Recurring concern

Unreliable ambulance call triage and re-triage

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 11 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the ambulance call triage and re-triage process, including initial clinical validation, categorisation, evidence-based category changes, recognition of new or worsening symptoms, timely re-triage and escalation to a more urgent response.

Not included

  • Excludes generic ambulance response delays or resource shortages where the triage or re-triage decision is not deficient.
  • Excludes failures in communicating dispatch status or expected response times after a triage decision has been made.
  • Excludes downstream ambulance attendance, hospital handover or clinical treatment failures that do not concern ambulance call triage or re-triage.
  • Excludes non-ambulance triage processes unless the report explicitly identifies the same ambulance call triage concern.
Reports
50

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
61

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
72

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care12
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives8
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust5
NHS Pathways5
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors4
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
College of Paramedics2
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
NHS West and North London Integrated Care Board2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Joan Margaret McIndoe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joan Margaret McIndoe was found unresponsive in the shower at her retirement complex after an alarm was activated and the call centre was unable to contact her. The ambulance call was categorised as a Category 4 response, and concerns were raised about the automatic categorisation of such calls and the lack of clarity about updates after a call centre contacts the ambulance service, particularly while the alarm continued to activate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to distinguish calls from residential facilities where contact cannot be established from calls where contact is lost during the call

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest was told that all such calls as this from residential facilities where contact cannot be established with the resident are automatically categorised as a Category 4 response by the ambulance service. This is in contrast to where a call is initiated and then contact is lost during the call. ”

    Source location

    Joan Margaret McIndoe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The AACE cannot mandate or instruct ambulance services, limiting its authority to require implementation of responsive safety changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AACE provides central support and co-ordination to ambulance services to assist with implementation of national policy and the improvement of patient care. Although the AACE is not constituted to mandate or instruct ambulance services, it facilitates and enables the development of good practice. This includes consideration of concerns identified by coroners, where the AACE’s National Ambulance Medical Directors Group will discuss and disseminate learning from Prevention of Future Deaths reports. The concerns in your report have been brought to the attention of the AACE.”

    Source location

    2020-0138-Response-from-Dept-for-Health-and-Social-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 September 2020

    Open published response
  2. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Helen Jayne SHEATH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Helen Jayne Sheath, who had a recent history of self-harm and suicidal ideation, ingested a fatal dose of sodium nitrate at home and died in hospital on 20 August 2018. Concerns included the initial ambulance call being coded as Category 3 rather than Category 2, subsequent delays in ambulance attendance, and the Community Mental Health Team leaving her home before gaining access despite being alerted to her threats to self-harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to code uncertain self-harm ingestion calls as Category 2

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Helen’s father first called ambulance services at 18.20 hours on 2018 which was before he had ingested the sodium nitrate. EAS’s investigation report stated that “from the information provided on this call, that Helen had locked herself in the bathroom and was threatening to self-harm by ingesting a substance, the call handler selected the set of questions titled “Psychiatric/Abnormal Behaviour/Suicide Attempt” and the call was coded as a Category 3. This call has been audited by the Quality Assurance Team and was correctly coded and the correct set of questions used” …yet a Category 3 call is for patients who have potentially urgent conditions that are not life threatening and yet Helen had a history of suicide ideation and her father was unable to tell, being the other side of the locked door, whether the substance had been taken or not. In view of both Helen’s past medical history and the fact that her father had no knowledge as to whether the substance had been ingested or not at that stage, it seemed to the Court that an assumption that an overdose had been taken ought to have been made and this first call, therefore, coded as a Category 2; ”

    Source location

    Helen Jayne SHEATH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to code uncertain self-harm ingestion calls as Category 2

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) If the first call had been coded as a Category 2, it seems likely that the RRV, Mental Health Street Triage Team (and even possibly the original DSA) would have arrived on scene much earlier (potentially just before or just after Helen had ingested the sodium nitrate) which could potentially have altered the outcome. ”

    Source location

    Helen Jayne SHEATH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage ambulance trusts to implement early clinical review of calls involving patients threatening suicide.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A person that is threatening suicide does not constitute a life-threatening emergency and therefore doesn’t warrant a higher category of response but, given the potential for a small number of these cases to become potentially life threatening, early clinical review of these calls is recommended. NASMeD has previously encouraged all ambulance trusts to implement clinical review of these cases in support of the letter sent by Professor ████████ in April 2019.”

