Recurring concern

Unreliable coordination of mental health crisis responses

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First reported 7 Apr 2014•Latest report 24 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the mental health crisis-response process involving coordination, role clarity, shared situational awareness, operational direction, staff readiness or timely recognition and response when these deficiencies directly affect coordinated crisis care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic inter-agency, multidisciplinary or organisational coordination failures not specifically tied to a mental health crisis response.
  • Excludes failures limited to routine mental health care, referral access, discharge, follow-up or ongoing care coordination outside a crisis response.
  • Excludes generic staff training, staffing or communication deficiencies unless they directly impair coordination or operational readiness during a mental health crisis.
  • Excludes failures concerning the availability or capacity of crisis services where no coordination or operational-response deficiency is identified.
Reports
22

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
24

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
37

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care4
NHS England4
North London NHS Foundation Trust3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Birmingham City Council2
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board2
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Birmingham Women'S and Children'S NHS Foundation Trust1
British Telecommunications Limited1
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Cornwall Health Limited1
Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Joseph DAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Day died on 15 January 2025 after taking a significant overdose of prescription medication and refusing treatment after an ambulance and police response. The principal concern was the absence of national guidance for frontline emergency services dealing with complex, time-critical situations involving mental health concerns, which the report said risks the lives of others.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of national guidance for frontline emergency crews dealing with time-critical mental health situations

    Wider context from the report

    “The fundamental issue was considered to be 'what can the frontline crew actually do' in such complex situations. I heard evidence that, sadly, Robert's situation is unlikely to have been novel but that there is an absence of national guidance to frontline emergency services in dealing with the complexities of cases such as Robert's. I acknowledge the complex interplay between the various agencies and services involved, but highlight to you my concern that the absence of any national guidance / advice to frontline emergency crews risks the lives of others who are found to be at time critical risk as a result of underlying mental health concerns. ”

    Source location

    Robert Joseph DAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for addressing concerns about national guidance for frontline emergency crews and will respond directly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission to ensure we adequately address your concerns. Upon reviewing your report, our NHSE colleagues felt it was more appropriate to reply directly to you given concerns around the absence of any national guidance/advice to frontline emergency crews. You may want to address your report to NHSE, so that they can also address your concerns. For CQC, you will see that their response to your concerns is highlighted in this letter below.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC & Department for Women's Health and Mental Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Kallum Josh REED · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kallum Josh REED died after being found fully suspended during a police search following his disappearance on 11 February 2025. The report raises concerns about delays in autism spectrum disorder and ADHD referrals, assessments and diagnoses, and about crisis-care referral pathways and coordination between mental health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of mental health professionals to work collaboratively to find a safe crisis-care solution

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The second concern is that the court was told that the "crisis team" gate-keep referrals into their service, notwithstanding that referral requests can often arise from psychiatry liaison and/or the community psychiatric team who have deep knowledge of the patient and have conducted their own detailed assessments. The care planning in Kallum's case advised him to contact the single point of access (who had rejected referral back to the crisis team in the weeks preceding the death), to present to ED (which he did but was discharged home to remain under the community team). The pathways essentially failed as the crisis team still able to reject the referral, thus effectively closing down an avenue for ongoing close care and communication as the crisis presentation continued. The Trust's internal report concluded that Kallum should have been assessed in person and probably should have been accepted back by the crisis team, but in court this conclusion was contested by the service manager. His evidence was that the crisis team was not appropriate for Kallum and the community team should continue the care. This re-emphasised the challenges faced by patients seeking crisis care as the Trust's own professionals were not in agreement or working collaboratively to find a safe solution. The situation appears not to have changed in the 12 months following this death. There appears to be no route to access the "half way house" provisions of care unless via the crisis team and so these were not offered or discussed with Kallum or his family who were trying to care for him. I am therefore raising this concern with the WLNHS Trust ”

    Source location

    Kallum Josh REED · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a borough-based mental-health service structure to support integrated, less fragmented care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From April 2025, the Trust moved from a service-line to a borough-based structure. This means that all mental health services are now managed within the borough rather than the previous model which saw all inpatient, all community, all liaison and talking therapies teams managed across the three directorates based on functional similarities. This change ensures that the organisation’s structure better supports integration of care and aims to reduce fragmentation for individuals whose care pathways previously spanned multiple service lines. The new structure supports more joined-up working within boroughs and stronger relationships with partners (both internal and external to the organisation) in place-based systems within the local areas.”

