Recurring concern

Unreliable coordination of mental health crisis responses

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First reported 7 Apr 2014•Latest report 24 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the mental health crisis-response process involving coordination, role clarity, shared situational awareness, operational direction, staff readiness or timely recognition and response when these deficiencies directly affect coordinated crisis care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic inter-agency, multidisciplinary or organisational coordination failures not specifically tied to a mental health crisis response.
  • Excludes failures limited to routine mental health care, referral access, discharge, follow-up or ongoing care coordination outside a crisis response.
  • Excludes generic staff training, staffing or communication deficiencies unless they directly impair coordination or operational readiness during a mental health crisis.
  • Excludes failures concerning the availability or capacity of crisis services where no coordination or operational-response deficiency is identified.
Reports
22

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
24

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
37

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care4
NHS England4
North London NHS Foundation Trust3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Birmingham City Council2
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board2
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Birmingham Women'S and Children'S NHS Foundation Trust1
British Telecommunications Limited1
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Cornwall Health Limited1
Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Nigel Byron Abbott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 27 July 2018, Nigel Byron Abbott was killed in a sustained assault by a man experiencing an acute psychotic episode who had been identified as posing a threat of violence but was not detained after mental health beds were reported to be unavailable. The report raised concerns about agencies misunderstanding the urgent use of section 135 powers and failing to work together effectively, potentially leaving acutely unwell people who pose risks to themselves or others unnecessarily free in public.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of agencies to work together effectively on mental health detention processes

    Wider context from the report

    “It appears on the current evidence that there is a misunderstanding between the agencies as to how section 135 Mental Health Act 1983 can work in an urgent situation. This includes both whether or not WMP need 24 hours’ notice and whether or not a bed first needs to be available. All agencies need to urgently review the ‘Joint Memorandum of Understanding For Mental Health Professionals Requesting Police Assistance With Mental health Act Assessments and s135(1) & (2) Warrants, June 2018’ and their own practices both individually and jointly to ensure that all staff working in this area understand what is achievable and how. The context for this report is: (1) The evidence from WMP is that they do not require 24 hours’ notice to execute a section 135 warrant, whereas the AMHPs (BCC) are of the view there was no point in applying for a section 135 warrant because WMP need 24 hours’ notice. (2) BSMHFT have stated that BCC refused to co-operate with their Root Cause Analysis process, reviewing what lessons could be learnt from the incident. (3) I was only made aware that BCC had conducted an Internal Management Review Report - that acknowledged AMHPs were fixed on the operational difficulties of applying for the warrant out of hours and police availability as they required 24 hours’ notice – by a witness on day 1 of the inquest. BCC had not volunteered this report existed. (4) The BCC Internal Management Review Report – which is designed to be the ‘organisational learning process’ - confirms that BCC has not learnt lessons from the incident effectively. In the action plan there is no mention of the incorrect belief amongst AMHPs, that WMP require 24 hours’ notice, having been corrected. My on-going concern is that the agencies involved in this area are not working together effectively. The consequence is that acutely unwell people who need to be detained, because of the risk they pose to themselves and others, will remain unnecessarily free in public when in fact the agencies have the mechanism to detain them. ”

    Source location

    Nigel Byron Abbott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop electronic action cards setting out staff processes and inter-agency interactions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.5 The group is currently overseeing five main work streams in response to the Coroner’s recommendations, which are:”

    Source location

    2019-0284-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate multi-agency call-in and prioritisation for Section 135 requests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.6 Clarity has been introduced in relation to the use of sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act. Section 135 requests are now subject to multi agency ‘call in’ and prioritisation at 10am and 7pm. This process has only recently been introduced, and it is recognised that a more robust escalation process is needed to determine priority cases.”

    Source location

    2019-0284-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Determine management arrangements for Section 136 cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.7 In relation to Section 136 matters, the agencies are working to determine the management of these cases. This is likely to comprise a criterion for cases to be identified for urgent admission, with non-urgent cases being managed with positive risk processes and diversion to least restrictive options wherever possible.”

