23 Jun 2021 Heather Frances Page · Prevention of Future Deaths report Nottinghamshire
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Concerns raised 1
Pedestrian crossings requiring people to walk on railway tracks View source
This report raised 4 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Linked responses
Derbyshire County Council Erewash Borough Council Nottinghamshire County Council
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 5
Erewash Borough Council
Submitted a consultation response supporting proposals to improve crossing safety and accessibility for disabled and non-disabled users.
View source
Nottinghamshire County Council
Maintain regular dialogue with Network Rail about level-crossing diversions, bridges, future management and safer access to non-operational land.
View source
Nottinghamshire County Council
Continue Countryside Access Team contact and collaboration with Network Rail’s Liabilities Team on public-highway rights across railway land.
View source
Nottinghamshire County Council
Divert public rights of way at specified Nottinghamshire crossings to remove or avoid at-grade railway crossings.
View source
Nottinghamshire County Council
Provide temporary emergency closure of Burton Joyce Footpath No.6 to prevent public access during Network Rail emergency safety works.
View source See 2 more actions
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AI-generated summary
Heather Frances Page · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
On 7 October 2020, Heather Frances Page stepped in front of a train and died in the resulting collision. The report identified concerns about pedestrian crossings requiring people to walk on the tracks, a high number of fatalities, ease of access to the track, and difficulties reducing or rationalising crossings because of local authority opposition.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Pedestrian crossings requiring people to walk on railway tracks
Wider context from the report “Evidence was heard regarding the section of track adjacent to the Attenborough Nature Reserve. I noted the following issues of concern in relation to this section of track:-
(1) There are a number of pedestrian crossings along this short stretch of track which involve pedestrians having to walk on the tracks to cross to the other side.
(2) There has been a high number of fatalities along this short section of track (seven in as many years).
(3) The nature of that section of track is such that it increases the risks of completed suicide due to the ease of access at multiple points and its proximity to a very popular beauty spot.
(4) Efforts by Network Rail to reduce / rationalise the number of crossings along that stretch have failed due, in part, to opposition from the relevant local authorities.
(5) Support or opposition from local authorities and councils will respectively increase or reduce the prospects of the risks inherent in that stretch of track being reduced. In the absence of support from local authorities and councils, Network Rail will be less likely to make an application to close or rationalise crossings along this section of track, given the known opposition from some persons living near, or using, the crossings. If an application is made, it will be less likely to be granted in the absence of support from the relevant local authorities and councils.
” Source location Heather Frances Page · Prevention of Future Deaths report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Submitted a consultation response supporting proposals to improve crossing safety and accessibility for disabled and non-disabled users.
Verbatim wording from the response “As part of the Level Crossing Closures Programme, the Council were invited to respond to Network Rail’s Equality Stakeholder Engagement Topic Guide (consultants ████████ had been appointed by Network Rail to undertake an Equalities Impact Assessment (EqIA) to investigate the impact of any works affecting the crossing). On behalf of the Council, I produced the response looking at the various issues from the perspective of Planning Policy. In the Council’s submission (Appendix B), support was demonstrated for any proposal, including a replacement footbridge, which would help to improve both the safety for crossing users as well as increased accessibility at the crossing for disabled and non-disabled users.” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Erewash-Borough-Council_Published
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain regular dialogue with Network Rail about level-crossing diversions, bridges, future management and safer access to non-operational land.
Verbatim wording from the response “6. Additional to the above, NCC and Network Rail are in regular dialogue regarding level” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-County-Council_Published
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue Countryside Access Team contact and collaboration with Network Rail’s Liabilities Team on public-highway rights across railway land.
