Recurring concern

Failure to establish effective plans to address identified safety concerns

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First reported 18 Sep 2014•Latest report 6 Jan 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to establish, specify or assure an effective corrective-action or improvement plan addressing identified safety concerns, service shortcomings or incident learning, including the anchor's failure to address specific service-provision shortcomings and comparable absences of meaningful plans in other reports.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to implement, complete or deliver actions from an already established safety plan where plan formation is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes inadequate incident investigations where the investigation process, rather than the absence or inadequacy of a resulting improvement plan, is the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic governance, oversight or organisational-learning deficiencies unless the report specifically identifies failure to establish a meaningful plan addressing known safety concerns.
  • Excludes ordinary service-improvement planning without an identified patient, public or operational safety concern.
Reports
28

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
28

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
67

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB3
Department of Health and Social Care3
NHS England3
Care Quality Commission2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Family of Gillian McKinlay1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Greater Manchester Police1
Health and Safety Executive1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Mohammed Ashraful Islam CHOUDHURY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mohammed Ashraful Islam CHOUDHURY, aged 26, died at hospital on 11 January 2023 after being attacked and stabbed by another resident at his supported accommodation. The concerns included inadequate management of the other resident’s known risks, lack of a multidisciplinary plan after he stopped taking medication, and withdrawal of medication support without checking with his GP that prescriptions were being obtained.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of an MDT plan to address anti-psychotic depot medication non-concordance

    Wider context from the report

    “(i) The risks identified in respect of ████████ on his discharge from his second hospital admission in August 2020, which included the fact that his paranoid schizophrenia (unusually) was associated with violent behaviour and that he lacked insight into his mental illness, were not adequately addressed by his mental health provider. This was of particular concern when he became non-concordant with his anti-psychotic depot medication from mid-September 2022. (ii) There was no MDT plan to address the significant development of ████████ non-concordance with his anti-psychotic depot medication from mid-September 2022. (iii) Despite knowing that ████████ lacked insight into his mental illness and of the need to ensure that he remained compliant with all medication, the support provided to him with medication administration, in addition to his depot, was withdrawn without there being any checks made with his GP as to whether he was remaining complaint with this medication (which he was not). ”

    Source location

    Mohammed Ashraful Islam CHOUDHURY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce medication non-concordance policies and procedures requiring weekly MDT discussion and comprehensive electronic-record documentation of missed depot injections or adherence concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The Trust has reviewed and reinforced its operational policy and standard operating procedures regarding medication non-concordance. These now require that missed depot injections or concerns about adherence be formally discussed in the weekly multidisciplinary team (MDT) meeting and documented comprehensively in the electronic patient record.”

    Source location

    Response from East London Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed depot-medication compliance auditing and weekly monitoring, with findings reported through local and Directorate governance and escalated where required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An audit cycle has been embedded into routine practice to ensure compliance with these standards. A retrospective review conducted during 2024-2025 examined 275 service users on depot within Luton”

    Source location

    Response from East London Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Formalise MDT risk oversight for medication non-adherence through risk-register inclusion, weekly RAG review, senior multidisciplinary attendance and recording of decisions and responsible clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The MDT has reflected on this learning and strengthened processes accordingly. Where a service user misses a depot injection or demonstrates medication non-adherence, the matter is now formally raised within the weekly MDT and added to the MDT risk register where appropriate. All MDT meetings are attended by the team Consultant, Operational Lead, Depot Clinic Lead, Care Coordinator, Psychologist, Occupational Therapist and wider MDT members. Risk is reviewed, RAG rated, and monitored weekly until resolved or stabilised. Managers and senior clinicians have reiterated the requirement that all discussions, decisions and responsibilities are clearly recorded in the electronic clinical system, including the named clinician responsible for agreed actions.”

    Source location

    Response from East London Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthened medication non-concordance procedures, auditing, monitoring and training are considered sufficient; no further action is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The Trust has reviewed and reinforced its operational policy and standard operating procedures regarding medication non-concordance. These now require that missed depot injections or concerns about adherence be formally discussed in the weekly multidisciplinary team (MDT) meeting and documented comprehensively in the electronic patient record.”

