Recurring concern

Unreliable handover of care information and responsibility

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First reported 17 Jan 2014•Latest report 26 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated handover process for care information or responsibility, including absent or unclear procedures, incomplete or unauditable handover records, failure to transfer relevant information, and unclear or uncompleted handovers between care staff, managers, coordinators or successor services.

Not included

  • Excludes clinical handovers between healthcare professionals where the existing clinical-handover concern is the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes failures of discharge, inter-service transfer or general continuity processes where no care-handover deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, documentation or training deficiencies unless they directly impair the transfer of care information or responsibility during handover.
  • Excludes non-care operational handovers, such as fire-and-rescue incident roles or general workplace shifts, unless the assertion concerns transfer of responsibility for care.
Reports
45

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
48

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
77

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
Care Quality Commission2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Son of the deceased2
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust2
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust2
Arden Court1
Bank Close House1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Bedford Prison1
Belle Green Court1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Wilkinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Wilkinson died on 4 April 2018 after choking, with the inquest concluding that he was unlawfully killed as a result of foreign body obstruction of the airway. The report identifies concerns about the failure to incorporate Speech and Language Therapy advice on diet and supervision into care plans, risk assessments and staff communications, alongside wider concerns about care-provider governance and regulatory oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of procedures for care handovers

    Wider context from the report

    “(11)I did not hear or see any evidence of any policy or procedure being in place at the Stars Social Support Limited which related to completion of risk assessments and care plans; where they will be kept; how they should be updated; who will look at them and where; what to do in the event that there isn't one; how documents should be presented; how technology will be used; how data will be safeguarded; how audits will be undertaken; how handovers will be undertaken. This list is not exhaustive it is simply a list of some of the areas I am particularly concerned about in this case however I have not seen evidence of any policies produced by Stars Social Support Limited despite asking specifically for this at the end of the inquest proceedings. I have seen only an induction booklet. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Wilkinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A decision to cease operating prevents provision of a detailed response to the indicated corrective actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A decision has been taken by the Registered Manager and Director of Stars Social Support Limited for the organisation to cease to continue. The Registered Manager and Director at Stars Social Support Limited has contacted the Local Authority and the Care Quality Commission to notify them that Stars Social Support Limited will cease to continue.”

    Source location

    2021-0102-Response-from-Stars-Social-Support-Ltd-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 April 2021

    Open published response
  2. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Elsie Yvonne Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elsie Yvonne Taylor, aged 68, fell at home on 15 September 2020, sustained rib fractures and a pneumothorax, and died later the same day after deteriorating in hospital. Concerns included incomplete recording of her reported decision to decline hospital admission and the advice given, lack of information about the consultation and deterioration symptoms, and no attempt to contact her GP or family despite her living alone.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to leave information recording the admission decision and paramedic advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There was no information left by the attending paramedic crew to reflect the decision of the deceased to decline admission or the advice given by paramedics. The family of the deceased were not present during the consultation and as a consequence they did not know what symptoms to look out for which might suggestion a deterioration in the condition of the deceased; ”

    Source location

    Elsie Yvonne Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete refresher training for crew members on documentation standards, checking EPR entries and obtaining signatures for non-conveyance cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response During the meeting with the paramedic, he stated the patient was advised to attend hospital but refused, this refusal was not documented on the EPR. The paramedic also made admissions that he did not thoroughly check the EPR which the student paramedic had completed prior to him signing it. The importance of the EPR and the information contained in it was reiterated to the paramedic. Both crew members have attended further training which covered the Trusts’ expected standard of completing and checking documentation.”

    Source location

    2020-0281-Response-from-West-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-REDACTED
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2021

    Open published response
  3. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    John Ashley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Ashley took his own life while suffering a deterioration in his mental illness, according to the inquest conclusion. The report identified concerns about failures to update his care and treatment plan, record and share key information, review his deterioration and medication non-compliance, and provide adequate clinical oversight and cover arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of practitioner cover and formal handover arrangements for Lead Practitioner caseloads during leave

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Save for the duty scheme there appears to be no procedure in place for another practitioner to cover a Lead Practitioner’s case load or any formal handover when they are on leave. Therefore there was no single person who has up todate knowledge of a patient who may be in need or whose mental health was deteriorating. ”

    Source location

    John Ashley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate leave handover arrangements, particularly for vulnerable patients, into staff risk assessment training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I acknowledge that in this case, it was a specific concern that a Lead Practitioner when returning from leave should be aware of important developments regarding his/her patient. It is the responsibility of a Lead Practitioner and other members of staff returning from leave, to review their caseload and establish if there were any concerns during their absence and I understand that Mr Ashley's Lead Practitioner did make himself aware of events when he returned from leave (he addressed this in his addendum report at the Inquest). Nevertheless, I wish to reassure you, that I agree that it is important that there should be a handover following a leave of absence, particularly in the case of the most vulnerable patients and staff are actively encouraged to ensure that this takes place and this will become part and parcel of staff risk assessment training.”

