Recurring concern

Failure to apply overdose-risk safeguards to medication prescribing

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 15 Jan 2015•Latest report 27 Oct 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes prescribing-process controls specifically intended to identify and respond to a patient's overdose history or material overdose risk, including mandatory clinical review before issuing prescriptions, scrutiny of repeat prescriptions, use of relevant overdose information and proportionate restrictions or supervision of prescribing.

Not included

  • Excludes general medication-prescribing errors, medication review or quantity-control failures where no overdose history or material overdose risk is part of the asserted unsafe condition.
  • Excludes medication administration, dispensing, storage or supply failures occurring after a safe prescribing decision unless the prescribing safeguard itself was deficient.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping, communication, training or alert-system deficiencies unless they directly impair overdose-risk safeguards in medication prescribing.
  • Excludes treatment of an overdose and broader self-harm or suicide-risk management where no medication-prescribing control is identified.
Reports
12

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
16

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
26

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
NHS England2
Addison House Surgery1
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Axminster Medical Practice1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Daynight Pharmacy (Macklin Street)1
Devon Partnership NHS Trust1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Frimley Health NHS Foundation Trust1
General Medical Council1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Constabulary1
Heathview Medical Practice1
Macklin Street Surgery1
NHS Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Danielle Monique Christina JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Danielle Jones was found unresponsive at home on 13 May 2025 and was confirmed deceased by paramedics. Post-mortem toxicology found high levels of amitriptyline, excess zopiclone and recent substantial cocaine use; the recorded cause was combined multidrug toxicity. The principal concerns were that, despite reported prescription overdoses and concerns raised by a drug and alcohol service, her repeat prescription medication does not appear to have been reviewed and was continued in large quantities at 28-day frequency.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record clinical rationale for continued repeat prescribing in light of overdose risk

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Although Miss Jones was signposted to Mental Health Services by her GP, her prescription medications do not appear to have been reviewed and the GP surgery continued to prescribed repeat medications in large amounts at 28 day frequency without any further review subsequent to her appointment on 25/2/25. 6. She was issued with repeat prescriptions on 3 occasions subsequent to her appointment on 24th and 25th February 2025 when she self-closed an overdose of prescription medication. 7. On 6/3/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████ ████████ Miss Jones was prescribed 8. On 27/3/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████ Miss Jones was prescribed Amitriptyline ████████ Diazepam ████████ lamotrigine ████████ mirtazapine ████████ pregabalin ████████ zopiclone 9. On 28/4/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████ Miss Jones was prescribed ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 10. Miss Jones died on 13/5/25 from the combined toxic effects of a fatal level of amitriptyline along with an excessive amount of zopiclone. 11. The clinical lead at Cranstoun had previously had discussions with the GP about reducing Miss Jones prescription for zopiclone. 12. No medication review appears to have taken place after Miss Jones self-reported overdose of prescribed medication nor after concerns were raised by Cranstoun. 13. GMC Guidance requires a practitioner to prescribe drugs or treatment including repeat prescriptions, only when they have adequate knowledge of the patient’s health and are satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the patient’s needs and to keep clear, accurate and legible records, reporting the relevant clinical findings, the decisions made. 14. There is no clinical rationale recorded for the continued prescribing of Miss Jones’s repeat medications in terms of managing Miss Jones’s risk of overdose given her recent disclosure e.g. reducing the frequency to 7 days rather than 28 days. 15. There is no evidence of any medication review having taken place after Miss Jones’s disclosure of overdose of prescription medication or prior to her repeat prescriptions being issued on 6/2/25, 27/3/25 or 28/4/25. Her last reported medication review was on 23/8/24. ”

    Source location

    Danielle Monique Christina JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continued prescribing of repeat medications in large amounts at 28-day frequency after overdose disclosure

