Recurring concern

Ineffective prison suicide and self-harm prevention systems

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First reported 2 Dec 2013•Latest report 13 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of an explicitly prison-based suicide and self-harm prevention system or strategy, including dedicated ACCT, risk-assessment, monitoring, information-sharing, learning and response controls.

Not included

  • Do not include suicide or self-harm outcomes without evidence of an ineffective prison prevention system or dedicated control.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, communication or documentation deficiencies unless the report directly ties them to prison suicide and self-harm prevention.
  • Excludes suicide and self-harm concerns outside prison settings.
  • Excludes isolated emergency-response failures that are not presented as part of prison suicide and self-harm prevention arrangements.
Reports
52

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
86

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
166

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service23
Ministry of Justice12
NHS England6
HM Prison Service5
Care UK4
Hewell Prison3
HM Inspectorate of Prisons3
Pentonville Prison3
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust2
Long Lartin Prison2
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust2
Practice Plus Group2
Sodexo2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Nigel John KEENAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nigel John Keenan died by hanging at HMP Haverigg between 8 pm on 12 March 2025 and 4:20 am on 13 March 2025; the inquest concluded suicide. Concerns included the lack of seven-day mental health support at the prison, limited staffing for constant observation, and a possible incentive for prisoners in crisis to minimise their suicidal intent.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incentive for prisoners in crisis to underreport self-harm intent

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of hearing evidence in this inquest I was told that: 1) Mental health provision is only commissioned within HMP Haverigg during the week and is not available at the weekends. I was told that in the event that a prisoner experienced a crisis during the weekend they would be cared for by prison staff using the ACCT procedure, but that mental health input would not be available until Monday morning. 2) Because HMP Haverigg is a Category D 'open' prison it has far fewer staff available to monitor prisoners. As such it is not able to place prisoners on 'constant watch'. As a result if a prisoner requires very regular or constant observation (as a result of being in crisis) they would have to be transferred to a closed prison. 3) This means that prisoners who are in crisis have something of an incentive to deny their intent to self harm because to admit it would result in their being transferred to a closed prison. I am concerned that the decision not to commission 7 day a week mental health support at HMP Haverigg is therefore counterproductive. Because of the limited number of prison officers at the establishment it gives rise to a higher risk than would be the case at a closed prison. In particular, it risks providing an incentive for prisoners in crisis to play down the true extent of their situation. ”

    Source location

    Nigel John KEENAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Rickie Wai Kee POON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rickie Poon, a dismissed police officer detained under the Mental Health Act and later remanded in custody at HMP Pentonville, was found hanging in his cell one month after arriving at the prison. The jury found failures in the prison’s ACCT process contributed to his death, including inadequate management, accountability, training, implementation of actions and the early closure of the ACCT; concerns were also raised about inappropriate CPR after he had died.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Premature closure of ACCT processes

    Wider context from the report

    “The jury found that the following failures at HMP Pentonville in the ACCT (assessment care in custody and teamwork) process contributed to Mr Poon’s death: • the ACCT process was not managed and implemented properly, e.g. supervising officers did not consistently acquaint themselves with case notes or history when completing reviews; record keeping was inadequate; agreed actions were not consistently implemented; and ACCT reviews lacked structure and consistency; • accountability was insufficient, e.g. there was no follow up when actions were missed in the ACCT document, sign offs were completed inaccurately, hand overs were not completed between staff, and an important email was not read or followed up on; • there were gaps in training and knowledge, e.g. ACCT training had expired and prison staff overly relied on Rickie’s presentation; • the ACCT was closed too soon. The jury also found that the level of ACCT observations was reduced inappropriately, but they were unclear as to whether this impacted on the outcome. ”

    Source location

    Rickie Wai Kee POON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for the concerns about HMPPS and HMP Pentonville rests with separate organisations, so no response is proposed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do not propose to respond to the points raised above in respect of HMPPS and HMP Pentonville as these matters are for separate organisation.”

