Recurring concern

Failure to maintain follow-up of patients who disengage from care

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First reported 23 Jul 2013•Latest report 1 Oct 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a patient follow-up or contact process involving non-compliance, non-contact, disengagement or loss to follow-up, including failures to initiate further contact, escalate concerns or maintain continuity across services.

Not included

  • Excludes routine delays in follow-up where patient disengagement or non-contact is not material to the concern.
  • Excludes failures concerning a specific diagnostic, treatment or appointment process unless the report identifies loss of patient follow-up as the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, documentation or governance deficiencies not explicitly tied to maintaining follow-up of disengaged patients.
Reports
23

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
23

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
29

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England3
Care Quality Commission2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Avenue House Nursing and Care Home1
Bexley Medical Group1
Bury Borough Council1
CAMHS East – Cross Street Clinic1
Care UK1
City Health Care Partnership CIC1
Community Mental Health Recovery Services (Surrey and Borders Partnership)1
CRG Medical Services1
Digital Health and Care Wales1
Droylsden Road Family Practice1
Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Milos JANKOVIC · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Milos JANKOVIC had been diagnosed with Barrett’s Oesophagus in 2014 but was lost to follow-up surveillance after bowel cancer took priority. In 2020, he developed symptoms and was found to have brain metastases from primary oesophageal cancer. Concerns included inadequate processes for Barrett’s surveillance, particularly in primary care, and the absence of recall or prescribing prompts to identify patients needing surveillance or endoscopy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain follow-up of patients diagnosed with Barrett’s, including non-regular primary care attenders

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There are two cases that have recently come to my attention within the Cardiff area where patients have been diagnosed with Barrett’s, lost to follow-up and have gone on to die from oesophageal cancers; (2) There are inadequate processes in place to address this lacuna, particularly in primary care where a patient may not be a regular attender; ”

    Source location

    Milos JANKOVIC · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and operate a standard procedure for clerically validating Barrett’s surveillance and other endoscopy waiting lists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Standard Operating Procedure for Surveillance has now been fully implemented. This ensures a consistent and robust process for clerical validation of all surveillance waiting lists, alongside our other endoscopy waiting lists.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff and Vale University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Schedule patients overdue since January for appointments to address and clear the backlog.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At present, the patient who has been waiting the longest for an Oesophago-Gastro-Duodenoscopy (OGD) on the Barrett’s surveillance waiting list was originally due in January 2026, representing a delay of approximately two months. All patients whose procedures became overdue in January are being scheduled for appointments this week to address and clear the backlog.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff and Vale University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Determine surveillance intervals using evidence-based recall periods, overdue calculations and disease-specific coding aligned with BSG guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The approach to surveillance grading has been revised. The previous 4a, 4b, and 4c categorisation system, introduced during the pandemic, has now been discontinued. Surveillance intervals will instead be determined using evidence-based recall periods in line with disease specific British Society of Gastroenterology (BSG) guidance. This includes the application of appropriate calculations to determine the extent to which patients are overdue and the utilisation of disease-specific coding to support accurate clinical prioritisation.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff and Vale University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Secondary care should continue managing Barrett’s Oesophagus surveillance recalls; GP recalls or prompts would duplicate responsibilities and cause confusion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of recalling people with Barrett’s Oesophagus for surveillance procedures, it is the secondary care team which manages this process. The need for surveillance is added to a patient’s record by the patient administration system used by the health board. Health boards operate standardised recall procedures and follow-up procedures for non-responders to invite people for their surveillance appointments.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Social Services of Wales
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The relevant health board is responsible for investigating surveillance-list management and strengthening records and processes to prevent future deaths.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is with regret that I am unable to comment on whether such factors may have played a role in the death of Mr Jankovic. The responsibility for the operational delivery of the surveillance list rests with the health board concerned for his treatment – the Welsh Government has no access to health board records or digital systems and processes. The power and expertise to investigate the circumstances of Mr Jankovic’s death – and that of the other case you refer to – and the processes involved in managing the surveillance, lie with the health board.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Social Services of Wales
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Welsh Government cannot investigate surveillance management because it lacks access to health-board records, systems and processes, and lacks the relevant power and expertise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is with regret that I am unable to comment on whether such factors may have played a role in the death of Mr Jankovic. The responsibility for the operational delivery of the surveillance list rests with the health board concerned for his treatment – the Welsh Government has no access to health board records or digital systems and processes. The power and expertise to investigate the circumstances of Mr Jankovic’s death – and that of the other case you refer to – and the processes involved in managing the surveillance, lie with the health board.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Social Services of Wales
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    George Kenneth Fraser · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Kenneth Fraser, aged 37, was found deceased at his home after mental health services had been unable to contact him and his family had last contacted him several weeks earlier. The cause and date of death were uncertain. Concerns included the absence of a clear care plan and robust risk assessment, and inadequate action and communication following failed contact and concerns raised by a friend and family.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review risk of harm when contact is lost

