Recurring concern

Unreliable emergency access to hospital care

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First reported 25 Feb 2014•Latest report 5 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to emergency hospital access, including recognition of need, escalation, approval for release or transfer, ambulance activation and coordination where these affect timely access to hospital care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic training, staffing, communication or protocol deficiencies not explicitly tied to emergency access to hospital care.
  • Excludes routine or non-emergency referrals and transfers.
  • Excludes unrelated emergency procedures or transport arrangements that do not concern access to hospital care.
Reports
50

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
60

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
99

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England10
Department of Health and Social Care6
Care Quality Commission5
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
HM Prison and Probation Service3
College of Policing2
Recipient name withheld2
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Asthma + Lung UK1
Beech Cliffe Grange1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Michelle Whitehead · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michelle Whitehead died on 7 May 2021 from a hypoxic brain injury after experiencing deterioration in her breathing and oxygen saturation while detained under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act. The report identifies concerns about unclear sedation medication and documentation, delayed recognition and treatment of her deterioration, lack of medical and consultant involvement, difficulty contacting the duty doctor, and delays in calling and admitting paramedics.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling paramedics for deteriorating patients

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Unclear dose/type of sedation medication given, possible excess dose given, poor documentation 2. Delayed recognition of Mrs Whitehead’s declining condition 3. No medical clerking from admission until her collapse 4. No Consultant involvement after admission 5. Inability to reach Duty Doctor for deteriorating patient 6. Delay in calling paramedics 7. Delay in Paramedics gaining access to the ward Many of these issues have been the subject of scrutiny in at least two previous Inquests, that have followed deaths on inpatient wards of the Trust. I have received reassurance during these Hearings that the issues have been addressed, but this case illustrates that they clearly remain. The issues are very serious in my view. ”

    Source location

    Michelle Whitehead · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redistribute NEWS2 quick-reference guides across inpatient sites and directorates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a response the Directorate has re-printed new refreshed supplies of the credit card sized NEWS2 quick reference guides (Appendix 1), which identify the physical health parameters and trigger points for escalation to local medical colleagues or the emergency ambulance service. The card is to be worn on a lanyard alongside individual identification badges, acting as an immediate reminder. These have now been confirmed as having been redistributed across our inpatient sites within Adult Mental Health Services and have been shared with the other directorates to ensure consistency across sites.”

    Source location

    2022-0016-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deploy handheld devices for electronic NEWS2 recording, automatic scoring and escalation alerts across Adult Mental Health inpatient areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, the Division is rolling out handheld devices that allow staff to immediately enter physical observations into the NEWS2 electronic system (and patient record). This will automatically calculate the NEWS2 scores and alert if interventions or emergency care is required. Confirmation has been received that these have been made available and are in use on all Adult Mental Health inpatient areas.”

    Source location

    2022-0016-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver comprehensive NEWS2, anaphylaxis and emergency-treatment training with scenario-based exercises for inpatient staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Two senior staff members have been identified to work with individuals and groups from the Lucy Wade Unit to ensure they fully understand how to undertake comprehensive NEWS2 assessments. The key focus of the sessions is about confidence-building, particularly regarding decision-making at the time of an urgent clinical incident. They will additionally ensure that all staff are supported to recognise signs of an Anaphylaxis reaction and its associated emergency treatment with Adrenaline. This will include individual group training and the completion of medical emergency scenarios to test knowledge and processes in a more realistic, true-life environment. We are initially prioritising the wards in the north of the county and intend to have this area fully compliant with the training target in this area by mid-April 2022.”

    Source location

    2022-0016-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree priority-one ambulance responses for emergencies from Mental Health units until the hospital crash process is operational.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The primary message to staff, is that they must call for immediate support from the Ambulance service when they recognise that someone’s physical health is rapidly deteriorating, and a medical emergency is or is likely to occur. This has been included clearly within the notification of learning letter already referred to within this response (Appendix 3).”