    Source location

    Response from East London Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Weekly MDT review, risk-register oversight, escalation and documented accountability are considered sufficient; no further action is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The MDT has reflected on this learning and strengthened processes accordingly. Where a service user misses a depot injection or demonstrates medication non-adherence, the matter is now formally raised within the weekly MDT and added to the MDT risk register where appropriate. All MDT meetings are attended by the team Consultant, Operational Lead, Depot Clinic Lead, Care Coordinator, Psychologist, Occupational Therapist and wider MDT members. Risk is reviewed, RAG rated, and monitored weekly until resolved or stabilised. Managers and senior clinicians have reiterated the requirement that all discussions, decisions and responsibilities are clearly recorded in the electronic clinical system, including the named clinician responsible for agreed actions.”

    Source location

    Response from East London Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response
  2. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Michelle Julie Marie Michaela MASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michelle Julie Marie Michaela MASON died on 1 June 2024 at Royal Infirmary, Lancaster, after sudden onset of lack of vision, vomiting and severe pain. She was reviewed around six hours later, when thrombolysis was no longer possible; thrombectomy was considered but no local service was available and transfer was considered too late. Concerns included the absence of a 24/7 thrombectomy service in Lancashire, limited understanding among non-stroke specialists about thrombectomy availability, and a lack of regional mutual aid.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear plan to deliver a 24/7 thrombectomy service in Lancashire

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) NHS England national service specifications provide for a 24/7 thrombectomy service which is not currently being delivered in Lancashire and there is no clear plan to deliver that service ”

    Source location

    Michelle Julie Marie Michaela MASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a seven-day mechanical thrombectomy service until 22:00, with the planned transition to full 24/7 provision by 28 February 2026.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the service began operating into the evening delivering 7 days per week including Bank Holidays with cover until 22:00 with some occasional gaps due to workforce availability, supported by collaborative working across Anaesthetics, Theatres, and Radiology. From 13 June 2025 cover have been consistently achieved from 08.00-22.00 (referral cut off times are 20.00 for all sites with the exception of Harrogate at 19.30). This has been achieved by flexible use of existing staff rotas, interim arrangements with Anaesthetic and Theatre teams, and a shared commitment across departments to maximise available NIR clinical time.”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Negotiate and evaluate a sustainable 1-in-8 neurointerventional radiology rota and associated job plans for 24/7 service delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NIR engagement and Business Case Development”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Finalise and agree the 24/7 thrombectomy business case, including required infrastructure and workforce arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Finalisation of a business case to be agreed with NHSE to support the required infrastructure and workforce;”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete radiographer shift planning and consultation to support 24/7 thrombectomy provision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Continued recruitment across Anaesthetics, Radiology, and Radiography;”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit additional Radiology and Anaesthetic staff required to support overnight thrombectomy provision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Continued recruitment across Anaesthetics, Radiology, and Radiography;”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop operational readiness for overnight theatre and recovery services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Development of operational readiness for overnight theatre and recovery services.”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish regional mutual-aid arrangements by engaging neighbouring thrombectomy centres and progressing a coordinated support agreement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust fully recognises the critical importance of regional aid to ensure timely access to thrombectomy for patients in Lancashire and South Cumbria, particularly during the overnight period (22:00–08:00) when local provision is not yet available.”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor progress against the 24/7 service and regional-aid plans through monthly executive review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Progress against these actions will be monitored on a monthly basis by the executive management team and an earlier start date will be considered if possible.”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with regional stakeholders and clinicians to explore and progress plans for overnight thrombectomy access across Lancashire and South Cumbria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These challenges are recognised by NHS England (“NHSE”) and are the subject of ongoing discussions. It is our understanding that the service provided from Royal Preston Hospital now covers 7 days per week, 8am – 10pm. The team here at Northern Care Alliance will continue to work with NHSE, Lancashire Teaching Hospitals and the Walton Centre to explore options to provide the Lancashire and South Cumbria catchment with access to this service overnight. A meeting between the Trust, NHSE and Lancashire Teaching Hospitals took place on 15 July 2025 to discuss this, where possible options for providing aid overnight were explored. Follow-up meetings will include representation from all NW thrombectomy providers to ensure all possibilities are thoroughly explored and aim to progress plans and clarify timelines. We will work with our clinicians to support this process.”