    Source location

    Response from Practice Plus Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 April 2026

    Open published response
  3. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Rajwinder Singh · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rajwinder Singh was imprisoned after being sentenced at Southwark Crown Court and was identified as at risk of self-harm and suicide. He was transferred to St George’s Hospital after failures including unanswered cell bells and inadequate observations, and died there on 25th June 2026. The principal concerns included inadequate risk assessment and record keeping, failures in observations and handovers, and insufficient mandatory ACCT training for prison and agency healthcare staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory procedures ensuring ACCT training equivalence for agency healthcare staff before deployment

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There are no mandatory procedures to ensure that, before they are deployed in the prison setting, Oxleas agency staff have the same mandatory ACCT training as that provided to permanent healthcare staff. ”

    Source location

    Rajwinder Singh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conducted a quality assurance visit verifying ACCT training arrangements and temporary staff completion at HMP Wandsworth.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England undertook a quality assurance visit to the healthcare team at HMP Wandsworth on the 19th March 2026. At that visit, the process was verified and it was confirmed that all temporary staff had undertaken ACCT training, with the exception of two. It was confirmed that the two outstanding members of temporary staff were booked onto ACCT refresher training.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Requested regional commissioning teams to confirm timely access to required joint training, including ACCT, for prison healthcare staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the findings of that report and to support national learning, the National Director for Health and Justice requested that regional commissioning teams confirm that there are appropriate arrangements in place to ensure that all staff, including agency and bank staff, have timely access to all joint training, including ACCT, that is necessary for them to undertake their role effectively within the prison environment. Therefore, regional commissioners gained assurance from healthcare providers operating across London prisons, that there were arrangements in place whereby ACCT training was in place for temporary staff working in prison settings.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtained assurance from London prison healthcare providers that temporary staff had access to ACCT training arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the findings of that report and to support national learning, the National Director for Health and Justice requested that regional commissioning teams confirm that there are appropriate arrangements in place to ensure that all staff, including agency and bank staff, have timely access to all joint training, including ACCT, that is necessary for them to undertake their role effectively within the prison environment. Therefore, regional commissioners gained assurance from healthcare providers operating across London prisons, that there were arrangements in place whereby ACCT training was in place for temporary staff working in prison settings.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtained further assurance from London prison health providers that systems ensure all staff access required training, including ACCT.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further assurances were gained by NHS England (London Region) from regional prison health providers in March/April 2026 that there continue to be suitable systems and processes in place to ensure that all staff, including bank and agency staff, have accessed the required training, including ACCT training, to undertake their roles.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require temporary healthcare staff to complete ACCT training before deployment and record attendance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is now mandatory for all temporary healthcare staff to undertake ACCT training. This training is currently provided by the Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust Practice Development Nurse (PDN). Attendance”

    Source location

    Response from Oxleas NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extend ACCT process coaching and refresher training to non-operational colleagues, including healthcare staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst HMPPS does not mandate how staff awareness and confidence in delivering ACCT should be maintained, HMP Wandsworth has appointed three dedicated safety floorwalker officers to strengthen oversight of ACCT processes and enhance support for individuals at risk of self-harm or suicide. Their role includes providing direct coaching to ACCT assessors and delivering targeted refresher training to staff to build confidence in key aspects of the process, including identifying risks, triggers and protective factors.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing processes are considered sufficient to ensure temporary prison healthcare staff access required ACCT training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England’s London regional colleagues have advised that Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust now have a process in HMP Wandsworth to ensure that all staff, permanent and temporary (including agency), have undertaken mandatory ACCT training. At the time of Mr Singh’s death, access to ACCT training was sporadic, due to a shortage of Safer Custody staff available to lead in training. This has since been resolved, with Safer Custody staff now available to deliver ACCT training for healthcare staff on two dates per month. In addition, all members of temporary staff receive an induction before working at HMP Wandsworth.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oxleas is responsible for commenting on ACCT training offered to staff during induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am aware that this PFD has also been addressed to the Director of Offender Healthcare Operations at Oxleas, who will be able to comment on what is offered to staff during their induction. However, HMP Wandsworth will also extend the aforementioned support to”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 February 2026

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Gareth Chumber-Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gareth Chumber-Kelly died after hanging himself while in custody at HMP Pentonville on 17 July 2023. The report identified concerns about lost or incomplete transfer documentation, inadequate recognition and management of suicide and self-harm risks, insufficient staff training, failures to provide basic life support, and inadequate staffing and support during crucial periods.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide suicide and self-harm risk management training to prison officers

