Recurring concern

Failure to maintain required continuous patient observation

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First reported 7 Apr 2014•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a dedicated continuous, within-eyesight, 1:1, or equivalent patient-observation process, regardless of whether the failure arises from staff conduct, unsuitable facilities, inadequate staffing, or use of an ineffective observation method.

Not included

  • Excludes observation requirements that are not continuous or not a dedicated patient-safety observation process.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, documentation, policy, or environmental deficiencies unless they directly cause failure of required continuous patient observation.
  • Excludes monitoring of non-patient subjects, such as weapons, equipment, records, or communications.
  • Excludes unrelated patient-location, contact, or assessment failures where continuous observation is not the required control.
Reports
21

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
22

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
31

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

East London NHS Foundation Trust3
Care Quality Commission2
Department of Health and Social Care2
NHS England2
Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust2
Black Country Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
British Renal Society1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Langley Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
New Cross Hospital1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
North London Mental Health Partnership1
North Manchester General Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Abigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Abigail Louise Smith was found at Braintree Recreation Ground on 15 February 2022 after attempting to suspend herself; resuscitation was unsuccessful and she was pronounced deceased at 00:08 on 16 February 2022. The report identifies concerns about inadequate trained staffing and observation, unsuitable care arrangements, access to ligature materials, insufficient risk assessments and care plans, communication adjustments for autism and learning disability, and an unsafe discharge from hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain required supervision when staff attend to other patients

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Staff left Abbi unsupervised during the admission to attend to other patients that permitted her to tie ligatures. ”

    Source location

    Abigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement enhanced supervision and engagement policy with risk-level assessment, staffing escalation, supervision handovers, daily review and family or carer involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the Court has been provided with an updated copy of the Trust’s Policy for Enhanced Supervision and Engagement. This policy strengthens our assessment and guidance for patients requiring enhanced supervision as per the attached tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian tied a fatal ligature in her room on Longview Ward on 17 April 2021 and died two days later in hospital. The principal concerns included inadequate and falsified observations, insufficiently trained and staffed ward personnel, poor communication about ligaturing and self-harm, medication-recording errors, failures involving Oxevision, and other care and record-keeping deficiencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide constant eyesight observations in a patient’s bedroom

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Oxevision imaging showed Elise entering her bedroom alone at approximately 18:10 hours and she remained in her room until she was found unresponsive at approximately 18:29. Elise’s observation logs for 17:30-18:30 on 17 April were falsified recording that Elise was in the communal area with checks completed at 17:30 17:40 17:50 18:00 18:10 and 18:20 recorded that Elise was present in the communal area. Elise was required to be on constant eyesight observations whilst in her bedroom. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement patient-specific engagement and observation plans and maintain a maximum allocation of three level-two patients to one staff member in CAMHS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ In June 2021 the Trust completed the new Engagement and Observation plan for each current inpatient, these were submitted to the CQC”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement daily handover checks and weekly audits to verify completion and appropriateness of patient observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ The Trust developed a daily handover checking audit to ensure observations were fully completed during shifts”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement electronic observations, staff training videos, engagement plans, and revised observation policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Trust Observation and Engagement project group was established in 2021 who took forward a number of actions Trust wide. The CAMHS staff were part of this project. Actions included:”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen observation monitoring through nurse-in-charge checks, handover checks, compliance audits, escalation, and staff accountability processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ The Nurse in Charge checks Observations intermittently during the day to ensure completed and takes immediate action with staff where any gaps are found in relation to administrative / recording errors.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing systems are considered robust enough to identify missed observations and ensure appropriate follow-up action with staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response The Trust acknowledges that there are times when observations are not carried out in line with observation prescriptions. This is often down to human error. As outlined above there are robust systems in place to identify missed observations and the onward action that is addressed with staff.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 10 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    ████████ was detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to psychiatric wards at the Tower Hamlets Centre for Mental Health before being found unresponsive in a patient room on 7 June 2022; her death was verified later that day. The jury identified several contributing factors, including a non-functioning door-locking system and shortcomings in patient observations. Further concerns included risk assessment, staff understanding and attitudes towards risk, auditing, and clinical oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain effective 1:1 or within-eyesight observations

