Recurring concern

Unsafe medication administration

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First reported 19 Sep 2013•Latest report 19 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to the end-to-end administration of prescribed medicines, including staff competence and supervision, administration accuracy and timing, monitoring, verification of ingestion, access and stock control, documentation, and follow-up of missed or incorrect doses.

Not included

  • Excludes prescribing-only, medication-selection or clinical-review deficiencies where the concern is not tied to administration.
  • Excludes hazards involving counterfeit or unlawfully supplied medicines outside the administering organisation's medication-administration system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping, staffing or training deficiencies that are not specifically dedicated to safe medication administration.
  • Excludes failures concerning unrelated information-sharing, assessment or care processes merely occurring in the same case.
Reports
115

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
147

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
192

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission7
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care6
Ministry of Justice4
NHS England4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Nursing and Midwifery Council3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Care UK2
Hc-One Limited2
Leeds Prison2
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Vivien Brunning · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Vivien Brunning was admitted to hospital with sepsis and treated for a kidney stone, during which prescribed Clexane was temporarily held and then omitted on 13 and 14 July 2020. She developed a right brachial artery thrombosis, suffered a stroke during emergency thrombolysis, and died on 25 July 2020. Concerns included missed venous thromboembolism reviews, omitted anticoagulant doses, and failure to report the initial omission through the Trust’s incident reporting system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omissions of prescribed daily low molecular weight heparin injections

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Prescribed daily injections of low molecular weight heparin were omitted on 13th and 14th July 2020 ”

    Source location

    Mrs Vivien Brunning · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Kumbulani MTOMBENI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kumbulani Mtombeni was found deceased at his home on 25 January 2021, with evidence indicating that he intended to take his own life; the inquest conclusion was suicide and the recorded cause of death was methadone toxicity. The principal concerns were how methadone prescribed to another person came into his possession, whether medication audits identified missing medication, and his access to residents’ prescribed medicines through his work as a senior carer.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to control staff access to residents' prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “In the deceased's possession was a ████████ of methadone in the name of ████████. Evidence was given at inquest that Mr ████████ was one of your residents until he died last summer. Mr Mtombeni was a member of your staff and at times had worked as a senior carer and had responsibility for and access to the residents prescribed medications. (1) Can you explain how the methadone was in Mr Mtombeni's possession? (2) Were any audits performed that demonstrated missing medication and if so, what actions were taken? (3) What actions will now be taken in the light of the findings at inquest? ”

    Source location

    Kumbulani MTOMBENI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a robust action plan covering controlled-drug training and ongoing medication monitoring for auditors and managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Due to our findings a robust action plan was developed based on lessons learnt to ensure all auditors and managers understood their obligations under CQC regulations in respect of administration of controlled drugs including training and ongoing monitoring.”

    Source location

    2021-0272-Response-from-Care-Outlook_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 August 2021

    Open published response
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Yusuf Seyit · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Yusuf Seyit had been in hospital since January and, after developing suspected urinary and chest infections, deteriorated into septic shock. He died on 3 July 2019. The concerns were uncertainty about whether there was a plan for timely antibiotic treatment, and uncertainty about when Amikacin was administered despite evidence that it was needed within an hour in septic shock.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to confirm and record timely administration of Amikacin

    Wider context from the report

    “2. When in septic shock in the early hours of 3rd, three antibiotics were prescribed and our initial death report indicated treatment had begun before he died. But the medical records available to the inquest did not confirm when Amikacin was actually administered. Evidence of a consultant physician was that it needed to be within an hour. ”

    Source location

    Mr Yusuf Seyit · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind clinical staff to administer prescribed critical medications within one hour and reinforce this through ward and team meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. The Trust will ensure that all wards are adequately stocked with the paper version of the Sepsis Assessment Bundle, and all clinical staff have been reminded that prescribed critical medications are to be administered to patients within an hour of being prescribed by a doctor. This is discussed at Ward Safety huddles and local team meetings.”

    Source location

    2021-0111-Response-from-University-Hospital-Lewisham-Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust states antibiotics were administered within an hour, disputing that Amikacin administration timing was unconfirmed or late.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. When in septic shock in the early hours of 3rd July 2020, three antibiotics were prescribed, and the Trust initial death report indicated treatment had commenced before he died. However, the medical records available to the inquest did not confirm when Amikacin was actually administered. Evidence provided by a consultant physician confirmed that it needed to be within an hour.”