    Source location

    2022-0016-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare_Published
    Page 6 · response
    Published 24 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A crash bleep was discounted because the duty doctor covered multiple sites and could not provide an immediate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The recommendation from the SI report was to have a “crash bleep”. This was considered but discounted as the duty doctor covers a number of geographical sites and cannot provide an immediate response. Therefore, the response to a medical emergency needs to remain as 999.”

    Source location

    2022-0016-Response-from-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 24 January 2022

    Open published response
  2. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Boateng · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Boateng became very unwell after contacting his GP surgery and was later found on a street bench. Police and ambulance services attended, but he died from Covid 19 shortly after arriving at hospital; concerns included the handling of urgent GP calls, communication between ambulance and police services, and practical guidance for police when ambulances were unavailable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of practical guidance for police conveyance of patients to hospital when ambulances are unavailable

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) College of Policing. Due to the Covid pandemic, no ambulances were available when police attended to Richard. The Metropolitan Police Service had a policy that permitted conveying patients to hospital in an emergency if no ambulances were available. However, the policy included no practical guidance as to how that could be achieved mitigating the risks. I heard that the Metropolitan Police Service is updating the guidance. However, I am concerned that other forces across the country may also lack such practical guidance, which is of particular concern due to ongoing pandemic and the demands that may continue of ambulance services. ”

    Source location

    Richard Boateng · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use developed Authorised Professional Practice to guide officers’ dynamic risk assessments and decisions when transporting patients without an ambulance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That said, there will be instances when this may be necessary, and in those scenarios I would expect officers to conduct a dynamic risk assessment at the scene. The College has developed Authorised Professional Practice (APP) to aid decision making National Decision Model (college.police.uk); this practical guidance guides officers through a process of considering the information, assessing the risks, considering policy and available powers, identifying options and finally taking action. In the absence of an ambulance and taking account of the prevailing circumstances (in particular the risk to the patient), I consider that the APP already provides appropriate guidance.”

    Source location

    2021-0335-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Escalate the issue to the NPCC First Aid Forum for consideration of practical advice that can be offered to forces.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a matter of course, all coroner reports and requests related to the provision of first aid by police officers are reviewed by the NPCC First Aid Forum as a standing agenda item. My staff have spoken with the forum chair and have agreed to escalate this issue to the Forum for consideration as to what practical advice can be offered to forces.”

    Source location

    2021-0335-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Transportation of casualties to hospital falls outside the First Aid Learning Programme’s scope and first-aider responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College licences the First Aid Learning Programme (FALP) used by Home Office Forces, including the Metropolitan Police Service. The programme is endorsed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The College is responsible for ensuring appropriate quality assurance processes are in place to guide forces in the implementation of the HSE guidelines relating to the provision of first aid. However, transportation of casualties to hospital are not within the scope of the responsibility of a first aider (and therefore the FALP).”

    Source location

    2021-0335-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The College does not issue specific transport guidance because police conveyance carries inherent risks, liabilities and risks of normalising the practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The transportation of casualties in police vehicles carries inherent risks to the casualty, requiring skills and responsibilities significantly above those of a first aider, and significant liabilities to the officers themselves. For these reasons officers of police transporting casualties should be kept to the absolute minimum and there is concern that development of College issued guidance would not only ‘normalise’ such practices but add to an unrealistic expectation being placed on officers at the scene.”

    Source location

    2021-0335-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Authorised Professional Practice and dynamic risk assessment already provide appropriate guidance when officers transport casualties without an ambulance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That said, there will be instances when this may be necessary, and in those scenarios I would expect officers to conduct a dynamic risk assessment at the scene. The College has developed Authorised Professional Practice (APP) to aid decision making National Decision Model (college.police.uk); this practical guidance guides officers through a process of considering the information, assessing the risks, considering policy and available powers, identifying options and finally taking action. In the absence of an ambulance and taking account of the prevailing circumstances (in particular the risk to the patient), I consider that the APP already provides appropriate guidance.”