    Wider context from the report

    “2) 1:1 or ‘within eyesight’ Observations The CCTV footage played at inquest showed a member of staff who was allocated to ‘within eyesight’ observations of another patient sat on the back of a chair (with their back facing the patient’s bedroom door) and engaged on their mobile telephone. That member of staff initially told the court that they were conducting the ‘within eyesight’ observations correctly and could see the patient in question. This raises significant concern, not only about the quality of 1:1 observation but also about staff attitudes and approach to observations that are integral to keeping patients safe (see below at para 7)). ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update mobile-phone policy requirements for staff working in clinical areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The member of staff in question has had their knowledge refreshed about the expectations of the Trust’s observations policy and the Trust’s mobile phone policy. The latter was updated in 2024 to include material on staff use of mobile phones, making it clear that they are not allowed in clinical areas unless there is an exceptional reason agreed with a local manager. There has been shared learning with all staff across the unit on the use of mobile phones whilst on duty, in 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver shared learning to unit staff on mobile-phone use while on duty.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The member of staff in question has had their knowledge refreshed about the expectations of the Trust’s observations policy and the Trust’s mobile phone policy. The latter was updated in 2024 to include material on staff use of mobile phones, making it clear that they are not allowed in clinical areas unless there is an exceptional reason agreed with a local manager. There has been shared learning with all staff across the unit on the use of mobile phones whilst on duty, in 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce CCTV auditing of recorded observations after completing staff training on footage access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is moving towards using CCTV to objectively audit whether observations have been made as recorded. This is anticipated to commence in January 2026 to allow for staff training to download and access CCTV footage.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is considered necessary because considerable work has addressed the identified concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have addressed these in turn below. Please note that in respect of Concerns 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 the Trust entirely acknowledges the reasons for your concerns and has considered them extremely”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response
  4. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Paul Timothy Dunne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Paul Dunne was brought to A&E after a paracetamol overdose and was considered at high risk of suicide, but did not receive continuous 1:1 observation. He absconded several times and was found dead after suspending himself in a nearby children's playground. Concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation, communication, documentation and escalation, as well as separate clinical-record systems used by mental health and A&E staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to direct staff to the need for 1:1 monitoring

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Individual mental health professionals appeared to have gaps in knowledge and judgment. The director who was spokesperson for the Mental Health Trust did not appear to appreciate the seriousness of these deficits. • A mental health liaison nurse, who now is manager of these nurses, did not recognize the patient as high risk, despite his having been persuaded to attend A&E by the police against his will, having just expressed suicidal ideation, made a previous attempt, with alcohol intoxication and absconsion, as at the time he denied suicidality. Even in retrospect in court she did not acknowledge her misjudgement. She also asserted incorrectly that a patient who has mental capacity cannot be assessed under the Mental Health Act. • A mental health nurse of 9 years standing in the Home Treatment Team who acknowledged the risk to the patient’s life could hardly be higher, failed to document his assessment, as he could not find anywhere to write it before going on his break. No staff acknowledged that he had informed them of the risk. He assumed the patient would get 1:1 monitoring, but did not direct anyone to the need. When asked what he would have done if he had known there were no staff to conduct 1:1 monitoring, he said that he could perhaps hang around for a bit longer. ”

    Source location

    Mr Paul Timothy Dunne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigating or acting against individual healthcare professionals falls outside the regulator’s authority.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. We recognise the distress and concern these events have caused and acknowledge the importance of accountability where there are apparent shortfalls in professional conduct or decision-making. However, it is important to clarify that the Care Quality Commission’s regulatory remit, as established under the Health and Social Care Act (2008) and the associated Regulated Activities Regulations (2014), is focused on assessing and holding providers rather than individual staff accountable for meeting fundamental standards of care. While we do not have the authority to investigate or act against individual healthcare professionals, we expect providers to ensure that their staff are competent, appropriately trained, and supported to deliver safe and effective care.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2025