    Source location

    2021-0111-Response-from-University-Hospital-Lewisham-Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 April 2021

    Open published response
  4. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Raymond Claude Woodhouse · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Raymond Claude Woodhouse had severe Parkinson’s disease and underwent a total knee replacement, after which he developed infections in his elbow and knee and died on 11 February 2019. Concerns included difficulties obtaining staff attention, poor cleanliness, a potential delay in antibiotics, and multiple late or omitted doses of prescribed Parkinson’s medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays or omissions in the administration of prescribed Parkinson’s medication

    Wider context from the report

    “iv) Delays or omissions of prescribed Parkinson’s medication. Matron ████████ had reviewed the nursing records. She accepted in evidence that there were ‘multiple’ occasions when medication was given late and three occasions when it was not given at all. She conceded nursing standards had fallen below what could reasonably be expected. The inquest was told this is a national problem coming out of the difficulties caused where a patient needs time-specific medication that falls outside traditional ward times for the administration of medication. I was also informed that a business case has been prepared for consideration by the Board for the appointment of a specialist Parkinson’s nurse and pharmacist. It was not known whether the case had been accepted and, if so, when it will be taken forward. ”

    Source location

    Raymond Claude Woodhouse · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in the administration of antibiotics

    Wider context from the report

    “iii) Potential delay in the administration of antibiotics. In evidence, Dr ████████ accepted that with the benefit of hindsight this was the case. While it was not causative of the death it was possible this had resulted in an avoidable wash-out in theatre; ”

    Source location

    Raymond Claude Woodhouse · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Douglas Robert Owens developed acute cardiac failure, hypotension, aspiration pneumonia and multi-organ failure after cataract surgery, treatment for raised intraocular pressure, ongoing eye pain and painful urinary retention. He died in intensive care on 7 July 2018. Concerns included arrangements for urgent ophthalmic transfer, specialist assessment, monitoring and review of deterioration, fluid documentation, and recording medication doses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the actual medication dose given

    Wider context from the report

    “(6)That the evidence disclosed the fact that the Once-only and Pre-medication Chart does not make provision for the dose of medication actually given to be recorded in the event that the dose prescribed has been specified as falling within a range (for example, as here, morphine 1-10mg) and that, in any event, the actual dose given was not recorded in that chart. Unless the giving of medication is recorded fully the lives of patients may be put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Once-only and Pre-medication Chart to provide for recording the actual dose when a dose range is prescribed

    Wider context from the report

    “(6)That the evidence disclosed the fact that the Once-only and Pre-medication Chart does not make provision for the dose of medication actually given to be recorded in the event that the dose prescribed has been specified as falling within a range (for example, as here, morphine 1-10mg) and that, in any event, the actual dose given was not recorded in that chart. Unless the giving of medication is recorded fully the lives of patients may be put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require variable medication doses to be recorded in the PRN chart and monitor compliance through the Emergency Department pharmacist.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The once only and pre-medication sections of the chart are to be used for STAT doses only where the exact dose to be given is clearly indicated. Variable doses are written on the PRN section of the chart with the person administering the medication completing the dose given. This is standard practice throughout the hospital and the ED have been reminded of this. The ED pharmacist will monitor to ensure this happens.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Variable medication doses are recorded in the PRN section rather than the once-only chart, reflecting standard hospital practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The once only and pre-medication sections of the chart are to be used for STAT doses only where the exact dose to be given is clearly indicated. Variable doses are written on the PRN section of the chart with the person administering the medication completing the dose given. This is standard practice throughout the hospital and the ED have been reminded of this. The ED pharmacist will monitor to ensure this happens.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Elaine Rose Renshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elaine Rose Renshaw was found unresponsive at home, resuscitated and taken to Tameside General Hospital, where she died on 8 July 2019 after attempts to reverse the effects of morphine were unsuccessful. The inquest identified inaccurate controlled-drug checks and accounting, with concern that the absence of a clear process for recording controlled-drug use could lead to similar problems in other care and nursing homes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of controlled drug checks to identify unaccounted drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest evidence was given that controlled drug checks processes had been such that it was not easily identified that drugs were not accounted for e.g. Stock sheets were inaccurate. The home in question had tightened up its processes since the incident. However the inquest heard that this issue may well arise in the future in other care/nursing home settings as there is no clear process for handling/recording the use of controlled drugs. ”

