Recurring concern

Unreliable recording and retrieval of safety-critical risk information on the PNC

First to latest report 22 Jun 2015 — 16 Dec 2025

Reports that mention this concern
7
Times this concern has been raised
7
Stated actions linked to this concern
6

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the PNC process specifically concerning recording, highlighting, maintaining, checking, interrogating or retrieving safety-critical risk information, including risk descriptions, warning markers and related search responsibilities.

What is not included
  • Excludes downstream licensing, custody or operational decisions where the PNC information process itself is not deficient.
  • Excludes generic police information-governance, training or communication deficiencies unless they are directly tied to recording or retrieving safety-critical information on the PNC.
  • Excludes information systems other than the PNC, including local police databases and clinical records, unless the assertion explicitly concerns their PNC interface.
  • Excludes the underlying criminal, behavioural or public-safety risk when no PNC recording or retrieval failure is identified.

Reports and published responses 7 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Haddock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Haddock died on 25 June 2023 after using his shotgun. The report identified concerns that the police process failed to notify the Firearms Licensing Department of an Environment Agency prosecution, and that the Department had not checked his PNC record before returning his firearms. The inquest conclusion was suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Firearms Licensing Department to check the PNC record

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The police process which should have ensured that the Firearms Licensing Department was notified of the Environment Agency’s prosecution of Mr. Haddock failed to be effective (2) The offences with which Mr. Haddock had been charged by the Environment Agency were correctly placed onto Mr. Haddock’s PNC record on 11th October 2021 – a year before the final decision was made to return his shotgun to him in November 2022. The Firearms Licensing Department had not checked his PNC record since 4th August 2021 (more than a year before the final decision to return his guns was made) and were therefore unaware of the prosecution. ”

    Source location

    Richard Haddock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatically redirect firearms-related Daily Activity File reports to the Continuous Assessment Team inbox for ongoing suitability review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whenever a PNC record is updated, a so-called Daily Activity File (DAF) report is generated and provided to the relevant police force via an automatic file transfer from PNC Hendon. Any DAF reports that are specific to firearm and shotgun certificate holders in the Devon & Cornwall Police area are assigned a code of ‘50HL’ and forwarded to our Firearms Licensing and Explosives Unit (FLEU) via email.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon & Cornwall Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the Continuous Assessment Team to review relevant prosecution reports and record the review as underway in the National Firearms Licensing Management System.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Any DAF reports which reflect a prosecution of the type that Mr Haddock was subject to are subject to a suitability review by the CAT. The National Firearms Licensing Management System (NFLMS) is updated to reflect that this review is underway. The NFLMS is viewable by all police forces and other law enforcement agencies.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon & Cornwall Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require an immediate pre-return PNC check after finalising a suitability review, with a further review if relevant new information is identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• When a suitability review is finalised and a decision is made to return a certificate / licence and firearms to the certificate / licence holder, the CAT are also now required to review the PNC to ensure that it contains no new updates of relevance. If any such updates are identified, a further suitability review takes place.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon & Cornwall Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate additional police personnel to the Firearms Licensing and Explosives Unit to increase review capacity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2021 there was a significant backlog of outstanding reviews in the FLEU as a result of both the Covid-19 pandemic adversely impacting on the FLEU’s ability to undertake related enquiries, and the Devon & Cornwall Police response to the tragic events of August 2021 in Keyham in Plymouth, which you will be aware of. A significant additional number of police personnel have since been allocated to the FLEU, and there is significant additional senior oversight of the FLEU within Devon & Cornwall Police. In general terms, there has been a significant improvement in the FLEU’s ability to undertake reviews of the type that we are concerned with presently. More specifically in relation to the concern that you raise, the following processes are now in place:”

    Source location

    Response from Devon & Cornwall Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Check the PNC and other databases during initial suitability-review enquiries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The FLEU undertake a check on the PNC as a part of their initial enquiries in the aforementioned suitability reviews. More generally, suitability reviews encompass research of other databases.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon & Cornwall Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

  2. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Herrin Dodds · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Herrin Dodds was assessed and detained under section 136 after expressing suicidal thoughts and threatening to harm himself, but was later released and allowed to board a train. He took his own life on the train and was pronounced deceased at Tamworth train station. The principal concerns were failures to pass on next-of-kin and recent section 136 information, and missing information that might have prompted further contact with mental health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record recent s136 detention information on the PNC check

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was missing information on the PNC check which meant that Andrew was not flagged as recently being held under s136. The further email from force control also did not mention that he was recently detained under s136. I was told if this had been on the system BTP would have contacted mental health services for more information. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Herrin Dodds · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    South Yorkshire Police cannot alter the national PNC to implement the proposed S136 flagging change.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst we would always seek any opportunity to learn lessons and make changes to systems and processes to mitigate future risks, unfortunately South Yorkshire Police is unable to make changes to the Police National Computer that would satisfy this point. Further, the flagging of S136 MHA would not be in line with the Code of Practice for PNC, it is a temporary policing power that can only be used in the moment based on the officers assessment of the individual at that time, usually at point of crisis to take them to a place of safety where they can be supported and assessed by trained professionals.”