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Although Miss Jones was signposted to Mental Health Services by her GP, her prescription medications do not appear to have been reviewed and the GP surgery continued to prescribed repeat medications in large amounts at 28 day frequency without any further review subsequent to her appointment on 25/2/25. 6. She was issued with repeat prescriptions on 3 occasions subsequent to her appointment on 24th and 25th February 2025 when she self-closed an overdose of prescription medication. 7. On 6/3/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████ ████████ Miss Jones was prescribed 8. On 27/3/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████ Miss Jones was prescribed Amitriptyline ████████ Diazepam ████████ lamotrigine ████████ mirtazapine ████████ pregabalin ████████ zopiclone 9. On 28/4/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████ Miss Jones was prescribed ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 10. Miss Jones died on 13/5/25 from the combined toxic effects of a fatal level of amitriptyline along with an excessive amount of zopiclone. 11. The clinical lead at Cranstoun had previously had discussions with the GP about reducing Miss Jones prescription for zopiclone. 12. No medication review appears to have taken place after Miss Jones self-reported overdose of prescribed medication nor after concerns were raised by Cranstoun. 13. GMC Guidance requires a practitioner to prescribe drugs or treatment including repeat prescriptions, only when they have adequate knowledge of the patient’s health and are satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the patient’s needs and to keep clear, accurate and legible records, reporting the relevant clinical findings, the decisions made. 14. There is no clinical rationale recorded for the continued prescribing of Miss Jones’s repeat medications in terms of managing Miss Jones’s risk of overdose given her recent disclosure e.g. reducing the frequency to 7 days rather than 28 days. 15. There is no evidence of any medication review having taken place after Miss Jones’s disclosure of overdose of prescription medication or prior to her repeat prescriptions being issued on 6/2/25, 27/3/25 or 28/4/25. Her last reported medication review was on 23/8/24. ”

    Source location

    Danielle Monique Christina JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the self-harm follow-up policy to require medication review and consideration of reducing prescription quantities where ongoing risk exists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will amend our follow up policy to specifically mention the need for medication review at the time of pro-active follow up, and in particular to consider reducing the amount of medication per prescription if there is any ongoing risk of further self-harm and especially with high-risk medications.”

    Source location

    Response from Your Health Partnership Regis Medical Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the self-harm risk-assessment template to record medication review discussions, stockpiling, medication safety, prescription quantity, and medication supervision options.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will amend our risk assessment template to include a mental health medication review code and free text advice regarding the following with a free text box to record discussions.”

    Source location

    Response from Your Health Partnership Regis Medical Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the annual proactive self-harm follow-up audit to record medication reviews and discussions about prescribed medication quantities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will re-launch this amended policy in January 2026 with our clinicians and add the recording of medication review and recording of consideration of reducing amount of medication on each issue as part of the annual audit program.”

    Source location

    Response from Your Health Partnership Regis Medical Centre
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Alan Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Alan Smith was found deceased at home on 5 March 2024 after ingesting large quantities of prescription medication, including Mirtazapine and Pregabalin, together with a significant quantity of alcohol. The report identified a lack of GP policies or procedures for reviewing medication quantities prescribed to vulnerable patients with histories of addiction, self-harm, suicidal ideation or prescription medication overdose, and stated that this failure probably contributed more than minimally to the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of medication review controls for repeat prescriptions to vulnerable patients with histories of addiction, self-harm, suicidal ideation or prescription medication overdose

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was received from two GP Partners at Mr Smith’s GP Practice. Both GPs confirmed that at the time of Mr Smith’s involvement with the Practice continuing up to and including the date of the inquest, there continued to be no system, policy or process in place, to ensure that vulnerable patients with a history of addiction and/or self-harm and/or suicidal ideation and/or prescription medication overdose received or receive appropriate medication reviews to consider the frequency and volume of repeat prescribed medication. It was conceded, accordingly, that there was - and remained - no policy or procedure in place to mitigate the clear risk involved in GPs prescribing unnecessarily excessive quantities of (potentially dangerous) prescription medication (at inappropriate frequency) to a clearly vulnerable cohort of patients, and therefore no policy or procedure is in place to minimise the danger of stockpiling of such medications and the concomitant risk of potentially fatal, (advertent or inadvertent), misuse of such medication. ”