    Source location

    2019-0284-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain formal multi-agency approval for the revised police-assistance memorandum.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5.1 A new Memorandum of Understanding has been developed and agreed by all of the relevant agencies, WMP, BCC, BSMHFT and BWCH. This memorandum has been developed and will receive formal approval at the multi-agency working group on 22nd January 2020.”

    Source location

    2019-0284-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present the revised memorandum to frontline staff and deliver engagement, support and scenario testing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5.3 The new memorandum provides clarity for front line staff working in pressured situations, is clear on the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved and seeks to remove the ambiguity relating to the incorrect perception that WMP require 24 hours’ notice when providing police support. This approach has been communicated to staff in advance of the final sign off of the full document.”

    Source location

    2019-0284-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-CCG
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
  2. Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    William James Moody · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William James Moody, aged 85, intentionally entered the River Itchen from the banks of his home on 19 April 2019 and could not be revived after being taken to Southampton General Hospital. The report raises concerns that Hampshire’s 999 call-handling system may cause delays, missed triage opportunities and inadequate information-sharing between emergency services during mental health crises involving suicidal ideation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of 999 call triage to quickly and effectively identify the appropriate emergency response agency

    Wider context from the report

    “At Mr Moody’s Inquest I heard that his family (who were present throughout events as his daughter and son-in-law on the Estate in which Mr and Mrs Moody had a cottage) initially called 999 and asked for the Police to attend. The 999 call-taker triaged the call as requiring the attendance of Ambulance Service and deemed this to be a matter that the Police would not attend. This resulted in the family having to redial 999 and ask for an alternative service; during which some level of screening questions were repeated. This caused delay in the family reaching an appropriate service to attend. I heard evidence from the Mental Health Lead for Hampshire Constabulary who explained that as the incident on the 19th April 2019 was occurring in the person’s home and, as such the Police have no power to intervene where a person is in their own home and in mental health crisis and/or threatening to harm themselves. The situation on the 19th of April was distinguished from that which had happened the day before, on the 18th April, as the incident on the 18th had occurred in a public place and so, in that case, the police had a duty to attend. I heard further evidence that there is a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between Hampshire Police and the South Central Ambulance Service as to who is the primary response agency for persons making threats of suicidal ideation. Ultimately, the family were confused as to where help would come from and the call-handler will not transfer the call to a particular route/service unless the caller makes the decision as to which service they need. Despite there being a MOU between the agencies this does not appear to be something that the general public is aware of, and the task of making the general public aware of this is likely to be insurmountable and therefore it remains entirely foreseeable that future delays could occur because callers are unaware of which emergency service is the correct one to request in a situation where a person is suffering a mental health crisis episode and/or expressing suicidal ideation within the boundaries of their home. I heard further evidence regarding the existence of a different triage system, that operates in at least one area/jurisdiction of the country, but this only applies when a caller dials the 111 service; callers are given an option of accessing “Mental Health” services and this allows calls to be triaged through to an appropriately trained team/call-handler who can ask a set of wider diagnostic questions to understand and establish which agency, on the particular facts, should be the primary response service to that individual. In the situation of Mr Moody it transpired that it was actually a mixed response that was required; both the Police and Ambulance services. I am concerned that the current system of dealing with 999 calls in Hampshire gives rise to the potential for opportunities to be missed to triage the emergency call quickly and effectively, and to share information between agencies without the need to repeat the screening approach, and these factors may result in further deaths in the future. ”

    Source location

    William James Moody · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    George Daniel TWIDDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Daniel TWIDDY was found hanging from a tree on 15 November 2017 and died in hospital on 17 November 2017 after suffering an untreatable brain injury. The principal concern was a lack of clarity between the Hampshire AMHP Service and Southern Health NHS Trust’s Early Intervention Psychosis Team about responsibility for providing immediate assistance, leaving his parents and practitioners unclear about where help would come from.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient liaison between involved practitioners about crisis support