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The Mental Health and Wellness Team had been unable to reach Mr Fraser from the 16 July 2024. On the 18 July 2024 a friend contacted the mental health team to raise concern about his lack of contact with Mr Fraser. No action was taken at this time to review the risk of harm to Mr Fraser or to determine whether the Trust’s missing person procedure should be activated. There was no meaningful contact with the family to report the concerning lack of contact with Mr Fraser, until the 29 July 2024. ”

    Source location

    George Kenneth Fraser · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review zoning practice across four boroughs and produce a revised case-review template focused on recent face-to-face contact.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The patient safety investigation report into Mr Fraser’s sad death also highlighted learning outcomes in relation to team risk management. When Mr Fraser was not engaging with the Mental Health and Wellness Team, outcomes from the multidisciplinary zoning meeting were relatively passive, meaning that there was not an assertive response to support Mr Fraser. To support improvements in relation to this, we have established a Quality Improvement project to review zoning practice across the four boroughs. One outcome of this will be a revised template for teams to use to review cases, that maintains a focus on when the last face to face contact with a client took place. The implementation of the MaST tool also assists practitioners and supervisors in ensuring that face to face contact with clients is taking place appropriately.”

    Source location

    Response from North East London Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and finalise the Missed Appointments Policy with stronger guidance for disengagement, unsuccessful contact and escalation of concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Missed Appointments Procedure”

    Source location

    Response from North East London Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 May 2025

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Maria Patricia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maria Patricia Kelly, who lived alone and was in poor health, was found deceased at home by police on 15 May 2024 after concerns were raised by neighbours and a housing officer. The report identifies prolonged lack of contact with primary care and mental health services, numerous failed encounters, and no welfare check until the neighbours’ concerns were raised; the inquest determined natural causes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up repeated failed clinical encounters

    Wider context from the report

    “Ms Kelly’s medical records show that she suffered from a large number of medical conditions including steatosis of the liver, hydronephrosis, left anterior fascicular block, chronic kidney disease, iron deficiency anaemia, gastro-oesophageal reflux, hyperlipidaemia, simple schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, recurrent depressive disorder and anorexia nervosa (possibly in remission). She had been also diagnosed with Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma in the past. She was prescribed repeat medications of Atorvastatin and Lansoprazole for her physical health problems, and Flupentixol (as directed by her consultant) and Mirtazapine for her mental health. A prescription appears to have been last issued by her GP on 1 August 2024. From 23 August 2023 until the practice was notified of her death, her GP summary showed 31 failed encounters for mental health reviews, as well as failed encounters for blood tests and bowel screening. Her last medical (mental health) review with South Camden Rehabilitation of Recovery Team (SCRRT) was on 7 March 2023. Ms Kelly’s care coordinator went on leave in September 2021. Ms Kelly was placed onto the waiting list for allocation of a new care coordinator on 29 December 2023 after a review of the team’s patient list found that there had been no contact with her since 11 August 2023. It was recorded that were “many attempts” (not quantified) to contact her. After a review on 29 December 2023 there were then 12 unsuccessful home visits and 6 failed telephone attempts. Despite this, no welfare check was undertaken, nor any request for a welfare made to her housing officer or police, until neighbours raised concerns on 14 May 2024. ”