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The court heard evidence that 2 prisoners had died by ligature suspension (on 17.6.2021 and 1.3.22) prior to Mr Chumber-Kelly’s death, and that since then a further 5 prisoners have died by ligature suspension (one of which was Mr Chumber-Kelly). The Governor of HMP Pentonville told the court that Suicide and Self harm training for prison staff had been suspended during Covid and had never been re-started notwithstanding that 38% of prisoners arriving at HMP Pentonville said they felt suicidal and notwithstanding that 7 prisoners have died by ligature suspension since June 2021. The failure to train prison officers in the risks and management of suicide and self-harm creates a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Gareth Chumber-Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reintroduce the Pentonville Speed School and deliver self-harm and suicide-prevention training to officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to your training concerns, HMP Pentonville is re-introducing the “Pentonville Speed School”, which is an initiative that provides staff with bitesize training sessions in key subject areas. The local safety team will work in conjunction with the school to deliver training on self-harm and suicide prevention to officers. Additionally, all band 4 staff at HMP Pentonville have now received the Assessment, Care and Teamwork (ACCT) case review training, which equips them with the skills to be able to provide prisoners at risk of suicide with holistic and person-centred support in their role as ACCT case coordinators.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide ACCT case-review training to all band 4 staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to your training concerns, HMP Pentonville is re-introducing the “Pentonville Speed School”, which is an initiative that provides staff with bitesize training sessions in key subject areas. The local safety team will work in conjunction with the school to deliver training on self-harm and suicide prevention to officers. Additionally, all band 4 staff at HMP Pentonville have now received the Assessment, Care and Teamwork (ACCT) case review training, which equips them with the skills to be able to provide prisoners at risk of suicide with holistic and person-centred support in their role as ACCT case coordinators.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  5. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Emmett Peter MORRISON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emmett Peter Morrison, a serving prisoner at HMP Long Lartin, was found suspended by a ligature in his cell on 13 October 2024 and died from his injuries at hospital on 16 October 2024. The report raised concerns about the continued influx of illicit drugs into the prison and failures to record support actions in ACCT care plans and arrange a further ACCT review sooner.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record and implement support actions in ACCT care plans