    Wider context from the report

    “At George's Inquest I heard evidence that there was a lack of clarity in the days leading up to his death as to which of the two agencies that had been involved in his care (Hampshire AMHP Service and Southern Health NHS Trust's Early Intervention Psychosis Team) were in a position to provide him with immediate assistance. His parents were confused as to where help would come from and practitioners from the two agencies were unclear as to where the responsibility lay. Although an improved explanatory leaflet for families about the responsibilities of the agencies is now in the course of being finalised and liaison to clarify respective roles has now taken place between senior managers of the agencies, it appears to me that a better understanding of those roles would be achieved if the practitioners actually involved in patient care themselves liaised more about what action and support should be made available to patients and relatives in crisis situations such as that faced by George and his family in the last days of his life. ”

    Source location

    George Daniel TWIDDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop integrated pathways through monthly strategic workshops to improve joint crisis support, admission and discharge planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HCC and SHFT share an equal commitment to address the serious concerns raised by the Coroner. HCC & SHFT have reviewed the PFD report findings together to plan how both agencies can adopt a more collaborative & effective approach, to support people in crisis as a result of their mental distress including where the Mental Health Act assessment process takes place.”

    Source location

    2019-0150-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain collaborative AMHP and AMHT arrangements, including staff shadowing and AMHT availability during Mental Health Act assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1 Both agencies have agreed to embark on a programme of joint work to organise Acute Mental Health Team staff (AMHT/ SHFT) to accompany the AMHP (HCC) and the Doctors as the assessing team members, so they can agree a support plan if admission to hospital is not deemed to be necessary and to be available at the time of the Mental Health Act assessment as required.”

    Source location

    2019-0150-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response
  4. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    David John Buttriss · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David John Buttriss died at home on 9 May 2016 after cutting himself during a mental health crisis, despite medical assistance and resuscitation. The report identified communication problems between the GP and mental health services, separate healthcare record systems that limited access to relevant information, and a lack of clarity about the appropriate crisis-response pathway and the roles of different mental health teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about crisis response pathways and service roles

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mr Buttriss had contact with a number of health agencies in the weeks prior to his death including the Community Mental Health, Home Treatment team, GP, Out of Hours GP and Paramedics. It was clear from the evidence at the inquest that • There were Communication issues between the GP and mental health service. The mental health services had requested a patient profile from the GP on 14.5.16 which was not received. The Patient’s GP did not advise mental health services that Mr Buttriss had a mental health history pre-2009 when spoken to following his first self-referral on 14.5.16. It was not known whether this may have affected the decisions the mental health professionals took but it did and meant that his mental health issues were not known to the Cornwall Mental Health Service when they were contacted at the time of crisis • The health care records for the GP and the Mental Health services are held on different health care record systems held by the different healthcare providers. This meant that the GP did not have access to the mental health service records at the time of the consultation on by ████████ on 25th April nor did the mental health workers have information about the appointment with ████████ nor were they aware of the medication issues. The Out of Hours GP, ████████ did not have access to either the mental health or GP records and was in a difficult position when deciding how to deal with Mr Buttriss especially with regards to prescribing and sign posting to mental health professionals when she saw him in acute crisis on the 7th May. • It was clear from the evidence of the Paramedic and ████████ and the parents that there was lack of clarity of the appropriate method or pathway to deal with Mr Butriss on the night of 7th May when he was in crisis. The paramedic did speak to the Home Treatment Team for advice but as Mr Buttriss was reluctant to engage no intervention was made. There appeared to be confusions between the role of the Community Mental Health Service and the Home Treatment Team and the Home Treatment Team Out of Hours provision. ”