    Source location

    Mark Alan Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit all registered patients coded at risk of self-harm or suicide and receiving repeat medication, complete medication and risk reviews, and restrict repeats to seven-day supplies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Immediate High-Risk Patient Review: A full audit of all patients registered at Addison House Surgery, coded at risk of self-harm/suicide and on repeat medications. Identified patients have had medication/risk reviews by the pharmacists with restriction of repeat medications to seven-day periods.”

    Source location

    Response from Addison House Health Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Polypharmacy and High-Risk Prescribing Policy to require pharmacist review of relevant correspondence, seven-day high-risk medication supplies, and three-monthly or earlier reviews for high-risk patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Practice has updated and strengthened the risk assessment provisions of repeat prescribing for identified patients with self-harm or suicide risk as well as monitoring of same with enhanced medication reviews/risk assessments.”

    Source location

    Response from Addison House Health Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The practice disputes that no safety controls existed, stating its repeat prescribing policy already contained restrictions for inappropriate high-risk medication requests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There were safety provisions within the Practice’s repeat prescribing policy at the time of late Mark Smith’s death with multiple documented restrictions of inappropriate high risk medication requests by Mr Smith.”

    Source location

    Response from Addison House Health Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response
  3. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacqueline GREEN was admitted to Bedford Hospital after a fall and was found to be very weak, frail, cachectic and dehydrated. She received paracetamol at a dose intended for patients weighing over 50 kg despite weighing 33.6 kg, subsequently developed paracetamol-induced liver injury and died from liver failure. The concerns included inadequate safeguards for prescribing paracetamol to low-weight adults, unexplained variation in the administration of doses, and incomplete implementation of relevant safety measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to address or adopt safeguards against unintentional paracetamol overdose in low-bodyweight adult inpatients

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Despite the fact that the HSSIB made Safety Observations to mitigate the risks of unintentional paracetamol overdose in adult inpatients with low bodyweight in their National Report dated 24.02.2022 (https://www.hssib.org.uk/patient-safety-investigations/unintentional-overdose-of-paracetamol-in-adults-with-low-bodyweight/) none of these had been addressed/adopted at Bedford Hospital by the time of the Deceased’s admission on 29 August 2023 which meant that, despite weighing only 33.6kg, the deceased was prescribed a daily dose of 1,000 mg x 4 which was only suitable for a patient weighing in excess of 50kg. ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add EPMA prescribing prompts requiring accurate weight recording and appropriate paracetamol dosing, including liver-toxicity warnings below 50 kilograms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is now a prompt when prescribing paracetamol (all routes) on EPMA that reminds prescribers of the need to ensure there is an accurate weight recorded and that the dose is appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and launch a Nervecentre paracetamol prescribing guide.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Nervecentre paracetamol prescribing guide has been produced and been launched in to support safe prescribing of paracetamol.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response
  4. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alexandra Bronte Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexandra Bronte Roberts, who had a history of mental health issues, self-harm and Type 1 diabetes, died after intentionally overdosing on her prescribed insulin on 13 May 2023. The principal concern was that insulin could only be prescribed in pre-filled pens containing around 10 days’ supply, enabling access to a large overdose, whereas smaller amounts could have reduced the risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inability to prescribe smaller quantities of insulin

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The minimum amount of insulin available to be prescribed at the time of Alex’s death was 300 units, amounting to around 10 days of medication for Alex, enabling her to take a large overdose. The Court heard evidence that had it been possible to prescribe a smaller amount, the smaller amount would have been prescribed so as to reduce the risk of overdose. ”