    Source location

    2020-0107-Response-from-Association-of-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandating or instructing ambulance services is outside the organisation’s constitution and authority.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “AACE is a private company owned by the English Ambulance NHS Trusts. It exists to provide ambulance services with a central organisation that supports, coordinates and implements nationally agreed policy. Our primary focus is the ongoing development of the English ambulance services and the improvement of patient care. We are a company owned by NHS organisations and possess the intellectual property rights of the JRCALC UK ambulance service clinical practice guidelines. AACE is not constituted to mandate or instruct ambulance service however we do have national influence via the regular meetings of ambulance Chief Executives and Trust Chairs along with a network of national specialist sub-groups. One of our specialist sub groups is the National Ambulance Service Medical Directors (NASMeD) and this response therefore is from AACE and has been informed by NASMeD.”

    Source location

    2020-0107-Response-from-Association-of-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ECPAG, an NHS England-led group, is responsible for approving changes to clinical code sets and response categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The response categories are set by the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG), an NHS England led group responsible for the governance, control and approval of any change to clinical code sets (aligning codes to response categories).”

    Source location

    2020-0107-Response-from-Association-of-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2020

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shanté Andrée Marie Turay-Thomas ate hazelnuts on 18 September 2018 and died soon afterwards from acute anaphylaxis. The report identifies concerns about inadequate allergy care, advice and training concerning adrenaline auto-injectors, prescribing and clinical communication, and errors in the NHS 111 response and ambulance categorisation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistency in anaphylaxis ambulance categorisation between 999 and 111 services

    Wider context from the report

    “16. The individuals making these errors were working within the context of NHS Digital’s categorisation of anaphylaxis as needing a category 2 ambulance rather than a category 1 ambulance, on the Adastra computer system that supports the LCW 111 service. This was the wrong categorisation and not the categorisation that the call would have received if 999 had been called and the London Ambulance Service contacted in the first instance. Acute anaphylaxis is immediately life threatening and must be treated as a category 1. I heard at inquest that NHS Digital has since changed its categorisation. However, I also heard that for those areas (I think approximately half the country, though this is not completely clear to me), where the 999 service and the 111 service are supported by different computer systems rather than the same system being common to both services, there could remain inconsistencies of categorisation between 999 and 111. Even where there are inconsistencies in categorisation, the 999 service will not re-categorise following a 111 clinician’s categorisation, unless a 999 clinician has spoken to the patient, so inappropriate 111 categorisation will not be safety netted by the 999 service. This must be recognised and factored in. ”

    Source location

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the 999 service to safety-net inappropriate 111 categorisation

    Wider context from the report

    “16. The individuals making these errors were working within the context of NHS Digital’s categorisation of anaphylaxis as needing a category 2 ambulance rather than a category 1 ambulance, on the Adastra computer system that supports the LCW 111 service. This was the wrong categorisation and not the categorisation that the call would have received if 999 had been called and the London Ambulance Service contacted in the first instance. Acute anaphylaxis is immediately life threatening and must be treated as a category 1. I heard at inquest that NHS Digital has since changed its categorisation. However, I also heard that for those areas (I think approximately half the country, though this is not completely clear to me), where the 999 service and the 111 service are supported by different computer systems rather than the same system being common to both services, there could remain inconsistencies of categorisation between 999 and 111. Even where there are inconsistencies in categorisation, the 999 service will not re-categorise following a 111 clinician’s categorisation, unless a 999 clinician has spoken to the patient, so inappropriate 111 categorisation will not be safety netted by the 999 service. This must be recognised and factored in. ”

