Recurring concern

Unreliable ambulance call triage and re-triage

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 11 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the ambulance call triage and re-triage process, including initial clinical validation, categorisation, evidence-based category changes, recognition of new or worsening symptoms, timely re-triage and escalation to a more urgent response.

Not included

  • Excludes generic ambulance response delays or resource shortages where the triage or re-triage decision is not deficient.
  • Excludes failures in communicating dispatch status or expected response times after a triage decision has been made.
  • Excludes downstream ambulance attendance, hospital handover or clinical treatment failures that do not concern ambulance call triage or re-triage.
  • Excludes non-ambulance triage processes unless the report explicitly identifies the same ambulance call triage concern.
Reports
50

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
61

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
72

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care12
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives8
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust5
NHS Pathways5
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors4
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
College of Paramedics2
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
NHS West and North London Integrated Care Board2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver Charles Major Shelley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Charles Major Shelley became seriously unwell on 22 July 2024 with symptoms including a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced consciousness. After no ambulance was dispatched, his parents took him to hospital, where he was treated for meningococcal septicaemia but died approximately 7.5 hours after arrival. The report identified concerns about the lack of a sepsis algorithm for emergency medical advisors and the training and description of those advisors’ role.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway for emergency medical advisors during 111/999 calls

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway to assist the emergency medical advisor (EMA) during 111/999 calls At 14:51 hours on 22nd July 2024, Oliver’s parents called 999 indicating their concern that Oliver was suffering from meningitis as he was suffering from a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced level of consciousness. The EMA began a triage using NHS Pathways algorithm but as they were unable to prioritise any of the listed symptoms, they requested operational support at 14:57 hours, to ask if there was a meningitis pathway within the system. This call was concluded at 15:51 with the EMA indicating to Oliver’s parents that a call back was scheduled within 20 minutes. A call back was not undertaken until 1 hr and 41 minutes later and in the absence of a response a further unsuccessful call was made 2 hrs and 18 minutes later before Secamb closed the referral. In the meantime, Oliver’s parents made the decision to convey Oliver to hospital arriving there at around 15:55 hours. On attendance it was recognised that Oliver was gravely unwell and despite maximal supportive management sadly died from overwhelming meningococcal septicaemia 7.5 hours after his arrival. In their investigation, Secamb acknowledged that the EMA’s management of the 999 call was not compliant and have taken the opportunity to offer ongoing training. However, it was also recognised EMA’s found it challenging to triage individuals when multiple signs and symptoms were present in relation to a possible sepsis diagnosis and that having a dedicated sepsis algorithm would assist them in being able to provide an appropriate response to callers and to ensure appropriate management. This has important implications for prioritising ambulance disposition, which may also include the ability of a paramedic to attend at the earliest opportunity to give antibiotics. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Charles Major Shelley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A separate sepsis algorithm pathway is unnecessary because sepsis screening is embedded across multiple symptom-based NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is noted that the health advisor sought advice from a Senior Non-Clinician as they wanted to know if there was a specific Pathway for meningitis before then passing the case to the clinical queue for inability to prioritise a main symptom. It is important to highlight that as NHS Pathways is a non-diagnostic clinical assessment tool 'Meningitis' (or any other condition) would not present as a pathway option, however, questions regarding septicaemia and meningitis are covered in a variety of symptom-based pathways and when answered positively result in an ambulance dispatch. In essence, rather than one ‘sepsis algorithm’ pathway, NHS Pathways has embedded a ‘sepsis’ algorithm into a wide range of symptom-based pathways where sepsis could”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 September 2026

    Open published response
  2. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Edna May Wiggett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edna May Wiggett fell at home and sustained a fractured hip, underwent surgery, and later died from heart failure following surgery. The report identified a failure to re-triage a second ambulance call reporting increased pain, leading to delays in dispatch and a prolonged wait on the floor, which more than minimally contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to re-triage and re-classify cases when subsequent relevant information is received

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) the failure to re-triage Mrs. Wiggett’s case and consider a re-classification following receipt of a second call providing relevant information (an increase in pain) leading to delays in the dispatch of an ambulance. ”

