Recurring concern

Unreliable access to emergency communication

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First reported 6 Jun 2014•Latest report 15 Apr 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated emergency communication facilities or arrangements where their unavailability, inaccessibility or unreliable operation can delay emergency assistance, including telephones, alarms, radios or equivalent means.

Not included

  • Excludes inaccurate triage or categorisation of emergency calls.
  • Excludes failures to record, route or share information after a communication has been received unless the report directly identifies this as a failure of the emergency communication access arrangement.
  • Excludes ordinary customer-service or routine telephone-access problems without an emergency-response function.
  • Excludes hazards created by telephone equipment, such as ligature risks, where the concern is the equipment's physical safety rather than access to emergency communication.
Reports
46

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
49

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
51

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care7
NHS England5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives3
Health and Safety Executive3
Care Quality Commission2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
National Highways2
Winchester Prison2
Wolverhampton City Council2
Abbey Healthcare1
Appello Limited1
Bourne Leisure Limited1
Bow School1
British Heart Foundation1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Joseph BROOKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samuel Joseph Brookes was discharged home after a hospital admission following a fall and long lie, but his required care was not rearranged. He was immobile, lived alone, and was left unattended for two weeks without access to his pendant alarm or mobile phone; he was then found unresponsive and deceased. The principal concerns were the failure to arrange and document his care, the lack of a process requiring confirmation of his safe return, and his inability to raise an alarm or call for help.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure access to an alarm pendant or mobile phone for summoning help

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Mr Brookes did not have his alarm pendant around his neck and nor was his mobile phone available (it was in another room). Accordingly when Mr Brookes got into difficulty he could not raise the alarm or call for help. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Joseph BROOKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate pendant-alarm requirements to patient transport providers and establish cross-system governance for transport-related incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 4 Recommendation / Area for Improvement Identified: When discharging patients, transport company to be made aware when the patient has pendant alarm and that this must be left within reach when leaving the property.”

    Source location

    Response from The Dudley Group NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 23 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require discharge checklists containing safety information to accompany patients and inform transport crews about emergency equipment and alarm access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Communication to be sent out to all matrons and teams detailing that the nurse discharge checklist is to be printed and handed to transport company and sent with the discharged patient on discharge. Communication to detail that the discharge checklist must include key patient safety details, pendant alarm information, mobility status and to utilise the free text box with any other important information for the transferring crew (to include availability of mobile phone). This communication should include the necessary checks to be completed by transferring crews to ensure patients have necessary equipment in reach to make emergency calls/have access to pendant alarms. | Interim Divisional Chief Nurse - Medicine”

    Source location

    Response from The Dudley Group NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 23 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Some patient transport safety actions fall outside the Trust’s scope.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Some of the actions identified regarding patient transport, fall out of scope of the Trust. These will be taken forward by our Deputy Chief Operating Officer and Head of Site Operations and discussed with relevant integrated care system partners in relation to contractual obligations for ensuring patients discharged home are safe and have access to the agreed methods of communication e.g. mobile telephone, pendant alarm (should they have or require one).”

    Source location

    Response from The Dudley Group NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2025

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Elan Gransford Adams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elan Gransford Adams, a nursing home resident, choked on a burger on 5 February 2024 and died at hospital later that evening. The substantive concerns included poor-quality emergency-call communication, unclear clinical information provided to the ambulance controller, and a faulty resident call bell with limited assurance that staff could hear it during busy periods.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide reliable phone connections for emergency calls from residents’ bedrooms

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The call to the London Ambulance Service was of very poor quality partly due to interference in the phone line connection. The inquest heard that the staff had problems with the phone quality “most of the time” and continue to have difficulties when making emergency calls from resident’s bedrooms. ”

    Source location

    Elan Gransford Adams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable staff to make 999 calls directly from Care Vision handsets via the Home’s Wi-Fi.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The handsets, which have our electronic care system installed (Care Vision), now have a separate app installed. This allows staff to call 999 directly from the handset. Staff are now reliant on mobile phone signal as calls are made directly via the Home’s Wi-Fi.”

    Source location

    Response from Abbey Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace Wi-Fi hotspots, test post-installation signal coverage, and add further hotspots where weak areas remain.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Wi-Fi hotspots are in the process of being replaced and will be installed by 1st February 2025. Tests will be conducted following this, specifically to check for any signal issues post-installation. If any weak areas of signal are identified, further Wi-Fi hotspots will be installed, to boost the signal throughout the Home.”