    Source location

    2026-0061 - Response from West London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Bring Ealing Psychiatry Liaison and crisis teams under a single senior manager.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To fully support this roll-out, we have adjusted the management portfolios in Ealing and brought the Psychiatry Liaison and CAHTT teams together under a single new senior manager with previous experience of working within a trusted assessment framework. We have also recruited a new Clinical Lead who will work across the same portfolio to support the new service manager and implement all necessary changes and improvements supporting the medical staff. This interface and smooth transition remain a priority for the Clinical and Associate Directors within the borough.”

    Source location

    2026-0061 - Response from West London NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Transform mental health services into community-based mental health centres bringing crisis services and short-stay beds together.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To help ensure that fewer people reach a point of crisis, the government is transforming mental health services into community-based mental health centres, building on existing pilots. These centres will bring together a range of community mental health services under one roof, including crisis services and short-stay beds, improving continuity of care. This reduces fragmentation in service delivery and patient experience, which contributes to longer waiting times and lower patient satisfaction.”

    Source location

    2026-0061 - Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    West London NHS Trust is handling the specific local issues arising from Kallum’s death and responding separately to the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of the specific local issues that resulted in Kallum slipping between the gaps and not receiving the potentially life-saving care he needed, I understand that West London NHS Trust has undertaken a Patient Safety Incident Investigation to learn important lessons from this event, which I welcome. I believe that they are responding separately to your report.”

    Source location

    2026-0061 - Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

    Open published response
  3. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Frederick DULLING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Frederick Dulling, who had Parkinson’s disease, symptoms of dementia and swallowing problems, was admitted to York District Hospital and choked while eating toast, subsequently dying from aspiration pneumonia. Concerns included the response to reported risks before admission and multiple nursing-care lapses during his hospital admission, including the appropriateness of his diet, nutritional monitoring, response to choking and incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to explain anticipated police assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence that on 29 August 2023, the day after Mr Dulling had been assessed at home by two members of the Crisis Team, his wife contacted the All Age Crisis Line number she had been given. She spoke to a clinician from the Crisis Team and reported that she and her husband were outside their home address, he was angry and distressed and she needed help. The advice given to Mrs Dulling was to call the police if she was concerned for her safety. Mrs Dulling ended the call frustrated at the lack of practical advice and assistance. 2. Mr Dulling had been deemed to present a risk of harm to himself and others when assessed by Crisis Team members on 28 August 2023. My concern is that the call did not establish whether this risk had increased, such that Mental Health Act detention or other emergency intervention should be considered, nor offer practical advice to Mrs Dulling about taking her husband to an acute hospital or calling an ambulance, nor explain what assistance it was considered or anticipated could be provided by the police. 3. My concern is that a repetition of such a limited response could present a risk of future deaths to others. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Frederick DULLING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present the case to the Trust Urgent Care Board to address learning from the incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am sorry to hear that the role and rationale for contacting the Police was not clearly communicated to Mr Dulling's wife. The case will be presented at the Trust Urgent Care Board which takes place on the 23 January 2025. Learning from this incident will also be shared at the all the Trust's Specialty Clinical Networks meetings on 19 December 2024, 20 December 2024, 7 January 2025 and 22 January 2025 via the service development managers for adult mental health, mental health services for older people, child and adolescent mental health services and adult learning disabilities to highlight the importance of clear communication and the impact of it and to the Trustwide Organisational Learning Group on 5 December 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valley NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share incident learning across Trust clinical networks and the Organisational Learning Group to reinforce clear communication about contacting police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am sorry to hear that the role and rationale for contacting the Police was not clearly communicated to Mr Dulling's wife. The case will be presented at the Trust Urgent Care Board which takes place on the 23 January 2025. Learning from this incident will also be shared at the all the Trust's Specialty Clinical Networks meetings on 19 December 2024, 20 December 2024, 7 January 2025 and 22 January 2025 via the service development managers for adult mental health, mental health services for older people, child and adolescent mental health services and adult learning disabilities to highlight the importance of clear communication and the impact of it and to the Trustwide Organisational Learning Group on 5 December 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valley NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police advice was correct because violence and aggression required an emergency response with police powers, rather than Crisis Team intervention alone.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Crisis Team are not an emergency service and when there is felt to be an immediate and significant risk, the correct advice is for the emergency services to be contacted, which depending upon the nature of the call will either be done by the person contacting emergency services themselves or the Crisis Team agreeing to contact on their behalf. This will then result in a decision being made by the emergency services as to whether there will be a response from the Police or Ambulance Service.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valley NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response
  4. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Evie Jane DAVIES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evie Jane Davies was found deceased at home on 2 December 2021 after taking a significant overdose of medication that had not been prescribed to her. The report states that this was likely a deliberate act intended to end her life, amid deteriorating mental health and significant personal stressors. The principal concern was insufficient real-time information sharing between the café71 crisis service, the mental health team and the GP, potentially preventing prompt follow-up of people at risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify the mental health team when a person has contacted the café71 service