    Source location

    Edna May Wiggett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a Patient Safety and Experience Newsletter article reminding staff to re-triage calls when presentations change.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A re-triage at the point of the second call was unlikely to have resulted in a higher categorisation as pain is not included within the triage questions, set out by the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS – the system used to triage 999 calls). However an article was published in the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Patient Safety and Experience Newsletter to remind staff to re-triage these types of call and this will also be discussed at the Learning Group where potential themes are discussed. This information could have been included in the investigation report to assist the court and this has been communicated internally for consideration.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss re-triage learning and potential themes at the Learning Group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A re-triage at the point of the second call was unlikely to have resulted in a higher categorisation as pain is not included within the triage questions, set out by the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS – the system used to triage 999 calls). However an article was published in the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Patient Safety and Experience Newsletter to remind staff to re-triage these types of call and this will also be discussed at the Learning Group where potential themes are discussed. This information could have been included in the investigation report to assist the court and this has been communicated internally for consideration.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Re-triage at the second call was unlikely to produce a higher categorisation because pain is excluded from AMPDS triage questions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A re-triage at the point of the second call was unlikely to have resulted in a higher categorisation as pain is not included within the triage questions, set out by the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS – the system used to triage 999 calls). However an article was published in the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Patient Safety and Experience Newsletter to remind staff to re-triage these types of call and this will also be discussed at the Learning Group where potential themes are discussed. This information could have been included in the investigation report to assist the court and this has been communicated internally for consideration.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Yunus Hoque · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Yunus Hoque, aged 13, became increasingly unwell with a viral infection and Group A streptococcal infection before suffering respiratory and cardiac arrest after a delayed ambulance response. The principal concern was that, when an ambulance response is significantly delayed beyond the time indicated to the caller, there was no follow-up communication to reassess the patient, inform the caller of the delay, or identify deterioration requiring a more urgent response.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to update ambulance response categorization when a patient's condition deteriorates during a delayed response

    Wider context from the report

    “6. However, it is apparent that in circumstances where there is a significant delay over and above that indicated to the caller, there is no follow-up call or communication to indicate further delay, to confirm the status of the patient, or to suggest that alternative transport is required, if possible. Notwithstanding this, in a changing situation, a patient may deteriorate, moving from Category 2 to Category 1 and therefore requiring a more urgent response: as was apparent from the evidence at this inquest. But a patient, family member and / or carer who relies upon information already provided by the call handler, may continue to wait for an ambulance that they have been told will arrive in a given period of time, when in reality there is no likelihood of that ambulance arriving. At the same time, NWAS will be proceeding on the basis that they are dealing with a Category 2 when the case has now become a Category 1. ”

    Source location

    Yunus Hoque · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have senior clinicians regularly review and reprioritise waiting ambulance calls according to potential deterioration and clinical need.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When patients are waiting for an ambulance, I can confirm that the calls are regularly reviewed by senior clinicians”

    Source location

    Response from NWAS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide interim care and worsening-condition advice before closing ambulance calls, enabling callers to seek reassessment when circumstances change.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, prior to the closure of each call, we provide interim care advice which gives the caller advice on how to care for the patient until the ambulance arrives. Full worsening advice is also provided, advising the caller to contact 999 straight away if there are any changes in the condition of the patient, if they are worried about the patient, or if they have any other concerns. This creates the opportunity for the patient’s condition to be re-triaged and the appropriate categorisation to be elicited for their symptoms and condition.”

    Source location

    Response from NWAS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase clinician telephone triage and referrals to alternative care pathways to support ambulance availability for Category 1 and 2 patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the above I would like to highlight that NWAS has made significant improvement in its Category 1 and 2 response times since Yunus’ death. This has been achieved by improving the number of responding ambulances available for dispatch by employing more Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians. We have also increased the number of clinicians telephoning patients to complete a full clinical triage and referring into alternative pathways of care. This enables our responding ambulances to attend to our most critically unwell patients who require a Category 1 or 2 response.”