    Source location

    David John Buttriss · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the public website with crisis information explaining daytime and out-of-hours mental health services, helplines and team contact numbers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In direct response to your Regulation 28 report the Trust has changed the Trust’s internet page. There is now a designated section headed “I need help now” providing mental health crisis information. The internet page is accessible to all members of the public including patients and health professionals and provides information explaining the roles and responsibilities of daytime and out of hours mental health services as well as details of a number of helplines and resources available to support those in crisis. Contact telephone numbers are also provided for the Trust’s Home Treatment Teams and Community Mental Health Teams.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-Cornwall-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and provide patients with Safety Plans containing warning signs, coping strategies, crisis contacts, care-team details and carer guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition new Safety Plans have been developed to be completed and provided to patients containing detailed crisis information for patients and their relatives, friends and carers. The plans confirm the name of team providing the care and the name of their care co-ordinator as well as the best number to contact the team and crisis numbers. The plan encourages carers to share any concerns and participate in the care and also explains that a “Nearest Relative” can speak to an Approved Mental Health Professional about their rights as a nearest relative. The plan is completed with the patient and sets out their warning signs; coping strategies and professionals or agencies to contact in a crisis.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-Cornwall-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review out-of-hours services to determine whether changes to Home Treatment Teams are needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is reviewing the Out of Hours services and this is likely to result in changes to the Home Treatment Teams within the next 6 months. Once changes have been confirmed the Trust plans to meet with external providers to confirm the changes and clarify the role of the Home Treatment Teams.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-Cornwall-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish guidelines clarifying community pathways for urgent, emergency and acute mental health services in 2018/19.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England has already published guidelines on the provision of urgent and emergency mental health provision in A&E / general hospitals, and intends to publish guidelines in 2018/19 to clarify the pathways of care for urgent, emergency and acute mental health services in the community. This includes ensuring that anyone, including health professionals, police, family members are able to access timely, 24/7 specialist care for people with emergency mental health needs.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for reviewing Cornwall-related recommended actions was passed to the new Cornwall Integrated Urgent Care provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your letter was directed to Dr Dean Marshall, Medical Director for Cornwall Health. You are aware, as identified within your report, that Cornwall Health (a subsidiary company of Devon Doctors) no longer provide the out of hours service within Cornwall and that this is now provided by a partnership of Kernow Health CIC, Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust and Vocare, under the name of Cornwall 111 Integrated Urgent Care Service. You sent a copy of the regulation 28 report to Kernow CIC and I too have passed the responsibility to review the actions you have identified for Cornwall to the new provider, having shared these with Dr Dean Marshall who, while no longer Medical Director for Cornwall Health, continues in the role of Medical Director for the new service.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-Devon-Doctors
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Devon Doctors could not implement the requested Cornwall changes because it no longer provided urgent care there.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As Devon Doctors no longer provide any urgent care within the county of Cornwall we are unable to effect the potential changes you are seeking.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-Devon-Doctors
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Some information-sharing recommendations were beyond Devon Doctors’ control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Dr Eggleton notes that some of your recommendations regarding information sharing are beyond the control of Devon Doctors but he is assured that our clinicians are able to make accurate assessments regarding risk, to the patient and others, and they have appropriate pathways to escalate their concerns to local mental health services. In reality this often means the patient is referred to ED to see the liaison psychiatrist team, since mental health assessments in the home environment are even more difficult to arrange out of hours than they are in hours.”

    Source location

    2018-0010-Response-by-Devon-Doctors
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Siân Louise WITHERIDGE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Siân Louise Witheridge died by suicide after hanging herself at home on 30 May 2017, following admission to Highbury Grove Crisis House. Concerns included staff not having or fully reviewing her mental health records, inadequate or unenforceable risk-assessment arrangements, misunderstanding of responses about suicide plans, and disjointed care between the crisis house and crisis team.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disjointed coordination of care between crisis house and crisis team services

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The care offered to service users of Highbury Grove Crisis House and the Islington Crisis Team seemed disjointed and not dovetailed between OneHousing and Camden & Islington NHS Trust. For example, the crisis team members who gave evidence did not have any knowledge of the crisis house procedure for risk assessing before allowing leave. ”