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence I heard was that the café71 service is run as a crisis line for those who are in ’lesser crisis’ than those who would call mental health team crisis line or the crisis resolution home treatment team. It appears that the cafe71 team are operating in isolation/ separately to the mental health team, and for those patients who are under the mental health team, they will be unaware of the background and the risk factors for that person. They will take an assessment of that person at face value based on how they are in the call, as they don’t have access to the information held by the mental health team. In addition, there does not appear to be any notification to the mental health team to say that the person has been in contact such that this can be followed up. It is likely that there is notification to the GP but in this case there was no detail provided which could have been passed on, and the timescales for review of correspondence by the GP, who again are operating somewhat in isolation to the mental health team, does not lend itself to the prompt action which may be required by the mental health team. I am concerned that the lack of information sharing between these organisations, and in particular in real time or as near as possible, gives rise to a risk of future deaths and consider that your organisation has the power to take action, either as provider of the service or as commissioner. ”

    Source location

    Evie Jane DAVIES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind crisis line staff to include contact information in referrals and complete warm call transfers where possible.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At 20:27 on 1 December 2021 Café 71 staff emailed the crisis line as the referral did not contain a telephone number for Miss Davies. A telephone number was sent from the crisis line via email to Café 71 at 08:35 on 2 December 2021. A reminder has been issued to all”

    Source location

    Response from Cheshire and Wirral Partnership
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing procedures require Café 71 to contact relevant mental-health teams, attend professionals’ meetings and notify the Trust after three failed contact attempts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If an individual is known to Community Mental Health Team, Café 71 will link in with the individual’s key workers, this is via email or phone contact. This is set out in the current Community Mental Health Team Standard Operating Procedure. Café 71 staff are also invited to attend professionals’ meetings to provide feedback on the progress of the individual attending Café 71, including the level of engagement with the cafe, when an individual had completed their programme and offer recommendations for future support if appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from Cheshire and Wirral Partnership
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cafe 71 disputes that EJD contacted it, that it was a crisis line, or that referral information indicated immediate risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In point 4 of the report it says that EJD called the Crisis Line and was directed to Cafe 71. We want to make it clear that EJD did not ever call Cafe 71, the only call that we are aware of was to the NHS Crisis Line.”