    Source location

    Response from NWAS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS considers accurate estimates, worsening advice, clinical oversight and reprioritisation the most effective response to prolonged ambulance waits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, prior to the closure of each call, we provide interim care advice which gives the caller advice on how to care for the patient until the ambulance arrives. Full worsening advice is also provided, advising the caller to contact 999 straight away if there are any changes in the condition of the patient, if they are worried about the patient, or if they have any other concerns. This creates the opportunity for the patient’s condition to be re-triaged and the appropriate categorisation to be elicited for their symptoms and condition.”

    Source location

    Response from NWAS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 March 2026

    Open published response
  4. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Scott Darren Taylor died at Basildon Hospital on 13 August 2022 following multiorgan failure and rhabdomyolysis associated with cocaine use, physical exertion, prone restraint and Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome. The report raised concerns about inconsistent ambulance response categorisation for acute behavioural disturbance with active restraint, terminology and training, police training, and the removal of restraints during conveyance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent ambulance response categorisation for Acute Behavioural Disturbance with active restraint

    Wider context from the report

    “b. The East of England Ambulance NHS Trust provide ambulance services across 6 counties and that also includes police/healthcare professionals reporting Acute Behavioural Disturbance and active police restraint. There is concern that there is a different response applied and that this discrepancy between Category 1 and Category 2 responses is significant and could affect the survival of patients. Evidence heard from police trainers and expert witnesses is that Acute Behavioural Disturbance has a high rate of fatality and requires an urgent response, particularly where police officers with training in this condition are reporting to ambulance service and with active restraint. ”

    Source location

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to clearly link Acute Behavioural Disturbance and active restraint to Category 1 ambulance triage

    Wider context from the report

    “a. Members of the public were restraining Scott Taylor on arrival of the police who quickly became concerned that Mr Taylor was exhibiting signs of Acute Behavioural Disturbance and made an emergency call to the ambulance service. The police, during the 999 call, were put on hold on three occasions by the ambulance service and became increasingly concerned about Mr Taylor’s deteriorating condition over an 18 minute period and confirmation that this remained a Category 2 call despite active police restraint with suspected Acute Behavioural Disturbance. Police decided to ‘scoop and run’ and urgently convey Mr Taylor to hospital due to the severity of their concerns. The EEAST Standard Operating Procedure requires escalation to Category 1 where there is active restraint, but this is not linked to Acute Behavioural Disturbance and remains unclear and may continue to cause confusion during triage by contact call handlers. ”

    Source location

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confusing terminology for Acute Behavioural Disturbance in ambulance triage training materials

    Wider context from the report

    “d. The EEAST documents continue to use the term ‘Excited Delirium’ interchangeable in some of the training materials and this may lead to confusion with contact handlers triaging calls. ”

    Source location

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a standalone procedure for suspected or confirmed Acute Behavioural Disturbance, removing “excited delirium” terminology and requiring Category 1 escalation with clinical review for possible downgrade.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the inquest a working group was set up with the intention of revising the guidance for patients exhibiting signs of Acute Behavioural Disturbance and establishing the most appropriate way to respond to those patients within the Emergency Operations Centre.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update, approve and disseminate the detained-patient procedure and Emergency Operations Centre escalation guidance to reflect the Acute Behavioural Disturbance procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The procedure has also been updated to reflect that a Category 1 coding is now applied to all calls where the police are actively restraining a patient; or reporting agitation/behaviour changes; or the police use the term Acute Behavioural Disturbance. The call handler will immediately escalate this to a Call Handler Team Leader who will upgrade the call to a Category 1 and the response will be dispatched on this basis. If, at this point, the Call Handler Team Leader or Dispatcher believe this may not be a Category 1 call, the call will be highlighted to a Clinical Navigator who will complete a clinical review and triage to establish if a downgrade is required.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National ambulance response categories are determined by NHS England’s ECPAG, not by AACE.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the required classification for ambulance response to emergencies, AACE do not set the categories nationally of ambulance response. Ambulance call codes are determined by NHS England by the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG). We are aware that cases of suspected ABD should be assigned a Category 2 response, which is the immediate dispatch of an emergency ambulance. However, ambulance services are advised that a senior clinician within the”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

