Recurring concern

Failure to reliably telephone patients when follow-up or assessment requires it

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First reported 24 Mar 2014•Latest report 12 Aug 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to make required telephone contact with patients or their families for patient follow-up, requested contact, or assessment of a requested service.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to telephone treating healthcare professionals about abnormal results, unless the concern is specifically patient or family telephone follow-up or assessment.
  • Excludes general failures of referral escalation, investigation tracking, or safety-netting that do not specifically involve required telephone contact.
  • Excludes isolated communication failures unrelated to a required patient or family telephone contact.
Reports
18

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
18

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
23

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust3
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
Welsh Government2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Cardiff & Vale University LHB1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Daughter of the deceased1
Frimley Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Healthcare Inspectorate Wales1
Hereford Medical Group1
Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust1
King's College Hospital1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
NHS England1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr David Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr David Thompson had a longstanding affective disorder and a history of alcohol and illicit drug use. After receiving inpatient and outpatient mental health care, he consumed alcohol and inflicted deep cuts to his wrists; he died on 3 March 2024 from hypovolaemic shock caused by the wrist injuries. Concerns included gaps in discharge planning and follow-up at Priory Dorking, incomplete awareness of his care and relapse history at Priory Altrincham, and a lack of communication between NHS and private consultants.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make a 48-hour post-discharge follow-up call

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was no 48 hour follow up call to Mr Thompson following his discharge, as per Priory Policy. ”

    Source location

    Mr David Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A 48-hour follow-up call is not required where a confirmed NHS community appointment exists within 72 hours of discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Matter of concern 4 - 48 hour follow up call”

    Source location

    Response from Priory Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 August 2024

    Open published response
  2. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Adrian Michael James · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adrian Michael James died after falling from the fourth-floor balcony of his block of flats while experiencing severe and enduring mental illness, including paranoia and a high background risk of suicide. The principal concerns were that he was not assessed by a consultant, proactive care was not considered during his mental health crisis, insufficient attention was given to impulsive suicide risk, no follow-up assessment occurred after a police-interrupted treatment session, and communications between services were inadequate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide follow-up contact or assessment after an interrupted treatment call

    Wider context from the report

    “4.    That no follow up call or assessment was made to Adrian when his treatment session was interrupted by police attendance, and the treatment call was cut off. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Michael James · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review guidance on follow-up after treatment sessions are interrupted and calls are disconnected.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are reviewing our guidance on this and will ensure staff are clear on action to be taken.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify for staff the actions required after treatment sessions are interrupted and calls are disconnected.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are reviewing our guidance on this and will ensure staff are clear on action to be taken.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responding to the Coroner’s specific concerns falls outside NHS England’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within NHS England’s remit to respond to the specific concerns set out by the Coroner in your Report and it is appropriate that Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”) respond to these. We understand you have also directed your Report to the Trust to respond to your concerns. NHS England has been asked to be sighted on the Trust’s response to you and will carefully consider this.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is responsible for responding to the Coroner’s specific concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within NHS England’s remit to respond to the specific concerns set out by the Coroner in your Report and it is appropriate that Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”) respond to these. We understand you have also directed your Report to the Trust to respond to your concerns. NHS England has been asked to be sighted on the Trust’s response to you and will carefully consider this.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response
  3. Sefton, St Helens and Knowsley

    AI-generated summary

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wayne Milne attended hospital with chest pain on 28 February 2022 but was discharged without required chest-pain assessments and senior review. On 2 March 2022, after reporting further symptoms to his GP practice, he was advised to attend the emergency department, but the nurse did not call 999, escalate to a doctor, or check whether he had obtained urgent care; Wayne was later found deceased at home from haemopericardium due to a dissecting aortic aneurysm. The report identifies concerns about inconsistent procedures for summoning emergency assistance, escalation and follow-up, and awareness of dissecting aortic aneurysm within the practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up whether a patient has obtained urgent medical assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The nurse at the practice told the Inquest, the procedure for practice staff calling 999 (not leaving it to the patient) in the event of a patient with chest pain and other life threatening conditions applied only to reception staff and not to nursing staff. This led to inconsistency and in this case an avoidable delay in summoning urgent medical assistance and needs reviewing/all staff working in/working on behalf of the practice need to be aware of the procedure to be followed, consideration must be given as to whether it is appropriate to have different standards for qualified nursing and administrative/non qualified nursing staff. The awareness of Dissecting Aortic Aneurysm and the rapidity at which the condition can become catastrophic/fatal also needs raising within the practice. The nurse within the practice who spoke with Wayne on the date of his death on behalf of the practice , did not escalate to a doctor, did not call 999, she did not inform the NOK of her concerns, she did not call back to see if Wayne had called for an ambulance/attended hospital and she did not alert the hospital of her suspicions i.e. differential diagnoses including; PE, cardiac related problem or aortic aneurysm. The GP to whom this regulation 28 (Prevention of Future death) report is addressed informed the court (in a witness statement) no action had been taken within the practice since these events. ”