    Source location

    Response from Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with Lancashire Teaching Hospitals to sustain its seven-day thrombectomy service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Currently, 12 of the 24 CSCs across the 20 ISDNs have a 24/7 thrombectomy service in place. In the North West, NHS England’s Regional Specialised Commissioning Team have been focused on work with Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (LTH) on the sustainable delivery of a 7 day service. LTH had previously been delivering a 7 day service until April 2024 when, due to staffing issues, they regressed to a Monday to Friday service, moving back to 7 days in August 2024 on a six weekend in eight basis. The Regional Specialised Commissioning Team have, through dialogue and formal contractual levers, been following this up with LTH to improve this position and, as a result, the service has gradually expanded. From May 2025, the service has operated consistently on a 7 day basis (between the hours of 8am and 10pm) and NHS England continues to work with LTH in sustaining this service.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support an options appraisal of regional nighttime thrombectomy models to improve equal access across the North West.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to ensure equal access for the population across the North West region, the North West’s Medical Director for Commissioning is supporting an options appraisal to consider the best model that supports outcomes for patients, whilst making the most effective use of resources. As set out above, the options currently being considered are for LTH to move to a 24/7 service or for the population of Lancashire & South Cumbria to have access to the service elsewhere in the region during nighttime hours (10pm to 8am).”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue commissioners an urgent recommendation to review North West thrombectomy provision and achieve fully operational 24/7 coverage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following their visit to the CSCs at Royal Preston Hospital, Salford Royal and the Walton Centre in April 2025, ████████ and ████████ issued a letter in June 2025 to LTH, the Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust, and the Walton Centre NHS Foundation Trust. This outlined their recommendation that an urgent review of mechanical thrombectomy provision within the North West is undertaken by commissioners, and set out their expectation that a fully operational 24/7 service is achievable and the position set by October 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a fully operational 24/7 mechanical thrombectomy service at LTHTR by 28 February 2026.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These actions form part of a clear and accountable plan to implement a fully operational 24/7 thrombectomy service by 28 February 2026, ensuring equitable access for all patients across Lancashire and South Cumbria. There is a commitment to starting this sooner if staff can be recruited to enable this.”

    Source location

    2025-0268 - Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate and negotiate the proposed 1-in-8 NIR consultant rota and associated job plans for sustainable 24/7 coverage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A meeting held on the 27th June with national stakeholders, including the Chair of the United Kingdom Neuro-Interventional Group (UKNG), explored national models for 24/7 service delivery and shared sample rota structures. The NIR team were asked to provide feedback on preferred rota models and job plan implications, with a response received in the week commencing 21st July 2025.”

    Source location

    2025-0268 - Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Finalise the business case for 24/7 thrombectomy expansion, including required infrastructure and workforce arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Finalisation of a business case to be agreed with NHSE to support the required infrastructure and workforce;”

    Source location

    2025-0268 - Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete recruitment and rota development for Anaesthetic, Radiology and Radiography staffing needed for overnight provision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Continued recruitment across Anaesthetics, Radiology, and Radiography;”

    Source location

    2025-0268 - Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop operational readiness for overnight theatre and recovery services supporting thrombectomy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Development of operational readiness for overnight theatre and recovery services.”

    Source location

    2025-0268 - Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A 24/7 service cannot yet be implemented because NIR rota approval, recruitment, radiographer planning, and overnight theatre and recovery readiness remain incomplete.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While progress has been made with evening and weekend expansion, a 24/7 service is not yet in place. The barriers are multi-factorial and include:”

    Source location

    Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Since 1 April 2024, Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB is responsible for commissioning regional stroke thrombectomy services, not NHS England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England has liaised with Lancashire & South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (ICB) regarding your Report. Stroke thrombectomy services are now a delegated specialised service and, since 1 April 2024, Lancashire & South Cumbria ICB has been the responsible commissioner for the region rather than NHS England. Whilst NHS England was previously responsible for commissioning (funding) stroke thrombectomy services, the responsibility for providing this service rests with the Trusts in each region.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A 24/7 thrombectomy service cannot yet be implemented because the NIR rota, recruitment, staffing and overnight operational arrangements remain incomplete.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While progress has been made with evening and weekend expansion, a 24/7 service is not yet in place. The barriers are multi-factorial and include:”

