Recurring concern

Unsafe medication administration

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First reported 19 Sep 2013•Latest report 19 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to the end-to-end administration of prescribed medicines, including staff competence and supervision, administration accuracy and timing, monitoring, verification of ingestion, access and stock control, documentation, and follow-up of missed or incorrect doses.

Not included

  • Excludes prescribing-only, medication-selection or clinical-review deficiencies where the concern is not tied to administration.
  • Excludes hazards involving counterfeit or unlawfully supplied medicines outside the administering organisation's medication-administration system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping, staffing or training deficiencies that are not specifically dedicated to safe medication administration.
  • Excludes failures concerning unrelated information-sharing, assessment or care processes merely occurring in the same case.
Reports
115

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
147

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
192

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission7
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care6
Ministry of Justice4
NHS England4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Nursing and Midwifery Council3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Care UK2
Hc-One Limited2
Leeds Prison2
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Iris May GRIMWOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Iris May GRIMWOOD, aged 80, died at Pilgrim Hospital on 8 October 2013 as a result of progressive neurological disease. Concerns were raised about difficulties providing the nursing care she needed, including errors in using semi-automatic thermometers and an attempted application of an antifungal ointment prescribed for oral thrush to her genital region.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer topical medication to the correct body site

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence from medical staff at Pilgrim Hospital and members of Iris's family included expressions of concern that there were difficulties in providing the level of nursing care that Iris needed. Evidence was also given that mistakes were made in the use of semi-automatic thermometers for measuring body temperature and an episode was described where a nurse attempted to apply an antifungal ointment to Iris's genital region, this having been prescribed for the treatment of oral thrush, before being stopped by a family member. The medical staff attributed these problems to less than optimal numbers of nursing staff, compounded by difficulties in recruitment and retention of nursing staff as well as problems with funding training. ”

    Source location

    Iris May GRIMWOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL arrived at A & E on 28 March 2014 after approximately three days of confusion, abdominal pain and vomiting, with raised inflammatory markers. The concerns included delayed antibiotics, failures to refer him to the Critical Care Outreach Team when his NEWS was elevated, inadequate withdrawal treatment, failures in managing constipation, poor handover and communication, and serious omissions in the Medical Administration Record.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed PABRINEX

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Whilst it is noted that Mr. HILL was admitted at lunchtime on a Friday and the critical events took place over a weekend, nonetheless he was known to be an intravenous heroin user on a Methadone prescription and yet he was given no treatment for withdrawal treatment save for 2mg of Diazepam on the 28th March at 22:15 hours and another 2mg of Diazepam at 09:00 on the 30th March. Also on the 30th March PABRINEX was considered and he was written up for this, although this was not given. On the 30th March at 09:50 hours he was given 5ml of METHADONE and later at 13:00 on the 30th March he was given another 5ml of Methadone. (NB: His daily Methadone prescription was 50ml) ”

    Source location

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain complete and legible Medical Administration Records

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) There are serious omissions on the Medical Administration Record. I was told that it was believed that no Senior Pharmacist reviewed the MAR charts over a weekend. Given the importance of medicating patients correctly, it would seem advisable that there should be a review, if indeed it is the practice that records are not reviewed. It seems that in this particular case the charts are particularly poorly written and perhaps those involved with this patient would benefit from a discussion with the Chief Pharmacist. ”

    Source location

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Edward John Devlin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edward John Devlin was found dead in his cell at HMP Durham on 17 July 2011, having died from the effects of dihydrocodeine. The report raised concerns that medication, including potentially dangerous drugs, may have been slid under locked cell doors without confirming receipt or administration, creating risks of diversion, inaccurate medication records, stockpiling and potentially lethal overdose. It also found that his physical condition on the night before his death warranted medical assessment, but no such assessment was carried out.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unauthorised appropriation, trading and stockpiling of patient medication

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) It was stated by a nurse that he had, while dispensing medication to Mr Devlin and other patient on F wing, slid strips of medication including dihydrocodeine under locked cell doors instead of handing it to the patient. (2) He claimed this was his own common practice and was also common practice amongst nursing staff on F wing. This was in relation to potentially dangerous and/or tradable drugs like dihydrocodeine. (3) If this were the case, no one would know whether a patient is taking the medication intended for him. (4) Further, other healthcare professionals, assuming that medication was being taken by the patient, could base a future diagnosis upon this which would be potentially flawed. (5) Assessing any other patient would become fraught with uncertainty as healthcare professionals could never know for certain what medication had been taken by him. (6) The concomitant concern with 3, 4 and 5 above would be that the system whereby the dispensing of drugs is recorded by signatures of nurse and patient is either being ignored or subject to forgery. (7) Further, no one would know whether somebody else was appropriating that patient’s medication. (8) Depending on the type of medication, this may be traded within the establishment raising security concerns. (9) The drugs could be stockpiled with a view to creating a potentially lethal overdose. ”

    Source location

    Edward John Devlin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement procedures to stop administering medication by sliding it under cell doors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the cell door. This was limited to night time medication rounds as the requirement to open a cell door when in patrol state requires a senior prison officer to be present and the working arrangements at the time did not always allow this. At the time this was highlighted as a clinical risk and not appropriate. Procedures were therefore put in place to ensure this practice ceased.”

