping, weight-based anticoagulant dosing and inconsistent weight recording, inadequate equipment for leg elevation, and delays to surgery after two operation kits were found to be non-sterile. The stated medical cause of death included bronchopneumonia, deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolus, and fractured tibia and fibula.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use a sufficiently refined method for anticoagulant dose assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “3. He was administered his anti-coagulant simply on the basis of his body weight. He weighed 99.8Kg and the difference between a daily dose of 40mg of Clexane and a twice daily dose of 40mg of Clexane is arbitrarily set at a body weight of 100Kg. Should there not be a rather more refined way of assessing the dose required? ”

    Source location

    Michael Guy Hutchence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evidence and manufacturer guidance do not support routine anticoagulant dose adjustments for overweight patients without evidence of efficacy and safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) Mr Hutchence was administered his anti-coagulant simply on the basis of his body weight. He weighed 99.8 Kg and the difference between a daily dose of 40 mg. of Clexane and a twice daily dose of 40mg of Clexane is arbitrarily set at a body weight of 100 Kg. Should there not be a rather more refined way of assessing the dose required?”

    Source location

    2016-0228-Response-by-Stockport-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 June 2016

    Open published response
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Catherine Bloom · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Catherine Bloom, who had dementia and reduced oral intake, was admitted with probable left-leg ischaemia and died in hospital on 4 February 2014. Concerns included failures to record her weight, consult haematology, obtain baseline and follow-up blood tests, and make the heparin administration guidance sufficiently visible. There was also no discussion with her next of kin before a DNAR order was placed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consult a haematologist before heparin infusion for very low-weight patients

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a failure to comply with the Trust’s policy relating to the administration of heparin, by failing to weigh Mrs Bloom prior to the commencing the infusion of heparin. 2. There was a failure to consult a haematologist before the infusion of heparin in view of Mrs Blooms’ very low weight of 30 kilograms. Again, this is required by the Trust policy. 3. It was not possible to take baseline bloods before the commencement of heparin, however, attempts should have been made to retake bloods after hydration had commenced. The Trust policy requires baseline bloods to be taken and for the APTT to be checked after 6 hours. ”

    Source location

    Mary Catherine Bloom · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to weigh patients before commencing heparin infusion

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a failure to comply with the Trust’s policy relating to the administration of heparin, by failing to weigh Mrs Bloom prior to the commencing the infusion of heparin. 2. There was a failure to consult a haematologist before the infusion of heparin in view of Mrs Blooms’ very low weight of 30 kilograms. Again, this is required by the Trust policy. 3. It was not possible to take baseline bloods before the commencement of heparin, however, attempts should have been made to retake bloods after hydration had commenced. The Trust policy requires baseline bloods to be taken and for the APTT to be checked after 6 hours. ”

    Source location

    Mary Catherine Bloom · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain baseline bloods and subsequent APTT monitoring for heparin administration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a failure to comply with the Trust’s policy relating to the administration of heparin, by failing to weigh Mrs Bloom prior to the commencing the infusion of heparin. 2. There was a failure to consult a haematologist before the infusion of heparin in view of Mrs Blooms’ very low weight of 30 kilograms. Again, this is required by the Trust policy. 3. It was not possible to take baseline bloods before the commencement of heparin, however, attempts should have been made to retake bloods after hydration had commenced. The Trust policy requires baseline bloods to be taken and for the APTT to be checked after 6 hours. ”

    Source location

    Mary Catherine Bloom · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce an unfractionated-heparin chart and weight-based guideline with six-hour APTT checks and consultant escalation for abnormal results at extreme weights.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In your letter you acknowledge receipt of three new policies that have been put in place by the Trust following the inquest and the new chart that has been introduced for the administration of unfractionated heparin. You have however raised further concerns with regards to the new Trust guidelines that have removed the inquest and the new chart that has been introduced for the administration of unfractionated heparin. You have however raised further concerns with regards to the new Trust guidelines that have removed the requirement for a haematologist to be consulted where a patient is at the extremes of weight. The reasoning for this decision is as follows.”

    Source location

    2015-0417-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Weight-based dosing, six-hour APTT checks and conditional haematology advice are considered sufficient safeguards without routine consultation for extreme patient weights.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s new policy is for a weight based bolus and then a weight based infusion the latter within weight ranges. Even with a patient of 25kg the infusion would be at 20iu/kg/hr which is a very reasonable infusion rate and in line with recognised dosage rates even at this weight. The APPTT must be checked at 6 hours and this allows the dose to be adjusted within recognised time intervals. We therefore feel that the safeguards are in place as we have moved to an entirely weight based formulation. As an extra safeguard the guideline, following the concerns you raised, now also states that if the APPTT at 6hrs is outside the expected range then the Consultant Haematologist should be contacted for further advice in those patients at the extreme ends of the weight ranges i.e. <41kg and >90kg.”