    Open published response
  5. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Theo Gordon Tuikubulau · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Theo Gordon Tuikubulau, a three-year-old boy, died on 8 July 2022 from sepsis arising from an invasive Group A streptococcal infection. The report identified variation between the MPDS and NHS Pathways triage systems in assessing respiratory distress and cyanosis in children under five, resulting in different ambulance response categories for similar symptoms. The report stated that this two-tiered system continued to exist while work to review and align the systems had not yet occurred.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent assessment, triage and ambulance categorisation of urgent breathing complaints across MPDS and NHS Pathways

    Wider context from the report

    “The difference in assessment and triage of calls under these two systems appears to create a two-tiered system of assessment and ambulance categorisation in the Devon area (and potentially nationally). It appears that similar breathing complaints requiring urgent medical attention will result in a different ambulance disposition depending on whether the call is triaged via MPDS (used by the 999 provider in Devon) or NHS Pathways (used by the 111 provider in Devon). As a result of the evidence heard at the inquest I considered it likely that my duty to prevent future deaths was engaged in this case. However, I was conscious that I did not hear evidence directly from those responsible for the NHS Pathways or MPDS systems during the inquest. I therefore requested further information from both of the organisations responsible for NHS Pathways and MPDS about why there appears to be a two tier system in Devon (and potentially nationally) which would result in a different ambulance categorisation (category 1 under MPDS and category 2 under NHS Pathways) when a caller describes breathing difficulties such as "fighting for breath", "turning blue", or "gasping". Further I asked that if this two tier system does exist, either in Devon, nationally or both, for further information about what is being done to address those differences in call assessment, triage and ambulance categorisation. On 26 November 2025 I was provided with an independent case review from the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch ("IAED"). They had reviewed the calls triaged via the MPDS system and confirmed that these calls had been properly assigned a category 1 response time. They were unable to comment on the calls triaged by NHS Pathways as it has no association with that algorithm. On 4 September 2025 I was provided with further information from NHS England about the Triage systems in place. They confirmed that: "MPDS is a long-established triage system launched in 1979, published by the Priority Dispatch Corporation (PDC), and its ongoing development is supported by the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED)… NHS England does not manage or oversee the MPDS and we are therefore unable to provide comment on their system. NHS Pathways is a Clinical Decision Support System (CDSS) used for remote clinical assessment in urgent and emergency care. NHS Pathways was launched in 2005 and is developed and maintained by the Transformation Directorate at NHS England, and is overseen by the National Clinical Assurance Group (NCAG), an independent intercollegiate body hosted by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges. It underpins all NHS 111 services and more than half of England’s 999 telephony services… …Both triage systems are designed to assess the presenting symptoms/condition and acuity (severity and urgency of the symptoms/condition) of the patient based on the identification of priority symptoms (e.g. unconsciousness, difficulty breathing or chest pain). If, during the call, the patient’s condition changed (either improves or worsens), then there is an exception that the call handler will re-triage with the new information which may change the response being arranged." The response from NHS England further confirmed that: "Following a review of this case by NHS England’s Urgent & Emergency Care (UEC) Teams, it is clear that there is variation between the two triage systems with regards to respiratory distress in children under 5, specifically in relation to the management of declared cyanosis (where the patient’s skin or lips have turned blue or grey). If a caller volunteers ‘cyanosis’, they will be recognised as having ineffective breathing through the MPDS triage. However, the presence of cyanosis is not interrogated within NHS Pathways and as such this symptom/sign is not a specific trigger for generating a Category 1 disposition for ineffective breathing within NHS Pathways, instead resulting in the generation of a Respiratory Distress disposition that is mapped to a Category 2 response." I was advised within the letter that NHS England will work with the clinical coding groups and NHS Pathways to review this to ensure that the triage and categorisation of ineffective breathing and respiratory distress is consistent across the two triage systems and remains clinically appropriate, for which I am grateful. However, as this has not yet occurred and the two tiered triage system continues to exist, so does my duty to make a report to prevent future deaths in this matter. ”

