Recurring concern

Unreliable decisions about when ambulance attendance is required

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First reported 30 Aug 2013•Latest report 18 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the process for recognising when ambulance attendance is required, distinguishing ambulance use from an out-of-hours GP or other service, clarifying who must make the request, defining the information and urgency required, and enabling prompt escalation in hospitals, prisons, care settings and comparable services.

Not included

  • Excludes delays in ambulance dispatch, attendance, travel or hospital handover after an appropriate ambulance request has been made.
  • Excludes general emergency-call handling, ambulance capacity, triage or response-time failures where the decision to request ambulance attendance is not the deficient control.
  • Excludes routine GP access, referral or clinical-assessment failures where no ambulance-escalation decision is involved.
  • Excludes generic staff training, communication or role-clarity deficiencies unless they directly impair deciding when ambulance attendance is required or who must request it.
Reports
12

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
14

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
20

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care2
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Care UK Limited1
College of Policing1
Dorset Police1
Egg London1
G4S1
Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Herries Lodge1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Home Office1
LNT Software1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
London Central & West Unscheduled Care Collaborative Limited1
Metropolitan Police Service1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Anne Pytches · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Anne Pytches died on 14 October 2023 during elective spinal surgery after suffering a covert probable arterial bleed, major haemorrhage and cardiac arrest while prone in the operating theatre. The report identifies concerns about emergency protocols, staff understanding and training, communication of clinicians’ practice limitations, and uncertainty about ambulance attendance and possible transfer to a tertiary centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear roles and responsibilities for requesting ambulance attendance at major hospital events

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) There was some confusion about the roles and responsibilities when there was a concern that an ambulance was required to attend to a major event to a private hospital where the patient was undergoing surgery in an operating theatre. Evidence was that Mrs Pytches was suffering from a major haemorrhage with an uncertain aetiology. There is a concern that Mrs Pytches did not regain stability such that she could have been safely moved and there was no plan as to whether Mrs Pytches required transfer to a tertiary centre. Calling an ambulance without an understanding of specifically what was required could impact on a future death taking this resource from a community emergency. Mrs Pytches already had the attendance of qualified surgeons and anaesthetists whilst suffering a major haemorrhage that could not be treated by community paramedics, however well qualified and experienced as in this case. ”

    Source location

    Julie Anne Pytches · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain recurring major-haemorrhage and emergency scenario training, including escalation, blood-supply, role-clarity, documentation and transfer exercises.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Emergency reference guides are consistently available across all departments and include guidance for cardiac arrest and major haemorrhage in line with Nuffield Health Policy CL71 Medical Emergencies and Resuscitation Council guidelines. The availability, accessibility and use of these guides are routinely reviewed and reinforced through regular emergency scenario training and simulations to ensure staff familiarity and effective application in practice. Laminated emergency algorithms, including adult major haemorrhage pathways, are located on resuscitation trolleys and in key clinical areas.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify ambulance-activation responsibilities during theatre emergencies in local standard operating policies and emergency guides.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further actions across Nuffield Health:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate tertiary-referral criteria and senior clinician-to-ambulance communication into scenario-based training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further actions across Nuffield Health:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce ambulance-activation pathways through simulation covering deterioration recognition, escalation, intervention, ambulance arrival and SBARD handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further actions across Nuffield Health:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Regulation 28 concerns did not contribute to the patient’s death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HM Coroner specifically noted that the Regulation 28 concerns did not contribute to this patient death.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Robert John Fray · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert John Fray became unwell with suspected sepsis during a dialysis session on 4 April 2022, and ambulance delays and emergency department failures meant he remained untreated for many hours. He developed multi-organ failure after sepsis and a stroke and died on 9 April 2022. The principal concerns were that repeated 999 calls did not trigger consideration of a more urgent response and that the duplicate-call system failed to identify a further call when his location changed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prompt call assessors to consider repeated 999 calls over time when assessing urgency