    Source location

    Shanté Andrée Marie TURAY-THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change NHS Pathways ambulance categorisation so symptoms suggesting life-threatening anaphylaxis receive a category 1 response, and deploy the changes nationally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Ambulance Response Program, NHS England led (supported by NASMED and ECPAG) a “clinical coding review” in May 2019, reviewing the category 1 ambulance response definition. Consequently, it was decided that symptoms which may suggest life-threatening anaphylaxis should receive a category 1 ambulance response and the necessary changes were made by NHS Pathways. These were beta tested in September 2019 and deployed nationally from October 2019.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue participating in ambulance user groups to share data, discuss cases, exchange learning, and support triage-system improvements through feedback mechanisms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS, as an MPDS user for its 999 services and an NHS Pathways user for its 111 services, attend the relevant user groups with other ambulance trusts and fully participate in such meetings, where there is the opportunity to share data back and forth, discuss cases of note and share learning in order to make continual improvements through the feedback mechanisms to NHS Digital and the Academy at PDC process. The LAS will discuss the findings of PFD report at such user groups. Ultimately, however, changes to how the triage system operates are a matter for the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED) where MPDS (owned by PDC) is concerned, or for NHS Digital under their national clinical governance group where NHS Pathways is concerned.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with NHS England and other partners, and request resolution of inconsistent anaphylaxis coding between AMPDS and NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In line with the evidence you heard, at the time of this incident there was an inconsistency in the way in which AMPDS and NHS Pathways categorised anaphylactic shock. Whilst the technicalities of how the respective triage systems operate would be more appropriately commented on by others, it is worth noting that the tools have fundamentally different architecture and methods of operation. They are always likely to produce differing outcomes however we have worked closely with NHS England and other partners to reduce the variation as far as possible.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambulance categorisation and alignment of NHS Pathways with MPDS are not NHS Digital’s responsibility or oversight function.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance response categorisation, and the alignment of different triage systems, is not the responsibility of NHS Digital. This was set out in the following submissions made on behalf of NHS Digital:”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England oversees both systems and must address ambulance categorisation or inconsistencies between MPDS and NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is the organisation charged with overseeing both NHS Pathways and MPDS, and has the remit and ability to review potential inconsistencies or change ambulance categorisation. Accordingly, concerns regarding ambulance categorisation or inconsistencies between MPDS and NHS Pathways can only be properly answered by NHS England.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Established NHS Pathways governance systems capture, review and resolve clinical coding issues, including those raised through Prevention of Future Deaths reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to NHS Pathways specifically, I am advised that there are established governance systems in place to capture, review and resolve issues relating to clinical coding (including from Prevention of Future Deaths reports); and to ensure latest clinical advice and guidance is reflected in call categorisation. Independent clinical scrutiny of NHS Pathways is provided by a National Clinical Governance Group that includes representatives of medical Royal Colleges.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ECPAG, acting for NHS England, controls ambulance categorisation and can identify inconsistencies between NHS Pathways and MPDS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Response Priority for each MPDS determinant descriptor – being the Category of ambulance it requires – is set by ECPAG. This is because final decisions about categorisation are made by ECPAG on behalf of NHS England. It is, therefore, this organisation (if any) who has the power to take the action the learned Coroner is seeking at sub-paragraph 3 above and, where possible, would be capable of identifying any inconsistencies between the categories of ambulance assigned to dispositions within the NHS Digital system on the one hand and PDC on the other, in relation to acute anaphylaxis and otherwise.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changes to MPDS and NHS Pathways operation are matters for IAED and NHS Digital respectively.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS, as an MPDS user for its 999 services and an NHS Pathways user for its 111 services, attend the relevant user groups with other ambulance trusts and fully participate in such meetings, where there is the opportunity to share data back and forth, discuss cases of note and share learning in order to make continual improvements through the feedback mechanisms to NHS Digital and the Academy at PDC process. The LAS will discuss the findings of PFD report at such user groups. Ultimately, however, changes to how the triage system operates are a matter for the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED) where MPDS (owned by PDC) is concerned, or for NHS Digital under their national clinical governance group where NHS Pathways is concerned.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ECPAG has limited ability to align NHS Pathways and MPDS because the systems use different methodologies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From the LAS’s understanding however, there are limitations to ECPAG’s ability to align the two systems – NHS Pathways and MPDS – as they operate differently and have two different methodologies for reaching a triage decision.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-London-Ambulance-Service_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No remaining anaphylaxis categorisation inconsistency exists between NHS 111 and ambulance services because 111 incidents pass directly into ambulance dispatch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report makes the observation that inconsistency may remain in parts of the country where NHS Pathways is in use by the 111 provider and AMPDS is in use by the ambulance trust. I do not believe that is the case and, having consulted with clinical and operational colleagues within AACE, I cannot conceive of a circumstance where an incidence of anaphylaxis would be categorised as Cat 1 by the 111 provider but result in a different categorisation by the ambulance trust. Once categorised by 111 incidents are passed directly to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system of the ambulance trust bypassing any further call handling or other intervention. The incident would present as a Cat 1 to the ambulance dispatcher who would allocate an ambulance response.”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An independent body, rather than NHS Digital, should conduct the review of clinical triage systems because NHS Digital provides the NHS 111 Pathways system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Independent review of clinical triage systems”