    Source location

    2021-0335-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2021

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Guy Clifton Paget · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Guy Clifton Paget, a prisoner at HMP Leeds with terminal oesophageal cancer, was found confused in his cell on 16 March 2021 and died at 15:06 that day in an ambulance at the prison gate. The ambulance could not leave because of incorrect paperwork and a malfunctioning vehicle gate. The concerns related to the need for effective, urgent, and tested systems to enable emergency ambulances to enter and leave prisons with prisoners requiring hospital treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate the urgent need for ambulance-exit authorisation and have the authorisation prepared

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The prison should have effective systems to facilitate the exit of an emergency ambulance from the prison. 2. In this case a decision was made shortly after 13:00 that Mr Paget needed to be taken to hospital. It should have been made clear to the prison managers that the necessary authorisation to exit needed to be prepared as a matter of urgency. At approximately 15:00 hours, however, this was not in place. 3. It is foreseeable that prisons nationally will need to admit paramedics and ambulance vehicles to attend to prisoners at times of emergency – and may then need to leave with the prisoner in the ambulance. An efficient and tested system to manage this process is essential, in order that serving prisoners are provided with an equivalent level of care to that which they could expect in the community. ”

    Source location

    Guy Clifton Paget · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Records indicate the hospital-transfer authorisation was generated immediately after the emergency code was called, rather than being delayed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the paperwork needed to authorise Mr Paget’s move to hospital, our records do not indicate that there was a delay: it was generated as soon as the emergency code was called and was in the possession of the escorting officer, who was at the healthcare centre before the ambulance.”

    Source location

    2021-0118-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response
  4. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Eric Harold Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eric Harold Bird, a 91-year-old man with dementia and assessed as being at high risk of falls, suffered seven falls during a four-week period in a specialist care centre. After a fall on 21/11/20, he sustained a subdural haematoma and died in hospital on 30/11/20. The principal concerns included failures to follow procedures after head injuries, delays in contacting emergency services and gaining ambulance access, and inadequate updating and review of his falls risk documentation and care plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in contacting emergency ambulance services after a fall

    Wider context from the report

    “4. On 21/11/20 I heard evidence that the fall occurred at approximately 20.20/20.30 hours. Records suggested the 111 service was contacted at 21.06. I heard evidence that it was the 111 service that made arrangements for an ambulance to attend and the EPR showed that the ambulance was contacted at 21.34 arriving on site at 21.47; ”

    Source location

    Eric Harold Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue making 111/999 calls after falls and call 999 whenever a resident prescribed Apixaban falls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to make 111/999 calls following any fall and will call 999 whenever a resident falls who is prescribed Apixaban. This will continue despite some concern from the Local Authority that we are availing of these services too often.”

    Source location

    2021-0122-Response-from-Castlehill-Specialist-Care-Centre-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct management reviews and assess available evidence about the provider’s falls-management concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern which arose from the preventing future deaths report have prompted the CQC to take action. In direct response, we held a management review meeting on 17 February 2021. Following the management review meeting, we reviewed the evidence we held about Castlehill Specialist Care Centre, the information held following the specific incident review related to Mr Bird’s death and information following the inspection completed in January 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0122-Response-from-Care-Quality-Commission-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC will not progress a criminal investigation because the evidence does not meet the required threshold of proving avoidability beyond reasonable doubt.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• As a result of these findings, CQC held a management review meeting on 18 March 2021 to discuss the findings under our specific incident guidance. In order to open a formal criminal investigation, we have to be able to evidence a Registered Person (either a Registered Provider or Registered Manager) failed to provide safe care and treatment to Mr Bird in relation to this incident and can prove beyond reasonable doubt this incident was avoidable. We did not feel that this threshold was met and therefore will not progress the case.”

