Recurring concern

Failure to implement identified safety actions

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First reported 17 Dec 2013•Latest report 24 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to implement, complete or deliver actions arising from incident investigations, root-cause analyses, Trust action plans or other explicit safety action plans, including avoidable delays in completing their outstanding steps.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to create or sufficiently specify an action plan where no implementation failure is identified.
  • Excludes delays concerning ordinary clinical, infrastructure or administrative tasks that are not identified safety-plan actions.
  • Excludes generic organisational, staffing, training, audit or governance deficiencies unless they are explicitly presented as failures to implement identified safety actions.
Reports
45

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
48

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
80

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB9
Department of Health and Social Care3
British Transport Police2
Care Quality Commission2
Devon Partnership NHS Trust2
First MTR South Western Trains Limited2
NHS England2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust2
United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust2
Woodhill Prison2
Avenue House Nursing and Care Home1
Axminster Medical Practice1
Barnet Assist1
Barts Health NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Gladys Kathleen Rich · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gladys Kathleen Rich suffered repeated falls after moving into Avenue House Nursing and Care Home, culminating in a fall on 28 December 2016 that caused traumatic subdural and subarachnoid haemorrhages and a skull fracture. She died on 3 March 2017; the medical cause of death included chest infection, intracranial haemorrhage and a fall, with rectal cancer and liver metastases also recorded. The principal concerns related to failures to identify and manage her falls risk, ineffective referral and follow-up by the care home and Falls Prevention Service, inadequate resources and equipment, and the absence of an effective system to ensure required falls-prevention input was delivered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider and action falls risk action plan advice

    Wider context from the report

    “c) Once a referral was made, and a falls risk action plan was received the advice within does not appear to have been properly considered or actioned. Furthermore, the action plan was returned to the Falls Prevention Service by post rather than the required method of facsimile. Although the care home was notified that the Falls Prevention Service had not received the completed action plan, it was not resubmitted. Despite Mrs Rich then suffering a series of further falls, no new referrals were made to the Falls Prevention Service. ”

    Source location

    Gladys Kathleen Rich · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the Falls Team after sending referrals and action plans, confirm receipt and intended action, and record each contact in residents’ care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although we believe we followed normal and reasonable procedures in this case, in future to further mitigate against shortcomings of the Falls Team, we will contact them after sending them referrals and action plans. This will be done to ensure that the Falls Team have received them and to find out what action they intend to take. All contact will be recorded in our residents’ Care plans under the visiting professionals’ information section.”

    Source location

    2018-0149_Redacted-Response-by-Avenue-House-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
  2. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Naomi Clare Sourbut · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Naomi Clare Sourbut, who had a history of anxiety, depression, self-harm and bulimia, self-administered an overdose of medication, most probably Venlafaxine, and died after developing hypoxic brain injury. Concerns included whether recommendations from a root cause analysis had been considered and implemented, and whether protective factors were put in place after she reported suicidal intent and access to medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure consideration and implementation of root cause analysis recommendations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) A root cause analysis investigation was undertaken by the Devon Partnership Trust and that report was finalised on the 8th September 2017. The report contained a number of identified lessons learned and recommendations, ten in total (see attached annexe), applicable to different teams within Devon Partnership Trust. It was unclear at the Inquest as to whether or not these recommendations have been considered and acted upon by the teams to which they were directed particularly where clients have talked of suicidal ideation and identified the means with which to bring about their death. In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and your organisation has to take such action to confirm the recommendations in the root cause analysis report File No: 2017/10523 NON ANON RCA JHNS 18.9.17 – having been considered and implemented. ”

    Source location

    Naomi Clare Sourbut · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Dorothy Doreen BREISLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dorothy Doreen BREISLIN was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and was initially treated for a pulmonary embolism. A later diagnosis identified a right eighth-rib fracture that led to massive bleeding and her death. Concerns included delays in receiving the Incident Review Report, uncertainty about an apology said to have been provided, and confirmation that the referenced Action Plan had not been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement incident action plans

    Wider context from the report

    “3 ████████ confirmed on oath that none of the Action Plan referred to in the Appendices at 3 have been implemented. If not, in view of the Incident Date why not? ”