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Failures in ACCT process Emmett was a prisoner with a considerable history of substance misuse and self-harm while in custody. Of the eight ACCT reviews which were conducted after Emmett's ACCT document was re-opened on 10.9.24, not one resulted in any support actions being entered onto the ACCT care plan. The ACCT care plan is a key part of the ACCT process, which requires those taking part in ACCT case reviews to set in train actions designed to reduce the prisoner’s risk of suicide or self-harm. As the guidance then in force made plain, it is a mandatory part of the ACCT process. The reasons given by staff who took part in these ACCT reviews for not having done this included: (i) being sure that they had talked about it, but had not noted anything down; (ii) thinking that, if EM didn’t attend an ACCT review, they couldn’t put any actions in place because that could only be done with his agreement; and (iii) they were so weighed down by the number of ACCT reviews which they had to carry out and the rest of their workload, that they simply had no time to complete this part of the review. Most worryingly, two of those witnesses who cited a heavy workload and pressures of work for Care Plans not being completed, made clear that not only this was commonplace at the time of these events but also that it is still an issue. Despite hearing evidence that measures have been put in place to train officers conducting ACCT reviews, and to conduct Quality Assurance checks on open ACCT documents, I was left with the clear impression that ACCT Care Plans are still being overlooked. I also note that as long ago as 2021 this court heard an inquest into the death of a prisoner at the same prison in 2018, following which I wrote a Prevention of Future Deaths report to the then Governing Governor of the prison, indicating my concern that ACCT Case Reviews for that prisoner had, on several occasions, failed to review or add actions to the ACCT Care Plan. It is therefore a concern that, 6 years on from that prisoner's death, the same issue arose in Emmett's case. As long as that remains the case, the lives of those vulnerable prisoners whom the ACCT process is designed to protect will continue to be put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Emmett Peter MORRISON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Prison Safety Policy Framework requiring ACCT teams to identify, review and record support actions and care-plan decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding your concern about the ACCT process, the Prison Safety Policy Framework which was implemented on 1 January 2025, and superseded PSI 64/2011, requires that an ACCT case review team must set and review support actions to mitigate the risks identified. The ACCT Case Co-ordinator is expected to record the areas of risk discussed at a case review, update the Care Plan, including the support actions and note the rationale for the decisions of the case review team.”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce and complete four local ACCT quality-assurance checks covering opening, reviews, complex-case oversight and closure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the death of Emmett Morrison, locally, the Quality Assurance processes have been updated, with four Quality Assurance checks introduced in line with the Prison Safety Policy Framework. These new checks are now completed at HMP Long Lartin as follows:”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor and upload ACCT assurance findings, sharing them for follow-up through case management and monthly Safety Meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Findings from these assurance checks are shared with the case co-ordinator, line manager and Safer Custody Managers for further action where required. All Quality Assurance checks are monitored and uploaded onto a Quality Assurance analysis tool, with findings fed back at the monthly Safety Meeting for follow-up action where appropriate.”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a single ACCT case-management allocation system assigning open cases to trained Supervising Officers or Custodial Managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, since the death, the prison has implemented a new single case management allocation system. All open ACCTs are now assigned to a Supervising Officer or, for complex cases, a Custodial Manager. Only staff who have completed the required two-day ACCT case review team course can be allocated ACCTs or conduct reviews.”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Schedule ACCT reviews around allocated coordinators’ duties and use a buddy system to maintain continuity and prevent over-allocation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As of 19 February 2026, the prison has 20 open ACCTs, each managed by an individual Case Co-ordinator. Reviews are scheduled for times when the allocated Case Co-ordinator is on duty, with others stepping in only in exceptional circumstances. A buddy system has also been introduced so a nominated colleague can cover tasks during absences, ensuring continuity of care and preventing over-allocation.”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Book refresher training for staff who misunderstood care-plan requirements when prisoners missed reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Witnesses who believed they could not add Care Plan actions because the prisoner had not attended the review are being booked onto refresher training, and the prison has also prioritised Suicide and Self-Harm Awareness Training (SASH) on monthly lockdown training days.”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide one-to-one ACCT coaching to 21 Case Coordinators with support from Safety Leads.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, National Safety Team colleagues provided one-to-one ACCT coaching to 21 Case Co-ordinators, supported by Safety Leads, in January 2026.”

    Source location

    2026-0071 - Response from Director General of Operations HMPPS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  6. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY, who had a history of mental health issues and significant cocaine misuse, was remanded to HMP Chelmsford on 27 January 2024 after expressing an intention to end his life. He was found suspended in his cell about seven hours after arrival and died at Broomfield Hospital on 1 February 2024; the medical cause of death was hanging and the jury concluded suicide. The principal concerns included failures in mental-health care, communication and risk documentation, failure to share information about his extreme suicide risk, inadequate assessment and supervision in prison, and the accessibility of cell-window ligature points.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate national prison officer training for suicide risk assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “CONCERN: In the context of the finding of the jury of a gross failure to ensure that Mr Berry was, in all the circumstances as known to the prison staff, subject to Constant Supervision, I am concerned that inadequate national training contributed to an over-reliance by prison staff on the subjective perception of an ‘improvement’ in a prisoner’s transient presentation and demeanour over obvious and grave documented risk factors when assessing risk and setting observation levels. The reassurance provided by Mr Berry, (according to the Supervising Officer) appears to have been dangerously misleading and uncritically accepted notwithstanding the clear, high risk of suicide Mr Berry presented. This, in turn, gives rise to my concern (in the light of the evidence provided by the POELT trainer) that the exceptionally short time allocated in national prison officer training to equip officers with the requisite skills to assess, identify and records triggers, risk factors and protective factors is wholly inadequate. ”