    Source location

    2021-0122-Response-from-Care-Quality-Commission-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Philip Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip Taylor, who had Lewy Body Dementia and lived in a residential care home, became severely dehydrated during a chest infection and died in hospital on 6 January 2020 after developing an acute kidney injury. Concerns included failure to recognise and respond to dehydration, delayed ambulance transfer and hospital assessment, inadequate monitoring, and limited national guidance for care home staff and paramedics.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National pathfinder tool failing to clearly direct immediate expedited hospital transfer for sepsis

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The paramedic attending was a newly qualified paramedic and as a result was using the national pathfinder tool. Mr Taylor was scoring for sepsis on the NWAS observations. However, the crew took well over an hour to leave the care home. The inquest heard that newly qualified paramedics relied on the national pathfinder tool which did not make it clear the need for an immediate expedited transfer to hospital in such circumstances. More experienced paramedics used the Manchester triage tool which was far more explicit. The inquest was told that NWAS had recognised the issue with the national tool and were adjusting their practices to avoid the risk. However, it was not clear if other Ambulance Trusts had made similar adjustments for newly qualified paramedics. ”

    Source location

    Philip Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The choice of clinical triage tool remains the responsibility of individual ambulance services rather than being mandated nationally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am advised by the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) that Pathfinder is a clinical presentation-based, triage tool based on the Manchester Triage System, which is used worldwide by emergency clinicians and by a number of ambulance services in the UK. It may be helpful to clarify that Pathfinder is not mandated for use nationally and it remains a decision for individual ambulance services as to which clinical triage tools they use.”

    Source location

    2020-0289-Response-from-Dept.-of-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No Pathfinder changes are considered necessary because the tool remains a safe and effective assessment and triage tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am assured by the NWAS that having considered the concerns you have raised carefully, it believes that changes are not required as a result of this incident and that Pathfinder remains a safe and effective assessment triage tool.”

    Source location

    2020-0289-Response-from-Dept.-of-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response
  6. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Alyn Rees · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alyn Rees became acutely unwell on 3 December 2019, experienced breathing difficulties, deteriorated into cardiac arrest, and died after paramedics were unable to revive him. Concerns were raised about the approximately two-hour wait for an emergency ambulance, the lack of advice about the expected arrival time, the absence of an indicated response time for an Amber 1 call, and delays transferring patients into hospital care that prevented ambulances from being released.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in transferring patients into hospital care, preventing emergency ambulance release

    Wider context from the report

    “However, the family raised concerns, with which I agreed, that 2 hours is a long time to wait for an emergency ambulance. At no time were the family advised of the expected time of arrival and potentially, if they had been aware of this, they may have contacted earlier the local GP. The report did not indicate what the expected response time for an Amber 1 call should be. I was advised that on this occasion there were significant delays (up to 3 hours) transferring patients into the care of Aneurin Bevan University Health Board Hospitals. This is also of significant concern as it prevented emergency ambulances being released. ”

    Source location

    Alyn Rees · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Blaithin Grianne Buckley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Blaithin Grianne Buckley died at Northampton General Hospital on 30 April 2018 after being found hanging in a phone booth at St. Andrews Healthcare while on five-minute observations. Concerns included the delay in calling an ambulance and uncertainty about whether procedures adequately explained when an ambulance should be called. The inquest also identified failures relating to locking the phone booth, transferring relevant patient history, and the process for calling the ambulance service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of guidance on whether and when to call an ambulance during mobilisation of the medical emergency team

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The delay in calling for an ambulance to transfer Ms Buckley to the General Hospital in a clear medical emergency. There was no evidence before inquest to explain the delay between 23:20 and 23:44. Whilst it had been accepted that senior clinicians, with greater medical knowledge that the paramedics, formed the medical emergency team, St Andrews as a mental health setting was required to transfer Ms Buckley to A&E in any event. It was unclear whether the policies/procedures requiring the mobilisation of the medical emergency team included guidance on whether an ambulance should be called, and when. ”