    Source location

    2020-0124-Response-from-Advanced_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2020

    Open published response
  4. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Paul Mclean · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Paul Mclean died on 9 October 2018 after prolonged status epilepticus, following an emergency call to the Welsh Ambulance Service on 22 July 2018. The initial call was downgraded from code red to amber, resulting in an approximately 80-minute response instead of the anticipated 15–20 minutes; the jury found that the extended response contributed to prolonged status epilepticus and his subsequent death. The principal concerns related to seizure-call question scripting and categorisation, recognition of airway problems, and communication pathways between the ambulance service, prison healthcare operators, and hospital clinicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ask callers how long the patient has been fitting

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The adequacy/accuracy of the scripting of questions for seizure/fitting calls. In particular, and in relation to code 12D02 calls (post 19.6.19) the requirement for a healthcare professional to call back after 20 minutes of continuous fitting to trigger a call upgrade from Amber 1 to Red. In an email from ████████ of 17.10.19 @ 07.11 and read to the court, it was confirmed that the question is not currently asked of the caller to WAST, how long has the patient been fitting? This would appear to be a crucial piece of information in order to ascertain as accurately as possible, the known timing of the onset of the fit, for the purposes of determining when the 20minutes has elapsed. E.g. if it is known that the patient has already been fitting for 10 minutes, then the advice to call back should be in 10 minutes hence. If the fit has just commenced, then obviously, that advice can be for a 20 minute call back. ”

    Source location

    Mr Paul Mclean · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consistently categorise non-maintenance of airways as a continuous red code

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The wider issue of whether a response from a healthcare professional (to a question(s) posed by a call handler) that the patient is not maintaining his/her airways should in itself trigger/categorise a continuous red code. The evidence of ████████ at the Inquest, was that such a scenario was of the highest clinical priority, as the patient had a high risk of cardiac arrest in such circumstances. There appeared some tension in the evidence surrounding the 12D01/02/03 categorisation as to which code would be triggered on the volunteering, or otherwise of this indication from the caller. ”

    Source location

    Mr Paul Mclean · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing MPDS triage, clinical support and escalation arrangements are considered sufficient to prioritise healthcare professional calls appropriately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To overcome this, the Trust now use the questions through the Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS), to ensure that all patients across Wales are treated with parity, including HCP requests. HCP calls are consequently prioritised as Red where it is clinically appropriate.”

    Source location

    2019-0347-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing pan-Wales CPAS governance framework and international MPDS system are considered sufficient for best-practice call categorisation without a separate hospital pathway.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Whether there is, or should exist, a clear pathway for dialogue between the Princess of Wales Hospital Emergency Department clinicians and WAST in relation to best practice for call categorisation. In particular, whether there should be regular input from the emergency department consultants at the Princess of Wales Hospital into the CPAS group for the purposes of assisting in relation to the appropriate categorisation of calls.”