    Source location

    Response from Abbey Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace telephones and install additional cordless and landline phones to strengthen communication coverage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a) All telephones are being replaced;”

    Source location

    Response from Abbey Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the Coroner’s concerns and updated Emergency Protocol to all services, and require managers to check emergency equipment and communication systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that as a company, we have implemented change across all our sites, on 5 December 2024 we contacted each service to make them aware of the Coroner’s concerns following the Inquest in this matter. A copy of the Coroner’s Regulation 28 was provided to all managers. The Emergency Protocol, which was updated in November 2024, was circulated simultaneously. We asked all Home Managers to check the following in their service:”

    Source location

    Response from Abbey Healthcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response
  3. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Dean John Mark Anthony BRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Bray died of acute heart failure on 29 December 2021 while in the seclusion room on Hamtun Ward. The report identified failures to adequately monitor and escalate his high respiratory rate, and concerns about the ability to make emergency calls from the observation room and delays accessing the seclusion area.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an outside line on the seclusion-room observation handset for direct 999 emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “Firstly, Staff conducting 121 observations upon a patient within the seclusion room were unable to make a direct 999 emergency call from the observation room as no outside line was available from this handset to respond to a medical emergency. Secondly, I heard evidence from Paramedics of a delay, and difficulty with accessing the patient who was being cared for in seclusion. The most immediate access route to the ward used by secure transport services being unknown by South Central Ambulance Service and not shared with them to assist responding to a medical emergency at Antelope House. ”

    Source location

    Dean John Mark Anthony BRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adjust the Antelope House observation-room telephone line to enable external emergency calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Immediately following the conclusion of the inquest, an adjustment was made to the internal phone line in the observation room in question at Antelope House, allowing external calls. In order to provide further assurance, we have also checked our other inpatient Mental Health units (where there are seclusion rooms) to ensure that they are unimpaired in being able to dial 999 in an emergency situation.”

    Source location

    Hampshire and IOW Healthcare NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Check seclusion-room telephones across inpatient mental-health units to confirm they can dial 999.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Immediately following the conclusion of the inquest, an adjustment was made to the internal phone line in the observation room in question at Antelope House, allowing external calls. In order to provide further assurance, we have also checked our other inpatient Mental Health units (where there are seclusion rooms) to ensure that they are unimpaired in being able to dial 999 in an emergency situation.”

    Source location

    Hampshire and IOW Healthcare NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response
  4. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Ali Mohammed Nazemi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ali Mohammed Nazemi died from natural causes at Pinderfields Hospital on 18 January 2024 after an acute stroke and aspiration. His transfer from home was delayed when he and paramedics became trapped in a lift, raising concern that the lift’s uncontrolled movement device could be unintentionally activated without a way to reset it, leaving people dependent on Fire & Rescue Service rescue.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of a means to reset the uncontrolled movement device or obtain effective assistance after activation

    Wider context from the report

    “The lift that trapped Mr Nazemi and the attending paramedics is identified in an e-Worksheet generated by Schindler (copy attached) as a 20049625 MOD Replacement 6300. The lift was examined by Schindler on the day of the incident, and it was found that “the uncontrolled movement device had been activated by persons using the lift”. The lift was being used by four paramedics who were transporting Mr Nazemi in a carry chair, the lift being too small to accommodate a stretcher. None of the paramedics were aware of having activated the uncontrolled movement device. The evidence suggested that that was no way to reset the uncontrolled movement device once it had been activated, and that a call to the 24/7 helpline displayed in the lift could not help. Ultimately those trapped within the lift had to wait for the Fire & Rescue Service to break the lift door down. Although Mr Nazemi was so ill that the 45 minute delay caused by the activation of the uncontrolled movement device made no difference to his outcome, there is a concern that others in his position may be seriously affected by the unintentional (and unnoticed) triggering of the uncontrolled movement device and by the fact that nothing apparently can be done to reverse any such unintentional triggering, such that those affected have to await rescue by the Fire & Rescue Service. ”

    Source location

    Ali Mohammed Nazemi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide passenger-release instructions in the lift control panel for attending engineers and emergency services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In accordance with clause 5.10.1 of BS72-55, Schindler provided instructions for the release of passengers in the control panel of the lift. This is available to the engineers attending call outs and the fire service who attend in case of emergency.”