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A volume of 999 calls over a longitudinal period (vs a volume of calls in a short space of time) does not trigger or prompt NHS Pathways to require the call assessor to consider whether a more urgent response is needed. The simple fact of repeated 999 calls over a longitudinal period may be an indicator of a worsening situation. Currently, the call assessor repeats at each call the question ‘has the presentation changed?’ and is reliant on the judgment of the caller who may not have the complete picture (e.g. Mr Fray’s neighbour), rather than also having regard to the number of calls. 2. Linked, the automated ‘duplicate checker’ is based on checking location within a 250-meter radius and not the patient’s name. As Mr Fray had moved more than 250 meters between 999 call no.3 and 999 call no.4, the call at 23:05hrs was not identified as a fourth call. It follows the call assessor was not prompted to ask whether his presentation had worsened and the ambulance was sent to an out-of-date location. This would not have happened had the ‘duplicate checker’ included Mr Fray’s name rather than simply looking for a location within 250-meters. ”

    Source location

    Robert John Fray · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a call-taking protocol requiring clinical review when three or more repeat calls are identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledges the concern raised in Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, relating to the management of repeat calls. The Trust details the actions to identify duplicate, or repeat calls, in response to concern 2 below. In response to your first recommendation, the Trust will implement a change in call taking protocol that requires a clinical review of a patient’s condition where three or more repeat calls are identified. This will support an immediate review of the patient’s call history and presenting symptoms.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Treating callers with previous contacts differently could delay NHS Pathways assessment, ambulance dispatch, or life-saving advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Pathways triage assessment assesses symptoms at the time of the call. If all patients who had a previous 999 contact or a previous encounter with a healthcare provider were treated differently when a call reaches the 999 system, this could delay or prevent an NHS Pathways assessment occurring. This could in turn delay ambulance dispatch or life-saving advice.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Established protocols treat repeat calls as requiring full retriage only when the patient's condition has changed or worsened.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust answers, triages and processes 999 calls in-line with established call taking protocols that detail the required actions for managing duplicate or repeat calls. Most duplicate calls received are not because a patient’s condition has changed, they are because a caller is seeking an estimated arrival time. These calls are not routinely retriaged as it has been confirmed that there is no change in the patients presenting condition which means that the response category will not differ from that originally established. All duplicate calls from patients or callers, where it is confirmed the condition of the patient has changed or worsened will receive a full NHS Pathways triage. If the”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A higher response category would not have been achieved because the patient was reported conscious and breathing regularly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As described in the circumstances relating to the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, during the fifth 999 call that originated from a neighbour, Mr Fray received a further triage of his symptoms requiring a category 2 response. A higher response category would not have been achieved, due to Mr Fray being reported as conscious and breathing regularly. This call would therefore not have changed the priority of the existing response.”

    Source location

    2024-0307 Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 June 2024

    Open published response
  3. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Severine Alexia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Severine Alexia Kelly, who was detained under the Mental Health Act and accommodated at Wotton Lawn Hospital, choked on a sandwich provided by hospital staff on 1 October 2022 and died at the hospital. Concerns included out-of-date training for some bank staff, inadequate updating of risk assessments after a previous choking incident, difficulties contacting emergency services, delays in paramedic attendance, uncertainty about when to call an ambulance, and an AED with an apparently non-working internal clock.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Uncertainty about when medical professionals should call the ambulance service

    Wider context from the report

    “There seemed to be uncertainty at which stage of a medical emergency a medical professional should call the ambulance service. ”

    Source location

    Severine Alexia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the medical-emergency escalation process and reinforce it through resuscitation training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed the existing process regarding actions to be taken in the event of a medical emergency and believe that this remains fit for purpose, I have attached a copy of the Escalation Procedure Action Card for your information at Appendix 3. This forms part of the Care of the Deteriorating Patient Policy and will be reinforced at all resuscitation training courses. Local escalation procedures are also included as part of the on-site local induction for new starters, therefore, all staff on site should be familiar with the process. In addition, to ensure that staff have a greater awareness of how to respond to a serious choking episode, we have developed a choking simulation to complement the Resuscitation Action Card 5 – Adult Choking (revised in November 2022) which has been included as part of the Level 3 Resuscitation Training from 1 April 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing medical-emergency escalation process remains fit for purpose and is reinforced through training and induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed the existing process regarding actions to be taken in the event of a medical emergency and believe that this remains fit for purpose, I have attached a copy of the Escalation Procedure Action Card for your information at Appendix 3. This forms part of the Care of the Deteriorating Patient Policy and will be reinforced at all resuscitation training courses. Local escalation procedures are also included as part of the on-site local induction for new starters, therefore, all staff on site should be familiar with the process. In addition, to ensure that staff have a greater awareness of how to respond to a serious choking episode, we have developed a choking simulation to complement the Resuscitation Action Card 5 – Adult Choking (revised in November 2022) which has been included as part of the Level 3 Resuscitation Training from 1 April 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response
  4. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Douglas Paul Oak · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 11 April 2017, Douglas Paul Oak displayed erratic and frantic behaviour in Poole and was restrained by police after presenting with symptoms of Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD). An ambulance request was initially categorised as Category 3, and Douglas went into cardiac arrest before paramedics arrived; he died in hospital the following day. The report raised concerns about inadequate awareness and training on ABD, the lack of national guidance for police and ambulance services, ambulance call prioritisation, sedation, and communication between emergency services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confusion over Police procedures for requesting Ambulance support