    Source location

    2025-0268 - Response from Lancashire Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Alison CUNNINGHAM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Alison Cunningham jumped onto the northbound track at Chalk Farm London Underground Station while intoxicated by alcohol, cocaine and ketamine, and was killed by a train on 2 November 2024. The principal concern was that TfL’s corporate planning may not sufficiently address the risks posed to intoxicated passengers, with learning from its investigation described as aspirational and lacking a concrete plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to translate investigation learning into a concrete plan

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence at inquest that London Underground passenger intoxication is recognised as a risk to London Underground staff. Extreme intoxication is also known to be a risk to the individual who is intoxicated. However, it struck me that the risk to the individual is not necessarily at the forefront of TfL corporate thinking. Clearly, individuals have responsibility for their own drinking and/or drug taking and the consequences thereof. Intoxication carries additional risk whatever the activity. However, public transport is encouraged for many good reasons. Not least, it is a matter of public policy that those who are or may become intoxicated should make travel plans that do not involve being in charge of a vehicle. The London Underground is an obvious alternative. Realistically, some London Underground passengers will be intoxicated, and that has to inform TfL’s corporate planning. I heard that there was a TfL investigation following Sarah Cunningham’s death, but the learning from that appears at present to be somewhat aspirational, without a concrete plan. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Alison CUNNINGHAM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised process for managing Formal Incident Review recommendations, with accountable officers and directors developing actions to address identified risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “TfL has recently implemented a number of significant changes to the process around critical health and safety investigations, including changes to the management of recommendations arising from Formal Incident Reviews (FIRs). This new way of working means that the investigation team complete the investigation report with recommendations for the business.”

    Source location

    Response from Transport for London
    Page 4 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response
  4. Rutland and North Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Henrik LARSEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Henrik Larsen, a 52-year-old man, was found hanging at his home in Leicestershire on 6 January 2023 and died before a planned mental health triage call. Concerns included inadequate documentation and decision-making in multidisciplinary team meetings, inaccurate interpretation of risk information, insufficient risk assessment and discharge planning, and weaknesses in the serious incident investigation and learning process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to link identified serious incident failings to action-plan work

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Serious Investigation and Reporting Process at LPT I remain concerned about inadequacies in the Serious Incident Investigation and Reporting processes at Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust. The Serious Incident Investigation into Mr Larsen’s death did uncover and accepted some failings in relation to the care provided to Mr Larsen. However, it failed to uncover all the matters arising at inquest and, some of the matters that it did uncover do not have correlating items of work listed in the action plan. There was no exploration of the MDT meeting’s functionality or documentation as part of the SI investigation. Further, I have concerns about the implementation and embedding of the lessons learned which are identified by the SI Report. In this case the live witnesses who gave evidence during the course of the inquest did not demonstrate that learning had filtered down to the front-line staff. I am therefore concerned that the SI process at LPT does not support a robust and critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to patients, further, I have concerns about the ability of the Trust to embed changes and learning. This failure to properly explore matters and learn where possible inevitably leads to a delay, or failure altogether, to learn lessons which are vital to patient safety across the whole Trust. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Henrik LARSEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Ronald Henry SPENCER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ronald Henry Spencer had an oesophageal stent placed on 13 November 2023, which migrated into the small bowel and caused a suspected bowel perforation. He underwent surgery to remove the stent and repair the bowel, initially recovered, then deteriorated and died on 2 December 2023. The report raised concerns about significant staffing issues and resulting delays in treatment, as well as inadequate cohesive planning for short- and long-term staffing pressures; it stated there was no direct evidence that the delays caused or contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate cohesive planning for short-term staffing pressures and longer-term solutions

    Wider context from the report

    “5. I remain significantly concerned not only that delays are continuing and that deaths will continue to occur into the future, but also that there is inadequate cohesive forward thinking or planning either in relation short term pressures (eg. "winter pressures") or with a view to finding longer term solutions. ”