    Source location

    Response from Schindler Ltd
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing trained-personnel procedures and passenger-release instructions in the lift control panel are considered sufficient for releasing trapped passengers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Schindler are compliant with this clause. The process for when there is an entrapment is that a call is raised to the Schindler call centre who then contacts a nearby Schindler Engineer to attend a call out and release the entrapped passenger. All Schindler Engineers who attend call outs are trained and authorised. The recommended procedures should be followed for the release of passengers, and it is preferable for trained lift industry personnel to release trapped passengers as opposed to lay people. The reasoning behind this is that if any lay person could open the lift, the risk of death increases substantially.”

    Source location

    Response from Schindler Ltd
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is considered necessary because the lift conforms to and operates as expected under applicable safety standards and regulations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We therefore propose that no further action be taken as the lift fully conforms and operates as expected in accordance with EN81-20, BS72-55 and the Lift Regulations 2009. In addition, full passenger release information is available to the emergency services within the control panel of the lift. It is duly given that any persons performing passenger release should familiarise themselves with the process.”

    Source location

    Response from Schindler Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2024

    Open published response
  5. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Severine Alexia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Severine Alexia Kelly, who was detained under the Mental Health Act and accommodated at Wotton Lawn Hospital, choked on a sandwich provided by hospital staff on 1 October 2022 and died at the hospital. Concerns included out-of-date training for some bank staff, inadequate updating of risk assessments after a previous choking incident, difficulties contacting emergency services, delays in paramedic attendance, uncertainty about when to call an ambulance, and an AED with an apparently non-working internal clock.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of a portable landline telephone for emergency communication while remaining with the patient

    Wider context from the report

    “A doctor, attempting to assist Severine and speak to the 999-emergency service was obliged to leave the patient to use a mobile phone. He did not have the facility of a portable landline telephone which would have meant that he could have spoken to the service without leaving the patient. ”

    Source location

    Severine Alexia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test portable DECT telephones and establish a permanent hospital telephone solution, using Wi-Fi phones if required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ Modern Matron, Wotton Lawn is currently in the process of testing Mitel DECT phones on the hospital site. Portable landlines operate from a base unit, so we need to ensure that these have the range to function effectively at distance from the base unit. If distance proves to be too great in some areas, we have a further option to explore Wi-Fi based phones. We envisage that a permanent solution will be in place by 1 May 2024, and I will write again after this date to provide confirmation.”

    Source location

    Response from Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response
  6. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Wyllow-Raine Swinburn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wyllow-Raine Swinburn became unresponsive at home on 30 September 2022 after being discharged from hospital the previous evening, and died in hospital that day. The concerns related to a seven-minute delay in connecting the 999 call to an emergency call taker and the 31-minute response time for the first paramedic to attend.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in connecting 999 calls to an Emergency Call Taker

    Wider context from the report

    “The two concerns relate to, firstly, the length of time for the 999 call to be connected to a ECT (Emergency Call Taker, and secondly, the length of time for an ambulance/paramedic to attend. I fully appreciate there have been very significant demands on ambulance services including on SCAS in the past few years. I also understand, from the written and oral evidence of ████████ that multiple actions have been undertaken to improve ECT staffing and inconsistency. My primary concern is in relation to this first issue. I realise there will be occasions when ambulance resources, particularly in the early hours when there are fewer resources, happen to be located in a different area leading to prolonged response times. It would seem that the issue of the delay in being connected to an ECT is more amenable to a systems improvement, particularly when one considers that arrangements are in place for calls to default to other ambulance services who may be less busy or who have greater capacity. Given the risk associated with delayed response times, particularly in connecting to an ECT, I request that the concerns I have raised are considered and that you respond thereafter. I would be interested to learn if actions identified as part of SCAS’s own internal review have been fully implemented and are subject to auditing to ensure compliance. ”

    Source location

    Wyllow-Raine Swinburn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remodel Emergency Call Taker staffing to identify numbers required for reliable operational demand.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within the CCC we have undertaken the following work in addition to the work that you have already been informed of via evidence for the hearing:”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with Isle of Wight NHS Trust to increase Emergency Call Taker numbers and availability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We are continuing to work in partnership with the Isle of Wight NHS Trust to increase ECT numbers and availability.”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing critical call process remains in place for time-critical 999 situations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to call answer time, you are already familiar with the critical call process available where a BT operative becomes aware of, or is informed of, a time critical situation from the evidence provided to you for the inquest by both SCAS and BT. I have therefore not covered this within my letter but can confirm that this process remains in place.”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 February 2025