    Source location

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the risks, triggers and protective factors module in collaboration with Prison Learning Design and Delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Recognition of the risks and triggers that may increase a prisoner’s risk of suicide and self-harm is a vital skill for prison officers. The Safety Support Skills training within Foundation Training, formerly Prison Officer Entry Level Training (POELT), comprises approximately 18 hours of the overall curriculum and of this, the dedicated session on identifying and managing risk factors and triggers accounts for between 45 minutes to one hour of the training. The risks, triggers and protective factors module is currently under national review in collaboration with Prison Learning Design and Delivery (PLDD). While this work progresses, the National”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver interim risk-identification upskilling sessions across the reception estate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Safety Group has developed interim upskilling sessions focused specifically on risk identification at the point of the prisoner’s arrival in custody. These sessions will be delivered across the reception estate by the National Safety Group and Group Safety Leads, with completion anticipated by June 2026, subject to confirmation.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Reception Officer training to strengthen early-custody risk-identification and support for vulnerable individuals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, a comprehensive review of the Reception Officer training has commenced, and the National Safety Group have already proposed enhancements that will strengthen risk-identification skills and improve support for individuals who may be particularly vulnerable during their early days in custody. The revised training will be completed once PLDD capacity allows.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete the revised Reception Officer training once Prison Learning Design and Delivery capacity allows.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, a comprehensive review of the Reception Officer training has commenced, and the National Safety Group have already proposed enhancements that will strengthen risk-identification skills and improve support for individuals who may be particularly vulnerable during their early days in custody. The revised training will be completed once PLDD capacity allows.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revised Reception Officer training will be completed once Prison Learning Design and Delivery capacity allows.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, a comprehensive review of the Reception Officer training has commenced, and the National Safety Group have already proposed enhancements that will strengthen risk-identification skills and improve support for individuals who may be particularly vulnerable during their early days in custody. The revised training will be completed once PLDD capacity allows.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response
  7. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Aaron Lee Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Aaron Lee Taylor was discovered in his prison cell on 28 August 2023, having died between the evening of 27 August and the morning of 28 August 2023. The inquest heard that he had taken steps intending to take his own life and identified multiple failures in measures to prevent self-harm and suicide, including inadequate assessments, documentation, policy compliance and mental health interventions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of ACCT training and awareness of ACCT responsibilities among prison officers

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was heard that despite several prison officers being aware of a serious incident of self-harm involving a prisoner with a history of self-harm, an Assessment, Care in Custody Teamwork process (ACCT) was not opened. No evidence was provided confirming all prison officers were ACCT trained and/or were all aware of their responsibilities in relation to ACCT ”

    Source location

    Aaron Lee Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to open an Assessment, Care in Custody Teamwork process after a serious incident of self-harm

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was heard that despite several prison officers being aware of a serious incident of self-harm involving a prisoner with a history of self-harm, an Assessment, Care in Custody Teamwork process (ACCT) was not opened. No evidence was provided confirming all prison officers were ACCT trained and/or were all aware of their responsibilities in relation to ACCT ”

    Source location

    Aaron Lee Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide all new entry officers with suicide and self-harm prevention training covering ACCT and changes in risks, triggers and protective factors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to assure you that HMPPS is committed to providing prison officers with the right support, training and tools to do their jobs. All new entry officers receive a full day of training on suicide and self-harm prevention during their prison officer training. This training includes modules on the ACCT process as well as understanding and managing changes to risks, triggers and protective factors. Following completion of the prison officer training, new entry officers also have a two week local induction before becoming fully operational. In addition to the classroom training, there is an online Safety Learning Reference Library holding various guidance, templates and training material that is accessible to all staff via the HMPPS intranet. The library includes an area dedicated to ACCT which staff can access at any time.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain an accessible online Safety Learning Reference Library, including ACCT guidance, templates and training materials, and promote it to HMP Garth staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to assure you that HMPPS is committed to providing prison officers with the right support, training and tools to do their jobs. All new entry officers receive a full day of training on suicide and self-harm prevention during their prison officer training. This training includes modules on the ACCT process as well as understanding and managing changes to risks, triggers and protective factors. Following completion of the prison officer training, new entry officers also have a two week local induction before becoming fully operational. In addition to the classroom training, there is an online Safety Learning Reference Library holding various guidance, templates and training material that is accessible to all staff via the HMPPS intranet. The library includes an area dedicated to ACCT which staff can access at any time.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue HMP Garth staff instructions reiterating when and how to open ACCTs, who should open them, and how to complete ACCT records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At HMP Garth a staff information notice has been issued promoting the Safety Learning Reference Library and a Governor’s order was issued to all staff in October 2025 reiterating the process on when and how an ACCT should be opened and by whom, and on how the ACCT record should be completed.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing ACCT training, induction and accessible guidance are considered sufficient to address concerns about staff suicide and self-harm prevention training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to assure you that HMPPS is committed to providing prison officers with the right support, training and tools to do their jobs. All new entry officers receive a full day of training on suicide and self-harm prevention during their prison officer training. This training includes modules on the ACCT process as well as understanding and managing changes to risks, triggers and protective factors. Following completion of the prison officer training, new entry officers also have a two week local induction before becoming fully operational. In addition to the classroom training, there is an online Safety Learning Reference Library holding various guidance, templates and training material that is accessible to all staff via the HMPPS intranet. The library includes an area dedicated to ACCT which staff can access at any time.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response
  8. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Steven Roy Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven Roy Davidson died while in prison after a history of self-harm during a previous prison stay. The report identifies concerns that healthcare staff at HMP Chelmsford could not sufficiently navigate or search System One records, or did not sufficiently understand the importance of previous self-harm information when assessing his mental health and risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inability to navigate System One records to find previous incidents of self-harm in prison