    Source location

    Alexandra Bronte Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The MHRA is the more appropriate organisation to respond to concerns about the insulin doses currently available to patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As your Report notes, the smallest quantity of insulin within a single pen device is currently 300 units of insulin. You may wish to refer to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) as the UK’s regulator of medicines regarding your concerns, as they would be the more appropriate organisation to respond on the insulin doses currently available to patients.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 January 2025

    Open published response
  5. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Mary Feeney · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Mary Feeney was found deceased at home after taking excess prescribed medication, with pneumonia also contributing to her death. The principal concern was that prescribing and pharmacy arrangements around longer bank holiday periods allowed excess medication to be supplied to a patient recognised as being at risk of overdose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of measures to prevent excess prescribing to patients at risk of overdose during longer bank holiday periods

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that measures are not in place at Macklin Street Surgery and Daynight pharmacy to prevent prescription of excess medication to patient’s recognised to be at risk of overdose, either intentional or unintentional, who are ordinarily issued shorter period repeat prescriptions to reduce those risks. This situation arises when early prescriptions are issued due to statutory holiday periods when most pharmacies are likely to be closed. I have been informed that measures have been introduced to prevent excess prescribing by taking account of single day bank holidays, but there are no measures relating to longer bank holiday periods (e.g. Easter). With electronic patient record and data systems it seems a reasonable presumption that suitable solutions can be identified. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Mary Feeney · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the GP practice investigation, lessons learned and identified actions, and determine required support with primary care quality and patient safety teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action number | Overview of DDICB actions | Proposed completion date INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT 1a | Review investigation and lessons learnt/ actions identified by the practice. With support of the ICB primary care quality team and ICB patient safety team, identify support required | 7/2/25 1b | Review investigation and lessons learnt/ actions at community pharmacy. With support of Midlands controlled drugs area team and primary care commissioning team, identify support required. | 7/2/25 REVIEW AND COMMUNICATIONS 2a | Extract shared learning from the practice and community pharmacy reports and add lessons to be shared additionally to those raised above, into an incident report, ready to be shared with system colleagues. Learning report ratified | 14/2/25”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the community pharmacy investigation, lessons learned and identified actions, and determine required support with controlled drugs and commissioning teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action number | Overview of DDICB actions | Proposed completion date INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT 1a | Review investigation and lessons learnt/ actions identified by the practice. With support of the ICB primary care quality team and ICB patient safety team, identify support required | 7/2/25 1b | Review investigation and lessons learnt/ actions at community pharmacy. With support of Midlands controlled drugs area team and primary care commissioning team, identify support required. | 7/2/25 REVIEW AND COMMUNICATIONS 2a | Extract shared learning from the practice and community pharmacy reports and add lessons to be shared additionally to those raised above, into an incident report, ready to be shared with system colleagues. Learning report ratified | 14/2/25”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate collated learning and prescribing-safety updates through pharmacy newsletters, GP messages, medicines-safety communications and prescribing-leads forums.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We recommend promoting the use of this feature across all practices as part of a broader effort to strengthen the scheduled prescription process. Sharing this learning with system users can help make prescription management more robust and prevent potential medication-related risks.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning and concerns with clinical-system providers, requesting consideration and implementation of solutions to prevent recurrence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge that updates to provider clinical systems could play a crucial role in addressing the issues identified. However, given the operational and developmental oversight of these systems lies with their respective clinical system providers, we believe they are best positioned to evaluate and enact the necessary changes.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a significant event analysis to identify safer arrangements for short-term prescriptions around bank holidays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of Mrs Feeney’s death, the practice conducted a significant event analysis on 8 August 2024 and a copy of that report has been shared with you previously. As part of that review, it was identified that a way of minimising the need to bring forward 7-day prescriptions prior to bank holidays (and therefore reduce the risks associated with patients having additional medication) was to move the day on which 7-day prescriptions were issued. We initially considered changing the issuing day to a Wednesday but we have since decided to move the day of issue to a Tuesday.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Move all short-term prescription issue days to Tuesday, notify patients and pharmacies, and place alerts in patient notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of Mrs Feeney’s death, the practice conducted a significant event analysis on 8 August 2024 and a copy of that report has been shared with you previously. As part of that review, it was identified that a way of minimising the need to bring forward 7-day prescriptions prior to bank holidays (and therefore reduce the risks associated with patients having additional medication) was to move the day on which 7-day prescriptions were issued. We initially considered changing the issuing day to a Wednesday but we have since decided to move the day of issue to a Tuesday.