    Source location

    Response from Spider Project
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NHS Crisis Line, which received the call, was responsible for notifying the mental health team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Also in point 5, there is a sentence regarding a lack of notification to the mental health team about EJD being in contact, but again, this would be the Crisis Line who would notify the mental health team as it was them who received the phone call.”

    Source location

    Response from Spider Project
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  5. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Oliver Beswetherick · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Oliver Beswetherick, who had a history of depression, bulimia and bipolar affective disorder, was found dead after falling from his flat on 4 September 2020. The report raised concern that mental health crisis teams did not have contact details for psychiatric liaison services and crisis teams in neighbouring boroughs, hindering direct referrals and the sharing of case information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of contact details for neighbouring psychiatric liaison and crisis mental health teams

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) It became evidence during the inquest that CMHT/ Crisis teams do not have contact details of: (i) Psychiatric liaison nurse services in neighbouring (out of their locality) boroughs based in Accident & Emergency departments, or details of (ii) CMHT/ crisis teams in neighbouring boroughs. Such contact could provide for direct referral, contact and passing on of knowledge of cases between neighbouring organisations, especially when individuals have already been assessed and asked to attend for a face-to-face consultation. Otherwise, those individuals who seek help, may have to revisit the same process of being interviewed on multiple occasions with a sense of déjà vu and anxiety that they are not obtaining the urgent assistance and support that they require. That may lead to them not engaging when they had hitherto made every attempt to do so. To provide those contact details would seem a relatively simple task, so teams could contact each other, and the local psychiatric liaison nurses based within the A&Es. ”

    Source location

    Mr Oliver Beswetherick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing NHS Service Finder and website directories provide professionals with current neighbouring mental health service contact details and referral information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises the concern that Community Mental Health and Crisis Teams do not have the contact details of Psychiatric Liaison, Community Mental Health, and Crisis Teams within neighbouring boroughs.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response
  6. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Elizabeth Anne WATSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Anne Watson attended the Humber Bridge on 5 December 2022 and jumped from it, landing on Cliff Road; she was declared dead at the scene. The concerns included a lack of structured training, including input from trained mental-health professionals, for bridge security staff identifying and responding to people in mental-health distress, as well as delays in emergency and mental-health support responses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of structured, clinically informed training for staff identifying and interacting with people in mental health crisis

    Wider context from the report

    “It appeared there was no structured training policy in place to ensure that staff are given appropriate training to deal with identifying vulnerable people. On joining, staff have an 8 weeks mentoring course, whereby an experienced colleague shows them the role and advises on what to look for. Staff may also undertake an on line suicide prevention course and mental health first aid at work as well as safety harness/working at height training. However there appeared to be no structure to any of the training for this vital role and of more concern there was no input from a trained medical professional with significant knowledge of working with those suffering from mental health crisis. Nor was there any current input with regard to how to talk and negotiate with people in crisis. I was informed that there were many very competent staff who had good intuition, but I have concerns that without appropriate and structured input from a health care professional, any experience on the job is based on unstable foundations. It was evident that the role is vitally important in identifying those at risk and seeking the appropriate help. Without receiving knowledge from someone trained in mental health, having a substantive input on negotiation and how to interact with those in crisis then the difficult job of assessing people and reacting appropriately with them becomes very difficult. ”

    Source location

    Elizabeth Anne WATSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Jayden Andrew Booroff · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jayden Andrew Booroff died after absconding from The Linden Centre and being struck by a train on 23 October 2020. The report identified concerns about risk assessments, observation levels, ward security, absconsion procedures, record keeping, medication, and communication between healthcare professionals and emergency services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish the changed risk and immediacy of serious or fatal harm when a patient escapes from a secure mental health ward

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Miscommunication between: a. Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust to emergency services b. Essex Police to Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust c. Essex Police to other emergency services In seeking further information, how a risk managed within the confines of a secure mental health ward may change for an escaped patient and whether there is real and immediate risk of serious or fatal harm to self or others, rather than assumptions that language is being used in the same way by different services. ”