    Source location

    Dorothy Doreen BREISLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Paul James Maddox · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul James Maddox was admitted to hospital with vomiting and subsequently developed severe internal bleeding after a fall in haemoglobin was not acted upon. He underwent emergency surgery after deteriorating, but died from massive gastrointestinal bleeding with disseminated intravascular coagulopathy. The principal concern was the missed opportunity to detect, investigate and treat the bleeding, with strategies to prevent recurrence still described as work in progress at the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement strategies to prevent recurrence of the identified failure

    Wider context from the report

    “In spite of a Trust Root Cause Analysis Report identifying a missed opportunity before 13th April 2017 the court has been told at inquest that strategies to avoid a repeated failure were still work in progress. The missed opportunity was not acting upon a reducing trend in a haemoglobin result. This is simply not good enough as this issue should have been fixed during the Root Cause analysis investigation and before the report was approved as soon as the error became evident. During the course of the inquest evidence was heard from several doctors including a surgeon and it was suggested that “when there is a downward trend in haemoglobin of 10% or more the laboratory should always ring through the result as a potential surgical emergency for the urgent review of clinicians” The court brings this to the attention of the Trust and for confirmation as to when a solution to this problem has been implemented ”

    Source location

    Paul James Maddox · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a weekly Serious Incident meeting to review new incidents, report progress, and flag overdue actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A new Serious Incident meeting has been set up and meets on a weekly basis after the safety summit to review new incidents and the progress of reports. Any issues with out of date actions can be flagged at this meeting.”

    Source location

    2017-0220-Response-by-Wirral-University-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 September 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change the laboratory IT system and issue staff instructions on revised standard operating procedures for haemoglobin reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Changes to the lab IT system have been made and an action notice has been issued to all staff informing them of the agreed changes to our standard operating procedure around Hb reporting”

    Source location

    2017-0220-Response-by-Wirral-University-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 September 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reduce the haemoglobin delta-check threshold from 25% to 20%.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The delta check value for Hb has changed from 25% to 20%. There is currently no delta check in the Royal College guidance.”

    Source location

    2017-0220-Response-by-Wirral-University-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 September 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the haemoglobin telephone-alert threshold from below 70 g/L to below 75 g/L and audit its operation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The telephone criteria for Hb has changed from less than 70g/l to less than 75g/l and continues to be audited.”

    Source location

    2017-0220-Response-by-Wirral-University-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 September 2017

    Open published response
  5. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Jeffrey William Matthews · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jeffrey William Matthews suffered fatal injuries when his motorcycle collided with a Nissan Juke at the C2051 crossroads on 26 March 2017. The report raised concerns that the crossroads and Give Way sign were obscured by hedgerows and that warning signage was inadequate, with previously recommended safety measures not implemented due to a lack of resources.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement identified highway safety measures

    Wider context from the report

    “The C1021 is a minor country road that runs from the A595 at Orton Grange Roundabout in a north westerly direction and terminates when it joins the C2051 at Great Orton village. The road is generally unmarked and just wide enough for two vehicles to pass in opposite directions. The statutory speed limit is 60 mph. Approximately 220 metres prior to the scene of the collision on the C1021, is a left hand bend as you approach from the A595. The bend travels through an angle of approximately 16 degrees before the road straightens on the approach to the crossroads. The C1021 is straight for approximately 196 metres from the bend to the crossroad and continues straight beyond the crossroads for approximately 159 metres before entering another left hand bend. The police collision investigation report dated 14th August 2017 identifies at paragraph 4.4 that at this point, the presence of the crossroad junction is not obvious to any approaching vehicle. The height of the roadside hedgerows and their close proximity cause a tunnel effect and as such obscure any sign of the crossroads. It is also noted that the presence of the 'Give Way' sign at the crossroad junction is lost in the background and therefore not obviously visible to approaching drivers from a distance. Cumbria County Council is responsible for implementing measures on the county highway network that aim to reduce casualties and the risk of collisions. The C2051 Great Orton Crossroad was previously identified as having a sufficiently serious collision record during the period 1st October 2012 up to 30th September 2015. Capita were commissioned to carry out an independent investigation and inspection. The finding in the police investigation report at paragraph 4.4 as set out above was not identified by Capita. Evidence was heard at the inquest that the recommendations made by Capita in their report dated May 2016 were not implemented due to a lack of resources. The recommendations were; 1. The application of High Friction Surfacing on the north and southbound approached 2. Vegetation trimming – cutting back vegetation to the south-east, north-east and north-west quadrant verge areas 3. Additional Road markings on C1021 junction approaches – provide ‘SLOW’ markings on red patch on the C1021 approaches, adjacent to warning signs. (1) The current warning signage on approach to the junction from a north westerly direction is inadequate. (2) The height of the roadside hedgerows and their close proximity causes a tunnel effect obscuring any sign of the crossroads restricting visibility. (3) Modifications to the junction on approach as recommended by Capita should be re-considered to minimise the risk of incidents and death in the future. ”