    Open published response
  5. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Allan Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Allan Taylor was admitted to Sunderland Royal Hospital after an unwitnessed fall at home and later suffered a further unwitnessed fall in hospital, fracturing his right neck of femur. He died in theatre on 1 June 2024 after becoming hypotensive and suffering cardiac arrest during surgery. The report identified that required Level 2 observations were not provided because the side room was not within sight or sound of the nursing station, and the issue was not escalated; it noted that closer observation might have enabled assistance and possibly prevented the fall.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain required nurse sight or sound for Level 2 EICO observations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The evidence confirmed that the guidelines for Level 2 EICO observations, which required a nurse to be within sight or sound of Allan, were not complied with as Allan was in a Side Room 1, which was not within sight or sound of the nursing station. It has been explained that the geography of that ward is such that this is the furthest side room away from the nursing station, and a vestibule is before it. 2. The evidence was that this was not escalated to the Matron or Site Manager, which may have resulted in the movement of an additional member of staff to ensure compliance with the EICO Level 2 observations. 3. The evidence was that had Allan been within sight or sound for observations, it was likely that upon Allan attempting to get out of bed, assistance could have been provided to him, which in turn may have prevented the fall. ”

    Source location

    Mr Allan Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and amend the observation guideline, renaming it Enhanced Therapeutic Observation and Care and strengthening observation, assessment, escalation, family involvement and documentation requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal investigation identified omissions in care regarding the level of observation in place for Mr Taylor and the lack of escalation of concerns. Actions were undertaken to address this issue; an urgent review of the existing Enhanced Interactive Care and Observation (EICO) guideline took place which has now been amended and renamed Enhanced Therapeutic Observation and Care (ETOC) for patients in line with recent national changes in guidance as recommended by NHS England. In addition to exploring best practice nationally, the review of the guideline also took into consideration how other local Trusts manage safe observation and care of patients.”

    Source location

    Response from South Tyneside and Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the amended Enhanced Therapeutic Observation and Care guideline across the organisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This amended guideline (please see attached draft) has increased the levels of observation from 3 to 4 levels, it includes clarity around the assessment of ETOC against these levels, better family involvement and the importance of escalation and requirement for accurate documentation where there are any concerns regarding patient safety including rationale for any actions taken. This guideline will be implemented across the organisation during May 2025 with a plan to evaluate the impact of this guideline after six months.”

    Source location

    Response from South Tyneside and Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate the impact of the Enhanced Therapeutic Observation and Care guideline six months after implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This amended guideline (please see attached draft) has increased the levels of observation from 3 to 4 levels, it includes clarity around the assessment of ETOC against these levels, better family involvement and the importance of escalation and requirement for accurate documentation where there are any concerns regarding patient safety including rationale for any actions taken. This guideline will be implemented across the organisation during May 2025 with a plan to evaluate the impact of this guideline after six months.”

    Source location

    Response from South Tyneside and Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Yemisi Cielto-Opaleye · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Yemisi Cielto-Opaleye, a psychiatric inpatient at St Pancras Hospital, died on 13 December 2023 after receiving an Olanzapine depot injection and developing Olanzapine toxicity. The report identified concerns about inadequate pre- and post-injection vital-sign monitoring, unclear staff responsibilities, insufficient escalation and contingency planning, and failures to obtain required approval and provide adequate information about risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure continuous suitably qualified staff observation after Olanzapine depot injections

    Wider context from the report

    “(b) In a psychiatric in-patient setting, there are many demands on staff who can become distracted from their expected duties. Unless there is a suitably qualified medical member of staff whose sole duty it is to remain in the company of a patient, who has had an Olanzapine depot injection at all times during the 3 hour post-injection observation period, there is a risk that vital signs checks will be missed and that Post Injection Syndrome will not be detected early enough if it occurs; ”