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement rolling alerts notifying clinicians when patients move onto short-term prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The surgery has now identified all patients who are on short-term prescriptions (which we have defined as having a prescribing period of 14 days or less) and the prescription day for all of these patients has been moved to a Tuesday. Patients and pharmacies have been advised. An alert has also been placed in the patients' notes. We are implementing a rolling alert so that a clinician will be alerted if a patient moves onto short-term prescriptions in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review short-term-prescription patients clinically and classify their risk of medication harm, with reassessment at annual medication reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The surgery is currently in the process of ensuring that the notes of all of the patients who have been identified as being on short-term prescriptions are reviewed by a clinician to assess whether each patient is at high or low risk. However, risk is broader than risk of overuse / overdose. Risk includes risk of medication harm, (that is to say, some drugs would present a greater risk of harm than others if overused or taken in overdose). Therefore, a clinician will determine whether a patient is at high or low risk of harm if the patient takes more than their prescribed dose. This will be reviewed at the annual medication review.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Split high-risk patients’ prescriptions into shorter supplies when specified bank holidays fall on Tuesday.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Now that all short-term prescriptions have been moved to a Tuesday, the issue of having to alter prescription processes will only arise on the years when Christmas Day, Boxing Day or New Year’s Day fall on a Tuesday. If Christmas Day, Boxing Day or New Year’s Day fall on a Tuesday, the prescriptions for those patients who have been identified by a clinician as being at high risk will be split i.e. the prescription week will be divided so that those patients will receive two shorter prescriptions to cover them for the bank holiday. How the prescription will be split will depend on how the bank holiday falls but could take a 3:4 day format thus minimising the risks as far as possible.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek advice from the Integrated Care Board on using central clinical pharmacy and medicines-management expertise for high-risk patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The surgery will write to the Integrated Care Board seeking advice on how we use the ICB system's central clinical pharmacy / medicines management expertise to assist practices with the management of high-risk patients. We will liaise with the Integrated Care Board to determine how our learning from this experience could be shared with other local GP surgeries to assist them in improving their processes around short-term prescribing. We will also highlight to the ICB any potential national level digital constraints.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinical system providers are responsible for evaluating and implementing necessary updates because they control operational and developmental oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge that updates to provider clinical systems could play a crucial role in addressing the issues identified. However, given the operational and developmental oversight of these systems lies with their respective clinical system providers, we believe they are best positioned to evaluate and enact the necessary changes.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prescribing and dispensing decisions are assigned to responsible clinicians and pharmacists, who must apply clinical judgement and may delay dispensing where concerns arise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You outlined in your report that Ms Feeney had a long history of being prescribed benzodiazepines and codeine and had become dependent on them. It is important to note that the decision to prescribe a particular drug is a clinical one and should be based on the patient’s medical needs. Decisions about what medicines to prescribe are made by the doctor or healthcare professional responsible for that part of the patient’s care and”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England, through regional Controlled Drugs Accountable Officers, holds national oversight responsibility for safe controlled-drug management and use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At a national level NHS England has a clear responsibility in providing systems oversight for the management and use of controlled drugs, including benzodiazepines and opioids. NHS England’s Controlled Drugs Accountable Officers (CDAO¹) undertake this role within each geographical region across England. They provide assurance that all healthcare organisations, including pharmacies, adopt a safe practice for appropriate clinical use, prescribing, storage, destruction and monitoring of controlled drugs.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk cannot be mitigated entirely because pharmacies are not routinely open on bank holidays and patients may choose different pharmacies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, it is not possible for the surgery to mitigate risk entirely because of the fact that pharmacies are not routinely open 7 days a week including on all bank holidays and because patients, understandably, have the freedom to choose which pharmacy they would like their prescriptions sent to. As you have identified, this is not an issue that is likely limited to Macklin Street Surgery but is one that is likely to affect all GP surgeries across the country. It should also be appreciated that there are some technical constraints to the digital records system the practice uses (SystmOne) and the reports it is able to generate.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Addressing digital reporting constraints requires action by the national system supplier and NHS Digital.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, it is not possible for the surgery to mitigate risk entirely because of the fact that pharmacies are not routinely open 7 days a week including on all bank holidays and because patients, understandably, have the freedom to choose which pharmacy they would like their prescriptions sent to. As you have identified, this is not an issue that is likely limited to Macklin Street Surgery but is one that is likely to affect all GP surgeries across the country. It should also be appreciated that there are some technical constraints to the digital records system the practice uses (SystmOne) and the reports it is able to generate.”

