Recurring concern

Inadequate formal health and safety training for responsible staff

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First reported 13 Apr 2015•Latest report 22 Feb 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to provide, require or maintain formal health and safety training for staff who hold health and safety management, oversight, inspection, review or documentation responsibilities, including directors, managers and staff responsible for safety documentation.

Not included

  • Excludes training deficiencies concerning a named clinical, operational or hazard-specific safety system where that system provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes generic staff training deficiencies with no health and safety responsibility or public-safety connection.
  • Excludes failures of safety documentation, inspections, checklists or risk assessments where staff training is not itself the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes training for staff whose duties do not include health and safety management, oversight or safety-critical control responsibilities.
Reports
6

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
11

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Health and Safety Executive2
ACR Leisure Limited1
Children's Commissioner for Wales1
Department for Education1
Department for Work and Pensions1
Hugo Boss UK1
Kirklees Borough Council1
Mac Skip Hire Limited1
Office of the Children's Commissioner1
The Charity Commission1
The Scout Association1
Unity Insurance Services1
Welsh Government1
West Yorkshire Police1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Benjamin David Leonard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin David Leonard, aged 16, died after slipping and falling from a cliff while descending the Great Orme during an Explorer Scout trip in North Wales. The report identifies concerns about inadequate planning, risk assessment, briefing, supervision, training, safeguarding, first-aid provision, oversight and the Scouts Association’s response to the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Superficial and inadequate safety training

    Wider context from the report

    “12. Safety training is predominantly done online. Having seen and forensically within the hearing, undertaken an exercise to complete the current Safety Module, I am concerned that the course is superficial at best and fundamentally basic. It can be completed in 12 minutes. It is unsurprising that the current pass rate is now correspondingly high. This causes concern as an introductory module needed to equip thousands of leaders with an understanding of how to complete a risk assessment in order to keep Scouts safe. It does not embed the fundamental principles of safety and safe scouting. ”

    Source location

    Benjamin David Leonard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the Learner Management System with role-specific training, competency validation and training-compliance auditing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. The Scout Association is also investing in a new Learner Management System (LMS) which will be rolled out to all 145,000 volunteers in late 2024. The LMS will enable the delivery of new, redesigned and enhanced safety training. It will enable all volunteers to easily access training that suits their role and builds their individual competency throughout the year, instead of being trained every three years. The system will:”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 14 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission enhanced supplementary safety training and validation for all volunteers, prioritising nights-away and adventurous-activity leaders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We are currently commissioning enhanced supplementary safety training and validation for all 145,000 volunteers. The new training will be available by September 2024 with a target completion within 6 months thereafter. We will focus initially on”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 13 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and externally validate the redesigned safety training and its competency requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. As detailed in Section 1, point 3, we are commissioning an independent strategic review of all new proposed safety training as part of our strategic partnership. This will specifically address the issues and concerns identified by HM Coroner with the intention that all future training is fit for purpose. It will provide volunteers at every level, including our managers and senior volunteers, with the required competencies and skills suited to their role, including ongoing learning and development. Where possible, we will be seeking external accreditation for this training.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 14 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create mandatory role-specific safety training and support for senior District and County volunteers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. We will create new, additional mandatory training and support that is focused for our senior leaders (District and County level) so they are clear on their safety responsibilities. This will further support the skills for their roles and will be underpinned by ongoing learning. We are planning this training to be externally validated and we are currently discussing this with potential providers. Learning from the inquest initial learning will be delivered by July 2024, then full ongoing training will roll out by October 2024 with completion within 6 months.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 20 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department cannot comment on the Scout Association’s internal structure, workings, or implementation of internal policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, we would note that various matters identified in your report concern the internal structure and workings of the Scout Association (for example their internal FAIP process). Where feasible, we have sought to address all matters of concern, but unfortunately we cannot comment on the internal set-up and structure of individual organisations, or charities in the case of the Scout Association. We understand that the Scout Association will provide a response to your report which we expect will address these issues. Similarly, we understand that the Charity Commission will provide a response which we expect will address matters relating to charity trustees’ legal duties and responsibilities in managing their charity.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Scout Association and the Charity Commission are expected to address matters concerning internal operations and charity trustees’ legal duties, respectively.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, we would note that various matters identified in your report concern the internal structure and workings of the Scout Association (for example their internal FAIP process). Where feasible, we have sought to address all matters of concern, but unfortunately we cannot comment on the internal set-up and structure of individual organisations, or charities in the case of the Scout Association. We understand that the Scout Association will provide a response to your report which we expect will address these issues. Similarly, we understand that the Charity Commission will provide a response which we expect will address matters relating to charity trustees’ legal duties and responsibilities in managing their charity.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response
  2. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Malcolm James BASTEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Malcolm James Basten died after sustaining head and chest injuries in a fall while working at height on a construction site. The report identified inadequate safeguards, including no edge protection, incomplete boarding, no safe internal access, and an unsecured scaffold ladder. Concerns also included the absence of required notification and inspection for this project and no mandatory accredited health and safety training requirements for principal contractors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory accredited health and safety training for principal contractors before project engagement