    Wider context from the report

    “ix. It was clear from the evidence that there appears to be confusion of when Dorset Police Officers should call 999 directly and when they should request assistance through the Police control room. I would request that there is consideration of the redrafting of the current “Police Requesting Ambulance Support” policy within Dorset Police and specifically when Police Officers should dial 999. In addition, I would request consideration of training be provided by Dorset Police to all Police Officers regarding the use of dialling 999 when contacting other Emergency Services. In doing this I would ask that consideration is given to liaising with the other local emergency services regarding their expectations, especially SWAST. ”

    Source location

    Douglas Paul Oak · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain and update the clinically informed ABD presentation covering recognition, management, emergency response and transfer options.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College and NPCC have developed a PowerPoint presentation on ABD which describes the behavioural and physical signs of ABD and makes very clear the need for rapid clinical assessment/intervention. The ABD PowerPoint was developed with the benefit of clinical input and was last updated in July 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0352-Response-by-College-of-Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised ABD presentation and training template for police and ambulance control-room staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NPCC is working with ████████ and Subject Matter Experts in police and ambulance (SECAMBE and LAS) Control Rooms to produce a PowerPoint on ABD specifically for police and ambulance control room staff. This PowerPoint will form the basis of a template for both police force or ambulance trusts to train their staff with the aim of teaching recognition of ABD and the risk to life, thereby standardising the language and response to ABD (point 2.v). For the first time this PowerPoint is also endorsed by the Independent Ambulance Association and Heath Practice Associates (Council) increasing the reach of the material. We will also share this with the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives or the National Ambulance Service Medical Directors.”

    Source location

    2019-0352-Response-by-College-of-Policing
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Chemical sedation and emergency-call categorisation are clinical matters for ambulance services, to which police officers defer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The other matters within this area for concern (chemical sedation and categorisation of calls) are clinical matters in which police officers would not be directly involved other than to ensure that the ambulance service has access to the information that it needs. Police officers would defer to ambulance colleagues in these matters.”

    Source location

    2019-0352-Response-by-College-of-Policing
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Forces should address communication issues, including local ambulance-service arrangements, with their local emergency-service providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College and the NPCC will continue to work at a national level to secure greater consistency in the recognition and prioritisation of ABD. It is also our position that forces should discuss communication issues with their local emergency service providers.”

    Source location

    2019-0352-Response-by-College-of-Policing
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Information-passage arrangements between Police and Ambulance control rooms should be determined locally because technologies and working practices differ.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “AACE understand the cultural and practical barriers raised by the NPCC and accept that direct communication from the Police Officer on scene may not always be practicable. Ambulance trusts have locally agreed arrangements for the passage of information between Police and Ambulance control rooms. This is best determined at a local level due to differing technologies and working practices.”

    Source location

    2019-0352-Response-by-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Jack Alfie Charlie HUBBARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Hubbard, aged 18, ingested MDMA at Egg Nightclub in London on the evening of 24/25 August 2018; the investigation recorded the medical cause of death as MDMA toxicity. A concern was raised that the nightclub’s ambulance-calling protocol required the duty manager to be called and a second set of observations to be taken first.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling an ambulance pending contact with the duty manager

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that the protocol at Egg Nightclub for calling an ambulance is that before this can happen: 1. the duty manager must be called; and 2. a second set of observations must be taken, regardless of the results of the first. ”

    Source location

    Jack Alfie Charlie HUBBARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling an ambulance pending repeat observations regardless of initial results

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that the protocol at Egg Nightclub for calling an ambulance is that before this can happen: 1. the duty manager must be called; and 2. a second set of observations must be taken, regardless of the results of the first. ”