    Source location

    Response from Macklin Street Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2024

    Open published response
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Tracy Frances MCCARTHY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracy McCarthy was found deceased at home on 17 July 2023 and died from long-term misuse of amitriptyline; the inquest conclusion was a drug-related death, with amitriptyline toxicity and coronary artery disease recorded. The concerns included prescribing amitriptyline above the maximum suggested dose, failure to flag the overdose risk and stop or appropriately manage the prescription, and changing from daily to monthly prescriptions despite recognised risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain daily amitriptyline dispensing to mitigate overdose risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Ms McCarthy’s Amitriptyline prescriptions had previously been issued on a daily basis, to mitigate the risk of overdose. However, following her admission to hospital (mentioned above) a GP at The Tredegar Practice took the decision to reduce the dose slightly, but transfer to monthly prescriptions, thereby allowing Ms McCarthy access to 28 days’ worth of Amitriptyline all at once. A GP from The Tredegar Practice told me that they thought this was “risky” but said that the GP who made that decision was not familiar with the patient and maybe wouldn’t have known the rationale for daily prescriptions. They also told me that the Practice was probably “over-reliant on the knowledge of particular doctors that treated her.” The concern is that too great an emphasis was placed on the knowledge of a few individuals, which led to acknowledged risks not being put in the records in a way that would alert any practitioner to them. ”

    Source location

    Tracy Frances MCCARTHY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to flag the overdose risk and stop continued amitriptyline prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Following Ms McCarthy’s admission to hospital as a result of an overdose of Amitriptyline and Codeine, The Tredegar Practice received information from the hospital, making reference to the overdose. Despite this, the risk was not flagged and no alert was put on the system; as such, the prescription of Amitriptyline continued. A GP from The Tredegar Practice told me, “[the Amitriptyline] should have been stopped, but knowing [the patient] that would have been very hard to do.” ”

    Source location

    Tracy Frances MCCARTHY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prescribing of amitriptyline for depression despite its increased risk of fatality in overdose

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Although Amitriptyline is not generally regarded as a drug of abuse, Ms McCarthy was known to be dependent on it. She had been prescribed Amitriptyline for many years, and at one stage in or about 2022, she was regularly prescribed ████████ mg per day, which is over the maximum suggested dose in the BNF (150mg per day). In addition, the BNF provides a clear warning (as did the prescribing/records software in use at The Tredegar Practice) that Amitriptyline prescribed for depression (which it was in this case), is “not recommended – increased risk of fatality in overdose”. A GP from The Tredegar Practice told me that ████████ mg was an “unacceptable dose”. The concern being that guidelines were not followed, particularly in relation to a patient known to be dependent and where use of Amitriptyline was not recommended for the presenting condition in any event. ”

    Source location

    Tracy Frances MCCARTHY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify eligible complex patients, add them to the Risk Management & Care Planning Register, and create corresponding care plans and EMIS alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Identification of patients to be entered into the framework.”