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There is no mandatory requirement for the principal contractor to undertake health and safety training from an accredited organisation before engaging in this type of project. ”

    Source location

    Malcolm James BASTEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory accredited health and safety training for principal contractors after a project incident

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There is no mandatory requirement for principal contractors to undertake health and safety training from an accredited organisation after an incident such as this has occurred on one of their projects, nor to notify the HSE of any projects they undertake thereafter. ”

    Source location

    Malcolm James BASTEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CDM skills, knowledge and experience requirements, supported by guidance, are considered sufficient without mandatory accredited principal-contractor training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although there is no mandatory requirement for the duty holder to undertake health and safety training Regulation 8 of CDM requires that anyone undertaking construction work must be able to demonstrate that they have the appropriate health and safety skills, knowledge, experience. Where they are an organisation, the organisation should have the capability to carry out the work in a way that secures health and safety. If the dutyholder cannot demonstrate that they have these attributes then they should not accept the work.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing enforcement arrangements address post-incident capability concerns; previous performance informs future enforcement without mandatory training or project notification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HSE’s Enforcement Policy Statement (EPS) sets out the principles inspectors should apply when determining what enforcement action to take in response to breaches of health and safety legislation. Fundamental to this is the principle that enforcement action should be proportional to the health and safety risks and the seriousness of the breach. This means that if a lack of health and safety capability played a part in an incident, then requiring a dutyholder to undertake training will be a potential line of enforcement for HSE.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 January 2023

    Open published response
  3. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    MAYA GRACE KANTENGULE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maya Grace Kantengule, aged 7, was found unresponsive at the bottom of a swimming pool during a birthday party on 1 May 2016 and was declared dead later that day. The concerns included the absence of a separate risk assessment for swimming pool birthday parties, failures to follow safety procedures and check compliance, non-functioning CCTV, limited staff awareness of pool-area health and safety, and a lack of formal health and safety training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide formal health and safety training to responsible personnel and staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) Since Maya’s death, the decision has been made to hold no further external pool parties. The Swimming pool is still used by the public and WRC is still involved in activities involving the public and water. (6) Fourteen months have passed since Maya’s death and there has been no formal health and safety training of Directors and staff. It was said on behalf of WRC they are awaiting the outcome of the inquest before arranging formal health and safety training and in addition the member of staff responsible for updating and reviewing Risk Assessments has suffered with PTSD as a result of Maya’s death. There was no indication that anyone else had been considered in respect of undergoing health and safety training, such as those ultimately responsible for health and safety at WRC or any other member of staff. ”

    Source location

    MAYA GRACE KANTENGULE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of formal health and safety training for directors and staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Prior to Maya’s death in 2004, independent Contractors had drawn up the Risk Assessments and other Health and Safety documentation relating to the organisation and the use of its facilities by staff and the public. Since 2011, the Risk Assessments were updated internally. These had been deemed “suitable and correct” by South Norfolk Council. Since 2004 there had been no formal Health and Safety Training of Directors or staff at Waveney River Centre (WRC), in particular by those responsible for health and safety and by those updating, reviewing and checking health and safety documentation. (2) Although a Risk Assessment had been completed and updated with regard to the use of the swimming pool in 2016, there was no separate Risk Assessment in place with regard to the holding of swimming pool birthday parties. It was clear from the evidence it was believed by those at WRC to be the responsibility of the person holding the birthday party who would be responsible for the safety of the guests. ”