    Source location

    Ronald Henry SPENCER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider all recommendations from the independent upper-GI service review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It has also been recognised that the current staffing model in place, which includes four dedicated esophago-gastric consultants running the specialist upper GI on-call service for the region, may represent an additional vulnerability within the service, particularly at times of increased demand. The UHB upper GI service has recently undergone an independent invited review which has been conducted by the East Midlands Clinical Senate. The review encompassed all aspects of elective and emergency upper GI care at the QEΗ. The final report is awaited, but it is anticipated that recommendations will likely include reviewing the current esophago-gastric service configuration and increasing the number of consultants”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Open the refurbished elective surgical hub at Solihull Hospital, adding six theatres and capacity for 11,500 procedures annually.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the above and recognising the impact of increased urgent and emergency admissions on our healthcare system, there are also plans underway to open the refurbished elective surgical hub at Solihull Hospital in September 2024. There has been significant investment in the hub which includes six new operating theatres and will enable an additional 11,500 procedures a year for patients from Birmingham and Solihull, thereby alleviating pressure on bed occupancy and treatment capacity across the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the NHS Long Term Workforce Plan and Framework 15.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “BSol ICB recognises the need for a workforce that is sufficient in numbers and skills to care for patients throughout the calendar year and works with all system partners to ensure this. We are also committed to the introduction of the NHS Long Term Workforce Plan and Framework 15.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a high-level diagnostic of current and future workforce demand and supply.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In June 2023, BSol ICB carried out a high-level diagnostic of the current and future workforce looking at both demand and supply drawing upon BSol strategy and operational documents. It identified that workforce is an immediate and urgent priority for the ICB and supports the system in responding to the NHS Long Term Workforce Plan and Framework 15.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the 4R’s Workforce Delivery Framework with allocated resources supporting implementation over two years.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The 4R’s Workforce Delivery Framework is now operational and significant resource has been allocated to support implementation over the next two years. This investment will be used to sustain the delivery of existing programmes where they have been identified as supporting the 4R’s as well as a range of additional priorities identified as part of the Workforce Diagnostic.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver workforce programmes addressing diagnostic risks, including sustainable staffing, retention, training and workforce-plan foundations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Deliver key programmes of work that have been identified as critical to address the risks and challenges identified within the workforce diagnostics which will enable:”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver the Long-Term Workforce Plan, expanding domestic education, training and recruitment while improving staff culture, leadership and wellbeing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is working at a national level to deliver the Long-Term Workforce Plan. This is a robust and effective strategy to ensure we have the right number of people, with the right skills and support in place to be able to deliver the kind of care people need. It heralds the start of the biggest recruitment drive in health service history, but also of an ongoing programme of strategic workforce planning. It includes ambitious commitments to grow the workforce by significantly expanding domestic education, training and recruitment, as well as actions aimed at improving culture, leadership and wellbeing so that more staff are retained in NHS employment over the next 15 years. These actions will aim to close anticipated staffing shortfalls in the NHS in the long term.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Plan for and provide system support ahead of winter pressures through operational, surge, cross-system and workforce preparedness measures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England continues to plan for and provide support to systems ahead of winter pressures. Further information and links to historic plans and letters to our systems can be found on our winter resilience website pages. For the most recent winter period (2023/24), we sent out a letter to our Integrated Care Boards and Trusts, setting out our national approach to winter planning and our four areas of focus:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue national winter-planning guidance to Integrated Care Boards and NHS trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England continues to plan for and provide support to systems ahead of winter pressures. Further information and links to historic plans and letters to our systems can be found on our winter resilience website pages. For the most recent winter period (2023/24), we sent out a letter to our Integrated Care Boards and Trusts, setting out our national approach to winter planning and our four areas of focus:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for delivering the long-term workforce strategy rather than the responding department undertaking further workforce planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Long Term Workforce Plan (LTWP) sets out the steps the NHS and its partners need to take to deliver an NHS workforce that meets the changing needs of the population over the next 15 years.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response
  6. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Dennis John William KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dennis John William KING suffered a myocardial infarction after experiencing chest pain on 9 December 2022 and died on 13 December 2022 following recognised complications of emergency treatment. The report raised concerns about delays in ambulance responses and inter-hospital transfers, confusion over transfer categorisation, and the adequacy of arrangements for urgent care at regional specialist centres.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequacy of the action plan for addressing ambulance response concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “a. Availability of ambulances to carry out transfers in a timely manner, in urgent cases, between NHS Hospitals and in responding to 999 and 111 calls in the community. b. Confusion as between ambulance and hospital staff and a lack of clarity in the purpose of and process for the categorisation of transfers (particularly in urgent situations) between NHS hospitals. c. The suitability of the NHS approach to centralising exigent care in regional centres (such as the Royal Papworth Hospital for cardiac conditions) if the means to deliver such an approach are inadequate. d. Adequacy of the action plan provided to the court in addressing the concern at (a) above and that of ambulance attendances to 999 and 111 calls; the plan is generalised, lacking detail and any means of measurement of progress. Evidence received at Inquest identified waits for ambulance attendance of between 5-6 hours on the evening of 9th/10th December 2022. This, in circumstances where there call relating to Mr. KING had been categorised as a category 2 response. In Mr. KING’s case he was exhibiting symptoms of having suffered/was suffering a heart attack. In Mr. KING’s case he had arrived at hospital been triaged, assessed and arrangements for urgent lifesaving care made by competent emergency clinicians in conjunction with experts from the regional cardiac unit. This included the requirement for an urgent transfer to the regional cardiac centre. A request for an emergency transfer from West Suffolk Hospital to The Royal Papworth Hospital was subject to further computer algorithm-based triage by the ambulance service. This resulted in a several hour delay to Mr. KING’s transfer, notwithstanding the protests from competent clinical staff in the Accident and Emergency Department at West Suffolk Hospital. The circumstances of this case raise concerns about the NHS approach to centralising exigent care in regional centres (such as the Royal Papworth Hospital for cardiac conditions) if the means to deliver the approach are inadequate. East of England Ambulance Service provided evidence to the Inquest, including a Report concerning its response. This plan is generalised, lacking detail and any means of measurement of progress and is inadequate in addressing the concerns raised at the Inquest. ”