    Source location

    2019-0347-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 November 2019

    Open published response
  5. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alf REWIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alf Rewin died at Wexham Park Hospital on 22 November 2018 after taking an overdose of Quetiapine, Methylphenidate and Duloxetine and becoming unresponsive before arrival. The principal concern was that overdose cases could receive a Category 3 ambulance response with a target of up to 120 minutes, despite the risk of unconsciousness, cardiac arrest or other potentially fatal events requiring earlier attendance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of overdose call categorisation to ensure timely ambulance response

    Wider context from the report

    “The National Ambulance Call Categories prescribed by NHS Pathways to ambulance services, including South Central Ambulance Service, who were the attending service in relation to Alf Rewin's death, indicate that an individual contacting emergency services himself or herself, having taken an overdose may be triaged through the national call handling pathway to a Category 3 Urgent Call. This category currently prescribes a target ambulance within 120 minutes. There is a concern that in cases of overdose, the patient is at risk of becoming unconscious or having a cardiac arrest or other potentially fatal event and will be unable to contact emergency services or be contacted by them subsequently, such that his or her call should at that stage then be regarded as Category 1 (with a 7 minute response time) or Category 2 (with an 18 minute response time). In Alf Rewin’s case, there existed a local policy to override the Category 3 120-minute response in overdose cases to provide a specific triage which could lead to a Category 2 18-minute response (although the 18-minute response was not, in fact, implemented at the outset in Alf Rewin’s case and he was initially allocated the national Category 3 response). It is understood that the national categorisation of overdose cases is under review. Whilst the Category 3 120-minute target may be the standard, subject to local variation, in relation to overdose cases where the patient is conscious, the risk of deaths arising during this period remains where the circumstances of the overdose might enable some counteractive treatment to be given, or successful resuscitation measures to be carried out, if there were to be earlier attendance and / or earlier hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Alf REWIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deploy Release 18, including the Dx0124 disposition code, to identify higher-risk suicide cases for early clinical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Release 18 changes:”

    Source location

    2019-0469-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 7 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a disposition code for symptomatic accidental-overdose patients, subject to National Clinical Governance Group review, to enable urgent clinical risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Pathways has also recognised that those patients who have overdosed without suicidal intent and have symptoms (and so receive a Dx012 disposition and Category 3 ambulance) would benefit from having the same visibility within the Category 3 cohort as those with suicidal intent, so they can also be easily identified by clinicians working within ambulance control rooms for urgent remote clinical assessment of the risk to life. Further work by the NHS Pathways team is commencing in this area and, subject to review by the National Clinical Governance Group, a new disposition code will be introduced (similar to Dx0124) to enable this to occur. The Ambulance Response Programme will be made aware of this proposed change.”

    Source location

    2019-0469-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 7 · response
    Published 7 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambulance response standards and category mappings are set by NHS England, not by NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “National ambulance call categories are not prescribed by NHS Pathways to ambulance services.”

    Source location

    2019-0469-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Pathways cannot automatically identify higher-risk overdoses from drugs taken because closed questions cannot safely capture the relevant variables.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A) Assessment of drugs taken”

    Source location

    2019-0469-Response-by-NHS-Digital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 7 October 2019

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Joseph Kevin Lafferty · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joseph Kevin Lafferty, who had dementia and required 24-hour residential care, left The Cedars Rest Home unsupervised and was found outside the care home with serious injuries after a fall. He was taken to hospital and died on 24 June 2018; the inquest concluded that he died following the fall and access to an area of the grounds not intended for resident access. Concerns included that external areas of registered premises were not required to be routinely included in CQC inspections, and that the ambulance dispatch system did not specifically take the patient’s age into account when determining response speed and acuity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of priority dispatch systems to take patient age into account when determining response speed and acuity

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest, evidence was heard to the effect that, like other ambulance services, North West Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust utilises a priority dispatch system to triage calls whereby the answers callers gave to standard questions determined the level of response provided, and the timescales within which a response can ordinarily be expected. It is a matter of concern that, according to the evidence of the Care Quality Commission Inspector who gave evidence at court, there is no requirement on inspectors to include external aspects of a registered premises in the course of a CQC inspection in every case. It is a matter of concern that the system in use at this and other ambulance Trusts does not specifically take into account the age of the patient when determining the speed and acuity of response to be provided. ”