    Source location

    Jeffrey William Matthews · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate funding to implement the collision study’s safety recommendations in 2017/18.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you state in your report a study into road traffic collisions over the 3 year period, October 2012 to September 2015, was carried out by Capita and the report was published in May 2016. As a consequence of this report funding was allocated to implement the recommendations in the current financial year, 2017/18. This is standard practice in allocating funds for safety improvements i.e. the study is carried out in one financial year and depending on priorities the recommendations are implemented in the following financial year.”

    Source location

    Jeffrey-Matthews-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 October 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult the police, Parish Council and County Councillor on proposed high-friction surfacing, road-marking and signage improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The scheme to introduce the high friction surfacing, improved road marking and signage is currently out to consultation with the police, the Parish Council and the local County Councillor and subject to agreement, the measures will be introduced as soon as practicable. The vegetation has already been reduced by the local landowners, presumably as a result of the media coverage of the inquest.”

    Source location

    Jeffrey-Matthews-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 October 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a further police site visit after installing the measures to identify necessary amendments or further improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once all measures have been installed a further site visit will be held with the police to see if any amendments need to be made or if any further improvements are required.”

    Source location

    Jeffrey-Matthews-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 October 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The recommendations were not delayed by insufficient resources; funding had already been allocated for 2016/17 and the following year.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A statement is made in your letter that the Capita recommendations were not installed due to a lack of resources but they were not installed as by May 2016 the funding had already been allocated for the 2016/17 financial and funding was allocated for the following year, as explained previously.”

    Source location

    Jeffrey-Matthews-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 October 2017

    Open published response
  6. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Carol Ann Harvey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carol Ann Harvey, aged seventy, was discharged from hospital with care planned at home, but no carers attended after a referral message was left without confirmation that it had been received. She was found the following morning drowsy, vomiting and having suffered significant blood loss, and died in hospital on 9 April 2016 following a paracetamol overdose and a pre-existing cardiac condition. The principal concerns were the lack of a procedure to confirm that referrals had been received and actioned, and delay in implementing a safe hospital discharge procedure.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in developing and implementing a safe discharge procedure

    Wider context from the report

    “(b) The Action Plan which has been produced by the Health Board following an investigation into this death indicates that a Standard Operating Procedure for the safe discharge of patients from the Acute Hospital environment is being developed, however it was not possible to provide a completion and implementation date for this, notwithstanding that the death was eleven months ago. I am concerned that delays in undertaking work of this kind could place existing patients at risk. ”

    Source location

    Carol Ann Harvey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    JACK OLIVER PORTLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Oliver Portland was a prisoner who was diagnosed with substance-induced psychosis and later detained under the Mental Health Act. He died on 27 December 2015 at Wycombe Hospital while on unescorted leave from the Whiteleaf Centre; the medical cause of death was morphine and ethanol toxicity. Concerns included the management and communication of ACCT documents, family communication, discharge planning for a vulnerable and homeless prisoner, and the coordination of coronial disclosure.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement changes with clear timescales and adequate coverage of identified concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) Whilst there were indications that there were changes being implemented, there was no clear indication of timescales nor did they address the particular concerns identified during this investigation. ”

    Source location

    JACK OLIVER PORTLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete governance approval and implement the amended section 17 leave form, including recording whether copies should be provided and to whom.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The provision of copies of leave forms is not in fact mandatory under either the Mental Health Act Code of Practice or Trust policy (the Trust’s current granting of leave form, which suggests that this is the case, is misleading). Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that in many cases patients and their families find it useful to have a copy of the form in addition to being involved in discussions around the granting of any leave and conditions. The section 17 leave form has been amended and is currently going through the Trust’s governance processes for approval. It is anticipated that use of the new form will be implemented no later than 28th April 2017. The newly designed form allows the consultant to indicate, following discussions with patients and families, if copies should be provided and, if so, to whom.”