Verbatim wording from the response “7. NCC’s Countryside Access Team has regular contact and a good working relationship with Network Rail’s Liabilities Team; this being the team within Network Rail with responsibility for the stopping up and diversion of public highway rights across railway lines and operational property. As part of this, NCC are currently discussing a number of at grade crossings in the County regarding their future management, as well as discussing opportunities for access on their non-operational land, which would increase public safety. Any proposals arising from this would, however, be subject to the formal legally prescribed consultation referred to above and thus may potentially be unable to be taken forward due to objections from highway users.” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-County-Council_Published
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Divert public rights of way at specified Nottinghamshire crossings to remove or avoid at-grade railway crossings.
Verbatim wording from the response “8. Notwithstanding the above, it has been possible to obtain public support to take forward a number of safety improvements in recent years, and several crossings in Nottinghamshire have been diverted by NCC and bridged by Network Rail to remove at grade crossings over operational lines. For example:” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-County-Council_Published
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide temporary emergency closure of Burton Joyce Footpath No.6 to prevent public access during Network Rail emergency safety works.
Verbatim wording from the response “9. Separate to the above, NCC continues to work closely with Network Rail’s Level Crossing Managers in order to help manage public safety at level crossings. For example, NCC recently provided a temporary emergency closure on Burton Joyce Footpath No.6 (Chestnut Grove) following a near-miss incident which prevented public access while Network Rail undertook some emergency improvement works.” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-County-Council_Published
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Network Rail is responsible for operating, maintaining and improving the safety of the national rail network, including level crossings.
Verbatim wording from the response “B. The operation, maintenance and improvement of a safe national rail network (including level crossings), is the responsibility of Network Rail, with oversight and funding specifically provided to them by the Office of Rail and Road for improving safety at such crossings.” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-County-Council_Published
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Network Rail would have to apply under section 119A of the Highways Act 1980 to divert the public footpath’s current alignment.
Verbatim wording from the response “The correspondence indicated that the planners within Network Rail were planning on making contact with the local planning authority, which would be Erewash Borough Council in this regard, in relation to the proposed design that had been prepared. It was identified that you would have to make an application under Section 119a of the Highways Act 1980 to divert the public footpaths current alignment. To the best of our knowledge Derbyshire County Council received no further correspondence from Network Rail in relation to this matter.” Source location 2021-0213-Response-from-Derbyshire-County-Council_Published
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15 Nov 2018 Richard John Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report Nottinghamshire
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Concerns raised 2
Failure to display a Network Rail contact telephone at the crossing View source Absence of telephones at the crossing View source
This report raised 1 other concern. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
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AI-generated summary
Richard John Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Richard John Hill died on 17 August 2018 when he was struck by a London North Eastern train near the Cromwell Lane level crossing, also known as the Norwell Lane level crossing, near Newark, Nottinghamshire. The concerns identified were that the crossing had no telephones, no displayed contact telephone for Network Rail, and a possibility of a repeat incident at or near the location in the future.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to display a Network Rail contact telephone at the crossing
Wider context from the report “1. That the British Transport Police post incident site report, by Paul Hardy, a copy of which has been sent to you, states the following:
1.1 There are no telephones at the crossing.
1.2 No contact telephone for Network Rail is displayed at the crossing.
1.3 There is a possibility of a repeat incident at or near to this location in the future and that Network Rail staff should be made aware of this.
” Source location Richard John Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Absence of telephones at the crossing
Wider context from the report “1. That the British Transport Police post incident site report, by Paul Hardy, a copy of which has been sent to you, states the following:
1.1 There are no telephones at the crossing.
1.2 No contact telephone for Network Rail is displayed at the crossing.
1.3 There is a possibility of a repeat incident at or near to this location in the future and that Network Rail staff should be made aware of this.
” Source location Richard John Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation A telephone is not required because CCTV monitoring, emergency services and Network Rail’s emergency number provide sufficient reporting arrangements.