    Source location

    Jack Alfie Charlie HUBBARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Rosario CORDERO-SANZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rosario (known as Charo) Cordero-Sanz died after jumping in front of a train at Bethnal Green Underground Station on 14 July 2018. The concerns included gaps in special police officers’ access to information, understanding of missing-person and mental-health procedures, communication with a non-native English-speaking friend, and the failure to identify her as a high-risk missing person.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider and communicate ambulance involvement when clinically indicated

    Wider context from the report

    “2. In addition, the jury heard as follows. - The three police officers did not appear to have an in depth understanding of the misper process. - They did not (save for one who had attended such calls before) appear to have an in depth understanding of the s136 Mental Health Act / mental health potential issues. - They did not consider using language line to assist them in obtaining information from the non native English speaking friend, with whom they spoke outside the building where Ms Cordero-Sanz was staying with a friend. Being able to speak in his native language might have facilitated the informant to give fuller details, such as the fact that Ms Cordero-Sanz was by now hearing voices. - Having been told that she would be upset by their uniforms, they did not insist on seeing Ms Cordero-Sanz to assess her for themselves, or call for the assistance of a plain clothes colleague, or suggest that they speak to the friend who was sitting inside with her. - Nobody thought of calling an ambulance that night, save for the CAD (computer aided despatch) operator who took the call in the first place, but he did not mention he had done so to anyone else. I wonder whether this suggests a training need, and/or whether, given the difficulties in maintaining skills on only 15 hours a month, consideration could be given to teaming special officers with regulars? ”

    Source location

    Rosario CORDERO-SANZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rafe Robbie Angelo was born at 17:30 on 23 September 2014 after his mother was transferred from the Blake Birthing Centre to hospital during labour. He was born pale and floppy, without breathing or a heart rate, and died after 37 minutes of resuscitation. The principal concerns included delays in recognising the need for urgent delivery and communication failures between the birthing centre, ambulance service and hospital, including failure to request a time-critical transfer and a non-urgent ambulance stop.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Uncontrolled discretion by call handlers when time-critical factors are disclosed without an explicit time-critical transfer request

    Wider context from the report

    “Discretion of SCAS call handlers if time critical factors are mentioned but birthing centre staff do not actually request a time critical transfer is requested. ”

    Source location

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive to require clinicians to identify time-critical transfers and prioritise qualifying inter-facility calls as Category 1.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following your report, we have reviewed the SOP and updated it so that any Health Care Professional (HCP) requesting an Inter-facility transfer (i.e. Hospital or Birthing Unit) who asks for an emergency / immediate response will now be asked “Do you require a Time Critical Transfer?” Due to the known risks associated with obstetric emergencies. Midwives will be asked whether the case is time critical when they call from a patient’s home as well as a standalone birthing centre. If the HCP answers positively then the Emergency Call Taker (ECT) will prioritise the call using the TCT pathway and will process the call as a Category 1 response.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the updated Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive to all Emergency Operations Centre staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The new Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive has been sent to all staff in the Emergency Operations Centre. A mail drop will also be issued to all Emergency Departments and Birthing units across the South Central Area to remind all HCP’s of the correct process to request a Time critical transfer.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Emergency Operations Centre staff with guidance on diagnoses and circumstances indicating a time-critical transfer, including escalation to the Clinical Support Desk when needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has provided the below list of diagnoses and circumstances as a guide to EOC staff. ECT’s are also instructed that if they do not understand what the medical condition is, assistance must be gained from the Clinical Support Desk.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit inter-hospital time-critical transfer requests and provide feedback to acute trusts and commissioners when request information conflicts with the patient’s clinical condition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that TCT requests are made by clinicians and are made in appropriate circumstances, as well as the mail drop described above, requests for inter-hospital TCT’s will now be audited by SCAS and feedback will be provided to acute Trusts and commissioners when there is a discrepancy between the information provided when the request was made and the clinical condition of the patient when SCAS arrive. This is because it is important to ensure that SCAS resources are used appropriately and are not diverted from medical emergencies in the community unnecessarily. This process will also identify at an early stage occasions where re-education or further engagement with acute Trusts is required.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An exhaustive list of time-critical transfer diagnoses and circumstances cannot be provided because medical care is complex.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of diagnoses and circumstances that would or would not be classified as a time critical transfer due to the complex nature of medical care. However, as above, the ECT who is taking the call will now be speaking to a clinician and will ask the”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response
  8. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Anthony Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin Anthony Forster died in his prison cell at HMP Durham on 14 September 2014 after taking drugs he had hidden within his body. Staff identified that he was under the influence of an unknown substance, but no thorough or clinical assessment was undertaken. The principal concerns included inadequate policies, training, assessment, observation, treatment planning, communication and emergency response to prisoners who may have overdosed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays and uncertainty in calling an emergency ambulance and using the code blue call