    Source location

    Theo Gordon Tuikubulau · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the MPDS and NHS Pathways triage systems with clinical groups, ambulance services and providers to assess respiratory-distress consistency and clinical appropriateness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises the concern that the triage and categorisation of ineffective breathing and respiratory distress is still not consistent across the two triage systems; NHS Pathways and the Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS). NHS England had informed you that a review would be undertaken of this, to ensure that the two triage systems are consistent and remain clinically appropriate. As you have not been informed that the review has occurred, this remains a concern.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase clinical support and oversight in 999 Emergency Operations Centres to enable reassessment and potential re-categorisation of high-risk patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although the MPDS and NHS Pathways use different triage methodologies, following our review, NHS England is assured that no system changes are required to maintain patient safety and consistency. Both triage systems consistently generate a Category 1 ambulance response for patients presenting with the same high-acuity clinical symptoms. In addition, strengthened clinical oversight within 999 Emergency Operations Centres provides significant further mitigation for patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue refining and aligning the MPDS and NHS Pathways triage systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England welcomes the feedback from HM Coroner and will continue to refine and align both systems, monitor categorisation, and strengthen clinical oversight. I hope that this further response sufficiently addresses the outstanding concern raised within your Report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring triage categorisation and strengthening clinical oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There has been a significant increase in clinical support within 999 Emergency Operations Centres, providing enhanced oversight for patients who may not initially receive a Category 1 triage outcome, but who may benefit from clinical reassessment and potential ambulance re-categorisation. This includes patients at the extremes of age and those presenting with symptoms such as severe breathing difficulty.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Both MPDS and NHS Pathways would produce a category 1 response for another child presenting as Theo did, if triaged appropriately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The information above confirms that another child presenting as Theo did would result in a category 1 response being reached, when triaged appropriately using either MPDS or NHS Pathways.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England (2)
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The two triage systems use different methodologies but consistently produce the same highest categorisation for patients with the relevant high-acuity symptoms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although the MPDS and NHS Pathways use different triage methodologies, following our review, NHS England is assured that no system changes are required to maintain patient safety and consistency. Both triage systems consistently generate a Category 1 ambulance response for patients presenting with the same high-acuity clinical symptoms. In addition, strengthened clinical oversight within 999 Emergency Operations Centres provides significant further mitigation for patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No triage system changes are required because existing clinical oversight and alignment between the systems are considered sufficient to maintain patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although the MPDS and NHS Pathways use different triage methodologies, following our review, NHS England is assured that no system changes are required to maintain patient safety and consistency. Both triage systems consistently generate a Category 1 ambulance response for patients presenting with the same high-acuity clinical symptoms. In addition, strengthened clinical oversight within 999 Emergency Operations Centres provides significant further mitigation for patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 January 2026

    Open published response
  6. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Aubrey GARFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lewis Aubrey Garfield suffered an intracerebral haemorrhage at home on 4 December 2024, fell down the stairs, and was taken to John Radcliffe Hospital, where he died on 8 December 2024. Concerns included delays in clinical review and ambulance attendance, inadequate guidance to the family while awaiting an ambulance, and delays handing patients over from ambulances to hospitals, with wider delays affecting patient flow and ambulance availability.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to base triage category changes on evidence of clinical change or deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “a) It was not clear if information about the symptoms taken by SCAS was adequate or if it had been recorded or conveyed by them accurately/completely. It was odd that the call was upgraded to category 2, just 14 minutes after being designated a category 3, without any evidence that there had been a change or deterioration. ”

    Source location

    Lewis Aubrey GARFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The second call was upgraded because the patient’s condition deteriorated and accurate triage information became available.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have asked the SCAS legal team to provide you with copies of call recordings for the calls that were taken so that you can be satisfied that the information captured during the call triage was accurate. It is evident from the second 999 call that there had been a change and deterioration in Mr Garfield’s condition, and he had unfortunately fallen again after the first 999 call was made. The Emergency Call Taker was also able to obtain answers to the questions”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response
  7. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Miles Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Miles Robinson developed chest pains and vomiting on 19 December 2022 and experienced delays and incorrect triage after his granddaughter called 999. He travelled by Uber to an urgent treatment centre, where he suffered a cardiac arrest, and died at 06:36 after further cardiac arrests. The principal concerns were the incorrect categorisation of the 999 call and the rigidity of the triage system, alongside ambulance allocation and dispatch delays that may place patients reporting a heart attack at risk of death before an ambulance arrives.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of MPDS chest-pain triage to identify reported heart attacks for a Category 1 response