Verbatim wording from the response “There is no requirement for a telephone Cromwell Lane level crossing because it is a CCTV monitored crossing. Should a member of the public be concerned about an emergency situation, this should be reported by calling 999. Network Rail also maintains a 24 hour emergency number (03457 11 41 41) for the reporting of safety incidents on or near the railway, details of which are widely publicised. The emergency services closely liaise with Network Rail to pass information to signallers where required.” Source location Richard-Hill-Response
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19 Jun 2018 Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report Bedfordshire and Luton
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Concerns raised 2
Lack of repeater lights warning foot crossing users of approaching trains View source Inadequate physical separation between foot crossing users and the railway View source
This report raised 2 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 1
Network Rail
Install audible alarms and larger-lensed miniature stop lights at Lindsells Level Crossing through the planned area-wide programme.
View source
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AI-generated summary
Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Andrew Thomas HANAHOE died after walking onto Lindsells Foot Crossing at Biggleswade Railway Station as a train approached on 29 December 2017. Concerns were raised about the crossing’s safety, including its exposure to high-speed trains, inadequate fencing and the absence of measures such as repeater lights or trespass deterrence; the report states that the risk of a future death remained.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of repeater lights warning foot crossing users of approaching trains
Wider context from the report ““(1) The Post Incident Site Report states:
“Ideally this foot crossing should be closed. It crosses railway line that have trains regularly passing over it at speeds up to 125 mph.
“Biggleswade, like many towns, is growing in size and any future development in this area will bring housing closer to the crossing.
“Would the crossing be installed today?
“If the crossing is a recognised “foot path” then an enclosed foot bridge, to prevent items being thrown at or dropped on trains, should be installed, together with suitable fencing on both sides of the line adjacent to it, to prevent simple access to the tracks.
“Currently there is just “post and wire” fencing immediately next to the adjacent railway structure...
“If the crossing is to be retained, then “repeater lights” should be installed on either side of the crossing, so that users on the crossing can be made aware that a train is approaching”.
“Additionally trespass deterrence “Pyramid matting” that has been approved for use by Network Rail ... or similar should be installed on either side of the crossing, to deter simple access to the railway. Additional fencing is also needed between the existing line side fencing and the trespass deterrence to prevent access to the embankment.”
I understand that no decision has been made since this Report was made in January 2018, yet the risk of a future death remains.
” Source location Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate physical separation between foot crossing users and the railway
Wider context from the report ““(1) The Post Incident Site Report states:
“Ideally this foot crossing should be closed. It crosses railway line that have trains regularly passing over it at speeds up to 125 mph.
“Biggleswade, like many towns, is growing in size and any future development in this area will bring housing closer to the crossing.
“Would the crossing be installed today?
“If the crossing is a recognised “foot path” then an enclosed foot bridge, to prevent items being thrown at or dropped on trains, should be installed, together with suitable fencing on both sides of the line adjacent to it, to prevent simple access to the tracks.
“Currently there is just “post and wire” fencing immediately next to the adjacent railway structure...
“If the crossing is to be retained, then “repeater lights” should be installed on either side of the crossing, so that users on the crossing can be made aware that a train is approaching”.
“Additionally trespass deterrence “Pyramid matting” that has been approved for use by Network Rail ... or similar should be installed on either side of the crossing, to deter simple access to the railway. Additional fencing is also needed between the existing line side fencing and the trespass deterrence to prevent access to the embankment.”
I understand that no decision has been made since this Report was made in January 2018, yet the risk of a future death remains.
” Source location Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Install audible alarms and larger-lensed miniature stop lights at Lindsells Level Crossing through the planned area-wide programme.
Verbatim wording from the response “While the option for closing the level crossing are being pursued, our risk assessment is reviewed regularly to identify if there are any additional mitigation measures that can be implemented to make the crossing safer.” Source location 2018-0184-Response-by-Network-Rail
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Additional repeater lights are not used because they could confuse users; existing near-side miniature stop lights provide sufficient warning time.