    Source location

    Siân Louise WITHERIDGE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with OneHousing to establish shared access to clinical records and risk assessments for Highbury Grove staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We agree that Highbury Grove Crisis House staff should have access to our clinical records. To this end, we have been working with One Housing to enable members of their staff to acquire access to our IT system. We are aiming to have shared access in place in early 2018 following staff completing the relevant training and necessary checks.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce joint risk assessments completed by OneHousing and Camden and Islington staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also going to move to undertaking joint risk assessments which will be completed by One Housing and C&I staff members. This will ensure that all risk factors as identified by all the staff caring for the patient are taken into account when formulating risk assessments and next steps. In cases where C&I staff conduct the risk assessment themselves, the Operations Manager and Team Manager for the crisis teams have reinforced to the teams the importance of providing detailed feedback to One Housing staff and agreeing a written plan of action for each patient.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce detailed feedback to OneHousing staff and agreement of a written action plan when crisis team staff complete risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also going to move to undertaking joint risk assessments which will be completed by One Housing and C&I staff members. This will ensure that all risk factors as identified by all the staff caring for the patient are taken into account when formulating risk assessments and next steps. In cases where C&I staff conduct the risk assessment themselves, the Operations Manager and Team Manager for the crisis teams have reinforced to the teams the importance of providing detailed feedback to One Housing staff and agreeing a written plan of action for each patient.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Information-sharing problems have been rectified through ready access to relevant clinical information and established communication channels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are aware that Highbury Grove has sent you our ‘Working Protocol’ setting out how our teams work together. As set out earlier, we accept that there have been challenges with information sharing. We are confident however that this has been rectified and Highbury Grove and staff will in the future have ready access to all the relevant clinical information.”

    Source location

    2017-0305-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Leah Abby Ratheram · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leah Abby Ratheram, who had autism, foetal alcohol syndrome and a history of self-harm, died after being found hanging from a tree on 7 October 2016. The report raised concerns about the lack of coordinated care and unclear responsibility between mental health organisations, ineffective sharing of records and risk information, and uncertainty about the Mental Health Act assessment process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of coordinated mental health care during crisis and transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Adults aged between 18 – 25 now have mental health services provided by two organisations – Forward Thinking Birmingham and Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust. If a patient presents in crisis to A&E they will be seen by someone from the RAID team who work for Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust. If they require ongoing treatment they will be referred to forward Thinking Birmingham. There is a concern that patients will have no coordinated approach to their care at a time of crisis. It is also unclear who will ultimately be responsible for the patient, particularly during the period of transfer. ”

    Source location

    Leah Abby Ratheram · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Mariana Hungria Bayam Veiga PINTO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mariana Pinto jumped from the third-floor balcony of her home as a deliberate act, without a proper understanding of what she was doing, after attending the emergency department the previous day. The concerns included whether the crisis team’s limitations and possible symptom worsening had been adequately communicated to her family, and whether the urgent crisis-line call was escalated appropriately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to clearly communicate crisis team limitations to families and friends

    Wider context from the report

    “1. It seemed to me at inquest that, when Ms Pinto left the emergency department the day before her death, the limitations of the crisis team were not made clear to her family and friends. ”

    Source location

    Mariana Hungria Bayam Veiga PINTO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Patrick DANIELS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Patrick Daniels hanged himself following several contacts with South Camden Crisis Response and Resolution Team. The principal concerns were failures to carry out and record planned visits, communicate within the team and with crisis houses, progress a crisis-house referral promptly, and consider hospital admission despite identified suicide risk and Mr Daniels stating that he did not feel safe at home.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of cohesion in crisis care

    Wider context from the report

    “You will see from the determination attached, that I found there was a failure by the crisis team: - to visit Mr Daniels twice a day, despite a plan so to do; - to record why twice daily visits were not attempted; - to communicate within the team and with the two crisis houses; - to progress the referral to a crisis house promptly; - to consider hospital admission, despite the fact that Mr Daniels was known to have made several suicide attempts; had told staff he did not feel safe at home; was observed to be keeping a rope at home; told staff he would kill himself, albeit not immediately; said he wanted to be in a contained environment; and there was apparently no prospect of prompt admission to crisis house. I gained the impression of a lack of cohesion and clinical direction. ”

    Source location

    Mark Patrick DANIELS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of communication within the crisis team and with crisis houses

    Wider context from the report

    “You will see from the determination attached, that I found there was a failure by the crisis team: - to visit Mr Daniels twice a day, despite a plan so to do; - to record why twice daily visits were not attempted; - to communicate within the team and with the two crisis houses; - to progress the referral to a crisis house promptly; - to consider hospital admission, despite the fact that Mr Daniels was known to have made several suicide attempts; had told staff he did not feel safe at home; was observed to be keeping a rope at home; told staff he would kill himself, albeit not immediately; said he wanted to be in a contained environment; and there was apparently no prospect of prompt admission to crisis house. I gained the impression of a lack of cohesion and clinical direction. ”