    Source location

    2020-0071-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The team-wide duty system is considered safer and sufficient than assigning leave cover to one individual practitioner.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This concern was addressed in my letter of 20 December 2019 wherein I sought to convey that Mr Ashley was treated as part of a team, and that a plan was in place (as part of his overall care plan), to ensure that there was adequate support when his Lead Practitioner was not available. Prior to going on leave, I understand that Mr Ashley's Lead Practitioner visited to discuss cover arrangements and his crisis/contingency plan. It is apparent that Mr Ashley understood the arrangements as he attended his planned appointments at the Wellbeing Café and Clozaril Clinic, and he accessed the duty system and the Mental Health Liaison Team for further support.”

    Source location

    2020-0071-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 5 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response
  4. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Terence Ewart JAMES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terence Ewart JAMES, aged 85, was living in a residential home when he sustained an unwitnessed fall on 17 April 2019 and a further fall on 20 April, resulting in a neck of femur fracture. He underwent surgery but became delirious, did not thrive, and died in hospital on 14 May 2019. Concerns included failures to inform the GP of the first fall, hand over the fall history to care staff, and escalate pain and deterioration for further medical advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over fall histories to returning care staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The history of the fall on 17th April was not handed over to care staff who had returned from leave on 20th April. ”

    Source location

    Terence Ewart JAMES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a comprehensive review of the handover system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, due to the concerns raised by the Coroner, we are conducting a full review of our handover system. For the time being, we have reverted back to the paper based system for handovers, across all of our homes as it is a visual tool that can be read straight away rather than having to find the appropriate tab on a system to read back in the notes. The system was put in place at Chippendayle Lodge immediately after the inquest on 11 December 2019. It was communicated to staff in internal meetings, and we are ensuring that all staff understand the importance of ensuring the handover forms are completed in full. This is being done through team meetings, which have taken place, for example, on 11 December 2019 and 13 December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement paper-based handover arrangements across all homes, including comprehensive sheets, senior sign-offs and ongoing monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, due to the concerns raised by the Coroner, we are conducting a full review of our handover system. For the time being, we have reverted back to the paper based system for handovers, across all of our homes as it is a visual tool that can be read straight away rather than having to find the appropriate tab on a system to read back in the notes. The system was put in place at Chippendayle Lodge immediately after the inquest on 11 December 2019. It was communicated to staff in internal meetings, and we are ensuring that all staff understand the importance of ensuring the handover forms are completed in full. This is being done through team meetings, which have taken place, for example, on 11 December 2019 and 13 December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share inquest learning and reinforce escalation, handover and related procedures through manager communications, team meetings and supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A further staff meeting was held on Friday, 13 December 2019, and the manager shared the details of the inquest to ensure that all staff understood the importance of following the systems and protocols in place and to enforce expectations in this respect.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a specific audit of the handover process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As an organisation, we also conduct regular audits. We have a schedule in place in this respect. We are also in the process of introducing a specific audit relating to the handover process, and this will be in place from 29 January 2020, after the managers’ meeting, where it will be discussed. We have endeavoured to put robust systems in place to ensure that errors do not occur again. The above being said, we had in fact put a great deal of thought”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The errors were considered individual judgment calls rather than evidence of systemic failures in existing processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “into the processes in place before the inquest, and we do believe that where errors occurred, they were individual judgment calls, rather than systemic errors.”