Verbatim wording from the response “The PISR suggests that “repeater lights” should be installed on either side of the crossing. It is not immediately clear what is meant by “repeater lights” but we assume this refers to lights facing into the crossing. This design has been considered many times before but after detailed risk assessment, we do not use such a design due to the risk of users becoming confused about whether it remains safe to cross if the light comes once they were on the crossing. Miniature stop lights are therefore installed at the near side of the railway facing towards oncoming users. The warning time gives sufficient time to safely cross to the other side.” Source location 2018-0184-Response-by-Network-Rail
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Further boundary mitigation is not required because fencing is in good condition, fit for purpose, compliant, and unrelated to the incident’s access route.
Verbatim wording from the response “The fencing in the area of Lindsells Level Crossing is a mixture of Class 1 (1.8m high, which includes palisade fencing) and Class 3 (1.4m high), which includes post and wire boundary measures. The latest inspection recorded all fencing in the area of Lindsells Level Crossing to be in good condition, fit for purpose and compliant with the current fencing standard. We understand that there is no suggestion in this incident that access was taken to the railway as a result of failure of the boundary measures, therefore it is not considered that further boundary mitigation is required at this time.” Source location 2018-0184-Response-by-Network-Rail
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30 Nov 2017 Sarah Athermith · Prevention of Future Deaths report Black Country
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Concerns raised 1
Lack of effective protection or warning at the level crossing View source
This report raised 2 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Linked responses
Network Rail Walsall Borough Council
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 6
Network Rail
Progress the statutory process for permanent closure of Wallows Lane level crossing with Walsall Local Authority.
View source
Network Rail
Risk-assess level crossings and periodically review risks, further mitigation and available technical solutions while crossings remain open.
View source
Network Rail
Maintain user safety instructions through stop, look and listen signage at Wallows Lane level crossing.
View source
Network Rail
Use whistle boards requiring train drivers to sound horns to warn crossing users of approaching trains.
View source
Network Rail
Implement physical safety enhancements including a marked decision point, solar lighting, vegetation clearance and highlighted gates and signage.
View source
Walsall Borough Council
Urgently review revised Network Rail closure applications and supporting evidence, while continuing to provide guidance and support through the closure process.
View source See 3 more actions
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AI-generated summary
Sarah Athermith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
On 26 September 2017, Sarah Athermith was struck and fatally injured by a train while crossing the unprotected Wallows Lane railway crossing after stopping for another train. Concerns included the lack of a warning system for approaching trains, the risk of pedestrians becoming confused when trains pass in opposite directions, and the obstruction of drivers’ views by double-height freight carriages.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of effective protection or warning at the level crossing
Wider context from the report “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that the Wallows Lane level crossing is an unprotected crossing and there is no method of warning of an approaching train .
2. There are whistle boards (train drivers should sound their whistles/horns on approach) in place to warn users. However, the crossing relies on users actively stopping, looking and listening for approaching trains before deciding if it is safe to cross .
” Source location Sarah Athermith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Progress the statutory process for permanent closure of Wallows Lane level crossing with Walsall Local Authority.
Verbatim wording from the response “We confirm that Network Rail's preferred option is permanent closure of Wallows Lane level crossing. The crossing was closed to members of the public on 26 September 2017 via temporary order granted by Walsall Local Authority and remains closed today.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Risk-assess level crossings and periodically review risks, further mitigation and available technical solutions while crossings remain open.
Verbatim wording from the response “All level crossings on Network Rail’s infrastructure are risk assessed to determine the level of protection that is required to reduce the risk associated with that crossing so far as is reasonably practicable.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain user safety instructions through stop, look and listen signage at Wallows Lane level crossing.
Verbatim wording from the response “In accordance with the risk assessment of the crossing, the protection measures at Wallows Lane level crossing rely on users actively stopping, looking and listening for approaching trains before deciding if it is safe to cross. These instructions are provided to crossing users via signs installed at the crossing.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Use whistle boards requiring train drivers to sound horns to warn crossing users of approaching trains.