    Source location

    Response from Care UK
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 July 2014

    Open published response
  4. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Maria De Oliveria Alva LOPES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maria De Oliveria Alva LOPES died on 9 September 2012 after developing severe sepsis from an obstructing ureteric stone, followed by septic shock, multiorgan failure and rhabdomyolysis associated with propofol-related infusion syndrome. The principal concerns included delayed recognition and escalation of sepsis, delays in intensive care admission and treatment, inadequate supervision and control of propofol use, and insufficient monitoring for propofol-related complications.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about propofol infusion duration, volume and dose

    Wider context from the report

    “10. Lack of clarity to the length, volume and dose of propofol infusion to be given in ITU ”

    Source location

    Maria De Oliveria Alva LOPES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    ALBERT FLYNN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Albert Flynn, a resident of Appleton Manor Residential Home, was taken to hospital with a suspected deep vein thrombosis and treated with the blood-thinning drug Enoxaparin. The following night he was left in a chair for approximately 10 hours without food, fluids or prescribed medication, while staff were unable to rouse him. He was suffering from a severe cerebral bleed, which was fatal; concerns included inadequate staff training and failure to recognise the significance of his condition and recent blood-thinning treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Whilst the care staff members were apparently concerned as to the condition of Mr Flynn, none of them was sufficiently well trained or qualified to make an informed decision as to how he should be treated. 2. As a result of the above, he was left sitting in a chair, partially dressed, without food, fluid or medication for a period of approximately 10 hours. 3. None of the staff gave any indication of any, or any proper, training in the assessment of this type of event, nor did they attribute any or any sufficient weight to the fact that he had been administered blood thinning drugs the previous day. 4. The staff did not seem to appreciate the importance of administering prescribed medication. ”

    Source location

    ALBERT FLYNN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide additional training and competency assessment to the senior carer involved in the incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The importance of medication being provided at the appropriate time is something that is contained in the routine training and competency assessments undertaken by staff and repeated at annual intervals but conducted more frequently should individual concerns be raised. Senior carer staff involved in this incident will undergo additional training and competency assessment to support her awareness.”

    Source location

    2014-0308-Response-by-Lester-Aldridge-LLP
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 July 2014

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    THOMAS PATRICK MAHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Patrick Maher fell on a ward at Trafford General Hospital on 3 February 2014 and fractured his acetabulum. The report identified concerns about missing clinical records, assessments and alarm arrangements relating to falls risk, delays and problems in transferring him between hospitals, ward placement, medication administration, notification of next of kin, and the transfer of patient notes. The investigation recorded the medical cause of death as chest sepsis, hospital-acquired pneumonia and a left acetabulum fracture of the hip, with other conditions also listed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of nursing staff training and confidence in administering prescribed oral morphine

    Wider context from the report

    “5. On returning to the ward the doctors had prescribed oral morphine but the nursing staff were not trained/confident in giving this so the prescription had to be altered to oral morphine. ”

    Source location

    THOMAS PATRICK MAHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Gary Bradshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gary Bradshaw attended hospital with groin pain and kidney stones, later developed hyperparathyroidism and died during a hospital admission. The report identified concerns including delays and errors in diagnosis and testing, prescribing bendroflumethiazide before blood-test results, discharge before full investigation, inadequate escalation and fluid monitoring, and incomplete clinical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prescribing and administering Bendroflumethiazide before blood test results were known

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The above blood tests were ordered but the patient was prescribed and administered Bendroflumethiazide before the results were known, something which the expert witness described as contra-indicated.(Stockport NHS Trust and The Secretary of State) ”

    Source location

    Gary Bradshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable clinicians to electronically check all outpatient tests ordered in their name.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The above blood tests were ordered but the patient was prescribed and administered Bendroflumathiazide before the results were known, something which the expert witness described as contraindicated ████████ accepted at inquest that it should not have prescribed Bendroflumathiazide without knowing the serum calcium results and will not do so in the future. He had expected to review the results within a week and review his decision but unfortunately that did not happen as he expected.”

    Source location

    2014-0232-Response-2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include cross-disciplinary prescribing-alert capabilities in discussions of requirements with advanced electronic patient-record suppliers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. I was told that a new electronic system of note keeping is being introduced at Stockport and throughout the NHS. I would consider it helpful if the system had a built in flag which highlighted to a doctor that he or she was prescribing drugs before the requested blood/urine test result had been received. Electronic records have moved on considerably since 2011 for example we now have Advantis ED (The Emergency Department electronic record), EPMA (Electronic prescribing and recording of medication administration) and Advantis Ward (ward electronic records in its pilot stage). It is however not possible at present to create a flag or a rule for the circumstance as described i.e. across disciplines (Laboratory/Medication Administration). It is unlikely to be possible in the vast majority, if not all Trusts in the UK.”