    Source location

    2019-0430-Response-from-Charing-Healthcare-Redacted-1
    Page 5 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response
  5. London Inner (North)

    AI-generated summary

    Amy Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amy Allan underwent elective corrective spinal surgery on 4 September 2018 and subsequently suffered severe deterioration, requiring ECMO support before dying on 28 September 2018. Concerns included inadequate pre-operative planning for ECMO, poor communication and handover between departments, extubation while her condition was deteriorating, delayed ECMO support, and a lack of clear co-ordination of her post-operative care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably convey and record vital information during handover to PICU

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that: (a) It appears there was a lack of awareness and sharing of information between departments at Great Ormond Street Hospital. In particular, the PICU had not been given any advance warning of Amy’s complex medical background and needs before she was admitted there post operation. As PICU staff were not invited to the Multi-Disciplinary Team meetings prior to the operation, they were not aware of the “critical time” which lay ahead for her; (b) There was no clear plan or instruction for the management of Amy post operation in relation to extubation and ECMO support on the PICU; (c) The handover between clinicians involved in Amy’s operation and those taking over her care in the PICU, was poorly executed with vital information either not properly conveyed or recorded or simply missed; (d) There was a delay in commencing ECMO support, and (e) No single properly informed clinician appeared to be co-ordinating Amy’s post-operative care in such a complex and high risk case. ”

    Source location

    Amy Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use Epic to record MDT outcomes and link clinician messages directly to patient records for cross-department information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In April 2019 the Trust launched a new electronic patient record system (Epic) that replaces the previous paper records and combines numerous existing electronic systems. Epic now enables the notes of MDT meetings to be recorded directly within the individual patient’s records. It is therefore much easier for all teams involved in caring for a patient to access the outcome of the MDT discussions. Epic also includes a messaging system (similar to email) within the patient’s records to support clinicians discussing the patient’s care and to ensure that those messages are directly linked to the patient’s records. This provides a much better awareness and sharing of information between departments.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the spinal surgery ECMO pathway, including Joint Cardiac Conference review, postoperative location and consent planning, capacity checks, Epic documentation and multidisciplinary handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Spinal MDT TOR have been amended to include the specific responsibilities for clinicians attending the meeting in regards to ECMO. This is reiterated in the PICU guidance for managing spinal patients. A copy of this guidance is enclosed [Spinal Surgery Pathway PICU FINAL].”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop, test and launch a standardised electronic anaesthetic-to-ICU handover document with accompanying training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Electronic Patient Record department is currently supporting the Anaesthetic and ICU teams to develop a standardised electronic handover document which mirrors the paper form which has been developed for this purpose. The electronic handover document will ensure that all the relevant fields are together in one section so that they can be clearly and easily discussed as part of a structured verbal handover, and act as an ongoing plan to support the ICU team.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce consultant-to-consultant handover requirements and record additional anaesthetic-PICU discussions in Epic.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust expects this handover to take place between the Anaesthetic Consultant and the PICU Consultant whenever possible. The Clinical Lead for PICU and the Clinical Lead for Anaesthetics have reminded all Consultants of this requirement again in November 2019. When it is not possible (e.g. PICU Consultant is busy with another patient), handover should be given to the most senior doctor on the unit, who will then share that information, alongside the handover document, with the PICU Consultant. Where further discussions about the patient between the Anaesthetic Consultant and the PICU Consultant are required, these are now recorded in Epic. It is the responsibility of the PICU Consultant to record this information.”

    Source location

    2019-0343-Response-by-Great-Ormond-Street-Hospital-for-Children
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 November 2019

    Open published response
  6. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    James William Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James William Francis, who had a history of falls and balance difficulties, suffered an unwitnessed fall at his care home on 9 April 2017 and later developed repeated vomiting and deterioration. He was admitted to hospital with a large subdural haematoma and died on 11 April 2017. The principal concerns included failures in shift handover and monitoring, delays in seeking medical advice, inadequate information provided to paramedics, the patient’s positioning, staff training, and whether relevant guidelines sufficiently addressed this type of injury in elderly patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate required increased observations during shift handover

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence from several staff members at different grades including two support workers responsible for Mr Francis’s daily care, a senior support worker and a team leader that they were unaware of Mr Francis recent fall or the fact that 30 minute observations needed to be carried out. In particular, both key support workers who knew Mr Francis best failed to carry out the 30 minute observations during the morning and afternoon shifts and on balance of probabilities it was likely that neither support worker was told either during the handover meeting or by the senior staff on duty that this was a requirement that day. However, it certainly seems that both support workers observed Mr Francis on a regular basis throughout the day and took appropriate action to report his condition and any change to senior staff. In another patient, this lack of handing on of vital information to key members of staff could be crucial I was shown a shift handover form but this is basic and contains no additional guidance or method to highlight particular concerns or need for increased observations ”

    Source location

    James William Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and review the corporate shift-handover process, including documented handovers, incoming checks, staff allocation and accessible records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to your inquest we had already recognised a need to improve our handover arrangements at Deerswood and in March 2018 we had set up the attached “Shift Handover Form”.”