Verbatim wording from the response “Further protection has been installed at Wallows Lane level crossing in the form of whistle boards. Train drivers are required to sound their horn at the whistle boards to warn users of an approaching train. The sound of the horn is intended to be a further warning to any user who is actively assessing whether it is safe to cross.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implement physical safety enhancements including a marked decision point, solar lighting, vegetation clearance and highlighted gates and signage.
Verbatim wording from the response “As part of Network Rail’s continuous improvement to level crossing safety, in 2016 a number of enhancements were made at Wallow Lane level crossing to encourage safer user behaviours. These included:” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Urgently review revised Network Rail closure applications and supporting evidence, while continuing to provide guidance and support through the closure process.
Verbatim wording from the response “25. As in the past, WMBC are undertaking an urgent review of the NR’s revised closure application and will continue to provide assistance and guidance to NR in the closure application process.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Walsall-Council
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Network Rail cannot itself permanently close a level crossing carrying a public right of way.
Verbatim wording from the response “It should be noted that, regrettably, it is not within Network Rail’s power to simply close a level crossing that carries a public right of way. Even when a clear safety case exists for closure of a crossing, Network Rail requires the relevant local authority to first support and then to progress the necessary statutory process.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Permanent closure requires the relevant local authority to support and progress the statutory process.
Verbatim wording from the response “It should be noted that, regrettably, it is not within Network Rail’s power to simply close a level crossing that carries a public right of way. Even when a clear safety case exists for closure of a crossing, Network Rail requires the relevant local authority to first support and then to progress the necessary statutory process.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Risk assessment concluded existing measures reduce risk at Wallows Lane level crossing so far as reasonably practicable.
Verbatim wording from the response “The risk assessment for Wallows Lane level crossing has considered if any existing technology may be used to warn of approaching trains at this location. Due to the close proximity of signals and junctions in both upside and downside directions, options to use technology are very limited and the evaluation concluded that risk at the crossing is reduced so far as is reasonably practicable.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Network-Rail
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Network Rail must make the level-crossing closure application; the Council’s role is to advise and consider it as highway authority.
Verbatim wording from the response “5. The closure application needs to be made by Network Rail (“NR”) and will then be advised upon and considered WMBC as the Highway Authority.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Walsall-Council
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The Council cannot convert the crossing into a controlled crossing because it is neither the landowner nor the operator and lacks legal authority.
Verbatim wording from the response “29. As WMBC is not the landowner or the operator on which the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing is located, it has no authority or legal power to convert the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing into a controlled crossing using suitable methods.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Walsall-Council
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation If technological safety improvements are required, Network Rail must consider converting the crossing into a controlled crossing as landowner and operator.
Verbatim wording from the response “30. If NR determines (whether as a result of the Coroner’s Regulation 28 Report or for any other reason) that a technological safety improvement is required, NR as the landowner and operator will have to consider converting the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing into a controlled crossing using suitable methods.” Source location 2017-0350-Response-by-Walsall-Council
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6 Nov 2017 Harminder DHILLON · Prevention of Future Deaths report Bedfordshire and Luton
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Concerns raised 1
Lack of CCTV monitoring of the level crossing View source
This report raised 2 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
No linked response statements No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
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AI-generated summary
Harminder DHILLON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Harminder DHILLON drove around a lowered half barrier at Lidlington Level Crossing and collided with a train; the crossing was functioning appropriately. Concerns included the lack of CCTV monitoring, the limited deterrent effect of half barriers, and whether full-length barriers could prevent misuse and potential future deaths.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of CCTV monitoring of the level crossing
Wider context from the report “(1) The level crossing is not monitored by CCTV and it is likely that the crossing is misused more than is reported
” Source location Harminder DHILLON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