    Source location

    Elaine Rose Renshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    David Michael Potts · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Michael Potts fell at home while prescribed apixaban and was admitted with an acute subdural haematoma. Beriplex was prescribed to reverse the apixaban but was not given in a timely manner, and staff did not confirm that it had been administered or establish where he was. His bleed extended; after transfer to a local unit, he declined and died seven days later.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish why prescribed medication was not given as ordered

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) That no-one seemed to know why it was not given as ordered or where Mr Potts was on the day in question. ”

    Source location

    David Michael Potts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in giving prescribed Beriplex

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the prescription of Beriplex was not given in a timely manner. ”

    Source location

    David Michael Potts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check administration of prescribed medication after an extension of bleeding

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That no-one checked that it had been given despite an extension of the bleed. ”

    Source location

    David Michael Potts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dorothy June MACEY sustained leg injuries when her legs went through a glass door and was later discharged home with district nurse dressing care. Antibiotics prescribed in September were not received promptly, and concerns were raised about wound assessment, information sharing, record-keeping, sepsis checks, medication monitoring, care planning and a missed visit. She was admitted to hospital for sepsis on 28 September 2018, developed gangrene in her left lower leg, and died at Medway Maritime Hospital on 7 October 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incomplete medication administration charts

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Protocol required district nurses to photograph the leg wounds to assist in the assessment and this was not done on any of the visits. I heard evidence that photographs on the patient electronic record cannot be accessed remotely on home visits limiting the shared information that should be available to conduct an assessment. (2) District nurses did not share information with the GP when it was established that there had been a delay in the prescribed antibiotic treatment regime, and this was not escalated within the team. (3) Incomplete recording- The district nurse electronic care and treatment records on iNurse were: a) very brief and did not contain information necessary to have a comprehensive assessment or understanding of deterioration or improvement in her condition b) difficult to access remotely and showed limited information, therefore the previous nurse attendance could not be seen on particular visits. Evidence was that the record was not accessed prior to the visit on 24th September and the delay in the treatment regime was not understood when antibiotics were requested on that day. (4) A sepsis pathway check was completed on 20th September. This was not completed when antibiotics were requested on 24th September. There is a concern that developing sepsis may be missed in a deteriorating patient. (5) There was no updated care plan in place for her leg dressings. District nurse support staff changed the type of leg dressings without approval of the qualified nurses, evidence was heard that this should not be done without discussion. (6) Medication administration charts completed by carers were incomplete. The antibiotic administration was not checked despite previous issues with the delay in the treatment regime becoming known to district nurses on 20th September. This record was shared with or escalated to the GP for advice when there was a lack of improvement in her condition. (7) A visit required for 28th September was incorrectly scheduled for 1st October and was not picked up within the Missed Visit protocol in place. ”

    Source location

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check antibiotic administration

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Protocol required district nurses to photograph the leg wounds to assist in the assessment and this was not done on any of the visits. I heard evidence that photographs on the patient electronic record cannot be accessed remotely on home visits limiting the shared information that should be available to conduct an assessment. (2) District nurses did not share information with the GP when it was established that there had been a delay in the prescribed antibiotic treatment regime, and this was not escalated within the team. (3) Incomplete recording- The district nurse electronic care and treatment records on iNurse were: a) very brief and did not contain information necessary to have a comprehensive assessment or understanding of deterioration or improvement in her condition b) difficult to access remotely and showed limited information, therefore the previous nurse attendance could not be seen on particular visits. Evidence was that the record was not accessed prior to the visit on 24th September and the delay in the treatment regime was not understood when antibiotics were requested on that day. (4) A sepsis pathway check was completed on 20th September. This was not completed when antibiotics were requested on 24th September. There is a concern that developing sepsis may be missed in a deteriorating patient. (5) There was no updated care plan in place for her leg dressings. District nurse support staff changed the type of leg dressings without approval of the qualified nurses, evidence was heard that this should not be done without discussion. (6) Medication administration charts completed by carers were incomplete. The antibiotic administration was not checked despite previous issues with the delay in the treatment regime becoming known to district nurses on 20th September. This record was shared with or escalated to the GP for advice when there was a lack of improvement in her condition. (7) A visit required for 28th September was incorrectly scheduled for 1st October and was not picked up within the Missed Visit protocol in place. ”

