Recurring concern

Unreliable safety controls for shooting-range operations

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 14 Nov 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2021

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated shooting-range operational safety controls, including range-officer assurance checks, competent supervision, weapon or ammunition control, shooter oversight, first-aid readiness and other controls specifically intended to make shooting-range operations safe.

Not included

  • Excludes generic training, staffing, planning or time-pressure deficiencies unless they directly impair a dedicated shooting-range safety control.
  • Excludes firearm, ammunition or weapons-control concerns outside shooting-range operations.
  • Excludes general workplace or public-safety deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the safe operation of a shooting range.
  • Excludes the underlying activity of shooting or the occurrence of an incident without an identified deficient range-safety control.
Reports
3

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
6

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2021

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
0

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Ministry of Defence2
BAE Systems plc1
Home Office1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emiel Ariel Malinski attended a miniature rifle range on 2 November 2020, where he fired a rifle in the direction of his right temple and later died in hospital. The report recorded that he died as a consequence of suicide and raised concerns about the limited regulation of miniature rifle ranges, including the absence of requirements for supervision, secure weapons, ammunition control and first-aid provision.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide continuous competent range officer supervision of shooters

    Wider context from the report

    “It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”

    Source location

    Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to control weapon loading and account for ammunition

    Wider context from the report

    “It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”

    Source location

    Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide first-aid-trained staff and a first-aid kit

    Wider context from the report

    “It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”

    Source location

    Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to keep weapons and ammunition secure, controlled and supervised at all times

    Wider context from the report

    “It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”

    Source location

    Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cpls Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing hot pressurised gases to enter the turret, the breech block to explode and a subsequent fire. The substantive concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate information about tank status available to the Range Conducting Officer, and insufficient risk assessment of the gun’s ability to fire without the BVA assembly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range

    Wider context from the report

    “2. One of the contributing factors to this tragedy was that the RCO, the person in charge of the live firing exercise, did not know the state of the tanks on the range and therefore allocated a stripped down tank for a live firing exercise. I remain concerned that it is vital that the person in charge of such exercises has up to date knowledge about the status of the tanks on the range. The MOD should look at what communication can be put in place to ensure the RCO is in fact in charge and has all the correct information to make decisions during the exercise. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Requiring the RCO to keep contemporaneous tank-status records or maintain a centrally managed system would be impractical and distract from range safety duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is essential that the RCO is focused on delivering a safe live firing exercise. Any requirements for the RCO to keep contemporaneous records on the state of the tanks would detract from his focus on the safety of the range as a whole.”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Crew responsibility, training, revised drills and repeated component checks make the risk of firing without safety-critical components acceptably low.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Army judges that any potential risk presented by the RCO not being aware of the state of tanks on the range is ALARP. As indicated above the revised drills and procedures ensure that there is no scenario in which a crew could proceed to fire the main gun without first having completed the ‘prove the gun’ drill which mandates a specific check for the presence of the BVA, obturator and shim (Paragraph 6.19). Even if the ‘prove the gun’ drill was not adequately completed the presence of the BVA, obturator and shim would be checked again upon ‘going to action’ and if necessary again upon receiving a ‘TVEDU – Red Indication or No Display’ (an inevitable consequence if the BVA is missing).”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 6 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

  3. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Dean Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Griffiths died during a live-firing exercise at Lydd Ranges in September 2011 after a shot passed through a target and perimeter wall and struck him. The principal concern was time pressure to complete exercises, with a need for sufficient time for the Range Conducting Officer to complete a final assurance check.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient time for the Range Conducting Officer’s final assurance check

    Wider context from the report

    “There were time pressures of completing the exercises within the allocated time available to the Range Conducting Officer. I believe that the Exercise Director must ensure that the Planning Officer allows sufficient time for the RCO to complete his final assurance check. ”

    Source location

    Dean Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026