    Source location

    Jayden Andrew Booroff · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and disseminate an SBARD aide-mémoire guiding staff escalation to police for patients absent from authorised leave or absconded, including Mental Health Act status and risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of communication with emergency services, in collaboration with the Trust’s Lessons Team, a one-page aide-mémoire was created to support staff to escalate concerns to the police for incidents where a patient does not return from leave or they have absconded from the ward. This guidance provided information regarding the impact factors that should be verbalised to the police when reporting a person missing. This would then enable the police to make an informed decision in relation to their response. This document uses the SBARD communication tool (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation, Decision). This document was shared with operational managers for cascading to front line staff and calls will be audited between EPUT and Essex Police to ascertain the effectiveness of the tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 February 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit missing-person calls with Essex Police to assess the aide-mémoire’s effectiveness and establish and share further learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of communication with emergency services, in collaboration with the Trust’s Lessons Team, a one-page aide-mémoire was created to support staff to escalate concerns to the police for incidents where a patient does not return from leave or they have absconded from the ward. This guidance provided information regarding the impact factors that should be verbalised to the police when reporting a person missing. This would then enable the police to make an informed decision in relation to their response. This document uses the SBARD communication tool (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation, Decision). This document was shared with operational managers for cascading to front line staff and calls will be audited between EPUT and Essex Police to ascertain the effectiveness of the tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 February 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share national guidance on restricted patients who abscond with Essex Police and relevant external agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Essex Police’s Strategic Vulnerability Centre is a department that oversees and co-ordinates the force’s activity across a number of areas of vulnerability. It includes non-operational thematic strands relating to missing persons and Mental Health. Through the work of the Strategic Vulnerability Centre:”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 February 2023

    Open published response
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Mark Largin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Mark Largin died by suicide after asphyxiating himself in the early hours of 6 February 2022 at the home where he lived. Concerns included delays in allocation to the neighbourhood rehabilitation team, failure by the crisis team to reassess him after being told he remained very depressed, inadequate recording and investigation of decision-making, and a lack of clarity about referral pathways and response times between teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of shared understanding of neighbourhood team patient-contact response times

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The SI review also did not identify that members of the crisis team and the neighbourhood team did not share an understanding of how quickly the neighbourhood team aims to make contact with patients, to assist in their decision making about the correct pathway for a patient. In fact, a member of the neighbourhood team itself gave evidence about the response times that, I was told later, was not correct. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Mark Largin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Serious Incident reviewers to consider integrated working practices between different services during quality assurance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have considered that the Trust SI review failed to highlight that there was no shared understanding between the HTT and the WWNT about referral timelines and I agree that this should have been explored.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 January 2023

    Open published response
  9. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Philip John BATTLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip John Battle died by suicide on 8 July 2022 after contacting the ambulance service about an overdose and an attempted hanging. The report raised concerns that the ambulance triage process focused on physical health rather than immediate mental-health and self-harm risks, and that no attempt was made to contact someone who could check on his safety. It also identified limited coordination and shared mental-health crisis resources between ambulance, police and health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance, police and health services to coordinate and share mental-health crisis intervention resources

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence has been received that Philip Battle self-referred to the ambulance service stating he had taken an overdose and that he had tried to hang himself. The then triage system (medical priority dispatch) concentrated on questions relating to physical health such as his physiological function rather than assessing the actual presenting risks from poor mental health including self-inflicted fatal harm. Mr Battle lived in warden monitored sheltered accommodation and no inquiry was made about whether someone could be telephoned to check on his safety. Even if Mr Battle had not been in sheltered accommodation, it was unclear as to why there was no triage question about a phone number for a friend or relative. Evidence was given that NWAS work with Lancashire police and the health service in Blackpool with the Synergy project sharing the resources of a triage mental health car. These arrangements and relationships do not exist in Liverpool. The Court was concerned about silo - public health working between Blue light services - given the limited mental health intervention resource for NWAS was not on duty on the morning of 8th July and there was no call to Merseyside Police to see if its Mental Health triage car was available to intervene. Evidence was heard that these services need commissioning and there was no arrangement between Merseyside Police and the NWAS to share mental health intervention resources. This issue appears to become more important when the court heard of the plans for three mental health ambulances to be available in Merseyside and Cheshire in the near future. The Court would like the ambulance service, Police and health providers to work together with the public funds at their respective disposal to develop in concert and to share community mental health crisis intervention resources for the good of the public. ”