    Source location

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Victor James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Victor James Hall died at Salford Royal Hospital on 29 June 2018 after being admitted with shortness of breath and an exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. He was mistakenly administered Phosphate Polyfusor instead of prescribed sodium bicarbonate after dispensing, pharmacy checking and ward checking errors, although the post-mortem and toxicology evidence concluded that the medication error played no role in his death. Concerns were raised about the similar Polyfusor product design and about medication-checking, recording, dispensing, training and supervision procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check medication packaging and labelling against the prescription chart before administration

    Wider context from the report

    “During the Inquest, evidence was heard that:- 1.Salford Royal Hospital had undertaken an internal investigation and concluded that one of the root causes for the medication error, was the Phosphate Polyfusor product design. i. The Pharmacy and Nursing Matron Lead, concurred that the staff involved in the incident had relied on the word Polyfusor, without actually checking the medication packaging against the prescription chart and label. Salford Royal Hospital, wrote to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in 2018, requesting the word Polyfusor be removed from the Phosphate design product packaging to prevent future medication errors. Despite repeated requests from Salford Royal Hospital for an MHRA update, the product design for Phosphate Polyfusor remains the same. 2. I request that The Chief Executive, Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) reviews the: i. Product design on the Polyfusors in question 3.The Chief Executive, Nursing & Midwifery Council, 23 Portland Place, London W1B 1PZ reviews the: i.Guidance given to their members in relation to the administration of medication to consider and include the simplest of steps, namely that a Healthcare Professional should check the name of the medication on the prescription chart against the name of the medication on the packaging and labelling of the medication at the time of each administration of medication to ensure that the correct medication is always administered to a patient. ii.Guidance given to their members in relation to their duties, to accurately record and contemporaneously document the packaging, label an prescription checks they have undertaken to ensure the correct medication is always administered to a patient. 4.The Chief Executive, Salford Royal Hospital, NHS Trust Hospital, Stott Lane, Salford M6 8HD reviews the: i.Guidance and procedures in relation to the dispensing and transfer of medications from the Pharmacy Department to a ward, to include a system of checking medications against the packaging, labelling and prescription chart at the time of receipt by the ward. Furthermore, to consider documentary evidence of the fact that the medication packaging has been checked against the prescription chart and an acknowledgement of receipt of the correct medication by the pharmacy and ward staff, evidenced by a signature of the recipient. ii.Training, Auditing, Supervision and monitoring of all staff, particularly Nursing and Pharmacy staff, in relation to the above issues. ”

    Source location

    Victor James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient training, auditing, supervision and monitoring of nursing and pharmacy staff on medication checking controls

    Wider context from the report

    “During the Inquest, evidence was heard that:- 1.Salford Royal Hospital had undertaken an internal investigation and concluded that one of the root causes for the medication error, was the Phosphate Polyfusor product design. i. The Pharmacy and Nursing Matron Lead, concurred that the staff involved in the incident had relied on the word Polyfusor, without actually checking the medication packaging against the prescription chart and label. Salford Royal Hospital, wrote to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in 2018, requesting the word Polyfusor be removed from the Phosphate design product packaging to prevent future medication errors. Despite repeated requests from Salford Royal Hospital for an MHRA update, the product design for Phosphate Polyfusor remains the same. 2. I request that The Chief Executive, Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) reviews the: i. Product design on the Polyfusors in question 3.The Chief Executive, Nursing & Midwifery Council, 23 Portland Place, London W1B 1PZ reviews the: i.Guidance given to their members in relation to the administration of medication to consider and include the simplest of steps, namely that a Healthcare Professional should check the name of the medication on the prescription chart against the name of the medication on the packaging and labelling of the medication at the time of each administration of medication to ensure that the correct medication is always administered to a patient. ii.Guidance given to their members in relation to their duties, to accurately record and contemporaneously document the packaging, label an prescription checks they have undertaken to ensure the correct medication is always administered to a patient. 4.The Chief Executive, Salford Royal Hospital, NHS Trust Hospital, Stott Lane, Salford M6 8HD reviews the: i.Guidance and procedures in relation to the dispensing and transfer of medications from the Pharmacy Department to a ward, to include a system of checking medications against the packaging, labelling and prescription chart at the time of receipt by the ward. Furthermore, to consider documentary evidence of the fact that the medication packaging has been checked against the prescription chart and an acknowledgement of receipt of the correct medication by the pharmacy and ward staff, evidenced by a signature of the recipient. ii.Training, Auditing, Supervision and monitoring of all staff, particularly Nursing and Pharmacy staff, in relation to the above issues. ”