    Source location

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Herefordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ronald Leslie HARRIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ronald Leslie Harris’s family contacted the practice in April 2023 about worsening mental health difficulties and requested further help, but a routine appointment was offered with a stated 4–6 week wait and no follow-up call was made. He died by suicide on 5 June 2023. Concerns included incomplete triage documentation, failure to make the requested call, and the triage doctor’s lack of awareness of the waiting time and the telephone-call transcript; a review of mental-health triage protocols was noted, but no revised protocol had been advised by the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to telephone patients as requested or advised

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The patient was not telephoned as requested and as advised they would be. ”

    Source location

    Ronald Leslie HARRIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update reception protocols so receptionists telephone patients first to explain the GP’s triage decision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When patients complete a triage form they are asked to indicate their preference for contact including phone or SMS. We have updated the protocols that the team follows and the reception team, who usually undertake the actions indicated following triage, now telephone the patient in the first instance to advise on the GPs triage decision.”

    Source location

    Response from Hereford Medical Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response
  5. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Annabel Jean Findlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Annabel Jean Findlay had a history of psychiatric illness and depression and discharged herself from Priory Hospital, Roehampton on 27 August 2021 after a change in antidepressant medication. The concerns identified were that next of kin or emergency contacts were not contacted, no follow-up appointment was booked before discharge, and no attempt was made to contact her until 6 September 2021; the inquest recorded a short-form conclusion of suicide and fatal pressure to the neck as the medical cause of death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to contact the patient after discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “Although a discharge plan was implemented in Ms. Findlay’s case, it would appear that steps were not taken to contact her emergency contact and/or next of kin, such as to facilitate Ms. Findlay being supported in the community upon discharge. Ms. Findlay, having discharged herself, left the hospital with next of kin/ emergency contacts not being aware of her discharge – despite, her emergency contact being the person who had transported her to the Priory Hospital. No follow up appointments was made prior to Ms. Findlay’s discharge and no attempts were made to contact her following her discharge until 6 September 2021. A. That no contact was made with next of kin/ emergency contacts prior to, or at the time of her release. B. No follow up appointment was booked prior to Ms. Findlay’s discharge. C. No attempt was made to contact Ms. Findly until 6 September 2021 (some 10 days following her discharge). ”

    Source location

    Annabel Jean Findlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind nursing and medical colleagues to telephone patients 48 hours after discharge, unless qualifying community or crisis-team follow-up is confirmed within 72 hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This matter was also identified as an improvement action as part of the internal learning review referenced above. Nursing and medical colleagues at the hospital have since been reminded about the requirement to make telephone contact with a patient 48 hours after discharge (unless the patient has a confirmed community mental health team/crisis recovery home treatment team appointment within 72 hours of discharge). The purpose of the telephone call is to check on the patient’s welfare and respond to any issues identified. We have already audited the provision of post-discharge telephone calls and identified significant progress: we will continue to audit this monthly, until we have three successive months of 100% compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monthly audits of post-discharge telephone calls until three successive months achieve 100% compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This matter was also identified as an improvement action as part of the internal learning review referenced above. Nursing and medical colleagues at the hospital have since been reminded about the requirement to make telephone contact with a patient 48 hours after discharge (unless the patient has a confirmed community mental health team/crisis recovery home treatment team appointment within 72 hours of discharge). The purpose of the telephone call is to check on the patient’s welfare and respond to any issues identified. We have already audited the provision of post-discharge telephone calls and identified significant progress: we will continue to audit this monthly, until we have three successive months of 100% compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 March 2023

    Open published response
  6. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    STEVE MARTIN BRIAN COOKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steve Martin Brian Cooke had COVID-19 pneumonia following a COVID-19 infection and was found deceased at home on 26 December 2020. He had called an ambulance with extreme shortness of breath and apparent hypoxia, but communication difficulties led to the ambulance being sent to the wrong address and him not being located. Concerns included the failure to obtain his correct address, insufficient communication with his ex-partner, and failure to escalate the matter or review the original call when he could not be found.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct an adequate location-finding follow-up call