    Source location

    Yemisi Cielto-Opaleye · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Book an additional qualified staff member for inpatient olanzapine depot administrations to prepare, administer and deliver three-hour post-administration observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Trust Response: The olanzapine depot policy dated March 2024 section 10.1.2 states that ‘the nurse must be available for the duration of the three-hour post-administration observation’. Section 10.1.7 states that ‘A appropriately trained and /or professional member of staff, other than a nurse, can take the subsequent clinical observations if delegated by the administering nurse’. We agree that this policy will be reviewed and in instances of olanzapine depot administration in an inpatient setting an extra qualified member of staff will be booked on shift with the sole responsibility of preparing, administering and delivering post administration observations of the patient for the three hour period.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Kashim ALI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kashim Ali was detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 at Mile End Hospital and died on 21 May 2024 after being found unresponsive in bed; attempts at resuscitation were unsuccessful. The concerns identified included failures to escalate NEWS2 scores, shortcomings in one-to-one observation practices, and inaccurate observation records, which were considered to create risks to patient safety and future patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain continuous sight of patients during one-to-one observations

    Wider context from the report

    “2) During part of his on Millharbour Ward, Mr Ali was on one-to-one observations, requiring him to always be within the sight of a dedicated member of staff. Following Mr Ali’s death, it transpired that during this period of observations, designated members of staff were noted to preoccupied with the use of their personal mobile telephones at times, and on one occasion, the designated member of staff was sat on a chair with their back to Mr Ali’s door. While this was not a causative factor in Mr Ali’s death, I consider that such practices undermine patient safety and would place future patients at considerable risk. ”

    Source location

    Kashim ALI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the mobile phone policy to prohibit personal mobile phone use during clinical shifts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. We recognise that the inappropriate use of personal mobile phones by staff during clinical shifts can be detrimental to patient safety and the quality of care. In response to this concern, the Trust has reviewed and updated its mobile phone policy to establish clear guidelines on the acceptable use of personal phones within clinical settings, with the effect that staff are completely prohibited from using personal mobile phones during shifts. This policy is designed to ensure that staff remain fully engaged with their patients and the clinical environment, minimising distractions and maintaining focus on patient care.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase lead Nurse or Matron night-shift visits to twice monthly for three months and observe compliance with clinical standards and the mobile phone policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “15. To further ensure that these issues are being addressed at the local level, the frequency of visits by a lead Nurse or a Matron on night shifts has been increased to twice a month from once a month for three months. These visits are focused on maintaining high standards of care and ensuring that all clinical practices, including the monitoring of physical health observations, are being consistently followed. As part of these visits, any use of mobile phones by staff is specifically observed to ensure compliance with the updated policy. These increased visits are also an opportunity to address any concerns directly with staff and to reinforce the Trust’s expectations regarding clinical standards.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the updated Observations and Therapeutic Engagement Policy, including documentation standards, missed-observation procedures, improvement ideas, and Honesty in Documentation training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Updated Observations and Therapeutic Engagement Policy”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Marion Nickson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marion Nickson was admitted to hospital after a fall and later died following an unwitnessed fall in hospital that caused a brain bleed. The principal concern was that observable bay nursing failed because staff left the bay to deal with other tasks, with insufficient staffing, understanding of the risks, and prioritisation of patient observation contributing to the problem.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain observable bay nursing because of insufficient staff time and competing ward demands

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that to deal with the risk of falls in patients deemed to be high risk the concept of observable bay nursing had been introduced at both Trusts. At both Trusts Mrs Nickson fell whilst unobserved due to the challenges of maintaining the bays as observed bays. The challenge for both trusts had arisen where staff were required to deal with issues out of the bay and had left the bay area. The cause of that was multifactorial and included a lack of understanding of the risk presented by leaving the bay and a need for the staff to complete other urgent tasks due to the demand on ward staff. The inquest heard that preventing in patient falls to reduce avoidable deaths was recognised as being important and that across the NHS bays of this nature were seen as a way to reduce the risk. However they would only work if staff had the time and there were cultural changes amongst staff where it was recognised that observing patients had to be seen as a priority and not something that could be left to fit around other demands. The evidence was clear that if observable bays could not function as intended then across the NHS there would continue to be avoidable falls and consequential deaths. If bay nursing could not effectively delivered due to resourcing then other options to keep patients safe needed to be explored by Acute Trusts. ”