    Source location

    Mark Patrick DANIELS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement measures across all Crisis Teams and Crisis Houses to address the identified concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ Associate Divisional Director for the Acute division has considered your concerns and put in place a comprehensive action plan to address them – the action plan is appended at the end of this letter. As you can see from the action plan updates, several”

    Source location

    2015-0208-Response-by-Camden-and-Islington-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 June 2015

    Open published response
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kingsley Burrell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kingsley Burrell died on 31 March 2011 after being restrained and transported between mental health and hospital settings following an acute mental health disturbance. The inquest found that the covering over his head, unreasonable periods of restraint, delay in resuscitation and neglect contributed to his death. Concerns included inconsistent national understanding of acute behavioural disturbance, the absence of a nationally implemented crisis-team system, and non-nationally consistent policies for managing patients between services during a crisis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a national multi-agency crisis team system for people in mental health crisis

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The West Midlands area now have a crisis team that works with people who are in a mental health crisis. This involves a mental health worker and ambulance crew working together with the Police to try to help patients with acute mental health disorders. My concern is that this is not a national system. Chief Inspector ███████ at West Midlands Police can provide full details of the scheme. ”

    Source location

    Kingsley Burrell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the Crisis Care Concordat to establish cross-sector expectations for local mental health crisis responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Department published the Crisis Care Concordat in 2014 to ensure that anyone experiencing a mental health crisis receives the right support in the right place. The Concordat is a cross-sector agreement which ensures that local areas provide the”

    Source location

    2015-0472-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fund street triage pilot schemes providing mental health professionals’ on-the-spot advice to police during possible mental health crises.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Department has also funded a number of street triage pilot schemes where mental health professionals provide on the spot advice to police when dealing with people with possible mental health problems. These pilots are currently being evaluated so that this approach can be rolled out more widely.”

    Source location

    2015-0472-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National paramedic teams for acute mental health responses may be difficult to provide because of a recognised paramedic shortage and local commissioning arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Due to a now recognised national shortage of paramedics, being able to provide a paramedic to specifically work as part of a team to respond to patients with acute mental health disorders will be difficult for some trusts, and will depend on local commissioning arrangements. We recognise that these schemes are likely to continue to develop.”

    Source location

    2015-0472-Response-by-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing local policies and crisis plans provide the arrangements for cross-agency mental health crisis responses rather than a single national system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You highlight the need for cross-agency working to safely manage people being moved between services when a mental health crisis occurs and when police attend a health setting. The Code states local policies should be in place between providers, the police and other agencies with protocols covering all aspects of the use of section 135 and 136 powers. Sections 135 and 136 give the police powers to temporarily move people, who appear to be suffering from a mental disorder, and who need urgent care, to a ‘place of safety’ so that a mental health assessment can be carried out and appropriate arrangements made for care. Local policies should include arrangements for police attend a health-based setting and transporting people between places of safety.”

    Source location

    2015-0472-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 March 2015

    Open published response
  10. Powys, Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Barrie Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barrie Lewis was found by his family hanging from a rope attached to a garage rafter on 31 August 2014. The inquest concluded that his death was suicide. Concerns included the absence of a specific risk assessment for suicidal ideation, poor communication between mental health services, no reliable system assigning responsibility for assistance, and a lack of clinical records of crisis-team contact.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure crisis team responsibility for providing assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) A clinical review was undertaken of the contact the deceased had with the mental health services in the days prior to his death and it was apparent from that review, and from the evidence heard that: a) That no risk assessment was undertaken to detail risks specifically associated with the deceased’s suicidal ideation which, on the evidence, would have assisted the crisis team in assessing his risk of suicide or self harm. b) There was little formal mechanism for communication between the mental health out patients department and the acute services which he accessed in the days prior to his death. c) There was no reliable system to ensure that a member of the crisis team took responsibility for providing assistance to the deceased – simply leaving the deceased to make his own telephone call to the appropriate department. d) No clinical recordings were made of the contact the deceased had with the crisis team (Crisis Resolution Home Treatment team) following his contact with them. ”

    Source location

    Barrie Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a procedure defining the role of the duty officer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Actions implemented”

    Source location

    2015-0065-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026