    Source location

    2014-0232-Response-2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No Summary Care Record flag for prescribing before test results is planned; the matter is left to doctors’ clinical and professional judgement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the third concern above, I assume you are referring to the Summary Care Record (SCR). I can confirm that flag system functionality is not within existing requirements for the SCR system nor are there any current plans for SCRs or SCR systems to introduce “an in-built ‘flag’ which would highlight to a doctor that he or she was prescribing drugs before the requested blood/urine test results had been received. This is a matter best left to the clinical and professional judgement of the doctor involved, with first-hand knowledge of the patient’s circumstances.”

    Source location

    2014-0232-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A cross-disciplinary electronic alert for prescribing before test results are available cannot currently be created and is unlikely across most UK trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. I was told that a new electronic system of note keeping is being introduced at Stockport and throughout the NHS. I would consider it helpful if the system had a built in flag which highlighted to a doctor that he or she was prescribing drugs before the requested blood/urine test result had been received. Electronic records have moved on considerably since 2011 for example we now have Advantis ED (The Emergency Department electronic record), EPMA (Electronic prescribing and recording of medication administration) and Advantis Ward (ward electronic records in its pilot stage). It is however not possible at present to create a flag or a rule for the circumstance as described i.e. across disciplines (Laboratory/Medication Administration). It is unlikely to be possible in the vast majority, if not all Trusts in the UK.”

    Source location

    2014-0232-Response-2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 May 2014

    Open published response
  8. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Jennifer Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jennifer Tompkins, who was undergoing dialysis while awaiting a kidney transplant, suffered fatal allergic anaphylaxis after receiving an intravenous injection of Tazocin at Kings College Hospital on 6 July 2011. Concerns were raised that Tazocin may have been administered too quickly, indicating possible training issues, and that the early stopping of a vancomycin infusion was not recorded in drug administration records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient training for administration of IV medications

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence at the inquest was that IV Tazocin should be given by slow IV injection. Mr Tindugen’s evidence was that he administered this drug over a period of 7 minutes. Even allowing for some uncertainty as to exact timings, the evidence (as set out in the timings given above) suggests that the drug was in fact administered too quickly. I am therefore concerned that there may be training issues relating to the administration of IV medications in this case. ”

    Source location

    Jennifer Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document IV infusions stopped before full administration

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Both Dr Kon and Mr Tindugen gave evidence that the IV vancomycin infusion was stopped early and before it had been fully administered. My concern is that both witnesses said that this fact would not be routinely documented in the drug administration records, and may not be recorded at all. There was no record in this case that the infusion was stopped early. ”

    Source location

    Jennifer Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Teresa Lonergan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Teresa Lonergan, aged 73, was found dead at home on 4 September 2012 after taking an overdose of morphine that she had hoarded. The concerns included large quantities of prescribed morphine being available, repeat prescriptions and no reported monitoring of her consumption of controlled drugs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to monitor consumption of prescribed controlled drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) At the scene the following bottles of morphine were found: 1 100 ml bottle 10mg/5mls 10% remaining, dated 21/02/12 1 100 ml bottle 10mg/5ml 30% remaining, dated 09/03/12 1 100 ml bottle 10mg/5ml 33% remaining, dated 08/05/12 1 100 ml bottle 10mg/5ml 75% remaining ? date 1 100 ml bottle 10mg/5ml, full, dated 13/07/12 and 3 loose strips of 10mg Zomorph with 23 of 28 remaining It was calculated that if the liquid morphine alone was considered there was 340mg available. The pathologist advised that 100 to 200mg would probably be sufficient to cause a fatality. (2) She was a retired matron. She was visited twice daily by her care worker, who opened her bottles for her as she was not able to do so herself. She did not report any medical instructions from doctors about administration or monitoring. Her GP issued repeat prescriptions of: 10mg Zomorph MR3 capsules 1 dse (issue up to 120), last issued 03/05/12 Morphine sulphate 10mg/5ml qds prn (issue up to 200mls)last issued 11/07/12. This was in addition to regular benzodiazepines and other non controlled analgesia. It was reported that she was visited several times a year by the surgery and kept in contact on the phone. There was no report of any monitoring of her consumption of controlled drugs, but the evidence from the general practice was read. She appeared to continue to draw prescriptions but not consume them as prescribed, thus building up a hoard, and providing the means for a deliberate overdose to be taken. ”

    Source location

    Teresa Lonergan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Teesside

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Ronald Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Ronald Hall, an inmate at HM Holme House Prison, died on 27 March 2009 after causing incised wounds to his neck in a healthcare unit cell. The concerns included inadequate communication and documentation about his mental health and self-harm risk, failures in medication administration and observation, and deficiencies in CCTV quality, monitoring and staff arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “8. Medication was not administered to the deceased on 23 March 2009 and 24 March 2009 as prescribed. (Medical healthcare staff) ”

    Source location

    Andrew Ronald Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026