27 Jan 2017 Derek Edward Hope THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report Hampshire (North East)
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Concerns raised 1
Inadequacy of direct warning of approaching trains at the crossing View source
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
No linked response statements No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
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AI-generated summary
Derek Edward Hope THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Derek Edward Hope THOMAS was struck by a non-stopping train while using the foot crossing at Bentley station on his mobility scooter on 5 October 2016, sustaining catastrophic injuries. Concerns included that the crossing was unmanned and unprotected, that the only direct warning was the train driver's horn, and that visibility was obscured by a fence.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequacy of direct warning of approaching trains at the crossing
Wider context from the report “(2) The only direct warning is the horn being sounded by the driver some 400 m from the crossing
” Source location Derek Edward Hope THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
23 Mar 2015 Elliott Bignall · Prevention of Future Deaths report West Sussex
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Concerns raised 1
Inadequate warning signage at the foot crossing View source
This report raised 1 other concern. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
No linked response statements No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
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AI-generated summary
Elliott Bignall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Elliott Bignall, aged 17, died from multiple injuries after being hit by a train at Langsmead Foot Crossing in Ferring, West Sussex, on 9 September 2014; the death was recorded as accidental. Concerns included poor lighting and inadequate warning signage at the crossing, and the risk that people using headphones or phones might not hear or see an approaching high-speed train.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate warning signage at the foot crossing
Wider context from the report “Sergeant ████████ the investigating officer from BTP gave evidence to the Inquest and described the foot crossing at Langmeads as horrendous. He said the location of the foot crossing was poorly lit and there was inadequate signage at the site warning pedestrians of the dangers associated with the crossings .
My concerns are that individuals wearing headphones or on the phone, who are unaware of the dangers associated with the crossing, may not hear or see the high speed train approaching. This could lead to further fatalities.
” Source location Elliott Bignall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
18 Sep 2014 William Dennis FRANCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report West Somerset
View report summary
Concerns raised 2
Telephone located beyond the pedestrian stop line at the level crossing View source Obstructed visibility for motor vehicle drivers approaching the crossing View source
No linked response statements No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
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AI-generated summary
William Dennis FRANCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
William Dennis France died on 21 March 2013 when his car was struck by a high-speed train while he attempted to cross Athelney Railway Crossing with the automatic half barriers down. The barriers had remained down for an unusually prolonged period due to an earlier engineering train movement and signalling issues. Concerns included obstructed visibility for motor vehicle drivers approaching the crossing and the position of the crossing telephone beyond the pedestrian stop line.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Telephone located beyond the pedestrian stop line at the level crossing
Wider context from the report “(2) Although not a factor in the death the telephone at the level crossing was some 8 metres beyond the pedestrian stop line .
” Source location William Dennis FRANCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Obstructed visibility for motor vehicle drivers approaching the crossing
Wider context from the report “(1) Motor vehicle drivers approaching the crossing from either side have to go up a rise and their visibility towards Taunton is obstructed in part by the barrier controls and the road crossing which is also at an angle .
” Source location William Dennis FRANCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
8 Jul 2014 Anthony Shane Ponting · Prevention of Future Deaths report Somerset (West)
View report summary
Concerns raised 2
Failure to position S.H.1 boards 3 metres from the line View source Reduced sighting time caused by trackside vegetation at the S.H.1 sign View source
This report raised 1 other concern. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 1
Network Rail
Cut back vegetation and maintain six-monthly inspections to preserve pedestrian sightlines.
View source
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AI-generated summary
Anthony Shane Ponting · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Anthony Shane Ponting, a 34-year-old man, was killed on 11 July 2013 while using an authorised pedestrian crossing over the Bristol to Taunton railway line near Highbridge, Somerset. The inquest jury returned an accidental verdict. A report identified potential risks to other crossing users, including reduced sighting time from vegetation, incorrectly positioned S.H.1 boards, and tripping hazards on the crossing surface.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to position S.H.1 boards 3 metres from the line
Wider context from the report “(ii) the S.H.1 boards should have been positioned 3 metres from the line .