    Source location

    Blaithin Grianne Buckley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling an ambulance for transfer in a medical emergency

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The delay in calling for an ambulance to transfer Ms Buckley to the General Hospital in a clear medical emergency. There was no evidence before inquest to explain the delay between 23:20 and 23:44. Whilst it had been accepted that senior clinicians, with greater medical knowledge that the paramedics, formed the medical emergency team, St Andrews as a mental health setting was required to transfer Ms Buckley to A&E in any event. It was unclear whether the policies/procedures requiring the mobilisation of the medical emergency team included guidance on whether an ambulance should be called, and when. ”

    Source location

    Blaithin Grianne Buckley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and refresh the deteriorating-patient policy to clarify actions when physical health deteriorates and medical intervention is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) The policy concerning the management of a deteriorating patient is being reviewed and refreshed to provide clarity on the actions to be taken in the event of a patient experiencing deteriorating physical health and requiring medical intervention. This is due for implementation on or before 1 January 2020.”

    Source location

    2019-0465-Response-from-St-Andrews-Healthcare-R-pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatically call an ambulance whenever a medical emergency is called, rather than leaving the decision to the nursing team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) One specific and significant change in the procedure that has already been implemented is that when a medical emergency is called, an ambulance is also called rather than leaving it to the discretion of the nursing team as was previously the case. This will enable a faster response to medical emergencies. Action completed on 7 November 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0465-Response-from-St-Andrews-Healthcare-R-pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor medical emergencies and ambulance attendances through the physical healthcare governance meeting, escalating identified problems or challenges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) Responses to medical emergencies including ambulance attendances will be monitored in the relevant governance meeting chaired by the Director of Physical Healthcare (the medical physical healthcare group) with necessary escalation where problems or challenges are found.”

    Source location

    2019-0465-Response-from-St-Andrews-Healthcare-R-pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Earlier arrival at the General Hospital would not have altered the outcome in this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further to the Regulation 28 notice received by St Andrew’s Healthcare dated 15 September 2018, I am providing a response to the matter of concern which was the delay in calling for an ambulance to transfer Ms Buckley to the General Hospital. While the evidence provided to the Court indicated that an earlier arrival at the General Hospital would not have altered the outcome in this instance, St Andrew’s recognises that there is a need for greater clarity around the recognition of a medical emergency and how and when an ambulance is called. To that end the Charity has taken the following steps:”

    Source location

    2019-0465-Response-from-St-Andrews-Healthcare-R-pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2020

    Open published response
  8. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Hall, a six-year-old boy, became acutely unwell on 23 October 2017 and died in the early hours of 24 October 2017 after developing meningococcal septicaemia. The report identified concerns about NHS 111 disposition information not being transferred to ambulance and treating clinicians, delays in ambulance availability information, and conflicting guidance about the significance of his heart rate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to inform medical professionals of ambulance delays of 39 minutes or less

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It was heard in evidence that since this incident the East of England Ambulance Service have introduced a system whereby if a medical professional calls requesting an ambulance and one is not available (due to pressure on the service exceeding capacity) they will inform the medical professional if the anticipated response time is outside the key performance times for the category of call. It was identified, that in a septicaemia case similar to Oliver’s (or indeed any case where time is of the essence to transport a patient to hospital to commence life saving treatment) the correct category for the ambulance response would be Category 2. As such, any medical professional who calls for an ambulance will only be told there will be a delay if it is anticipated that delay would be longer than 40 minutes (40 minutes being the Category 2 aimed response time in 9 out of 10 cases). Therefore, under the current system, a medical professional requesting an ambulance will not be told if the delay is 39 minutes or less. Evidence was heard, that in a patient with meningococcal septicaemia the bacterial loading in their system will have almost doubled in that 39 minute time period and the patient’s condition would have rapidly deteriorated. As such, under the current system of a medical professional being told of the delay if it is only 40 minutes or more (in a Category 2 case), that attending medical professional will be unable to make an informed judgement as to whether waiting for an ambulance or using another form of transport is the right course of action for the patient they are treating. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Call takers cannot provide accurate expected arrival times because emergency responses are fluid and may be diverted to more urgent incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whether an ambulance is called by the public or an HCP, it is extremely difficult for a call taker to give accurate information regarding the expected time of arrival of a response. This is due to the fluid and ever-changing nature of emergencies. It is not uncommon for a responding ambulance to be diverted from one emergency to another that has been assessed as more urgent or indeed for a responding ambulance to be flagged down at another incident they may be passing. For these reasons, call takers do not commit to an estimated time of arrival, rather they are asked to say ‘help is on its way and please ring back if the patient’s condition changes’.”