    Source location

    Victor James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement closed-loop medication administration using electronic barcode scanning of patients and medications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Implementing “closed loop medication administration” (electronic barcode scanning of patients and medications) to ensure that patient’s receive the right drug at the correct dose by the right route at the intended time. This will indicate to nursing staff (at the point of administration rather than the point of receipt) that the prescribed medication has been correctly sourced. | Digital Team | 30th June 2020”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update accuracy-checking procedures to require a second check for all intravenous fluids.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Updating the accuracy checking procedure which will incorporate a second check for all intravenous fluids. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing an electronic sign off to indicate that key procedures have been read and understood by relevant staff. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Reviewing the number of items required to complete dispensing and accuracy checking logs during induction. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing a formal revalidation procedure for staff involved in dispensing errors | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Introducing a recurrent accuracy checking log for all accuracy checkers to ensure competence. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Identifying formal supervisory duties and responsibilities in the dispensary.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure nursing staff recognise different Polyfusor products and check all medication details in full.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “| ████████ | 29th February 2020 Analysing near miss data to identify common dispensing errors and introducing on-going communication of this to staff. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Reviewing the accuracy checking test to incorporate a wider range of medications. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Monitoring of compliance of medicines safety training completed by nursing staff on Ward H2. | ████████ | Commenced Monitoring of medicine safety incidents on ward H2 | ████████ | Commenced Policy to be published about the process to follow when involved in a medicines safety incident. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 All nursing staff to be made aware that there are many different types of Polyfusor products. In order”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Arrange staff feedback sessions on improvements to clinical checking, dispensing and accuracy-checking processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Preventing staff entering the dispensary unless they have a relevant reason to be in there and so minimise the risk of interruption. This will be enforced with signage and staff awareness at daily huddles. | ████████ | 31st January 2020 Introducing library conditions within the dispensary. | ████████ | Commencing with immediate effect. Changing the exit route (after 5pm) from the department which is currently located next to the accuracy checking area. Staff will exit the department via the pharmacy reception exit, preventing staff using the dispensary as a thoroughfare. | ████████ | 31st January 2020 Arranging feedback sessions for all staff to highlight elements of the clinical check, dispensing and accuracy check processes that need to be improved. Staff will be made aware of this at daily huddles.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce formal revalidation for staff involved in dispensing errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Updating the accuracy checking procedure which will incorporate a second check for all intravenous fluids. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing an electronic sign off to indicate that key procedures have been read and understood by relevant staff. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Reviewing the number of items required to complete dispensing and accuracy checking logs during induction. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing a formal revalidation procedure for staff involved in dispensing errors | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Introducing a recurrent accuracy checking log for all accuracy checkers to ensure competence. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Identifying formal supervisory duties and responsibilities in the dispensary.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a recurring accuracy-checking log for all accuracy checkers to monitor competence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Updating the accuracy checking procedure which will incorporate a second check for all intravenous fluids. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing an electronic sign off to indicate that key procedures have been read and understood by relevant staff. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Reviewing the number of items required to complete dispensing and accuracy checking logs during induction. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing a formal revalidation procedure for staff involved in dispensing errors | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Introducing a recurrent accuracy checking log for all accuracy checkers to ensure competence. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Identifying formal supervisory duties and responsibilities in the dispensary.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the accuracy-checking test to cover a wider range of medications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “| ████████ | 29th February 2020 Analysing near miss data to identify common dispensing errors and introducing on-going communication of this to staff. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Reviewing the accuracy checking test to incorporate a wider range of medications. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Monitoring of compliance of medicines safety training completed by nursing staff on Ward H2. | ████████ | Commenced Monitoring of medicine safety incidents on ward H2 | ████████ | Commenced Policy to be published about the process to follow when involved in a medicines safety incident. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 All nursing staff to be made aware that there are many different types of Polyfusor products. In order”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor completion of medicines-safety training by nursing staff on Ward H2.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “| ████████ | 29th February 2020 Analysing near miss data to identify common dispensing errors and introducing on-going communication of this to staff. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Reviewing the accuracy checking test to incorporate a wider range of medications. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Monitoring of compliance of medicines safety training completed by nursing staff on Ward H2. | ████████ | Commenced Monitoring of medicine safety incidents on ward H2 | ████████ | Commenced Policy to be published about the process to follow when involved in a medicines safety incident. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 All nursing staff to be made aware that there are many different types of Polyfusor products. In order”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure Ward H2 nursing staff comply with mandatory medicines-safety training and monitor their compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Deborah Hindle, Deputy Director of Nursing for the Integrated Care Division will ensure that all nursing staff on ward H2 are compliant with their medicines safety mandatory training. Deborah Hindle will monitor medicines safety mandatory training and ensure all staff are compliant. Weekly senior nurse walkabouts will include ward H2, where observations will be undertaken of nursing medication/fluids dispensary checking procedure.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct weekly senior-nurse walkabouts on Ward H2, observing nursing medication and fluid dispensing-checking procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Deborah Hindle, Deputy Director of Nursing for the Integrated Care Division will ensure that all nursing staff on ward H2 are compliant with their medicines safety mandatory training. Deborah Hindle will monitor medicines safety mandatory training and ensure all staff are compliant. Weekly senior nurse walkabouts will include ward H2, where observations will be undertaken of nursing medication/fluids dispensary checking procedure.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response
  10. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Dylan Jay Henty · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dylan Jay Henty had a complex medical history including schizophrenia, a cerebral tumour, communication difficulties and seizures. He went missing after declining prescribed medication on 17 February 2018, and his body was found at Fistral beach on 21 February 2018; the cause of death was recorded as multiple injuries, with no evidence explaining the apparent fall or how he entered the sea. Concerns included an unsupervised seizure in a bath, inadequate awareness of hoarding, medication compliance, inconsistent reporting of absconding incidents, and arrangements for monitoring residents at risk of absconding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the system for monitoring compliance with prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “iii. Linked to the issue of hoarding is the question of how to ensure a resident is compliant with taking medication prescribed to him. It was accepted in evidence that, given the discovery of the medication in Dylan’s room, the system in place must have failed. It was recognised in court that there are limits to enforcing residents to take medication. Nevertheless, there needs to be a robust system in place and where there is doubt about a resident’s compliance, notification should be made to the relevant professionals. ”