” Source location Anthony Shane Ponting · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Reduced sighting time caused by trackside vegetation at the S.H.1 sign
Wider context from the report “(i) reduced sighting time caused by track side vegetation growth for pedestrians crossing from the downside for both up and down trains and on the upside for down trains at the S.H.1 sign
” Source location Anthony Shane Ponting · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Cut back vegetation and maintain six-monthly inspections to preserve pedestrian sightlines.
Verbatim wording from the response “The vegetation growth was cut back during the first week of August 2013. In terms of managing the vegetation going forward, this has been and will continue to be routinely checked at six-monthly inspections. Most recently, those inspections were conducted on 16th” Source location 2014-0322-Response-by-Network-Rail
Open published response
7 May 2014 Emma Isabel Lifsey · Prevention of Future Deaths report Nottinghamshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 2
Delays in replacing old-style level-crossing lights with LED lights View source Lack of adequately bright wig wag lights at level crossings View source
This report raised 1 other concern. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
No linked response statements No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
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AI-generated summary
Emma Isabel Lifsey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Emma Lifsey, a four-year-old passenger in a car, died after the car entered the path of a train at Beech Hill level crossing on 4 December 2012. The concerns included glare affecting the visibility of the crossing lights, the poor brightness of old-style filament bulbs, and the time being taken to replace them with LED lights and research the effects of glare.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays in replacing old-style level-crossing lights with LED lights
Wider context from the report “We heard evidence from several witnesses about the effect of glare – both directly from the low sun and reflected from the road surface – and how this may have affected the visibility of the wig wag lights in particular.
We heard that the wig wag lights at Beech Hill crossing had old-style 36W filament bulbs. The optical consultant described these lights as being “the worst he had seen”, and less than half as bright as they should have been.
Network Rail witnesses gave evidence about changes being implemented. In particular, we heard of the decision to change all 36W lights at level crossings to LED lights. We were told that 494 level crossings have been identified as having the old-style lights. This information was available in December 2013. To date, 58 have had the lights changed to LEDs . The current plan, we were told, was to complete this by October 2015 .
We were also told that Network Rail is considering commissioning research into the effect of glare on signals.
I heard evidence (in the absence of the jury) about RAIB recommendations made after collisions at Wraysholme in 2008, and Halkirk in 2009. These incidents were not identical factually to the collision at Beech Hill, but it is clear that the issue of sun glare and visibility of signals is not a new one.
I noted at the inquest that Network Rail is seeking to reduce these risks, but my concern relates to timescale. The proposed changes and research are simply taking too long, and I am concerned that this risk will not be reduced quickly enough to avoid further tragedies.
” Source location Emma Isabel Lifsey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of adequately bright wig wag lights at level crossings
Wider context from the report “We heard evidence from several witnesses about the effect of glare – both directly from the low sun and reflected from the road surface – and how this may have affected the visibility of the wig wag lights in particular.
We heard that the wig wag lights at Beech Hill crossing had old-style 36W filament bulbs . The optical consultant described these lights as being “the worst he had seen”, and less than half as bright as they should have been .
Network Rail witnesses gave evidence about changes being implemented. In particular, we heard of the decision to change all 36W lights at level crossings to LED lights. We were told that 494 level crossings have been identified as having the old-style lights . This information was available in December 2013. To date, 58 have had the lights changed to LEDs. The current plan, we were told, was to complete this by October 2015.
We were also told that Network Rail is considering commissioning research into the effect of glare on signals.
I heard evidence (in the absence of the jury) about RAIB recommendations made after collisions at Wraysholme in 2008, and Halkirk in 2009. These incidents were not identical factually to the collision at Beech Hill, but it is clear that the issue of sun glare and visibility of signals is not a new one.
I noted at the inquest that Network Rail is seeking to reduce these risks, but my concern relates to timescale. The proposed changes and research are simply taking too long, and I am concerned that this risk will not be reduced quickly enough to avoid further tragedies.
” Source location Emma Isabel Lifsey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Open source report
Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.