    Source location

    Joseph Kevin Lafferty · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Woods · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Woods died on 26 January 2019 while a patient at the Emergency Department of Bassetlaw District General Hospital after experiencing symptoms consistent with a cardiac event and subsequently suffering cardiac arrest. The report identified concerns about delays in ambulance dispatch for category 2 calls involving possible cardiac events and the failure to administer Amiodarone. It stated that these failings prevented her from having the best possible chance of survival, although it could not be concluded that either caused or contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Category 2 ambulance response allocations outside clinical need for patients with symptoms consistent with a cardiac event

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Patients requiring an emergency ambulance response reporting symptoms consistent with a cardiac event, but who are not yet in cardiac arrest, may wait up to 40 minutes for a category 2 response in line with the current national response times. (2) To combat this perceived inadequacy in nationally agreed response times, the East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust has developed an adjunct to the protocol by triaging all non-category 1 calls to upgrade calls such as Mrs Woods for a priority response. However, resources do not permit each and every call to be triaged, and Mrs Wood’s call was not triaged before she went into cardiac arrest. If the system for national response times is having to be supported by local adjuncts to the system, this rather suggests that the allocation of these calls in category 2 lies outside of clinical need. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Woods · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient resources for triage of all non-category 1 emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Patients requiring an emergency ambulance response reporting symptoms consistent with a cardiac event, but who are not yet in cardiac arrest, may wait up to 40 minutes for a category 2 response in line with the current national response times. (2) To combat this perceived inadequacy in nationally agreed response times, the East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust has developed an adjunct to the protocol by triaging all non-category 1 calls to upgrade calls such as Mrs Woods for a priority response. However, resources do not permit each and every call to be triaged, and Mrs Wood’s call was not triaged before she went into cardiac arrest. If the system for national response times is having to be supported by local adjuncts to the system, this rather suggests that the allocation of these calls in category 2 lies outside of clinical need. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Woods · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Jonathan Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Jonathan Davies, aged 52, became unresponsive after contacting emergency services about pains down his arms and back and died at home before the ambulance arrived. The inquest recorded that he died from an acute myocardial infarction and that delayed medical treatment may have contributed to his death. The report raised concerns that chest pains and related conditions were categorised as Amber 1 rather than Red, resulting in a response time of up to four hours and potentially putting patients’ lives at risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to categorise conscious, breathing patients with chest pains and related conditions as Category Red

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the inquest the Welsh Ambulance Service Trust disclosed that in 2015 chest pains and related conditions were removed from the Red categorisation and placed in an Amber 1 categorisation whenever the patient is conscious and breathing. The inquest heard that in England (or in parts thereof) chest pains and related conditions remain as attracting a Category Red response. 2. The effect of removing chest pains and related conditions from Category Red is the response time, previously 8 minutes, is now up to 4 hours and often patients are advised to make their own way to hospital. 3. This puts patients’ lives at risk and in this inquest may have contributed to the death of Mr Davies. ”

    Source location

    Michael Jonathan Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The response model appropriately assigns red priority only to chest-pain calls involving unconsciousness and absent breathing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you explored during the inquest, each ambulance service has a response model that supports the categorisation given to each call (irrespective of which prioritisation system is used). That response model and the decisions made will reflect the demographics of the population and the geography being served by that individual ambulance service. I notice that you have relied on evidence informing your view and subsequently raising the noted concerns that England (or parts thereof) have some chest pains as a red category of call, requiring an 8 minute response. I would respectfully draw to your attention to the fact that England operates a national system of response prioritisation (following the introduction of the Ambulance Response Program (ARP).”