    Source location

    Dennis John William KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the Delivery Plan for Recovering Urgent and Emergency Care Services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise the pressures our A&E and ambulance services are facing and the impact of waiting times for patients. That is why we published our ambitious Delivery Plan for Recovering Urgent and Emergency Care Services which aims to deliver sustained improvements in waiting times. The ambition is for 76% of patients to be admitted, transferred, or discharged from A&E within four hours by March 2024, and to reduce Category 2 ambulance response times to 30 minutes on average this year.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Operational Performance and Improvement Plan to improve organisational efficiency and maximise ambulance availability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The implementation of our Operational Performance and Improvement Plan, which is our plan to improve our own efficiency as an organisation and to maximise ambulance availability. I attach a presentation on OPIP with this letter to provide an update on this work.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the information sheet provided to families about actions addressing demand challenges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The action plan disclosed to you is an information sheet shared with families where a Serious Incident (as they were referred to at the time) is declared and the aim is to provide a high-level overview of the actions the Trust is taking to tackle the demand challenges we face. The plan provided to you was an existing version and has been updated a number of times since this incident. It is currently under review and, once approved, we will share an updated copy with you. The OPIP (as outlined above) is the more detailed action plan that the Trust has had in place to improve response times.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commenting on EEAST’s action plan adequacy is outside the respondent’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within NHS England’s remit to comment on the adequacy of the action plan provided to the court by EEAST and we would refer you to the Trust on this issue. We understand that their action plan is under review and once updated will be sent to you.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    EEAST is responsible for addressing the adequacy of its action plan and updating the court.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within NHS England’s remit to comment on the adequacy of the action plan provided to the court by EEAST and we would refer you to the Trust on this issue. We understand that their action plan is under review and once updated will be sent to you.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Luke Mervyn WHITELAW · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Luke Mervyn Whitelaw, who was known to mental health services, died by suicide; his body was recovered from the River Thames on 17 March 2023. Before his death, his mental health deteriorated and a referral for urgent psychiatric review following his disclosure that he would accept informal hospital admission was not acted on. Concerns included insufficient consideration of historic and current risks, inadequate documentation and exploration of deterioration, and a lack of reassurance that identified learning points would be addressed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a meaningful plan to address identified safety concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust’s Serious Incident Investigation Report, dated 8 September 2023, identified numerous matters and learning points, including, but not limited to the following: • There had been a lack of “professional curiosity” in the assessment and planning of Mr Whitelaw’s care and treatment • “Discussions and assessments of risk should be clearly documented” • “Risk formulations should consider both current and historic/contextual risks and incorporate ratings of mood to ensure that these are not used in isolation and are linked with appropriate interventions” • There were “missed opportunities identified in relation to LW’s self-reported deterioration following his discharge from hospital which do not appear to have been fully explored.” However, the Serious Incident Investigation Report does include any plan to address the concerns it identified. As such, there insufficient reassurance that there is plan to address the matters in a meaningful way moving forward. ”