    Open published response
  7. Coventry and Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Douglas Guillaume · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Douglas Guillaume was admitted to Warwick Hospital on 5 June 2023 with shortness of breath and a cough, and was later assessed as likely having severe aortic stenosis requiring urgent referral. He deteriorated, was admitted to the Cardiothoracic Critical Care unit at UHCW on 19 June 2023, and died on 20 June 2023; concerns included difficulties contacting the UHCW switchboard, lack of awareness of an emergency contact number, and the absence of a completed referral preventing discussion at a multi-disciplinary meeting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure Cardiology team awareness and access to the emergency GP telephone number

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) A previous incident in which a similar concern had been raised, had led to provision of an emergency GP phone number, that can be used by the clinical teams at SWFT, which is manned 24 hours a day and is prioritised over other calls. The Cardiology team had not been aware of this, nor did they have the telephone number. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Douglas Guillaume · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a 24-hour, seven-day direct communication escalation process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have agreed to explore the technological options that may improve this however, in the interim we have agreed an escalation process that now provides a direct line of communication 24 hours, seven days per week.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Conventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the confirmed escalation arrangement with other providers across the system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This arrangement has been confirmed with SWUFT following the tabletop review and we will also share this with the other Providers across the System. We hope this provides assurances, and I would like to assure you that we will continue to explore communication improvements as part of our digital plans.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Conventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a Trust-wide safety practice alert containing the priority UHCW referral telephone number at handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3 | Safety Practice Alert to be circulated Trust wide with priority telephone number for referrals to UHCW | Safety practice alert to be shared at each handover for 2 weeks. | Patient Safety team SWFT | 06/09/2023 | Action completed 6 September 2023”

    Source location

    Response from South Warwickshire University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns predominantly fall within the relevant NHS trusts’ remit, including UHCW, so they should be addressed to those trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern raised in your Report predominantly fall under the remit of the relevant Trusts, South Warwickshire University NHS Foundation Trust (SWFT) and University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust (UHCW). I note that you have addressed your Report to SWFT, but you may also wish to address your concerns to UHCW.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 January 2024

    Open published response
  8. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Iain Richard Farrell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Iain Richard Farrell became breathless and exhausted during a led coasteering activity on 26 May 2019, was swept back into the sea by a large wave after reaching a ledge, and was later confirmed deceased despite resuscitation efforts. The principal concerns were the risks of lone guiding, the delayed access to the sole means of communication, and the absence of assessment of participants’ swimming ability and physical fitness during booking.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of an immediately accessible means of summoning emergency services for the lead guide

    Wider context from the report

    “iii. Consideration should be given to the NCC guidance making it clear that a lead guide should have with them, or within immediate reach, access to a means of communication with which to summon the emergency services, for example a mobile phone, or where there is known to be no mobile phone reception, a VHF radio. ”

    Source location

    Iain Richard Farrell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce a final updated Safety Advice for Coasteering Providers document incorporating consultation responses and advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current NCC document, ‘Safety Advice for Coasteering Providers 2015 Version 3’ will be updated to address the 4 points raised as concerns by the Coroner in Section 5.2 i-iv in the Prevention of Future Deaths report. The rewrite will also update the 2015 version with other practices and advice that may have changed since the writing of the original advice with an aim of continuing to promote safe coasteering.”

    Source location

    Response from National Coasteering Charter
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult NCC members by email and through a committee-led working group on updates to the Safety Advice for Coasteering Providers document.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current NCC document, ‘Safety Advice for Coasteering Providers 2015 Version 3’ will be updated to address the 4 points raised as concerns by the Coroner in Section 5.2 i-iv in the Prevention of Future Deaths report. The rewrite will also update the 2015 version with other practices and advice that may have changed since the writing of the original advice with an aim of continuing to promote safe coasteering.”

    Source location

    Response from NCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce a final updated Safety Advice for Coasteering Providers document incorporating member consultation responses and advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current NCC document, ‘Safety Advice for Coasteering Providers 2015 Version 3’ will be updated to address the 4 points raised as concerns by the Coroner in Section 5.2 i-iv in the Prevention of Future Deaths report. The rewrite will also update the 2015 version with other practices and advice that may have changed since the writing of the original advice with an aim of continuing to promote safe coasteering.”