    Source location

    Response from The GP Partners
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular reviews of registered patients and the overall framework, documenting, minuting, and circulating review outcomes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Reviews: regular reviews will be needed in the process.”

    Source location

    Response from The GP Partners
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 May 2024

    Open published response
  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Joshua Arthur Stafford Delaney · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joshua Arthur Stafford Delaney, aged 19, had a history of mental illness, suicidal ideation and previous suicide attempts. On 19 January 2020, he took a large overdose of Propranolol, was found collapsed, and died despite resuscitation attempts. The principal concern was that GPs may not be aware of the risk of fatal Propranolol overdose and may prescribe quantities to people at risk, potentially causing future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to limit quantities of Propranolol prescribed to people at risk of overdose

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence of the General Practitioner in this case was to the effect that prior to this death, neither he nor his colleagues were aware that Propranolol carried any significant risk of death through deliberate overdose. The evidence of the doctor in question was that because of this specific incident, there has been a change in their approach to prescribing of Propranolol at his GP surgery, with smaller quantities prescribed (1 to 10 patients who might be at risk of taking an overdose. Shortly after this incident (11 February 2020) there was, coincidentally, an article in the British Medical Journal in respect of Propranolol, ("Doctors and paramedics must be better prepared to deal with propranolol overdoses"). However, the doctor’s evidence in the inquest was that he did not believe that GPs generally were currently aware of the risk of Propranolol overdoses. The evidence from the Consultant Psychiatrist from the Community Mental Health Team was that they would not usually prescribe Propranolol, and he also considered that GPs may not be aware of the overdose risk posed by the drug. The inquest also heard from the toxicologist, who gave evidence that her anecdotal experience was that there had in recent years been a significant number of deaths caused by Propranolol overdoses. In the circumstances, I am concerned that doctors in General Practice may not be aware of the risks of fatal overdose from Propranolol, and that in the absence of greater awareness by GPs, the prescription of quantities of Propranolol to those at risk may cause future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Arthur Stafford Delaney · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Eirwen Rebecca Hollister · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eirwen Rebecca Hollister, who had a history of mental health issues and overdoses of prescribed medication, was found deceased at home on 10 May 2022. Evidence at the inquest identified that prescriptions continued after overdoses, and that there was no process to prevent further prescriptions before a full review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a process to prevent prescriptions being issued before full GPO review following a prescribed-medication overdose

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was given during the inquest that there was no process or procedure in place to ensure that when a patient, registered with the GP practice, took an overdose of prescribed medication, no prescriptions were issued before a full review by a GPO was undertaken. . ”

    Source location

    Eirwen Rebecca Hollister · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a significant event analysis and discuss its findings with all clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We have carried out a significant event analysis to identify any failings and learning points. The results of the significant analysis were discussed with all clinicians in a meeting on 21/10/22. Please find attached a copy of the significant event analysis.”

    Source location

    Response from Heathview Medical Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the overdose policy, discuss it with clinicians, and make it accessible to staff on the shared drive.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The ‘Overdose Policy’ has been reviewed and discussed with all clinicians at Heathview Medical Practice on 21/10/22. The Policy is on the shared drive and can be accessed by all staff. Please find attached a copy of the Policy.”