    Source location

    Luke Mervyn WHITELAW · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and monitor an improvement plan addressing clinical-care, risk-assessment, documentation and reflective-practice gaps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2023 an improvement plan was put in pace for this clinical team to address gaps which were identified during the investigation and gaps which were identified as a result of day-to-day oversight. This plan is monitored by the service director and the clinical director for the Acute & Crisis Directorate and will continue until such time that we are satisfied that the care provided is to the standard needed, and for at least until July 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 December 2023

    Open published response
  8. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Francis Osborne Barnes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis Osborne Barnes suffered an external iliac artery injury and major haemorrhage during elective hernia repair on 12 March 2022. He underwent amputation at Royal Berkshire Hospital on 14 March and died there on 16 March 2022. The concerns included whether he should have been transferred to a vascular centre sooner, and the Oxford Trust’s failure to investigate, cooperate with other organisations, maintain records, and demonstrate learning from the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify proposed changes after a death

    Wider context from the report

    “The focus of my concerns relates to the approach of your Trust to learning from deaths. Although Mr Barnes was not treated at the John Radcliffe Hospital, I concluded that he should have been transferred there, and that the delay in carrying out vascular surgery there contributed to his death. The Oxford Trust has been involved in this investigation almost from the start, and other Interested Persons involved in the investigation have attempted to work with your Trust to investigate the circumstances of Mr Barnes’ death. I have been assisted by investigation reports and statements from the Spire Dunedin Hospital, and Royal Berkshire Hospital. This, I am afraid, sits in stark contrast to the response and approach by the Oxford Trust. The Oxford Trust has carried out no investigation. They did not co-operate with the offer to conduct a joint investigation with Royal Berkshire Hospital. There is no recorded morbidity and mortality meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no recorded MDT meeting minute, although we were told at inquest that the case was discussed. There is no evidence of proposed changes beyond evidence in court during the inquest that “we are looking into this”. Whilst I accept entirely that a knee-jerk response, even following a tragic death, is not appropriate, it is now some 18 months since Mr Barnes’ death. Evidence from RBH and Spire Dunedin was consistent, namely that attempts to liaise with your trust and learn from this event jointly have been universally ignored. It was also difficult for my office to obtain evidence for the inquest. We were provided with a joint statement, from three consultant vascular surgeons (only two of whom were clinically involved). It transpired that this statement was written by a clinical governance manager, and each of the witnesses who gave evidence was careful to tell the court that they did not agree with the wording of that statement. We subsequently received a statement from the consultant vascular surgeon in this case on the 29th of September, and from the clinical lead of vascular surgery some 5 days before the inquest started. We were also informed 11 days before the inquest started that the key vascular surgery witness would be on holiday abroad. This witness was summoned in May 2023. He ultimately gave evidence by video link, but this was difficult technically, and arrangements would have been made for him to attend in person, had we been made aware of this holiday arrangement, even aside from the fact that he had been formally summoned. Multiple attempts have been made by the other Interested Persons in this case (notably Royal Berkshire Hospital and Spire Dunedin Hospital) to discuss the issues arising, but each of these offers has been ignored. The key clinical issues in this respect have been clarification of vascular surgery pathways, and use of an OARS system (or similar). No records were made by the vascular surgery consultant involved, despite being consulted several times about the same patient in a short space of time, and the fact that there was a clinical difference of opinion about where the patient should best be managed. We heard no evidence of a reason for the failure to engage with processes specifically aimed at learning from deaths – whether resourcing or any other reason. The matters of concern can be summarised as follows: 1. Clarification of vascular surgery pathways - i.e. working with others in the Thames Valley network to consider how patients should be efficiently referred to the vascular team, wherever that patient is physically based (including in the private sector). 2. Consideration of an electronic referral system (such as OARS). I note that OARS was set up by the Oxford Trust itself, and is already in operation in a neurosurgery context, and indeed even for some vascular surgery patients. 3. Consideration of how the Oxford Trust responds to and learns from deaths. ”