    Source location

    2019-0198-response-by-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  9. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Mildred CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mildred CLARK died in hospital on 17 December 2017 following infection and failure of a bypass graft, haemorrhage, and inadequate blood supply to the leg. The inquest found that delay in diagnosing the infection and haematoma limited the available medical intervention. A separate concern was raised about a paramedic being instructed by telephone to attempt hernia reduction despite not being trained to do so, and about possible pressure on staff to avoid hospital admission during winter pressure.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess painful, swollen and hard suspected hernias for strangulation and arrange hospital transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “Although this matter did not contribute to this death a concern was raised that a paramedic sought telephone advice from a hospital doctor by telephone on presenting symptoms and the initial diagnosis was that of a hernia were was extreme pain. The paramedic was instructed to carry out a procedure to reduce the hernia despite being informed that the paramedic was not trained to do so. The attempt caused extreme pain and failed. (1) A senior member of ambulance crew gave evidence that reducing a hernia was not the role of a paramedic and a doctor should not instruct a paramedic to carry out this procedure particularly when they have stated they are not trained. (2) A consultant surgeon gave evidence that: a. a suspected hernia is not a medical emergency and there was no pressing requirement to undertake the procedure that could lead to complications if incorrectly carried out b. where there is pain, swelling and hardness as in this case, if a hernia is suspected it would be reasonable to consider if this was a case of strangulated hernia as this could be a medical emergency and an attempt to reduce it cause significant complications and a patient should be taken to hospital (3) There was a concern raised that staff may have felt pressured to act to avoid hospital admission during a period of winter pressure ”

    Source location

    Mildred CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Bernard Pius O’Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bernard Pius O’Flynn was imprisoned at HMP Thameside and developed back and abdominal pain before being diagnosed with an acute abdomen. His transfer to hospital was delayed for three days; he was later diagnosed with metastatic adenocarcinoma and died in hospital on 26 August 2018. The report identified concerns about urgent hospital transfers from prison, including the absence of expert emergency-medicine input into policies for emergencies outside Code Red and Code Blue situations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Potential medical emergencies outside Code Red and Code Blue requiring hospital transfer within less than an hour

    Wider context from the report

    “The failures identified in the clinical review and PPO reports were, in my view, deeply troubling. That said I am encouraged by the cooperation and efforts made by Oxleas and SERCO to formulate a policy to deal with medical emergencies falling outside the Code Red and Code Blue scenarios. However I remain concerned that a practising expert in Emergency Medicine has not yet had input into the formulation of the policies promulgated by the joint meeting between SERCO and Oxleas. In particular my concern is that there may be medical emergencies which do not fall within Code Red or Code Blue but may, nonetheless, require immediate transfer to hospital within less than an hour. It is possible that an expert in emergency medicine would be able to easily identify whether or not there are residual cases within this category. I am therefore of the view that I am under a duty to report this residual concern to Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust in order to take appropriate action, if so advised by an expert Consultant in Emergency Medicine, to reduce the risk of fatalities in future. ”

    Source location

    Bernard Pius O’Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026