    Source location

    Response from Heathview Medical Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Teach clinical staff how to action hospital letters concerning overdoses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Teaching has been carried out to all clinical staff on how to action Docman letters (Clinical letters from Hospital) which involve overdoses on 21/10/2022”

    Source location

    Response from Heathview Medical Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss the overdose policy and significant event analysis with all practice staff at the scheduled 15 November meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Policy and the significant event will be discussed with all the staff in a practice meeting on 15th November 2022”

    Source location

    Response from Heathview Medical Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2022

    Open published response
  9. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Brady · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Brady, a 75-year-old woman, was admitted to hospital on 4 August 2020 after being found unresponsive at home following a presumed medication overdose. She deteriorated into multi-organ failure and died in hospital on 8 August 2020. The concerns included prescriptions exceeding the GP’s seven-day limit despite her history of overdose and erratic medication compliance, possible stockpiling of medication, and uncertainty about whether an additional hospital prescription had been fulfilled.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to limit prescription quantities and avoid duplicate prescribing for patients at high risk of medication overdose

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Due to the above, Mrs Brady’s GP was only issuing 7 day prescriptions due to her high risk of overdose in order to limit medication availability. This included ████████ ████████ amongst others. (3) Mrs Brady had already been issued with a prescription by her GP on 14/7/20 for her regular prescription medication; (4) The inquest heard evidence that following a hospital admission in early July 2020, Mrs Brady was medically fit for discharge on 15/7/20 and a prescription was issued by the Sandwell & West Birmingham Hospital Trust for 14 days of ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ ████████ (4) It was unclear from the evidence whether the prescription had actually been fulfilled by the hospital. I am concerned that Mrs Brady was issued with a prescription in excess of 7 days and for medication that had already been prescribed to her by her GP only the previous day and against a background of overdose and erratic compliance with her medications; (5) The levels of ████████ found as a result of qualitative testing appeared to be well in in excess of her prescriptions and there was evidence that Mrs Brady may have been stockpiling medication. It is possible that the additional prescription, if supplied may have formed part of the medication taken by way of overdose. (6) I heard at inquest that another similar prescription issued on 28/7/20 following a further admission had NOT been fulfilled. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Brady · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that Mrs Brady was oversupplied with medication, stating supplies were limited or not dispensed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will see from the attached list that, apart from the Aspirin, dispensed on 29 July 2020, medications were supplied for 7 days, 5 days or were not dispensed at all, instead giving back her own medications. The Aspirin was a new medication so was supplied to the level agreed with the CCG and in total only provided 2.1g, where the maximum daily dose for pain control is 4g.”

    Source location

    2021-0224-Response-from-Sandwell-General-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2021

    Open published response
  10. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Laura Eve PARSONS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laura Eve Parsons was found dead at home on 5 November 2019, after consuming a fatal amount of liquid morphine prescribed for breakthrough cancer pain. She had previously been admitted to hospital following an accidental morphine overdose, but a repeat prescription was later issued without the electronic prescribing system directing the prescriber to review the prominent medical-record information about that overdose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to scrutinise repeat prescription requests

    Wider context from the report

    “Ms Parsons was prescribed liquid morphine to treat ‘break through’ pain for cancer. It was first prescribed on 9th August 2019. Ms Parsons was admitted to hospital on 10th August 2019 with an accidental overdose of morphine. It appears 180mls were consumed in a 12 hour period. She recovered and was discharged from hospital. The remainder of the prescribed morphine was discarded. On 31st October 2019 Ms Parsons requested a repeat prescription of liquid morphine from her GP surgery. This was authorised and a 500ml bottle of liquid morphine was dispensed to Ms Parsons. On 5th November 2019 Ms Parsons was found dead due to ingesting a fatal amount of morphine. At inquest evidence was given that information such as recent overdose would be added to the ‘Active Problems’ section on a person’s medical records and would be prominent when any clinician accessed that person’s records. It was explained at inquest that when a patient applies for a repeat prescription so far as the request is within the permitted timescale to issue a repeat of the prescribed item, then the prescription would be issued without any further scrutiny and the electronic systems would not take a prescriber to the patient’s medical records and in particular the ‘Active Problems’ section. ”

    Source location

    Laura Eve PARSONS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026