    Source location

    2019-0202-Response-by-Shaw-Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  7. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Marjorie GARTSIDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marjorie Gartside, aged 100, fractured her hip in an unwitnessed fall at a residential home and underwent surgery. She was discharged from hospital on two occasions, with concerns about inaccurate information regarding her mobility, unsafe discharge processes, lack of care handover and unclear palliative-care arrangements, and anticipatory medication not being sent with her. She died at the Home on 19 October 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over care

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There appears to have been no handover of care and a lack of clarity as to whether Mrs Gartside was for palliative care when she was discharged from the Royal Oldham Hospital on 12 October 2018. ”

    Source location

    Marjorie GARTSIDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A handover communication was documented, with an explicit discharge plan including consideration of palliative registration and ongoing care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am sorry that it was perceived in this way during the inquest and most importantly that the family were given cause to concern. On review it is documented on 12 October 2018 that the Handover of Care Communication was completed. On the documentation it states for the GP to consider putting Mrs Gartside on the palliative register, consider Vitamin D and the ongoing need for analgesia and laxatives.”

    Source location

    2019-0091-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  8. Somerset

    AI-generated summary

    Robin Damien Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robin Damien Richards, who had a history of mental health problems and diagnoses including Asperger's Syndrome, ADHD and a learning disability, was found suspended by his belt at supported accommodation on 29 June 2015 and died in hospital on 3 July 2015. Concerns included a shortage of suitable supported accommodation, the suitability and inspection of his placement, and shortcomings in communication, handover, discharge planning, care planning and risk assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate handover of mental health care information

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That there exists a shortage of suitable supported accommodation for those diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome, both in Somerset and nationally. In the case of Mr Richards this shortage resulted in him being obliged to remain on a psychiatric ward after his discharge under the Mental Health Act. This was not in Mr Richards best interests. (2) The suitability of Highbridge Court as a placement for Mr Richards which whilst CQC registered had not been CQC inspected. (3) A number of shortcomings on the part of Somerset Partnership NHS Foundation Trust ("the Trust") in Mr Richards mental health care were identified; a) Poor communication with family and between Trust staff. b) A lack of clarity in Mr Richards discharge plan and as to what Mr Richards could expect from his placement. c) An inadequate handover. d) Poor communication between Trust staff and Placement Staff and a failure to communicate with Mr Richards personally at a time of crisis for him. e) An inadequacy in the Trust's Risk Assessment process and subsequent management of risk to include only having telephone contact with staff and not speaking directly with Mr Richards ”

    Source location

    Robin Damien Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Michalla Jane SWEETING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michalla Jane Sweeting was a remand prisoner undergoing detoxification who was found unresponsive in her cell at 07.00hrs on 2nd June 2016. The medical cause of death was aspiration of gastric content in association with methadone toxicity. Concerns included inadequate response to reported over-sedation, unsatisfactory handover between shifts, inadequate clinical observations, and failures in communication and assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign handover responsibility to a registered nurse

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Handover: a. That the handover includes all prisoners/patients undergoing detoxification. b. That the handover is the responsibility of the registered nurse c. That it includes a review of the records for the shift by that registered nurse – this was raised by ████████ and was reflected in the jury conclusion. I therefore report this to you for your consideration in preventing future deaths ”

    Source location

    Michalla Jane SWEETING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Kathleen Joan Devine · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kathleen Joan Devine, a 94-year-old resident of a nursing home with advanced dementia and a history of falls, suffered an unwitnessed fall on 8 June 2017 while attempting to mobilise unsupervised. She sustained a right femur fracture, underwent surgery, and died on 10 June 2017 after her condition deteriorated post-operatively. Concerns included gaps in recorded observations, the removal and unplugging of a falls mat and sensor, and inadequate handover information for agency staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate quality and extent of handover instructions to agency staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The quality and extent of handover instructions to agency staff; ”

    Source location

    Kathleen Joan Devine · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide agency staff with robust handovers and clear resident-care guidelines when their use is necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• At Arden Court, we have dramatically reduced the levels of agency staff that are used, therefore, we now have regular staff who are aware of the equipment that needs to be in place for each of the residents. Although, if an agency staff member is needed to be used, then they receive a robust handover and clear guidelines of the needs of the residents.”

    Source location

    2017-0411-Response-by-Bloom-Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026