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The evidence indicated that there was a delay (albeit a short one) in either healthcare or discipline staff calling for an emergency ambulance to attend and/or whether code blue as an expression was used. Other inquests have clearly identified issues at the establishment about the calling of an emergency ambulance. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Anthony Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Verify current staff understanding of the Emergency Code Protocol and obtain signed confirmation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the death of Mr Kevin Anthony Forster on 14th September 2015, while in custody at HMP Durham, the following actions have already been taken by the prison to ensure all staff have a full understanding of the Emergency Code Protocol which covers the use of Codes Blue and Red. These steps were taken prior to the Inquest occurring and were in response to the concerns made by the Prison Probation Ombudsman Report and also from the prison’s own learning exercise that was undertaken following this death.”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response2
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue pocket-sized Emergency Code Protocol cards to staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been issued with pocket sized cards explaining the protocol.”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response2
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Display Emergency Code Protocol posters prominently in all residential areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All residential areas which are the wings on which prisoners live have displayed the protocol in bold colours in prominent places which are A4 size. These posters can be located in the wing main offices which everyone attending a wing must report to.”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response2
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed Emergency Code Protocol instruction, understanding checks, signed confirmation and card issuance in new-staff induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Governors Notice to Staff has been issued to ensure that all new staff either directly or non-directly employed attend the Safer Custody department and receive a full explanation of the Emergency Code Protocol”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response2
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce the Emergency Code Protocol through staff meetings, management briefings, notices, email, intranet publication and line-manager cascades.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Emergency Protocol has been an agenda item on monthly team meetings with staff and the protocol fully explained. It is also discussed at the Safer Prisons meeting as part of a wider discussion on deaths in custody. The Deputy Governor has addressed the emergency protocol issue with all functional heads at meetings and this has been cascaded to staff by line managers.”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Yusuf ABDISMAD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Yusuf died from meningococcal septicaemia after his mother called 999 and was advised to call 111; by the time the London Ambulance Service arrived, he was in cardiac arrest. The principal concern was that the emergency medical dispatcher used a potentially confusing method to assess whether Yusuf was conscious, alongside difficulties recognising possible signs of meningitis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of 111 call handlers to escalate reports of absent breathing for immediate paramedic attendance

    Wider context from the report

    “During the 111 call, Yusuf’s mother said at one point that Yusuf was not breathing. Rather than responding to this as a red flag that required immediate paramedic attendance and asking for London Ambulance Service to be notified, the LCW call handler felt she wanted to probe further. Evidence in court from the 111 service was that call handlers would benefit from further training in recognisingagonal breathing. I appreciate that 111 is not intended as an emergency service, but they are likely from time to time to take calls that are or become urgent. ”

    Source location

    Yusuf ABDISMAD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    RHYS TUDOR WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 3 March 2014, RHYS TUDOR WILLIAMS was put to bed at Sunrise Senior Living and was found deceased between his bed and the wall at 1.40 am. The report raised concerns about inadequate staff training, incorrect bed positioning, failure to apply bed brakes, insufficient staffing and communication, pre-completed care notes, and possible delays in calling an ambulance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure staff know to call an ambulance directly when required

    Wider context from the report

    “9. Some members of staff were clearly under the impression that they should not call an ambulance but should contact the nurse on site who would then do so. This could lead to unacceptable delays in the attendance of potentially life-saving emergency services. Has this misapprehension been addressed? ”

    Source location

    RHYS TUDOR WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate that the person discovering an incident must call emergency services when warranted, and embed this instruction in General Managers’ training for team members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A communication has been sent to staff (with instruction to be discussed and signed for at handover) that the emergency services must be called by the person discovering the incident if the situation warrants it, and to clarify that there is no need to delay this process by finding the nurse. To ensure that this communication is embedded into the organisation it has been added to the General Managers’ training which is in turn delivered to all team members as they join Sunrise.”

    Source location

    2014-0558-Response-by-Sunrise-Senior-Living
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 December 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026