    Wider context from the report

    “In the UK, 999 calls are triaged using one of two approved triage tools (also referred to as call prioritisation systems) approved by NHS England: the Medical Priority Dispatch System (“MPDS”) and NHS Pathways. LAS uses MPDS. The MPDS looks at signs and symptoms and prioritises them into dispatch codes, which assign a level of priority to the call, and in turn inform the type of ambulance resource that will be allocated to manage the incident. MPDS is designed for use by non-clinical call handlers. MPDS involves a system of structured questions which identify priority symptoms and thereby the clinical need of patients. The structured questions fall into different protocols and a patient can be shunted, or moved, between one protocol and another depending on the answers to specific questions. In these circumstances, and for sound operational reasons, there is necessarily an element of rigidity in the MPDS. In Mr Robinson’s case, LAS accepted that the first 999 call was incorrectly triaged and received an inaccurate categorisation of the urgency of the response required: it was allocated a Category 3 (urgent) rather than Category 2 (emergency) response. Given the rigidity of the structured questions, there was no capacity within MPDS to account for information provided on behalf of Mr Robinson during the first 999 call, namely that he thought and felt like he was having a heart attack. The evidence heard at the inquest was that: (1) there are no individual MPDS determinants, under the relevant protocol, Protocol 10 (Chest Pain), that are specific for a heart attack; and (2) under the MPDS this information (reporting a heart attack) would not result in a dispatch code justifying a Category 1 (life threatening) response, with an average response time of 7 minutes and 90% of calls responded to within 15 minutes. This means that for a patient who is conscious and breathing, but reporting a heart attack, the highest possible category of emergency response on the MPDS Chest Protocol is Category 2 (average response 18 minutes; 90% calls within 40 minutes). However, this rigidity and categorisation may give rise to a risk of future death, namely: the risk their heart attack leads to a cardiac arrest immediately or shortly following the cessation of the call, and because they are on their own, they are unable to re-call 999; and/or the cardiac arrest may cause their death prior to a Category 2 (or subsequent Category 1) ambulance arriving at their location. This risk also arises in the context of increasing nationwide demand on UK ambulance services which has given rise to delays in allocation and dispatch of ambulances. ”

    Source location

    Miles Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    John Stephen England · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Stephen England developed abdominal pain and increasing distention while on holiday in Cornwall on 12 March 2023, after a history of recurrent sigmoid volvulus. Delays occurred in ambulance arrival, transfer into hospital, and escalation of the CT findings; he underwent surgery for ischaemic and gangrenous bowel and died in hospital on 15 March 2023 after an acute collapse during placement of a naso-gastric tube. The principal concern was whether the ambulance dispatch system could distinguish surgical emergencies requiring conveyance within an appropriate timeframe.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the ambulance triage system to distinguish abdominal complaints and assign timely hospital-conveyance dispositions

    Wider context from the report

    “1) At the time of the initial call to South West Ambulance Service Trust, Mr England reported that he thought he had a ‘twisted bowel.’ This had happened to him on five previous occasions in Gloucester when medical intervention had been required four times to decompress a sigmoid volvulus. The call handler, using the MDPS system, reached a Category 5 disposition. Two experts who gave evidence at inquest, ████████, a Consultant Surgeon, and ████████, a Consultant Gastroenterologist, both felt Mr England needed to be conveyed to hospital within two hours which I believe would have required a Category 3 disposition. As both the fact of a delay and its causative relevance were admitted by the Trust, the detail of the call and the questions asked to reach a disposition were not enquired into at inquest. Evidence was heard, however, that upon audit it was felt the call handler had achieved a high degree of compliance with expected standards. This raises a concern whether the system is sufficiently nuanced to distinguish between different types of abdominal complaints and to ensure that those who need to be recognised as a surgical emergency receive a disposition resulting in a patient being conveyed to hospital within an appropriate timeframe. ”