    Source location

    Dylan Jay Henty · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the medication procedure and add immediate post-medication room checks to the Medication Policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The homes medication procedure was reviewed, all staff to attend rigorous face to face medication training on the 10th December 2019. All residents are to come to the office/medication room individually. Residents are given One to One time whilst medication is administered behind a closed door, allowing staff time to check medication is taken following the relevant standards and legislation. Room checks have been reviewed as it felt that there was little improvement to be made, other than if medication is found in a room then room checks are done immediately after medication times. This would be reviewed regularly, this has also been added to the homes Medication Policy. These changes are to be made within the home in the forth coming weeks following relevant guidelines and legislation.”

    Source location

    2019-0334-Response-by-Pentree-Lodge-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce individual medication-room administration behind a closed door and conduct rigorous face-to-face medication training for all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The homes medication procedure was reviewed, all staff to attend rigorous face to face medication training on the 10th December 2019. All residents are to come to the office/medication room individually. Residents are given One to One time whilst medication is administered behind a closed door, allowing staff time to check medication is taken following the relevant standards and legislation. Room checks have been reviewed as it felt that there was little improvement to be made, other than if medication is found in a room then room checks are done immediately after medication times. This would be reviewed regularly, this has also been added to the homes Medication Policy. These changes are to be made within the home in the forth coming weeks following relevant guidelines and legislation.”

    Source location

    2019-0334-Response-by-Pentree-Lodge-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing room checks were considered to require little improvement beyond immediate checks when medication is found.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The homes medication procedure was reviewed, all staff to attend rigorous face to face medication training on the 10th December 2019. All residents are to come to the office/medication room individually. Residents are given One to One time whilst medication is administered behind a closed door, allowing staff time to check medication is taken following the relevant standards and legislation. Room checks have been reviewed as it felt that there was little improvement to be made, other than if medication is found in a room then room checks are done immediately after medication times. This would be reviewed regularly, this has also been added to the homes Medication Policy. These changes are to be made within the home in the forth coming weeks following relevant guidelines and legislation.”

    Source location

    2019-0334-Response-by-Pentree-Lodge-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026