    Source location

    Response from NCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 November 2023

    Open published response
  9. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Sharon Elizabeth Langley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sharon Elizabeth Langley, an inpatient with Severe Depressive Disorder and Psychosis, died by immersion in water while unsupervised in an assisted bathroom at Princess Alexandra Hospital on 10 August 2019. The principal concerns included failures in the immediate emergency response, inadequate communication and coordination, shortcomings in bathroom and high-risk-area safety measures, confusion about bath-plug controls, unreliable investigation and learning processes, and inadequate record keeping and risk documentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to activate emergency alarms immediately

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust staff immediate emergency response was not followed: a. pinpoint alarms were not activated immediately on finding Sharon Langley unresponsive b. there was a delay calling the ambulance and basic key information about the type of the emergency was not relayed: i. by qualified nurses who made the 999 calls, or ii. to paramedics on attendance c. there was a delay informing the site co-ordinator of the emergency even though she was based on the ward and there was a lack of co-ordination of the emergency resulting in the ambulance being called a second time by the site co-ordinator d. staff trained in basic life support did not assist the two nurses who were attempting to resuscitate Sharon Langley ”

    Source location

    Sharon Elizabeth Langley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver drop-in refresher life-support training for clinical and administrative staff, emphasizing immediate help-seeking and pinpoint-alarm use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- EPUT’s Head of Deteriorating Patient Pathways and Resuscitation Training Officer is working closely with mental health wards to facilitate drop-in ‘refresher’ life support training for clinical and administrative staff dealing with emergency situations. During”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a medical-emergency simulation with Derwent Centre staff and share incident learning for incorporation into current training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- The issue of calling for help as soon as possible is also shared during the weekly ‘virtual’ drop-in sessions which focus on the deteriorating patient. Head of Deteriorating Patient Pathways and Resuscitation Training Officer will continue to work with staff at the Derwent Centre to conduct a medical emergency simulation with the team and the importance of calling for help at the earliest possible opportunity is relayed during the post simulation feedback. In addition, the Trust’s training team have shared details of the learning from this incident and request for incorporation and sharing within the current training programme (1b, 1c).”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response
  10. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Levi Louis Alleyne, a grab lorry delivery driver, died by electrocution at a building site after raising his lorry’s crane arm beneath overhead power lines. CPR was delayed because it was unclear whether the electricity remained live, and the ambulance control operator had no procedure or readily accessible emergency contact information for the relevant electricity network operator. The report identifies risks of delayed life-saving treatment or people approaching live electrical hazards and notes that similar mitigating procedures may not be adopted across England and Wales.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability and poor accessibility of correct DNO emergency numbers to ambulance control centre operators

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”

    Source location

    Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share updated ambulance-service SOPs, including electricity-network maps and distribution-network-operator contact details, across NHS ambulance services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that actions taken by South Central Ambulance Service NHS Trust, to update their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) following the inquest, have been shared across all NHS ambulance services, including a map and the appropriate contact details for each of the electricity Distribution Network Operators. In addition, to reinforce the required steps, the matter is being discussed with all Heads of Emergency Operations Centres at their meeting in January 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from AACE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The membership organisation can provide guidance and collaboration but cannot mandate NHS ambulance services to implement safety action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note, AACE is a membership organisation, subscribed to by all UK NHS ambulance services, and as such can offer guidance, encourage collaboration across services, and represent sector views, but cannot mandate action.”

    Source location

    Response from AACE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Preparing or overseeing local or national standard operating procedures and nationally overseeing 111 or 999 operations fall outside NHS Pathways’ remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Pathways remit does not extend to preparing or overseeing local or national standard operating procedures or providing national oversight of 111 or 999 operations. Standard operating procedures relating to a range of operational requirements are locally set by 111 and 999 providers. NHS Pathways is a clinical decision support system and more operationally focused content such as how to contact a utility provider sits outside the remit of the NHS Pathways system.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Digital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribution and transmission network operators have suitable and effective arrangements with local emergency services for incidents involving electricity-network equipment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have contacted the Energy Networks Association (ENA), who have advised that DNOs and Transmission Network Operators (TNO) have suitable and effective arrangements in place with their local emergency services providers. This includes ensuring that emergency services have suitable emergency contact details for their DNO and that they know how to respond to an incident involving equipment on the electricity network. In future, the ENA has requested that DNOs and TNOs check their arrangements with the emergency services on an annual basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026