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Health Care Staff at HMP Chelmsford say that they are: (i) not able to navigate the System One records sufficiently well to find information about previous incidents of self- harm in prison; and/ or (ii) not sufficiently aware of the importance of searching the records made by clinicians during previous prison stays when conducting Reception Health Screens and/ or reviews of a prisoner’s mental health needs. (iii) May not be sufficiently trained to understand and utilise System One records to find previous history, including incidents of self- harm in custody. ”

    Source location

    Steven Roy Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver structured SystmOne training through induction, refresher training, and equivalent training for long-term agency staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SystmOne is the NHS electronic patient record system used in prison and custodial healthcare settings across the country. NHS North of England Commissioning Support (NECS) provides training and technical support for users of SystmOne, including system navigation, search functions and information retrieval. HCRG has amended its training provision so that all new staff will now receive structured SystmOne training as part of their induction, provided by NECS and recorded in the mandatory training schedule. This will include guidance on locating clinical information that may be stored in different parts of the system (see further below). Refresher training will also be provided to existing staff within three months and recorded in their personal training record.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG Care Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require agency staff to confirm in writing that they understand how to navigate SystmOne clinical records and record confirmations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All agency staff will be required to confirm in writing that they understand how to navigate clinical records held in SystmOne and this will be recorded in the ShareDrive. Any long-term agency staff will also complete the same structured training as permanent staff.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG Care Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce through clinical governance that practitioners consider risk-related history, including information beyond the default summary record view.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All Practitioners conducting clinical assessments should, as part of good practice, review relevant patient history when undertaking reception screenings, mental health reviews or risk assessments. In this case, it appears that practitioners focused primarily on Mr Davidson's current presentation rather than reviewing earlier records in depth. HCRG will reinforce through clinical governance that risk-related history should be considered when assessing patients, and that in some cases this may involve searching beyond the default summary record view.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG Care Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand monthly clinical-note audits to check access to relevant historic information during risk assessments and report findings through governance and quality monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that records are being reviewed appropriately, the existing monthly audit of clinical notes will now include specific checks as to whether practitioners have accessed relevant historic information when assessing risk. Findings from the audit will feed into governance meetings and quality and performance monitoring available to NHS England commissioners.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG Care Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed SystmOne training into governance and supervision processes to support consistent and safe use of the platform.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HCRG’s Performance and Quality teams are embedding SystmOne training into existing governance and supervision processes to ensure consistent and safe use of the platform. Staff may also contact the Performance and Quality Lead if further clarification is needed, either directly or via their line manager.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG Care Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