    Source location

    Maria Patricia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the DNA policy to formalise escalation after two consecutive missed appointments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. DNA (Did Not Attend) Policy The DNA policy is currently under review to formalise new working processes in the management of DNA. The policy outlines clear steps for escalating cases after two consecutive missed appointments, ensuring disengaged service users are followed up promptly. The revised policy will be implemented through staff training to ensure consistent implementation. The impact of this policy will be monitored through a Quality Improvement (QI) project.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised DNA policy through staff training and monitor its impact through a quality-improvement project.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. DNA (Did Not Attend) Policy The DNA policy is currently under review to formalise new working processes in the management of DNA. The policy outlines clear steps for escalating cases after two consecutive missed appointments, ensuring disengaged service users are followed up promptly. The revised policy will be implemented through staff training to ensure consistent implementation. The impact of this policy will be monitored through a Quality Improvement (QI) project.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Organise additional London Care Record training to improve information sharing and notification of GPs when concerns or disengagement arise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8. Communication with GPs and LCR (London Care Record) Improving communication with GPs is a priority to ensure coordinated care for service users. We are organising additional training on the use of the London Care Record (LCR) to enhance information sharing between our teams and primary care providers. This will ensure that GPs are promptly notified if concerns arise or if service users disengage from care. The integration of our teams into the new Integrated Community Teams will strengthen collaboration with GPs and other community services, enabling a more coordinated, collaborative and effective approach to care.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2024

    Open published response
  4. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Linda Heath · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Heath was discharged from hospital with a sacral sore, but the discharge information did not include a required district nursing referral and no referral was made. Her condition worsened, she was admitted to hospital, and she died on 31 March 2022 from sepsis caused by an infected sacral sore. The substantive concerns included inadequate discharge information, failure to arrange district nursing care, insufficient follow-up after discharge, and over-reliance on private domiciliary carers without sufficient enquiry into their remit.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of GP follow-up triggers for recently discharged patients with worsening conditions and missed routine appointments

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) No trigger appears to exist whereby GPs conduct follow up enquiries or visits to patients who have recently been discharged from hospital and who are complaining of a condition which may worsen and failing to attend routine appointments due to a worsening of their condition. ”

    Source location

    Linda Heath · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the review findings with CQC’s Primary and Community Care operations team for consideration in its regulatory response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A national professional advisor and senior specialist for Primary and Community Care at CQC have reviewed the coroner’s letter, evidence bundle, the clinical records and practice response to the integrated care board who would cover the oversight of this GP practice. The findings will be shared with the operations team for Primary and Community Care to consider alongside other information held by CQC. This will inform our regulatory response.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about points 2 and 3 relate to primary care rather than the Trust’s responsive responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Matters of concern at paragraph 5 of the Report are noted, and the Trust responds as it did at the Inquest in relation to points 1 and 4. Points 2 and 3 relate to primary care.”

    Source location

    Response from HUTH
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providers involved in Linda’s care should address the specific care concerns, provide further information, and identify related learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises some concerns that would be more appropriately answered by the providers involved in Linda’s care, who I note you have also addressed your Report to. My response to your focuses on those areas that fall within the remit of NHS England’s national policy and programmes, although my regional colleagues have engaged with the Humber and North Yorkshire Health and Care Partnership on the concerns raised, as this is system in which the providers involved in Linda’s care operate.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oversight of the GP practice is assigned to the integrated care board, while findings inform CQC’s regulatory response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A national professional advisor and senior specialist for Primary and Community Care at CQC have reviewed the coroner’s letter, evidence bundle, the clinical records and practice response to the integrated care board who would cover the oversight of this GP practice. The findings will be shared with the operations team for Primary and Community Care to consider alongside other information held by CQC. This will inform our regulatory response.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren John Lawrence had a history of suicidal thoughts, plans, previous attempts, mental ill health, disengagement from services and medication noncompliance. He was found dead at his home on 29 August 2020, and the inquest conclusion was suicide. Principal concerns included inadequate communication and follow-up between mental health services and the GP practice, failure to ensure that prescribed venlafaxine was issued and collected, insufficient escalation when direct contact with him was unsuccessful, and inadequate systems for managing correspondence and medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of escalation following disengagement from community services