    Source location

    Response from South Yorkshire Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A temporary S136 flag would not comply with the PNC Code of Practice because its necessity ends at handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The use of a S136 MHA flag would not satisfy the codes of practice for PNC. The use of a flag would only become ‘relevant’ upon a Police Constable making that individual assessment to detain the person in question under S136 MHA and would cease to be ‘relevant’ once the individual was in a place of safety. The ‘necessity’ test would therefore not be met as the individual is already detained by a Police Constable at this point. Further, for most the population with no criminal history, there would be no substantive PNC account to ‘hang’ this flag from.”

    Source location

    Response from South Yorkshire Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Because the proposed PNC recommendation conflicts with the Code of Practice, no further action is proposed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of this recommendation not being compatible with the Codes of Practice we do not propose any further action on this matter.”

    Source location

    Response from South Yorkshire Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emma Day died in the street on 26 May 2017 from multiple stab wounds and was found to have been unlawfully killed. The report describes a history of domestic violence, coercive and controlling behaviour, threats to her life and protective orders that had expired shortly before her murder. Principal concerns included failures to share and record risk information, inadequate domestic-violence training and guidance, and a system failure in handling reports of domestic violence within the Child Maintenance Service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for direct entry of protective orders on the Police National Computer

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Domestic Homicide Review recommended (R24) that the Home Office work with the Ministry of Justice to implement a system whereby protective orders can be input directly to the Police National Computer. It was not clear whether all State bodies that needed to were able to make entries themselves on the Police National Computer Conflicting evidence was heard, but one police officer stated that R24 had not been adopted, and to do so would be welcomed by other agencies and that without this change there might be missed opportunities to save lives. ”

    Source location

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Permission for non-police agencies to enter protective orders on the Police National Computer falls outside the MPS’s authority.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “PNC is the primary source of information for operational policing in the UK. Access to PNC for non-police organisations can only be authorised by the Police Information Access Panel which is made up of a cross section of senior Home office and police leaders who meet to consider each application. Therefore, the MPS is not in a position to comment on whether other agencies should be given permission to enter protective orders on to PNC.”

    Source location

    2021-0263-Response-from-Metropolitan-Police_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 August 2021

    Open published response

  4. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Hoolickin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Hoolickin was attacked and stabbed in an unprovoked assault on 14 October 2016 and died at Manchester Royal Infirmary on 17 October 2016. The report identifies organisational and management failures in supervising the perpetrator, including failures concerning drug testing, information sharing and provision of relevant information, which resulted in a missed opportunity to initiate recall to prison. The Inquest found that this probably contributed to Michael Hoolickin’s death, although it was not causative of the attack.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record licence conditions on the Police National Computer

    Wider context from the report

    “The Court heard that an offenders’ licence conditions are not held on the Police National Computer database. Hence if an offender is arrested by a different force they are unlikely to know whether the offender may be in breach of their licence. ”