    Source location

    2015-0417-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 October 2015

    Open published response
  8. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Hireiti Kufletsion · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hireiti Kufletsion died at Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham on 20 November 2014 from thrombosis of a mechanical mitral valve during the first trimester of pregnancy. The report identified failures to adequately investigate the valve, seek specialist cardiology advice and prescribe adequate doses of clexane, with concerns that pregnant women with mechanical heart valves may be at risk from insufficient anticoagulation and inadequate clinical understanding of the associated thrombosis risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of clinicians managing pregnant women with mechanical heart valves to understand the thrombosis risk and anticoagulation implications

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was apparent from evidence given by clinicians at the Birmingham Heartlands Hospital that they did not understand the extent and gravity of the increased risk of thrombosis to pregnant women with mechanical heart valves and this affected the course of investigations into the deceased’s condition ultimately resulting in a delay in diagnosis until it was too late. Whilst this issue has now been brought to the full attention of all departments within the Birmingham Heartlands Hospital, it is reasonable to assume that there are haematologists, cardiologists and obstetricians without specialist cardio-obstetric knowledge across the country that do not appreciate the implications during pregnancies of patients with a mechanical heart valve for anti-coagulation therapy but maybe involved in the management and care of such patients. ”

    Source location

    Hireiti Kufletsion · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Powys, Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Ronald Francis Bonfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Ronald Francis Bonfield sustained a head injury at home on 29 September 2014, was admitted to Prince Charles Hospital on 1 October, and died there on 2 October 2014. The inquest recorded that he was taking Warfarin, was over-anticoagulated, and that his INR levels were not being monitored as required. The substantive concerns related to inconsistent procedures for monitoring delegated INR testing and the risk of unmonitored over-anticoagulation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unmonitored over-anticoagulation following omitted delegated INR testing

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Until such action is taken there remains a risk that a future death(s) could occur in similar circumstances to Mr Bonfield’s, where delegated INR testing has not been done leading to unmonitored over anti-coagulation ”

    Source location

    Mr Ronald Francis Bonfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Non-uniform implementation of monitoring practices for delegated INR testing

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The practices and procedures implemented by the Practice 1, Keir Hardie Health Park, GP Surgery following Mr Bonfield’s death (with regard to monitoring the compliance of the Health Boards District Nurse Teams following delegation to undertake a patient’s INR testing) is not uniform and/or implemented across all of the Health Boards Level 4 Accredited GP practices. ”

    Source location

    Mr Ronald Francis Bonfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk of unmonitored or unactioned failure to complete delegated INR testing

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The practices and procedures implemented by Practice 1, Keir Hardie Health Park Surgery act as a check and balance to reduce the risk of an unmonitored/unactioned failure on the part of the District Nurse service to undertake the task(testing the patients INR level) delegated to them by the GP practice concerned. ”

    Source location

    Mr Ronald Francis Bonfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Powys, Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Mr. Alun Walters · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr. Alun Walters, who was prescribed Warfarin following receipt of a metallic heart valve, died after a gastro-intestinal haemorrhage in circumstances of suspected elevated Warfarin levels and failed INR monitoring. His prescriptions continued despite no INR tests after November 2013, and 51 prescriptions were provided without dosage assessment. Concerns included failures by the medical practice in monitoring, prescription systems and notifying the pharmacy that Warfarin had been withdrawn, while the pharmacy supplied Warfarin without a valid prescription.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to advise the pharmacy of Warfarin withdrawal due to lack of INR safety testing

    Wider context from the report

    “The Lawn Medical Practice - (1) failed to use any computer software programmes to support its prescription decisions; (2) breached its contract with the Aneurin Bevan University Health Board in the development and maintenance of an anti-coagulation treatment register; (3) failed to put into place a system of notification to the GP and the Health Care Assistant of a patient’s failed attendance for INR testing; and (4) failed to advise the Rhymney Pharmacy Ltd. that Warfarin had been withdrawn due to a lack of INR safety testing. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Alun Walters · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement notification of failed attendance for INR testing

    Wider context from the report

    “The Lawn Medical Practice - (1) failed to use any computer software programmes to support its prescription decisions; (2) breached its contract with the Aneurin Bevan University Health Board in the development and maintenance of an anti-coagulation treatment register; (3) failed to put into place a system of notification to the GP and the Health Care Assistant of a patient’s failed attendance for INR testing; and (4) failed to advise the Rhymney Pharmacy Ltd. that Warfarin had been withdrawn due to a lack of INR safety testing. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Alun Walters · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026