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was heard at the Inquest that there were communication difficulties that resulted in the ambulance being dispatched to the wrong address and Mr Cooke not being located: Mr Cooke made an emergency call taken by NHS 111 with symptoms of COVID-19 and was extremely breathless with apparent hypoxia, the call handler was struggling to understand him in a busy working environment. The call was transferred for clinical assessment and an ambulance was dispatched. Paramedic ambulance crew arrived in under five minutes to an address provided by the emergency operations control (EOC) and could not locate the patient, Mr Cooke. The crew checked the address with EOC and managed to gain access from a key holder to the address that was unoccupied and a thorough search and enquiries with neighbours established the address was unoccupied. (1) Ambulance crew updated EOC Mr Cooke could not be located. EOC made checks with a telephone number on the system to attempt to establish the location of Mr Cooke. This telephone number was Mr Cooke’s ex-partner on 25th December 2020.The EOC established that Mr Cooke was not with his ex-partner. The call handler when speaking to Mr Cooke’s ex-partner: (i) EOC terminated the call within 62 seconds – this very brief given the serious nature of the query to locate a missing sick patient (ii) did not give a complete explanation of the reason for the call (iii) did not ask for Mr Cooke’s current address (iv) instead suggested part of the address that the crew had been dispatched to knowing Mr Cooke could not be located there and did not listen to or give sufficient time for Mr Cooke’s ex-partner to respond (v) did not update Mr Cooke’s ex-partner that Mr Cooke had not be located (2) Mr Cooke was very unwell and in need of medical attention: (i) the matter was not escalated further when Mr Cooke could still not be located (ii) the original call was not listened to again to attempt to establish the correct address being given by Mr Cooke. Mr Cooke gave the address as ████████ Hammond Hill and it was the call handler who suggested a different part of the address as there was difficulty establishing the postcode and this was approximately five metres from where Mr Cooke lived. (iii) It was possible to hear Mr Cooke stating with difficulty the word ‘opposite’ when this part of the address was suggested. ”

    Source location

    STEVE MARTIN BRIAN COOKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a patient-location verification process requiring team-leader escalation, call review, records checks, contact with information sources, and local hospital and police checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Our process upon a patient not being found by crew on scene”

    Source location

    2021-0266-Response-from-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 August 2021

    Open published response
  7. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Diane Greenslade · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diane Greenslade was found moaning on her bedroom floor with a chest of drawers on top of her after ambulance responses were delayed. She suffered a cardiac arrest and died, with the inquest concluding that she died from natural causes following a fifteen-and-a-half-hour delay in ambulance intervention. The substantive concerns included the initial call categorisation without clinical assessment, failure to consider escalation or a police welfare check, high ambulance demand and hospital delays, and a nearby rapid response vehicle being unavailable because it was reserved for higher-priority calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make contact with callers or their families

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The initial call was categorised Green 3 without any contact being made with Mrs Greenslade or her family and without any clinical assessment. ”

    Source location

    Diane Greenslade · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review policies and procedures for establishing contact with patients or callers at scene.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. After failing to make contact, no consideration was given to either upgrading the call category or to contacting Police to ask them to carry out a welfare check. Whilst we have set out in this correspondence that we are reviewing our policies and procedures around establishing contact with a patient or caller at scene, we are of the view that it would not be appropriate to request police attendance to undertake welfare checks for 999 calls to the ambulance service, as police officers are not suitably trained to make a clinical assessment. However, we are working collaboratively with our Police Force colleagues to develop a Memorandum of Understanding regarding this issue.”

    Source location

    2018-0401-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 December 2018

    Open published response
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Emmett Alexander Gillah · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emmett Alexander Gillah had a history of mental illness and was discharged from mental health services at his own request. He later moved onto railway tracks and died after being struck by a train. Concerns included inadequate discharge information and follow-up arrangements, insufficient communication with his family and GP, and failures to refer him to mental health services when his mental health deteriorated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain scheduled telephone contact with discharged patients or their families

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) KMPT failed to act in accordance with its policy to maintain telephone contact with discharged patients or their family at least every three months for a period of three years following discharge. This policy also states that within three years from discharge from the EIS, contact may be made by a discharged patient direct with Mental Health Services in order to receive treatment. KMPT procedures were inadequate in communicating this information to either the discharged patient, their family or others who may advocate for a patient’s interests. No information is made publicly available, e.g. by way of leaflet or website, which explains the Trust’s policy in this respect. ”

    Source location

    Emmett Alexander Gillah · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Richard Thomas Peter Barrett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 20 April 2018, Mr Richard Thomas Peter Barrett took a large overdose of medication with alcohol, called 999 for help, and died before an ambulance reached his flat. Concerns included underestimated ambulance demand, delays in welfare checks and ambulance dispatch, unrealistic hospital turnaround targets, and the failure to ask police to conduct a welfare check.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in making and chasing-up welfare calls