    Wider context from the report

    “b. There was lack of appropriate escalation following the deceased’s disengagement with community services in 2019 but also in 2020 when there was a repeated lack of direct contact with him as well as the recognition of its importance. From June 2020 no other methods were tried to have direct contact with the deceased apart from attempts from phone calls which were repeatedly unsuccessful. ”

    Source location

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use MaST across CMHT supervision and zoning meetings to identify gaps in contact and support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust now using Management and Supervision Tool (MaST) across all CMHT’s. MaST is a software platform which analyses data from the Trust’s existing clinical records system, Paris, to supplement decision making in CMHT’s regarding likely resources required to provide effective mental health care. MaST is being used in individual supervision and in team zoning meetings where it can be easily identified when someone was last seen by the service and any gaps can be picked up by the Team Manager and the clinical team.”

    Source location

    2021-0349-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and disseminate the Managing Did Not Attend and Cancellations policy across clinical services, with defined escalation requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In autumn 2020 the Trust implemented a policy for Managing Did Not Attend (DNA) and Cancellations. The policy provides information regarding the appropriate response to service user non-attendance at planned appointments as well as detailing different categories of non-attendance and non-engagement to support decision making across GMMH services and teams. This policy clearly outlines what staff should do and when/how to escalate that someone has not attended a planned appointment or staff have been unable to access them for a visit in the community. The escalation is based upon the person risk assessment and any concerns that the care team may have. As well as any risks being considered there are identified timeframes for escalation following no access visits across different services including HBTT and CMHT.”

    Source location

    2021-0349-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 October 2021

    Open published response
  6. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Steven Antonio Regoli · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven Antonio Regoli died on 26 June 2020 at a Lineside location adjacent to Gipsy Lane following a collision with a train. The report identifies concerns that opportunities for more appropriate help, including inpatient care, were not acted upon, and that there were no systems to support people who did not engage with services, leaving families to provide care alone.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of systems to prevent people who do not engage being left solely in family care

    Wider context from the report

    “During the inquest, there were clear signs that Steven needed more in depth help as did his family, but due to him not engaging, which was a major part of his symptoms he was never given the pathway or help he needed and there were no systems in place for this to happen. There needs to be systems in place where people who do not engage are not left with family only to care for them. ”

    Source location

    Steven Antonio Regoli · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Zak Miles Joe Walter Paul Farmer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Zak Miles Joe Walter Paul Farmer, a 23-year-old man, died on 21 July 2019 after being found hanging. Concerns included a lack of clarity about the meaning of “urgent” referrals to the Access and Assessment Team and shortcomings in guidance for community mental health service users disengaging from prescribed treatment plans.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of defined steps when a patient cannot be contacted

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a lack of clarity over the meaning of the word “urgent” when a referral is made to the Access and Assessment Team and what steps will be taken if a patient cannot be contacted. ”

    Source location

    Zak Miles Joe Walter Paul Farmer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Feni Lee · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Feni Lee, who had Behçet’s syndrome, took an excessive quantity of colchicine over a two-week period in September 2017 and died in hospital on 17 September 2017 after developing severe side effects, including liver necrosis. The concerns included the thoroughness of the medication review, the failure to address her loss to hospital follow-up, and delays and ineffective processes for redirecting correspondence between two GP practices.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and address hospital loss to follow-up during medication review