    Source location

    MAYA GRACE KANTENGULE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Arrange formal safety training courses, such as IOSH training, for staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Managing Director made it clear in his evidence that this incident had caused him to think that further training would be prudent and that there was an intention by the Centre to send staff onto formal safety training courses such as IOSH. His evidence was that this would be taken forward once the inquest had concluded. That remains the case and WRC's response to this notice is that such formal training has already been”

    Source location

    2017-0317-Response-by-Waveney-River-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 December 2017

    Open published response
  4. Rutland and North Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Beverley Dorothy Upton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Beverley Dorothy Upton, a heavy goods vehicle driver, died after being trapped between a loading shovel bucket and the side of her lorry while it was being loaded at work on 4 November 2015. Concerns included the method of loading, the lack of clear written and enforced rules requiring drivers to remain in their cabs and wear high-visibility clothing, and insufficient training and health and safety documentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of proper training for people responsible for risk assessment, health and safety documentation, and staff training

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) There was need for proper training to be given to those people whose task it was to assess risk, draft health and safety documentation, and who provided training to staff on risk and health and safety matters ”

    Source location

    Beverley Dorothy Upton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. West Yorkshire (West)

    AI-generated summary

    Nicholas Gary Stocks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nicholas Gary Stocks was struck and fatally injured by a vehicle after a collision at the junction of Dry Hill Lane and the A635 Barnsley Road in Huddersfield on 27 September 2012. The report raised concerns about damaged and poorly maintained give-way signs and road markings, inadequate reporting and repair systems, highway inspection practices, risk assessment, and coordination between West Yorkshire Police and Kirklees Council.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of ongoing training and assessment of Safety Inspectors