    Source location

    Francis Osborne Barnes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss and minute clinically concerning, potentially learnable TVVN vascular deaths at quarterly network morbidity and mortality meetings, sharing minutes across the Network.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1 Future Governance of cross-organisational incidents within TVVN”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce three forms for documenting vascular surgery-related concerns about patient deaths in the Thames Valley.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1.2 The M&M documentation will include three new forms which will require completion whenever there is a vascular surgery-related concern raised about a patient death in the Thames Valley region.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain the OUH Medical Examiner office to scrutinize all non-Coronial deaths and feed concerns to governance and clinical teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.2.3 OUH introduced the Medical Examiner (ME) office in June 2020. This is to provide greater safeguards for the public by ensuring proper scrutiny of all non-Coronial deaths. Currently 100% of Trust deaths are reviewed by the ME office who feedback any concerns directly to the Learning from Deaths team (part of the Clinical Governance team). Any concerns and compliments are also fed back to clinical teams for action.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the OUH Mortality Review Policy with an appendix governing cross-system learning responses across the BOB ICB and Frimley.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.2.8 In response to this inquest several new processes have also been introduced:”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response
  9. North West Wales

    AI-generated summary

    Eifion Wyn Huws · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eifion Wyn Huws, aged 63, died by suicide at his daughter’s home on 10 June 2022 after being found suspended by a ligature. Concerns included the Emergency Department not having access to a very urgent mental-health referral held in hard-copy notes, and delays in completing and sharing the Health Board’s investigation and implementing resulting actions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and address electronic record availability in investigation learning and improvement

    Wider context from the report

    “1. a. During the Inquest evidence was heard that Eifion’s GP had made a ‘very urgent’ referral to the Single Point of Access and Allocation (SPOAA) on 13 May 2022 indicating that on the background of attempts at ending his life, he was extremely concerned that Eifion was experiencing deterioration in his mental state. This document was contained within the hard copy set of notes held by the Psychiatric Liaison Team. When Eifion attended the Emergency Department the following day, on 14 May 2022, the Emergency department staff were not aware of this ‘very urgent’ referral as they only had access to the electronic notes and not the hard copy notes. Had they been aware it is likely to have further informed their decision making. It is concerning that the process of ensuring electronic notes to allow for fully informed decisions around treatment and care based on all available records, is not available to staff. It was not clear at Inquest whether the transition from paper-based notes to electronic notes was a Health Board initiative or a nationally followed initiative. Either way, any delay in ensuring all notes are available electronically is potentially harmful to patients. b. During the evidence it was accepted that ‘a’ above was not a consideration for improvement as part of the Health Board’s investigation and so was not an action within the Action Plan upon which it could make improvements or plan to make improvements. It is surprising that the Health Board did not consider this as an issue which required further consideration and improvements in its learning and improvement. ”

    Source location

    Eifion Wyn Huws · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider and discuss the benefits of integrated IT within the investigation report and subsequent action plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the investigation report and action plan into the care and treatment delivered to Mr Huws, the benefits of an integrated IT system should have been considered with reference to the implementation of WCCIS within the action plan and this has been discussed with the investigating officer.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Local Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 June 2023

    Open published response
  10. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Ania Sohail · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ania Sohail collapsed on 19 June 2021 after ingesting Propranolol tablets she had obtained from multiple online pharmacies and died later that day from Propranolol toxicity. The principal concerns included the lack of integrated information sharing between online pharmacies and prescribers, ineffective and poorly documented searches, inadequate post-leave assessment and care planning, and insufficiently auditable observation records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Recovery and Discharge Plans to address online medication procurement risks

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Recovery & Discharge Plans did not address the risks associated with Ania’s procurement of Propranolol from on-line pharmacies. The evidence was that an update of the Recovery & Discharge Plan involved members of nursing staff simply adding a note that the overdoses had taken place. The Plan did not show that any meaningful thought had been given to addressing the particular risk associated with the procurement of on-line medication. ”

    Source location

    Ania Sohail · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026