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) You informed the inquest that Bexley Medical Group has a system whereby all medication obtained by repeat prescription is reviewed annually. You could not say exactly when the review of Ms Lee’s medication took place (at that time it was not documented) but said it would have been towards the end of 2016. You said the review looked at the need for ongoing medication and the dose. There were a number of features that do not appear to have been taken into account at this review: a. Colchicine is an unlicensed usage of a drug used to treat a rare disorder. It was being prescribed by the GP under instructions from a specialist hospital clinic. b. There had been no instructions from Guys as to what should be prescribed since January 2016. c. The instructions from Guys in January 2016 do not mention colchicine. No inquiry was made with Guys to check whether the intention was for it to be continued as part of the treatment, and yet it continued to be given by the GP as a repeat prescription. d. The dosage being given on repeat prescription does not match any of the recent instructions from Guys about its use. e. Ms Lee had mental health problems and was a vulnerable person. I therefore have concerns about the thoroughness of this medication review. (2) Towards the end of 2016 it would have been obvious that Ms Lee had been lost to follow up at the hospital, and so the drug review appears to have been a lost opportunity to rectify this. ”

    Source location

    Feni Lee · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact mental health patients who miss hospital outpatient appointments to establish reasons and support attendance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our administrators and receptionists will contact patients with mental health problems, who do not attend hospital outpatient appointment to establish the reasons and support them in keeping up with their appointments.”

    Source location

    2019-0224-Response-by-Bexley-Medical-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 September 2019

    Open published response
  9. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Darren Edward KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren King died at home after an epileptic seizure while in the bath, with drowning recorded as the medical cause of death. The report identified concerns about inadequate follow-up when a high-risk patient with learning disabilities disengages, the lack of a clear escalation process, and the absence of a structured medication review within the care plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of effective follow-up action when high-risk patients with learning disabilities disengage

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The lack of effective follow up action when a patient with learning disabilities disengages, especially when they are a high-risk patient (such as Darren). ”

    Source location

    Darren Edward KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Gladys Kathleen Rich · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gladys Kathleen Rich suffered repeated falls after moving into Avenue House Nursing and Care Home, culminating in a fall on 28 December 2016 that caused traumatic subdural and subarachnoid haemorrhages and a skull fracture. She died on 3 March 2017; the medical cause of death included chest infection, intracranial haemorrhage and a fall, with rectal cancer and liver metastases also recorded. The principal concerns related to failures to identify and manage her falls risk, ineffective referral and follow-up by the care home and Falls Prevention Service, inadequate resources and equipment, and the absence of an effective system to ensure required falls-prevention input was delivered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Falls Prevention Service to proactively follow up required input

    Wider context from the report

    “2. In relation to the Falls Prevention Service.   a) Despite Mrs Rich having been referred to the Falls Prevention Service by her GP and the service being notified of a fall related hospitalisation in August 2016, the onus was placed on the patient and her family to make a further appointment. In the absence of any further contact, the service assumes that their input is no longer required. As is clear in the case of Mrs Rich, the prevention service was very much still required. Again, when the service was contacted in November 2016 the failure to receive a form or a response to the subsequent letter again led to an automatic assumption that input was no longer required despite the fact that this was the second referral to have been made in relation to Mrs Rich. It was explained in evidence that the reason the service cannot be more proactive is because they are inadequately resourced. ”

    Source location

    Gladys Kathleen Rich · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the Falls Team after sending referrals and action plans, confirm receipt and intended action, and record each contact in residents’ care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although we believe we followed normal and reasonable procedures in this case, in future to further mitigate against shortcomings of the Falls Team, we will contact them after sending them referrals and action plans. This will be done to ensure that the Falls Team have received them and to find out what action they intend to take. All contact will be recorded in our residents’ Care plans under the visiting professionals’ information section.”

    Source location

    2018-0149_Redacted-Response-by-Avenue-House-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    After submitting referrals and action plans, the care home must wait for the Falls Team’s input and decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “C) The management of the home completed the falls risk assessment and action plan and sent this by post, and not by the fax facility. There was a copy of this in the resident’s file for reference. There was no information in the resident’s file to say that the falls team hadn’t received this information. Mrs Rich had also been referred to the Falls Team prior to admission to Avenue House and again this was not followed up by the Falls Team. Once falls risk action plans are received by the falls team, they do not typically give the home even a rough estimate of how long it will be before it is followed up and the resident is seen. Therefore the care home simply has to wait for the Falls’ Team’s input.”

    Source location

    2018-0149_Redacted-Response-by-Avenue-House-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026