    Source location

    2017-0049-Response-by-Oxford-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test the new leave-management SOP on Sapphire ward, review it, and expand implementation across all adult wards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, a new standard operating procedure (SOP) for managing leave (appendix 1) includes the need for staff to have a discussion with the family, where appropriate consent is given by the patient, regarding the patient’s leave from the ward and to do this every time there is a change to the leave agreed.”

    Source location

    2017-0049-Response-by-Oxford-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor observation-recording practice through the Matron and make the prohibition on prospective or retrospective entries explicit in the revised Observation Policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Staff have been strongly reminded that it is not appropriate to fill in observations paperwork prospectively or retrospectively. This is now monitored by the Matron. We are in the process of reviewing the Trust’s Observation Policy, and will ensure that this is also made very explicit within the new version. This policy review will be complete by the end of April 2017.”

    Source location

    2017-0049-Response-by-Oxford-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response
  8. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Ian Keith Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ian Keith Brown, who had mental illness and was on remand at HMP Woodhill, was found in his cell with a belt ligature around his neck on 19 July 2015 and was pronounced dead at 14:00 hours. Concerns were raised that recommendations to improve suicide and self-harm prevention, including ACCT case management and a prison-wide strategy, had not been implemented sufficiently, while suicides and self-harm at HMP Woodhill continued to rise.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement previous safety recommendations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1)During the course of the evidence I was referred to the most recent report from the HM Inspector of Prisons that highlighted “Recommendations made by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman following previous deaths in custody, such as the need to improve the quality of ACCT case management documentation for prisoners at risk of suicide or self harm, had not been implemented with sufficient rigour. (2) Deaths at the prison from suicide and self harm continue to rise. (3) The recommendation from the Inspectors is that there should be a “prison-wide strategy and action plan to reduce the number of self inflicted deaths and incidents of self harm should be developed urgently. This should be based on detailed data and trend analysis and include implementation of Prison and Probation Ombudsman recommendations. It should also include improvements in the quality of ACCT case management documentation, and the lessons learned from internal investigations into life-threatening incidents.” I have concerns that the recommendations will not be implemented and that past recommendations have been ignored. (4) That despite my previous PFD reports the number of suicides at HMP Woodhill continue to rise. ”

    Source location

    Ian Keith Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a monthly forum chaired by the Deputy Governor to monitor progress on actions responding to death-in-custody recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the recent inspection by HMIP, a monthly forum, chaired by the Deputy Governor, has been introduced to monitor progress on the actions being taken in response to all recommendations relating to the recent deaths in custody. This forum will improve assurance of compliance. A whole establishment action plan, shared by the health provider and the prison, is in place and progress on this is formally monitored monthly and reported to both the prison Senior Management Team meeting and the newly established Clinical Governance meeting.”

    Source location

    2016-0200-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a whole-establishment action plan with the health provider and formally monitor and report its progress monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the recent inspection by HMIP, a monthly forum, chaired by the Deputy Governor, has been introduced to monitor progress on the actions being taken in response to all recommendations relating to the recent deaths in custody. This forum will improve assurance of compliance. A whole establishment action plan, shared by the health provider and the prison, is in place and progress on this is formally monitored monthly and reported to both the prison Senior Management Team meeting and the newly established Clinical Governance meeting.”

    Source location

    2016-0200-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a quarterly safer-custody taskforce chaired by the Deputy Director to oversee implementation of the review action plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As I explained in my letter of 6 February 2016 in response to a previous Regulation 28 report, the Deputy Director for Custody for High Security Prisons established a taskforce to conduct a review of safer custody processes at the prison, and this group now meets quarterly, chaired by the Deputy Director, to oversee the implementation of the action plan to address the recommendations of the review. Through the taskforce extra resources have been provided to the prison to assist in data analysis, focus groups and other research. At the same time the healthcare provider, Central North West London NHS Foundation Trust, completed a review of healthcare services at the prison.”

    Source location

    2016-0200-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing prison governance and monitoring processes are considered sufficient to deliver action on HMIP, PPO and Regulation 28 recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I hope this provides you with assurance that the Governor of HMP Woodhill, and the Deputy Director of Custody for High Security Prisons, have put in place processes and governance that will achieve successful action in response to the recommendations from HMIP and the PPO, and the matters of concern raised in your Regulation 28 reports, and that this will bring the necessary improvements in safety at the prison.”