    Source location

    Marion Nickson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Long Term Workforce Plan priorities to improve training, staff retention and workforce sustainability for inpatient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You also raised the issue of appropriate levels of resourcing within observable nursing bays. In June this year, the NHS published its Long Term Workforce Plan, setting out”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Registered providers, rather than CQC, must determine how to implement detailed standards and good practice for patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “exactly registered providers do to meet them; those are things that the registered provider, and the Trust in this context, must determine in order to meet the standards and duties set out in the Regulated Activities Regulations. It is therefore not for CQC to include or prescribe detailed standards and expectations about each specific condition and potential need in our regulatory framework. The CQC through its website signposts Trusts to relevant guidance on how they can meet relevant regulations, including the fundamental standards under the Regulated Activities Regulations. However, under CQC’s regulatory model it is for registered providers, including Trusts, to determine how it will meet and implement good practice standards, including in consultation with third-party expert organisations, as required who produce national guidance and may consult on local guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC does not consider bay nursing itself a national patient-safety issue; staffing pressures, including inadequate levels, create the safety risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC have not identified bay nursing as a national issue because it is not a patient safety issue in and of itself. However, we do identify workforce pressures and staffing levels as a national issue as this is a cause of patient safety risks. When staffing levels fall below acceptable standards any clinical intervention becomes a safety issue, we would indicate our findings on this. We highlight this in our reports and ratings demonstrating the level of risk, and appropriate regulatory action taken in response.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response
  9. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Doreen White · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Doreen White was admitted to hospital in April 2021 and suffered three falls while an inpatient, including fractures requiring surgery. Her condition deteriorated while recovering from surgery, and she died from a chest infection, with frailty of old age also recorded. Concerns included staffing shortages, difficulties providing required enhanced observation on the ward, and the absence of a documented and communicated plan for managing patients requiring Level 4 enhanced care in that setting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide continuous in-view observation for Level 4 enhanced care patients

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The ward is L-shaped and the patients on the ward are managed in individual cubicles. Mrs White should have been in view of nursing staff as part of her Level 4 enhanced care (‘observation of cohorted patients’). However, it was not possible to provide the observations that Mrs White required because: a. Patients were inside cubicles and therefore out of sight of staff and, b. The ward itself was L-shaped. 3. The Bargoed ward is a stroke ward and one where it is usual to see patients who have a high risk of falls and mobility difficulties. Prior to Covid-19 it was explained that staff would take patients who required the Enhanced Care to the dayroom so that they could be under the required observation. Since Covid-19, this had not been possible. To counteract the logistical difficulties faced by staff in observation of Enhanced Care patients on the ward it was explained that patients are now moved to their cubicle doorway for periods of the day so that they are in sight of nursing staff. This appeared to be ineffective because: a. The particular care needs/wishes of a patient may mean that is not suitable. b. That only accounts for part of the day. ”

    Source location

    Mary Doreen White · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The day room cannot always be used for patient cohorting during periods of extreme demand.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All wards have a day room area for patients, these are utilised to support the use of meaningful activities. Since the reduction in Covid 19 cases this area is often used during daytime hours to support the cohorting of patients who require a higher level of supervision. However, there are instances during extreme demand when the dayroom is unable to be used.”

    Source location

    Response from Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 February 2023

    Open published response
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Gary OTTWAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gary Ottway, aged 41, died after being found in cardiac arrest while detained alone in a seclusion room under constant nursing observation during a severe mental health episode. The report raised concerns about whether observation was constant or effective, delays in entering the room and obtaining emergency equipment, gaps in available medical training and resources, and ineffective chest compressions. The inquest determined that he died from natural causes involving two heart conditions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide constant and effective nursing observation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Though Mr Ottway was meant to be under constant nursing observation, not only was he in cardiac arrest but he was also cold and exhibiting hypostasis when he was found. This appears to indicate that either the nursing observation was not constant, or it was not effective. I appreciate that the trust is putting in place a new IT system to monitor signs of life, but nevertheless basic nursing observations must be performed competently. ”

    Source location

    Gary OTTWAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026