Recurring concern

Unreliable road closure arrangements for hazardous roads

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First reported 3 Sep 2014•Latest report 17 Jul 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in arrangements for deciding, authorising, implementing, maintaining or handing over road closures when a road presents a safety hazard, including delayed permanent measures after prolonged closure, failure to use available statutory closure powers, protocols that prevent the responsible emergency service from closing roads, and the need for an assured alternative authority to act promptly.

Not included

  • Excludes ordinary road maintenance, inspection, signage or hazard-remediation failures where no road-closure arrangement is deficient.
  • Excludes general emergency-service response failures that do not concern deciding, implementing or maintaining a hazardous-road closure.
  • Excludes railway-crossing closure decisions unless the assertion explicitly concerns the same public-road closure process.
  • Excludes temporary traffic-management arrangements where the issue is only the design or visibility of signs, signals or barriers and not whether a hazardous road is closed.
  • Excludes generic delays in safety-action implementation where no hazardous-road closure process is identified.
Reports
3

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
5

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
4

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department for Transport1
Derbyshire Constabulary1
Norfolk County Council1
South Wales Fire and Rescue Service1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Barry John HOWARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry John Howard entered flood water at an unbridged ford on 13 December 2023, after warning signs were not visible, and his car was swept into the river. He was found deceased in the almost completely submerged car on 14 December 2023. Concerns included inadequate and poorly positioned warning signs, delayed or insufficient road-closure measures, and other risks associated with the ford and road surface.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in implementing guideline-compliant permanent road-closure measures

    Wider context from the report

    “v. The insufficiency of the temporary road closed signs used and the lack of more permanent measures, in accordance with guidelines, once the closure lasted more than 24 hours. It was only a week prior to the inquest, some 7 months after this death, that action was taken. I am concerned that such lengthy delays to implement safety measures will lead to a risk in future incidents at this and possibly other locations. ”

    Source location

    Barry John HOWARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate permanent closure and other longer-term treatment options for Shotesham Ford through a feasibility assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A specific safety review has also been undertaken by the Council at Shotesham Ford. This has involved an initial scoping of options for addressing the specific issues identified at Shotesham, which has developed into a full feasibility assessment of alternative treatments at this location.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install immovable barriers and associated robust closure measures at Shotesham Ford.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) As stated above, a detailed safety review of Shotesham Ford has been undertaken and a number of actions have already been completed, with further planned. In addition, regular inspections have been undertaken to assess the safety of reopening the ford on a weekly basis and the results of these, combined with the groundwater challenges explained above, have resulted in the ford remaining closed to traffic. Despite regular complaints from local residents and businesses, this remains the case. Given the longer than expected ongoing nature of this closure and evidence to suggest that the road closed warning signs and barriers were being ignored by motorists, the Council therefore recently improved the barriers, by way of installing immovable barriers, to ensure motorists could not continue ignoring the warning signs and barriers.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain Shotesham Ford’s closure until the feasibility work is completed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In summary, given the concerns raised in the Regulation 28 Report, together with the fluctuating and higher than usual water levels at Shotesham, the Council deems it is not safe to reopen Shotesham Ford at the current time and the option of permanent closure to ensure public safety is being evaluated by the Council as part of the feasibility assessment of longer-term options at Shotesham. Until the completion of this feasibility work, which is expected later this year, the ford will remain closed.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk County Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

  2. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Russell William Sherwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Russell William Sherwood was found deceased in his vehicle after it was swept into flood water on New Inn Road, Bridgend. The concerns related to the Fire Service leaving the scene while flooding continued to pose a risk to life, without closing the road or leaving warning signs, and to limitations in equipment and protocols for road closures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of equipment for closing highways

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that having rescued a motorist from flooding, at a time when the flooding continued to pose a risk to life, the Fire Service Unit departed the scene before the Highways authority arrived and without closing the road or leaving any warning signs. (2) The evidence further revealed that South Wales Fire and Rescue Service Units do not carry equipment to close highways and they only carry enough equipment to make a road safe when dealing with an incident. Furthermore, it was stated in evidence that the Fire Service rely on the Highways authority or the Police to carry out road closures and Fire Service protocols do not permit the closure of roads. ”

    Source location

    Russell William Sherwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain road safety while flooding continues to pose a risk to life

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that having rescued a motorist from flooding, at a time when the flooding continued to pose a risk to life, the Fire Service Unit departed the scene before the Highways authority arrived and without closing the road or leaving any warning signs. (2) The evidence further revealed that South Wales Fire and Rescue Service Units do not carry equipment to close highways and they only carry enough equipment to make a road safe when dealing with an incident. Furthermore, it was stated in evidence that the Fire Service rely on the Highways authority or the Police to carry out road closures and Fire Service protocols do not permit the closure of roads. ”

    Source location

    Russell William Sherwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Fire Service arrangements to enable road closure

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that having rescued a motorist from flooding, at a time when the flooding continued to pose a risk to life, the Fire Service Unit departed the scene before the Highways authority arrived and without closing the road or leaving any warning signs. (2) The evidence further revealed that South Wales Fire and Rescue Service Units do not carry equipment to close highways and they only carry enough equipment to make a road safe when dealing with an incident. Furthermore, it was stated in evidence that the Fire Service rely on the Highways authority or the Police to carry out road closures and Fire Service protocols do not permit the closure of roads. ”

    Source location

    Russell William Sherwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a comprehensive review of operating procedures, including consideration of the coroner’s recommendations and flooding and inland water emergency response arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are pleased to confirm that your recommendations for action ("your Recommendations"), as set out at paragraph 6 on page 2 of your Report, are currently being considered by the Service as part of its overarching response to the Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (Wales) (Amendment) Order 2017 ("the Order"). For your information, the Order creates a new statutory duty for Fire and Rescue Authorities to make provision from 1 April 2017 for responding to flooding and inland water emergencies which present a risk of death, serious injury or serious illness to people.”

    Source location

    2017-0192-Response-by-South-Wales-Fire-and-Rescue-Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 August 2017

    Open published response

  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Ryan Reece Bramwell and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert John Graham died after his car was struck by an out-of-control Mercedes on the A619 on 13 November 2009. The following day, Ryan Reece Bramwell and Richard Alan Barker were among the occupants of a Ford Escort that aquaplaned while overtaking, collided with an ambulance and entered an embankment. The concerns identified were the placement of tyres with greater tread depth on the front rather than the rear, and limited awareness among Derbyshire police officers of powers to close hazardous roads.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of awareness among police officers of statutory powers to close hazardous roads

    Wider context from the report

    “(B) During the course of the taking of evidence it became apparent that not all officers within the police service in Derbyshire are aware of their statutory rights to require a road to be closed and to remain closed for up to 7 days for reasons of safety. Indeed, the Traffic Sergeant giving evidence appeared unaware of this power. Had he been aware of this he might have used that power to keep the road closed until it was deemed no longer hazardous. It would seem sensible that all officers, but especially those specifically directed towards road-policing, should be made aware of this power. (FOR THE CHIEF CONSTABLE) ”

    Source location

    Ryan Reece Bramwell and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026