    Source location

    John Stephen England · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss the abdominal pain case within the AMPDS clinical coding subgroup with PDC to identify opportunities to improve assessment and differentiation of surgical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To respond directly to the Coroner’s concerns on abdominal pain, NHS England has obtained the specific details of this case from SWASFT, which will be discussed within the NHS England AMPDS clinical coding sub-group, in collaboration with PDC, to determine if there are opportunities to improve the assessment and differentiation of abdominal pain presentations within the AMPDS triage system. NHS England has additionally shared the Coroner’s concerns with PDC, who have outlined that they welcome the opportunity to review any dispatch-specific, non-visual interrogation suggestions to further improve the discovery of surgical emergencies associated with the complaint of abdominal pain.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Telephone triage cannot make differential diagnoses requiring visual, historical and diagnostic information unavailable during the call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “symptoms of severe blood loss, such as a decreased level of consciousness, fainting or near fainting, or an ash-grey colour, are prioritised. Moreover, patients within a common cardiac age range (patients aged 35 years and older) are further assessed and coded based on their age and the location of the pain. However, whilst the AMPDS system’s Abdominal Pain Protocol is able to identify and prioritise based on priority symptoms, triage systems are not designed to make differential diagnoses that would require additional visual, historic and diagnostic information that cannot be provided via telephone triage.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Priority Dispatch Corp manages AMPDS protocols and questions, including responsibility for making changes to the commercial international system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• As regards to SWASFT being users of the AMPDS system, the Priority Dispatch Corp (PDC) is responsible for and manages the commercial international AMPDS system, including making any changes to the protocols and questions asked. This may be on the basis of a recommendation from NHS England’s ECPAG, or as part of PDC’s own improvement and triage development work, which draws on its international user base.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Individual ambulance services are responsible for processes and timescales enabling timely clinical navigation and validation of calls requiring further assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During this clinical assessment, the patient’s current condition should be explored as well as considering the past medical history to be able to determine if an ambulance response is required. At the conclusion of the clinical assessment, additional information can be provided to the clinician to the caller about what actions to take if the patient’s condition appears to be worsening or there are any other concerns. Individual ambulance services should have appropriate processes in place to facilitate the timely clinical navigation and validation of all calls that require further clinical assessment. It is critical that services consider their clinical navigation and validation timescales and processes in full to prevent patients from experiencing delays in receiving clinical assessment to identify the appropriate outcome required to meet their clinical needs.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 May 2025

    Open published response
  9. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Lachlan Charles Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lachlan Charles Campbell died on 1 November 2022 after being found outside a railway station in a distressed and possibly drug-affected state, where he remained for several hours in heavy rain and cold conditions. The report identifies concerns about delays in ambulance attendance, incomplete information sharing between ambulance and police services, and police officers not providing shelter, warmth, or timely medical attention. The inquest concluded that these failures contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verify police supervision status when determining ambulance disposition

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Information sharing between SWAST and D&CP. A number of issues were revealed during the course of the evidence. a) A concern for welfare call was received by police at circa 00:15. Officers attended on scene at circa 01:00 and chased an ambulance at 01:42 only to find one had not been previously called resulting in an initial delay of nearly 1.5 hours. b) The initial caller had been a bus driver. His mobile details were not taken and so SWAST was unable to call him back for further information they required. When police officers were asked for their numbers, they provided their shoulder numbers, not their mobile numbers. SWAST thus had incomplete information when considering what disposition was appropriate. c) Police Officers were advised the call had resulted in a Category 2 disposition but were not provided with an ETA. The target time was 18 minutes but an ambulance did not arrive until 06:15, some 4.5 hours later. Had Officers been aware of the likely delays, their evidence was that they would have considered other options (such as conveying Lachlan to hospital in their car.) d) In reaching a Category 2 disposition, SWAST understood the Officers were remaining with Lachlan. In the event, they left him to deal with an unresolved domestic violence incident. At inquest, evidence was given that, had this been known to SWAST, a Category 1/2 disposition may have been reached. e) In the event Officers had concluded there was a need to convey Lachlan to hospital, it would have meant there were no available Officers in the Penzance area. While this is a matter for police to reflect upon, it was notable the Officers’ supervisor was not contacted to discuss options. f) The inquest heard that in other countries (USA) there are arrangements in place for police to drop victims in need of urgent treatment at hospital (eg stabbings) without being detained for extended periods (current handover for ambulance crews in excess of 2 hours.) If ambulance delays are set to continue and police may need increasingly to convey patients to hospital, is there value in considering whether arrangements of this nature would be beneficial? ”