    Open published response
  9. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Steven HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven Hart was remanded to HMP Bedford in November 2022 and, after episodes of self-harm and deterioration in his mental health, was found unresponsive in his cell on 25 March 2023 after using a ligature attached to a faulty observation panel. He was taken to hospital and died on 29 March 2023 from asphyxiation due to hanging. The principal concerns were failures in cell safety, communication and handovers, mental health assessment, and the carrying out and escalation of observations after self-harm incidents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report serious self-harm incidents and trigger further assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Failure to Adequately Monitor and Audit Cells for Ligature Points Mr Hart was placed in a “safer cell” designed to have no ligature points. However, the observation panel ████████ was broken, ████████ which he was able to thread a ligature and hang himself. Staff and witnesses confirmed that the damage to the cell door was known, and that maintenance was generally responsive, but the cell was not taken out of use despite the increased risk. The prison’s own post-inquest review acknowledged that the design of the observation panels allowed prisoners to open them from inside, creating an opportunity for self-harm. Interim and permanent solutions were only implemented after the Inquest had commenced nearly two and a half years after Steven's death indicating a likely failure to tackle safety concerns promptly or appropriately. 2. Failure to Effectively Communicate Risk and Incidents There was a general failure to distribute and communicate relevant observations and concerns regarding Mr Hart’s mental state. Staff often did not have time to receive handovers or read current and previous ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork) documents during their shift. After a serious self-harm incident with Steven involving ████████ the officer involved failed to report the incident to OSCAR 1 (the officer in charge), as required by protocol. He simply removed the ████████ and did not conduct any further assessment or review of Steven. This failure prevented a multi-disciplinary review and possible escalation of risk management. The night shift handover on 25 March 2023 was insufficient, with lack of vital information provided to the receiving officer, leading to inadequate understanding of Mr Hart’s risk. 3. Failure to Carry Out Appropriate Observations Observations of Mr Hart were reduced from constant supervision to four irregular checks per hour, despite ongoing risk factors and recent self-harm attempts. CCTV evidence suggested that required observations were not always carried out to the proper standard, and some checks may not have been performed at all. The officer insisted they were carried out, although CCTV evidence strongly suggested that was improbable. The jury found that the failure to call OSCAR 1 after the telephone cord incident directly impacted Mr Hart, as it possibly prevented a further ACCT review and escalation of observations or removal of ligature materials. The death of Steven Hart was contributed to by systemic failings in cell safety, communication, and observation practices. There were, paradoxically, along-side poor practice and care, examples of exceptionally good practice by a group of officers of which several have left the prison service. There was generally a failure to implement robust systems for cell safety audits, enforce effective communication and handover protocols, and ensure strict compliance with observation requirements for vulnerable prisoners. ”

    Source location

    Steven HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate serious incidents, document findings, and action and monitor resulting recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All serious incidents are now investigated thoroughly, with any findings documented. Recommendations arising from these investigations are actioned and monitored, ensuring improvement is implemented where appropriate. Any themes identified through investigations are used to inform staff training and where necessary performance management, ensuring continuous learning is taking place and embedded into practice.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff and provide additional training and support on escalating incidents and conducting ACCT reviews when risk increases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Staff have been reminded, and received additional training and support where necessary, on the importance of escalating incidents and ensuring that ACCT reviews take place when risk increases.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response
  10. Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Azroy Dawes-Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Azroy Dawes-Clarke died in hospital on 10 November 2021 after self-ligaturing in HMP Elmley, followed by restraint, cardiac and respiratory arrest, and further arrests during conveyance and treatment. The substantive concerns included inadequate communication and healthcare involvement, disproportionate and prolonged restraint, delays in recognising the arrest and starting CPR, unsuitable ligature-resistant materials, and gaps in staff training on ACCT procedures, first aid, basic life support, and the legal framework for medical emergencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide bedding materials resistant to being ripped into ligatures

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Despite being in a safer cell, dressed in an anti-ligature gown, Mr Dawes-Clarke was able to make a ligature from the bedding material in his cell. The material from which the mattress and pillow cover are made, permit strips to be ripped from them. ”

    Source location

    Azroy Dawes-Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a cell design review to assess alternative materials meeting fire-safety and anti-ligature requirements for bedding.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HMPPS are currently undertaking a cell design review which is looking at all aspects of cell design, including furniture and fittings, to ensure it takes account of developments in how prisoners are accommodated and improvements in what is currently available on the market. As part of this review, we will explore the possibility of using different materials which meet the stringent fire safety requirements and can also function as anti-ligature for bedding. The review is expected to conclude at the end of 2026.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 July 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026