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There does not seem to be a reliable system for the making and chasing-up of ‘welfare calls’. Evidence showed that it was not until 2 hours 45 minutes after the initial call that an attempt was made to ring the patient back. It was known that the patient had taken a massive overdose of sleeping tablets at 01:50. It was not enquired by the call handler as to whether he had also taken alcohol, or whether he was alone. When there was no response from his telephone at 05:13 there was a missed opportunity to re-categorise the incident. ”

    Source location

    Mr Richard Thomas Peter Barrett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind clinical contact centre leads to handle Protocol 23 overdose cases promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this specific incident, an email was sent to the Clinicians on the Clinical Support Desk on the 15th May 2018 by the CCC Clinical Lead. The email identified the importance of attempting to review protocol 23 (overdose) calls when there were delays in responding as these may be time critical. If there was no reply the clinicians should use their critical thinking skills to determine how likely unconsciousness or death would be based on what the patient is recorded as having taken and act accordingly.”

    Source location

    2018-0249-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Demand-related capacity constraints make it challenging to undertake a robust welfare-call procedure consistently.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The welfare call is undertaken by an identified member of Clinical Contact Centre (CCC) staff from either the call taking or dispatch function depending on who has the most capacity. The Demand Management Plan identifies that ‘It is recognised that delays are often a reflection of demand and as such capacity to undertake a robust welfare call procedure is challenging. Every effort should be made to facilitate this process to maintain good customer practice where possible’. All callers are informed to ring back if the patient’s condition deteriorates.”

    Source location

    2018-0249-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 September 2018

    Open published response
  10. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Olive Nutt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Olive Nutt died at home on 29 January 2018 from heart disease, after waiting up to five hours for an LAS attendance. The concerns were that symptoms were not properly recorded, leading to an incorrect priority decision, and that LAS failed to return a call within its own time guidelines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to return calls within pre-set time guidelines to obtain further medical details

    Wider context from the report

    “2) The LAS breached its own pre-set time guidelines in failing to return a call to the deceased’s home to take further details of her medical conditions. ”

    Source location

    Olive Nutt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver refresher training for Control Services staff on call handling and MPDS application, including an anonymised learning-from-experience case study.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, our most recent Core Skills Refresher course for Control Services staff which began on 2nd August 2018 and will run until the end of March 2019, includes refresher training on call handling and the application of the MPDS protocol. This refresher course will also specifically include an anonymised case study of the issues highlighted in the management of CAD 3620 as a ‘learning from experience’ example. All EMD staff are required to attend the CSR and this case study is designed to provide EMDs with an example of best practice in applying the appropriate protocols when faced with this type of situation, to improve service delivery to patients.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reassess minimum Clinical Hub staffing levels in light of the new national response standard and increased demand.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For a day shift the minimum staffing level on the Clinical Hub is eleven members of staff, the level set by a matrix devised in 2013. Work is currently being undertaken to reassess the minimum staff levels in light of the changes within the new national response standard (ARP) and given that demand on the service has continued to increase since 2013.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Secure funding for additional recruitment to address Clinical Hub and operational staffing pressures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Resourcing is an ongoing challenge for LAS and we continue to work to address this, including securing funding for additional recruitment. I am very sorry that these difficulties resulted in a delay in ringing back Mrs Nutt to undertake a telephone assessment in a timely way.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce three additional Clinical Hubs in Kenton, Barking and Croydon to increase flexible Clinical Hub staffing capacity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Expansion of the LAS Clinical Hub”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a further Clinical Hub in New Malden to expand local Clinical Hub coverage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also planning to introduce a further Clinical Hub in New Malden by the end of 2020. This will be a total of six Clinical Hubs for LAS with a view to covering each of our operational sectors.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run a specific Clinical Hub recruitment programme to increase the pool of staff trained in Manchester Triage System and Clinical Hub procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff working on the Clinical Hub are fully trained in the Manchester Triage System and they must undertake a minimum of one shift per month on the Clinical Hub to maintain their licence.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue the operational staff recruitment drive to increase available staffing capacity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS recruitment drive is ongoing for operational staff and a specific recruitment programme for the Clinical Hub is taking place in September 2018 with a view to increasing the pool of staff trained in the Manchester Triage System and with specific Clinical Hub training.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Submit LAS data to the national review of ambulance response priorities, call-backs and safe systems to support improvement and learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Response Times”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The national review of ambulance response times and safe call-back systems is led by the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand you expressed an interest in the response times assigned to call priorities. A national review is currently being undertaken, led by the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE) in the process of ringing back patients and safe systems and LAS will respond to any actions and outcomes from this. LAS are playing a significant role in this national review by submitting our data which is being used, in conjunction with other ambulance services, to identify areas for improvement and learning and also to identify and promote areas of good practice.”

    Source location

    2018-0233-Response-by-London-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026