    Source location

    2019-0134-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  9. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terrence Smith died in hospital on 13 November 2013 after developing amphetamine-induced Excited Delirium/Acute Behavioural Disturbance, being subjected to prolonged restraint, and stopping breathing while being transported to hospital. The principal concerns included failures to recognise the condition as a medical emergency, inadequate assessment and training, excessive restraint, delayed conveyance to hospital, and deficiencies in relevant emergency response, clinical, police and custody policies and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of call-handling provision for identifying unrecognised ED/ABD presentations

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that, whilst waiting for version 17 of NHS Pathways, SECAMB has provided its call handlers with guidance (by way of a “Hot Topic”) that a call from the Police or a Health Care Professional stating that a patient is suffering ED/ABD should be given a category 2 response. I was also told, however, that SECAMB’s call handlers have no discretion when using NHS Pathways which must be followed precisely. I have three concerns about the current situation. First, there appears to be a contradiction between the call handlers being told they have no discretion when using NHS Pathways and their being given additional guidance for certain calls. This contradiction could cause confusion. Secondly, the guidance given in the “Hot Topic” is concerned only with calls from the Police or an HCP in which ED/ABD is identified. Currently, therefore, there is no provision for identifying the condition in calls from the Police or an HCP which do not expressly mention ED/ABD or in calls from the public (meaning the call from Terry’s family would still not be recognised as a call relating to ED/ABD, even today). Thirdly, the “Hot Topic” does not guide the call handlers to ask whether the patient is under restraint. If a patient suffering ED/ABD is under restraint this could add to his risk of sudden death and this information could affect the proper categorisation of the response to the call. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance call-triage tools to support recognition and appropriate response to ED/ABD

    Wider context from the report

    “The version of NHS Pathways currently in use is version 16 which does not enable operators to recognise potential ED / ABD and respond accordingly. I was told that it is intended that version 17 will do so but this is not yet in use. My concern is that, unless and until it is in use, there will continue to be a failure by call handlers to recognise ED/ABD and respond appropriately. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Faith Gudgeon collapsed at home after being diagnosed with a water infection and remained on the floor for a prolonged period. Her call was assessed as requiring a category three response, and substantial delays followed before ambulance attendance, hospital admission and treatment; she died on 25 May 2018 despite treatment for infection and sepsis. The principal concerns were the triage and escalation of her call, shortages of ambulance resources, and the effectiveness of EMAS capacity management arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lower priority allocation by the ‘111’ Pathway triaging system than by the ‘999’ AMPDS system

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It was suggested in evidence that if the same facts are inputted into the ‘999’ AMPDS triaging system they are likely to allocate a higher priority to the call than the ‘111’ Pathway triaging system would. ”

    Source location

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ‘111’ and EMAS call handling systems to treat neurological signs as urgent

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Triaging by ‘111’ and EMAS call handling systems, including in relation to sepsis. In the present case, Mrs Gudgeon had collapsed, passed out, been confused and had been vomiting. These are signs of central nervous system/neurological problems but were not regarded as urgent. Despite EMAS being told that Mrs Gudgeon may have a urinary tract infection, no escalation occurred. ”

    Source location

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share concerns about NHS Pathways’ ability to identify possible sepsis with the software developers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over the last year we have shared our concerns regarding NHS Pathways ability to pick up possible sepsis effectively and have fed our concerns back to them. This has resulted in changes to NHS Pathways in both versions 15 and 16. We have taken this call through NHS Pathways version 16 to try to identify the likely outcome had this version been in place at the time of the call. In version 16 the severely ill and new marks question has changed significantly. Firstly the 2 parts have now been split into separate questions. Due to concerns that the severely ill part of the question was too subjective this has been altered to “so ill they have stopped doing all normal activities”. The new marks part of the question is separate and triggered by answering the so ill they have stopped doing all normal activities question positively. The wording of the new marks part is unchanged.”

    Source location

    2019-0015-Response-by-111-East-Midlands-CIC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 April 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The triage systems would not have warranted a Category 2 ambulance without both severe illness and new marks being present.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The call has been reviewed against NHS Pathways version 14, which was in use at the time of the call. The key question relates to whether the patient was severely ill. The response from the son was unclear in answering this question. The Health Advisor (who is trained in the use of NHS Pathways, but who is not a clinician) could have probed this question more appropriately by utilising the supporting clarification information within NHS Pathways in order to get a clearer answer to this question. However, in order for this question to have been answered positively there is a second part to the question which asks whether the patient has new marks like bruising or bleeding under the skin. Both severely ill and the new marks have to be present in order for this question to be answered positively.”

    Source location

    2019-0015-Response-by-111-East-Midlands-CIC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 April 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026