    Source location

    Philip John BATTLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and assess NWAS interoperability models and relevant best practice when establishing and evaluating the mental-health triage service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Merseyside Police when setting up this service and indeed though review of the service and best practice, have looked at and considered inter-operability models with NWAS, however, they are not considered within this area to be the best use of personnel, as effectively it would lead to a vehicle crewed by three personnel, one of whom would almost always be surplus to requirements and indeed I would suggest that there will be more resource available if the current model is maintained.”

    Source location

    Response from Meryside Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A shared mental health response vehicle is not appropriate because ambulance and police services face different demands, calls, triage and dispatch processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NWAS and Merseyside Police provide each other with invaluable support and assistance on a daily basis. However, the demands faced by each service are very different, as too are the nature of the calls meaning that the call triage systems, categorisation and dispatch processes are distinct from each other. It is crucial that the respective mental health response vehicles reflect and meet the needs of the two very different services.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mental health response vehicles are health-led, with their scope and operating model agreed through a regional steering group involving ICBs and mental health trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Long Term plan is clear in its recommendation that the response to mental health problems (including response vehicles) is to be health led as they are health related issues. In the financial year ending 2022/23, NHSE released an amount of capital funding for which ambulance trusts, in partnership with their regional Integrated Care Board (“ICB”) and local mental health trusts, have tendered in order to purchase the mental health response vehicles. The staffing for such response vehicles is separately funded through the Mental Health Investment Standards, which is attached to the NHS Long Term Plan.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing separate police and NWAS cars are considered more effective than joint operability for Merseyside communities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Merseyside Police when setting up this service and indeed though review of the service and best practice, have looked at and considered inter-operability models with NWAS, however, they are not considered within this area to be the best use of personnel, as effectively it would lead to a vehicle crewed by three personnel, one of whom would almost always be surplus to requirements and indeed I would suggest that there will be more resource available if the current model is maintained.”

    Source location

    Response from Meryside Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2022

    Open published response
  10. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    James Kenneth Herbertson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Kenneth Herbertson took his own life after being struck by a train near Crawley train station on 10 April 2019. Concerns included unsuitable discharge accommodation and failures to recognise and act on signs of a mental health relapse, including not referring him to the crisis team or providing additional support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign responsibility for risk management and crisis referral

    Wider context from the report

    “c) His lead practitioner was not available at the time and nobody appears to have taken responsibility to manage James’ risk or make a referral to the crisis team. ”

    Source location

    James Kenneth Herbertson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review daily-meeting documentation and audit clinical records to verify recording of identified risk, actions and responsible staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “from the SI investigation the Trust reviewed the documentation of daily meetings, and completed an audit of the Carenotes noted by the service to ensure adherence. The documentation had to include the identified risk, plan of action and who was undertaking the action. The updated audit of November 2020 illustrated above 97% compliance to the specified requirements.”

    Source location

    2021-0078-Response-from-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 10 · response
    Published 24 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ongoing audits of red-zone risk recording and crisis referral arrangements were considered sufficient, so no additional action was required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Serious Incident report highlights the Care and Service delivery problem that the service ‘did not appear to have considered a referral to the crisis team despite clear signs of relapse and concerns raised by family’. In addition, that ‘there was no documented evidence of this discussion’. As an action”

    Source location

    2021-0078-Response-from-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 9 · response
    Published 24 March 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026