    Wider context from the report

    “West Yorkshire Police (1) I am concerned with the system that was in place to ensure that matters of concern identified by Officers of West Yorkshire Police who attend the scene of Road Traffic Collision in November 2011 were not fully reported to Kirklees Council. I would ask you to review the system presently in place to ensure that all future reports are made and fully reported (2) On the afternoon of the 27th September 2012 following the earlier road traffic incident, a Police Officer identified the need for a repair to the Give Way sign which had been demolished. The Police Officer in attendance would have been able to also identify that the road markings at the scene were no longer visible and therefore any road user who was travelling along Dry Hill Lane would have had no visible signs or road markings on the approaching Give Way junction. In essence the Officer would have been able to undertake a risk assessment and identify the level of urgency for remedial repair works to be undertaken. I would invite West Yorkshire Police to liaise with the relevant department of Kirklees Council and undertake a new review and consider whose responsibility it should be to undertake a risk assessment at the scene of a road traffic collision in order to determine the level of urgency of remedial work which is required to be carried out so as to ensure the safety of road users and to develop a system so as to ensure that risk assessment process is implemented and carried out. (3) I would also ask you to liaise with the relevant departments of Kirklees Council in order to carry out investigations to determine which departments of Kirklees Council was contacted on the afternoon on 27th September 2012 to report the damage to the give way sign. I heard evidence that Kirklees Council Customer Services, the relevant department which should have been contacted, and who are contactable between the hours of 8.00 and 18 hours. Outside of these hours an answer machine message provides an emergency contact number. If the control room unit had contacted the customer service centre then this telephone line should have been manned and a response received rather than sending an email which was acknowledged by an automated response. I wish to ensure that firstly West Yorkshire Police have the relevant contact number which needs to be used in the future and secondly if the Customer Service centre at Kirklees Council was contacted it clearly was not manned at the appropriate time, I wish to ensure this is rectified. Kirklees Council (1) I have concerns with the regard to the wide variation of how road inspections are undertaken by your Safety Inspectors. During the course of the enquiries undertaken by West Yorkshire Police a number of interviews were conducted with a number of safety inspectors. I have reviewed those interviews and note that there was a wide variation on how Safety Inspectors undertook inspections of a highway.. One Inspector indicated that they would inspect one side of the road one month, and when inspecting the road the following month would inspect the other side of the carriageway. Another Inspector indicated that they would inspect the whole of the carriageway on each inspection. Another Safety Inspector stated that the driver also had a role to place in inspecting the road in addition to driving the vehicle which transported the Safety Inspector who would be seated in the front passenger seat. (2) I have concerns with regard to how Safety Inspectors identify issues at the junction of two roads and which inspection has responsibility to consider matters at the actual junction. There appeared to have been vague and unclear responses from the Inspectors who gave evidence, as to whose responsibility it would be to actually inspect the junction of the two roads. (3) I was concerned that neither of the two Safety Inspectors who gave evidence, considered that the lack of road markings at the junction of Barnsley Road and Dry Hill Lane, and upon Dry Hill Lane itself posed a safety risk to road users and applying appropriate risk assessment should have been repaired I heard evidence from a highly qualified independent expert who was fully familiar with the Kirklees inspection policy and who stated that the lack of road markings at the junction with Barnsley Road and upon Dry Hill Lane itself, were identifiable and reportable defects applying Kirklees Council Policy criteria and should have been reported by the Safety Inspectors and repaired. In addition the independent expert stated that the poor state of the road markings would have been present for a considerable and significant period of time. Certainly, when each of the roads had last been inspected by a Safety Inspector from Kirklees Council. (4) I also have concern that there is no ongoing training and assessment of Safety Inspectors after initial training has been given so as to ensure consistency and appropriate standard levels of inspections are maintained. I would invite Kirklees Council to undertake a comprehensive review of the training of all of their Safety Inspectors and consider what further retraining requirements are required now and in the future. (5) I would refer you to the comments I have made in the West Yorkshire Police section of this report in respect of the operation of Kirklees Council’s Customer Service Centre. I would ask you to liaise directly with West Yorkshire Police and review and ensure the Customer Centre Service facility is fully operational at all relevant times (6) I would also ask you to liaise with West Yorkshire Police in respect of the comments made in the West Yorkshire Police Section of this report concerning risk assessments when a road traffic collision occurs and West Yorkshire Police in attendance and identify the need for repair works to be undertaken, so as to ensure that an immediate risk assessment is undertaken to safeguard members of the public. (7). From details provided in the course of this investigation, it appears that remedial work was required to be undertaken by Yorkshire Water at the junction with Barnsley Road and Dry Hill Lane. This work was to identified on 13th March 2010 and the 5th March 2012, but there was no record that such work had been undertaken, and no follow up was implemented by Kirklees Council, so as to ensure that this work was carried out. I would invite you to review your systems so as to ensure that work is undertaken by other agencies and checks made to ensure that all necessary works are completed. (8) Evidence at the inquest also revealed that members of the public had reported the lack of road markings to Kirklees Council, some months prior to this incident occurring. Although Kirklees Council records show no further action required. I am concerned with regard to this finding in light of the evidence provided to me by the independent expert who confirmed that the lack of road markings was clearly a defect which fell within the Councils existing guidance as an identifiable defect which required rectification. I would invite you to review the present system that Kirklees Council has in place with addressing complaints made by members of the public in respect of the roads and highways which fall within your designated area. 9. I understand that major road works have been undertaken by Kirklees Council at the scene of this incident. However, at the inquest it was clear that the speed limit still remains to be 50 mph. I would invite you to review the speed limit not only on Dry Hill Lane, but also Barnsley Road and Lower Denby Lane. I would request you to review the street lighting along Lower Denby Lane and Dry Hill Lane at their approach to the junction with Barnsley Road and whether any additional lighting is required. ”

    Source location

    Nicholas Gary Stocks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Austen Harrison · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Austen Harrison, aged 4, died on 8 June 2013 after an unfixed three-way mirror fell on him in a Hugo Boss store. The concerns included inadequate health and safety training and understanding of responsibilities, the absence of regular professional health and safety audits, and apparent failures to ensure that existing safety systems were followed and that the mirror was securely fixed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of adequate health and safety and health and safety management training

    Wider context from the report

    “1) It was apparent from the evidence of the aforementioned Store Manager and General Manager that they had received only very basic health and safety training and no training whatsoever in health and safety management responsibilities in respect of health and safety. Neither appeared to know of the existence of monthly health and safety checklists which the store manager is supposed to complete. More widely, the evidence indicated that there was a lack of understanding within Hugo Boss about roles and responsibilities in terms of health and safety. ”