    Source location

    Lachlan Charles Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train control-room personnel to notify the ambulance service when officers attending an urgent incident are redeployed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The potential for redeployment is particularly acute given the relatively large geographic areas of Devon and Cornwall. Our officers are trained to carefully consider the risk of each situation and liaise with our control room in relation to those decisions. If affected officers redeployed, our control room personnel are trained to ensure that SWAST are notified of the deployment.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon and Cornwall Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    SWAST should account for possible police redeployment when conducting its triage and risk assessment for patients needing medical attention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Devon and Cornwall Police understand that SWAST will factor police presence at a scene of someone needing medical attention into their triage / risk assessment process when determining whether to attend such an incident. If our officers are called to an urgent or potentially life-threatening incident, then they could be redeployed. Accordingly, Devon & Cornwall Police’s position is that this possibility should be factored into the aforementioned SWAST triage / risk assessment process.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon and Cornwall Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 March 2025

    Open published response
  10. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Jeffrey Martin Tyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jeffrey Martin Tyler called emergency services with chest pains and difficulty breathing, but his condition deteriorated while he was alone at home. An ambulance arrived several hours later, and his death was confirmed by paramedics on 20 February 2024. The substantive concern was that, despite his deterioration and being alone and in extremis, the emergency call remained categorised as Amber 1, with a reported waiting time of between 5 and 7 hours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to revise ambulance priority when a patient is deteriorating and in extremis

    Wider context from the report

    “In evidence I found that the call handlers had been following the correct algorithm as dictated by the nationally adopted Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS), and that he was appropriately categorised as requiring an Amber 1 ambulance. However, it would also have been clear to any clinician that he was deteriorating and was in the process of having a cardiac event. Mr Tyler was on his own and could not inform the ambulance service if his condition deteriorated. Despite Mr Tyler being alone and being in extremis, the MPDS Code was maintained at Amber 1. The waiting time was between 5 and 7 hours. ”

    Source location

    Jeffrey Martin Tyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a national group of clinical and operational leads to review measures for incidents outside the purple and red categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over the next two months, a review will be undertaken to consider whether measures are required for incidents not categorised in the purple or red categories. This will include conditions which currently fall in the ‘amber’ category such as symptoms of a stroke or heart attack. To drive the review, we are establishing a national group of clinical and operational leads to review and consider measures for these conditions. WAST will consider the findings of this additional review before finalising changes to its clinical model.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a review of whether measures are required for incidents outside the purple and red categories, including relevant amber conditions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over the next two months, a review will be undertaken to consider whether measures are required for incidents not categorised in the purple or red categories. This will include conditions which currently fall in the ‘amber’ category such as symptoms of a stroke or heart attack. To drive the review, we are establishing a national group of clinical and operational leads to review and consider measures for these conditions. WAST will consider the findings of this additional review before finalising changes to its clinical model.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek assurance at the next integrated quality planning and delivery meeting on call categorisation and provision of clinically appropriate responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I hold the Chair of WAST to account for oversight of the delivery of those expectations through regular meetings. Officials also hold the Chief Executive Officer and his executive team to account through bimonthly integrated quality planning and delivery (IQPD) meetings where progress against key performance targets is scrutinised and assurance on the quality and safety of services is sought. I have asked officials to seek assurance on the process of categorisation of calls and steps taken by the Trust to ensure service users receive the right response for their clinical need at the next IQPD meeting to be held on 24 April 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Welsh Ministers do not deliver health services or make WAST’s operational decisions on emergency ambulance call categorisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, it is important to note, that the Welsh Ministers are not responsible for the delivery of health services in Wales. Instead, Local Health Boards (LHBs) are responsible for planning, commissioning and delivering services for the population of its area and NHS Trusts are responsible for the delivery of services across Wales within the national policy framework set by the Welsh Ministers.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    WAST is responsible for operational emergency ambulance call categorisation and is best placed to respond to required action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Welsh Ambulance Services National Health Service Trust (Establishment) Order 1998 establishes the Welsh Ambulance Services University National Health Service Trust (WAST). Article 3 delegates the function of managing the ambulance service to WAST.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026