    Source location

    2016-0200-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 May 2016

    Open published response
  9. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Jonathan James LANDER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jonathan James Lander was killed on 28 April 2015 when he was struck by a train on tracks near Blackbridge, Worcester Road, Hartlebury. The principal concern was the absence of a policy or procedure for following up individuals seen by one service and then discharged to another service, and that the identified action plan had not been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of governance procedures to ensure action plans are followed through

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That there is not in place any policy or procedure for the following up of individuals who are seen by one service and thereafter discharged to another service. In the course of the inquest I was provided with a Root Cause Analysis which identified the failing mentioned above and which contained an action plan indicating that such a policy/procedure was to be implemented by September 2015. I was told in the course of the inquest that that policy/procedure has not been implemented. I was left with the sense that this is still to be considered but there appears to be no sense of urgency. I was further told that the Trust has a governance procedure to ensure that action plans are “followed through” but it seems to be clearly the case that this has not worked either. I respectfully suggest that you consider urgently the necessity for such a procedure / policy and to implement it. (2) (3) ”

    Source location

    Jonathan James LANDER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish an embedded lessons database containing Root Cause Analysis action plans and completion evidence, with Governance Team monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can advise in relation to a governance procedure to implement the Action Plans set out in individual Root Cause Analyses that the Trust now has an Embedded Lessons Database. All the Action Plans set out in individual Root Cause Analyses are now uploaded to that database together with evidence of completed actions. This database is monitored by the Governance Team based in the Adult Mental Health and Learning Disability Service Delivery Unit.”

    Source location

    J-Lander-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2016

    Open published response
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Roberts and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Roberts, James Dunsby and Edward Maher were reserve soldiers taking part in a specialist-unit selection test march in the Brecon Beacons in July 2013. The report identifies concerns about heat-illness guidance, training and risk assessment, communication of weather information, medical planning, emergency response, tracking of slow or static candidates, and the failure to implement lessons from previous incidents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement lessons from previous heat-illness and tracking events

    Wider context from the report

    “(10) A previous fatality, Soldier G see LAIT report October 2012, had identified that treatment for casualties should be within the “golden hour”. In addition following Private Poole’s death in 2009 it was identified that the tracker was not fit for purpose and standard operating procedures were issues dated January 2011. None of these recommendations were implemented by those involved in this exercise. I am concerned that lessons had not been learnt from these previous events. There appears to be no clear pathway for communicating this sort of information. ”

    Source location

    Craig Roberts and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce the formal lessons-learning process through the Training Governance and Assurance Policy review and biannual training reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a formal process in place for the capturing of lessons learnt/identified (Land Forces Standing Order (LFSO) 1118 – Learning Lessons in the Land Environment). Lessons are managed through the Defence Lessons Implementation and Management System (DLIMS) process which provides for a comprehensive way in which to consider that appropriate lessons are learnt, and that all appropriate steps are taken to prevent or minimise a recurrence. There is a clear and well established process, which is now being reinforced through the Training and Governance Policy review referred to under”

    Source location

    2015-0228-Response-by-MOD
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a Service Inquiry into the incident and wider endurance-training safety lessons across Defence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We continue to work with the Health and Safety Executive to take forward their recommendations and seek their advice on implementing improved processes. I have directed that two further inquiries be conducted by the Ministry of Defence. Firstly, a Service Inquiry will look at the events of 13 July 2013 to try and ensure that all safety-related lessons, including those identified in your Regulation 28 report, are learnt for endurance training across the whole of Defence. This will be conducted by a Service Inquiry Panel, convened by the Director General Defence Safety Authority, which will provide an independent, thorough and objective review outside of the chain of command. In order to ensure all relevant issues are captured and considered by the Service Inquiry, I have also written to the Director of Specialist Military Units,”

    Source location

    2015-0228-Response-by-MOD
    Page 7 · response
    Published 20 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A formal, established process already captures and manages lessons learned, with the Training Governance and Assurance Policy review reinforcing it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a formal process in place for the capturing of lessons learnt/identified (Land Forces Standing Order (LFSO) 1118 – Learning Lessons in the Land Environment). Lessons are managed through the Defence Lessons Implementation and Management System (DLIMS) process which provides for a comprehensive way in which to consider that appropriate lessons are learnt, and that all appropriate steps are taken to prevent or minimise a recurrence. There is a clear and well established process, which is now being reinforced through the Training and Governance Policy review referred to under”

    Source location

    2015-0228-Response-by-MOD
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 July 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026