    Source location

    Austen Harrison · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appoint a Health and Safety Manager responsible for all UK stores.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware from the evidence filed within the Inquest, on 14 July 2014 Hugo Boss appointed a new Health and Safety Manager for all UK Hugo Boss stores. As part of that role, the Health & Safety Manager has undertaken a detailed review of the health and safety training and guidance provided at every level of the business, with a specific focus being the training provided at Store and Area / General Manager level. Enhanced health and safety training for Store and Area / General Managers was re-launched in February 2015 by the Health & Safety Manager by way of a workshop (attended by Store and Area Managers) focusing specifically on the newly introduced Health and Safety Management Workbook (the “Workbook”). The Workbook was launched between 16 February 2015 and 7 March 2015 and also includes a Workbook Answer, which is effectively a completed Workbook to be used as guidance.”

    Source location

    2015-0481-Response-by-Hugo-Boss
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement enhanced health and safety training and a management workbook defining responsibilities, safe working practices, risk assessment duties and required checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware from the evidence filed within the Inquest, on 14 July 2014 Hugo Boss appointed a new Health and Safety Manager for all UK Hugo Boss stores. As part of that role, the Health & Safety Manager has undertaken a detailed review of the health and safety training and guidance provided at every level of the business, with a specific focus being the training provided at Store and Area / General Manager level. Enhanced health and safety training for Store and Area / General Managers was re-launched in February 2015 by the Health & Safety Manager by way of a workshop (attended by Store and Area Managers) focusing specifically on the newly introduced Health and Safety Management Workbook (the “Workbook”). The Workbook was launched between 16 February 2015 and 7 March 2015 and also includes a Workbook Answer, which is effectively a completed Workbook to be used as guidance.”

    Source location

    2015-0481-Response-by-Hugo-Boss
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require managers to complete, cascade and electronically register the management workbook, with compliance monitored by health and safety, operations and human resources teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following attendance at the workshop, it is the responsibility of every Store, General and Area Manager to distil the information communicated at both the workshop and contained in the Workbook to their respective teams. It is the responsibility of those who attended the workshop to then return to store and complete the workbook and ensure completion by all pre-existing employees in a managerial and / or supervisory role. For all new starters moving forward occupying a managerial and / or supervisory role this must be completed within 12 weeks as part of their induction. Completion of the Workbook must be registered via Formsite, an online monitoring system, which will be physically monitored by the Health & Safety Manager and Retail Operations Manager in conjunction with the HUGO BOSS Human Resources Department, thereby ensuring compliance.”

    Source location

    2015-0481-Response-by-Hugo-Boss
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular Health and Safety Manager visits with Area Managers to inspect stores, review issues and coach Store Managers on risk identification and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to ensure that the aforementioned health and safety training is cascaded downwards by store management and properly implemented by their respective teams, the Health & Safety Manager also undertakes visits with all Area Managers to stores within their remit to inspect, review and discuss all matters relating to health and safety, including how to escalate and follow-up any issues that may be identified. These visits take place regularly and their purpose is to ensure that Area Managers are able to identify risks and support and coach the Store Managers under their remit during their own store visits, as they would with any other Key Performance Indicator.”

    Source location

    2015-0481-Response-by-Hugo-Boss
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch a mandatory health and safety e-learning module for every new starter during induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, in August 2015 HUGO BOSS will be launching the e-learning Hugo Boss Health and Safety University Module which is to be completed, as a mandatory requirement, by every new starter as part of their induction. This Module, much like the Health and Safety Management Workbook, will communicate the role of each employee in contributing to the creation and maintenance of a safe working environment and culture, and crucially in the reporting of potential health and safety hazards and risks.”

    Source location

    2015-0481-Response-by-Hugo-Boss
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct an annual compulsory Health and Safety Focus Week covering refresher training and review of in-store risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Hugo Boss acknowledges that employee awareness of health and safety must be monitored and developed on an on-going basis. A number of tools have been created to assist with this process including daily store health and safety checks and a revised Monthly Store Health and Safety Inspection Form (completed by the Store Manager and checked by the Area Manager during their store visits). Both the daily and monthly checks are discussed in more detail below in Hugo Boss’ response to the second concern raised by the Coroner. In addition Hugo Boss will conduct an annual Health and Safety Focus Week, the first of which will commence on Monday 21 September 2015.”

    Source location

    2015-0481-Response-by-Hugo-Boss
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 April 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026