    Source location

    Michael Hoolickin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue collaborative work with the Police National Computer Bureau to review and improve the provision of licence information to police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An offenders’ licence conditions are not held on the Police National Computer database. Hence if an offender is arrested by a different force they are unlikely to know whether the offender may be in breach of their licence. Hence it is not clear how any potential breaches would ever be shared effectively with the NPS. There is an established process for prisons to inform the police about an offender’s release on licence and a specialist central unit uploads information on to the Police National Computer (PNC). The”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-HM-Prison-and-Probation-Service-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational matters within each force, including the concerns raised, are the responsibility of the respective chief constable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I was not previously aware of this incident, and I am very sorry to learn of the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Mr Hoolickin. You will appreciate that I am unable to comment on the specific facts of this case, but I can address your concerns regarding policing practice more generally. I understand that you have made contact with the chief constables of Greater Manchester Police and Lancashire Constabulary, both whom will no doubt wish to respond separately in addressing the issues you have raised with specific reference to the actions of their respective forces.”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-the-National-Police-Chiefs-Council-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NPCC lacks authority to direct chief constables to take or refrain from specific operational action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to understand the distinct role of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC). As you know, each chief constable is ultimately responsible for operational matters within their own force area, which includes all of those issues referred to within the matters of concern you have raised. Whilst the NPCC seeks to encourage chief constables to work collaboratively in the national interest (for example, the way in which forces implement policies or practice), the NPCC does not have the authority to direct a chief constable to take (or not to take) a specific course of action. That said, we do recognise the need for consistency across forces whenever possible, which we know can lead to better outcomes for the public. The way the NPCC”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-the-National-Police-Chiefs-Council-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A full response to concerns about serious further offence reviews, curfews, and police records was delayed pending subject-matter expert consideration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to provide a useful response to the matters of concern you have raised, it has been necessary for me to consult with a number of national leads across several portfolios. I am unfortunately not able to provide you with a full response to all of your concerns today because some of those I have consulted with are still in the process of considering the matters of concern, and no doubt further consulting with subject matter experts. However, I hope you are willing to accept this letter in part response to the issues raised.”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-the-National-Police-Chiefs-Council-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police need not record specific licence conditions because they are accessible from the National Probation Service, which determines any breach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At this time the PNC does not hold the specific licence conditions because of the volume of offenders on licence, many of whom have multiple conditions, which are subject to variation. After respectful consideration of the evidence gathered in this inquest and the concerns expressed in the Regulation 28 letter the disadvantage is felt that maintaining a timely and accurate record of all licence conditions would require a significant increase in administrative time which would not be justified given the information is accessible from the NPS who will in any case make a determination on breach.”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recording all licence conditions would require a significant increase in administrative time, which is not justified by the available information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At this time the PNC does not hold the specific licence conditions because of the volume of offenders on licence, many of whom have multiple conditions, which are subject to variation. After respectful consideration of the evidence gathered in this inquest and the concerns expressed in the Regulation 28 letter the disadvantage is felt that maintaining a timely and accurate record of all licence conditions would require a significant increase in administrative time which would not be justified given the information is accessible from the NPS who will in any case make a determination on breach.”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The National Probation Service is responsible for determining whether licence or supervision conditions have been breached.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The PNC is a national database and an entry on the CU page of a person record, concerning supervision or licence details, is completed using a set wording. This includes contact details for the national probation service or Spotlight team managing the subject and the dates between which the licence or supervision is effective. It is accepted that the PNC does not hold specific licence conditions. All persons authorised for detention at a police station should be checked on PNC and it is the responsibility of officers in the force where the subject is arrested to make contact with the relevant probation service office to share details of the arrest from which the NPS can assess whether the licence or supervision conditions have been breached.”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Police and Home Office own and operate the Police National Computer, while HMPPS provides licence information through established arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An offenders’ licence conditions are not held on the Police National Computer database. Hence if an offender is arrested by a different force they are unlikely to know whether the offender may be in breach of their licence. Hence it is not clear how any potential breaches would ever be shared effectively with the NPS. There is an established process for prisons to inform the police about an offender’s release on licence and a specialist central unit uploads information on to the Police National Computer (PNC). The”

    Source location

    2019-0292-Response-from-HM-Prison-and-Probation-Service-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2019

    Open published response

  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Jeroen ENSINK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dr Jeroen Ensink was stabbed to death in a wholly unprovoked attack on 29 December 2015. The report identified multiple concerns involving police recording and information-sharing failures, including failures to identify and communicate possible mental health problems and issues in the handling of evidence and custody records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to flag material mental health and assault information on the PNC

    Wider context from the report

    “17. The PNC (police national computer) was never flagged with a warning that ████████ had mental health problems, either after his arrest, after his sister’s phone call, or after the letter from his Nigerian doctor was presented and scanned onto COPA (case overview and prosecutions application); and was never flagged with a warning that he had assaulted a police officer. ”

    Source location

    Jeroen ENSINK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

  6. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Ms Michelle Ann Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms Michelle Ann Lawrence died at home on 2 May 2015 from respiratory failure after taking multiple prescription and illegal sedative drugs, following periods in police and private custody. The principal concerns included failures to identify concealed drugs, limited strip-searching and CCTV facilities, inadequate checking of custody-suite toilets, insufficient detail in risk records, and the lack of independent investigation into deaths following release from private custody providers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient PNC character capacity for meaningful risk recording

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) That the number of characters on the PNC where risks are described and highlighted need to be increased to allow sufficient meaningful detail to be recorded to allow accurate risk assessment by staff without having to trawl through multiple electronic documents. ”

    Source location

    Ms Michelle Ann Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

  7. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Jan McLEAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jan McLean was arrested at a flat in Guildford where drugs were being used, became unwell in a police van, and died in hospital on 14 August 2013. The inquest found drug-related death from cocaine, amphetamine and butylone toxicity, after he swallowed an unknown quantity of unknown drugs while in police custody. The principal concern was that police officers may not have received adequate training to fully interrogate warning markers on the Police National Computer.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of full and adequate police officer training on interrogating all PNC warning-marker details

    Wider context from the report

    “Training Consideration should be given to providing full and adequate training to all police officers on the need to interrogate fully all details relating to warning markers held on the PNC, whether by means of an MDT or by enquiry through the FCR. ”

    Source location

    Jan McLEAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026