Recurring concern

Unreliable emergency access to hospital care

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First reported 25 Feb 2014•Latest report 5 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to emergency hospital access, including recognition of need, escalation, approval for release or transfer, ambulance activation and coordination where these affect timely access to hospital care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic training, staffing, communication or protocol deficiencies not explicitly tied to emergency access to hospital care.
  • Excludes routine or non-emergency referrals and transfers.
  • Excludes unrelated emergency procedures or transport arrangements that do not concern access to hospital care.
Reports
50

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
60

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
99

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England10
Department of Health and Social Care6
Care Quality Commission5
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
HM Prison and Probation Service3
College of Policing2
Recipient name withheld2
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Asthma + Lung UK1
Beech Cliffe Grange1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terrence Smith died in hospital on 13 November 2013 after developing amphetamine-induced Excited Delirium/Acute Behavioural Disturbance, being subjected to prolonged restraint, and stopping breathing while being transported to hospital. The principal concerns included failures to recognise the condition as a medical emergency, inadequate assessment and training, excessive restraint, delayed conveyance to hospital, and deficiencies in relevant emergency response, clinical, police and custody policies and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conveyance policy restricting timely transport of medical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “The Joint Surrey Police, Sussex Police, Kent Police and South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust Conveyance Policy is currently being re-drafted but I have concerns about the current and draft proposed versions I was shown. Both versions indicate that a patient suffering ED/ABD (or other life threatening conditions) should not be conveyed to hospital by police vehicle under any circumstances or unless a series of 11 conditions are satisfied. Some of the 11 conditions could take some time to satisfy and some are dependent on the presence of SECAMB at the scene (which could be subject to delay). I am concerned that the policy could prevent a patient who is suffering a medical emergency being conveyed to hospital as soon as possible, and by police vehicle if necessary, and could result in a fatal delay in the provision of life-saving treatment. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conveyance policy restricting timely transport of medical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “The Joint Surrey Police, Sussex Police, Kent Police and South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust Conveyance Policy is currently being re-drafted but I have concerns about the current and draft proposed versions I was shown. Both versions indicate that a patient suffering ED/ABD (or other life threatening conditions) should not be conveyed to hospital by police vehicle under any circumstances or unless a series of 11 conditions are satisfied. Some of the 11 conditions could take some time to satisfy and some are dependent on the presence of SECAMB at the scene (which could be subject to delay). I have two concerns : (a) I am concerned that the policy could prevent a patient who is suffering a medical emergency being conveyed to hospital as soon as possible, and by police vehicle if necessary, and could result in a fatal delay in the provision of life-saving treatment. (b) I am concerned that the content of this policy is inconsistent with the training I was told is given to police officers, namely that they may convey a patient to hospital by police vehicle if the use of an ambulance is not an available or practical option, and as long as the conveyance is approved by a senior officer. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Jack Alfie Charlie HUBBARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Hubbard, aged 18, ingested MDMA at Egg Nightclub in London on the evening of 24/25 August 2018; the investigation recorded the medical cause of death as MDMA toxicity. A concern was raised that the nightclub’s ambulance-calling protocol required the duty manager to be called and a second set of observations to be taken first.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling an ambulance pending contact with the duty manager

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that the protocol at Egg Nightclub for calling an ambulance is that before this can happen: 1. the duty manager must be called; and 2. a second set of observations must be taken, regardless of the results of the first. ”

    Source location

    Jack Alfie Charlie HUBBARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling an ambulance pending repeat observations regardless of initial results

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that the protocol at Egg Nightclub for calling an ambulance is that before this can happen: 1. the duty manager must be called; and 2. a second set of observations must be taken, regardless of the results of the first. ”

    Source location

    Jack Alfie Charlie HUBBARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Reginald George KEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Reginald George KEY underwent surgery and was discharged from hospital on 1 December 2016. He was reportedly very unwell when delivered home after a delay in patient transport and was readmitted on 4 December with sepsis. He underwent further procedures and died on 10 December 2016; concerns were raised about his discharge condition, the delay in transport, and whether his deterioration could have been identified or whether paramedics could have returned him to hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an option for paramedics to return deteriorating patients to hospital

    Wider context from the report

    “• The deceased had undergone surgery and was apparently discharged from the Royal Stoke University Hospital at 6pm on 1st December 2016. He was collected by patient transport. Clinicians tell me he was well on discharge. He was apparently deliver home at 10pm some 4 hours later when he was described as being very unwell with paramedics commenting that he should not have been discharged and that they had to carry him into the house. Family noted there were other patients in the transport vehicle awaiting return home. • Family and clinicians raised concerns about the length of time it had apparently taken to deliver him home and whether or not his deteriorating condition was or could have been spotted and whether there was an option for paramedics to return him to the hospital. He was returned to hospital very unwell on the 4th December 2016. ”

    Source location

    Reginald George KEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Instruct the provider to produce an action plan addressing the identified patient transport safety measures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Assurances Undertaken to Prevent Future Deaths To address the Coroner’s concerns we have instructed the provider to act upon the findings and include in their action plan the following:”

    Source location

    2018-0025-Response-by-Cannock-Chase-CCG-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the provider’s action plan at the April 2018 contract and quality meeting, request measurable outcomes, and monitor progress until actions are concluded.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have instructed the provider to produce an action plan to address these matters. This plan will be reviewed in detail at the next provider contract and quality meeting in April 2018 by my commissioning and quality teams and will be monitored at this meeting until all actions are concluded and agreed between the provider organisation and the CCGs.”

    Source location

    2018-0025-Response-by-Cannock-Chase-CCG-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hospital transfers requiring escalation are handled by the 999 ambulance service, not patient transport staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have discussed the level of skill and escalation procedure with the PTS provider. They have reported all staff are aware of the deteriorating patient policy and they expect staff to enact this when they have any patient concerns. Staff are instructed at times of a medical emergency and/or concerns around the patients’ health, that they are to stop the vehicle and inform the ambulance service of the nature of the emergency and await the service to respond. It is important to highlight that they are not allowed to transport a patient to hospital and are required to seek professional help via the 999 service.”

    Source location

    2018-0025-Response-by-Cannock-Chase-CCG-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2018

    Open published response
  4. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Barry John TUCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The supplied text does not describe the circumstances of Barry John TUCKER’s death beyond recording that an inquest took place. Concerns included lack of pre-operative preparation and senior clinical input, absent enhanced-recovery support and information, inadequate hospital notes, flawed ambulance recall arrangements, and no coherent discharge-planning protocol for enhanced-recovery urology procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the system for recalling discharged urology patients by ambulance

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) Eastbourne District General Hospital’s system for recalling patients to the Urology ward following discharge, if they need to go in by ambulance, is flawed. ”

    Source location

    Barry John TUCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There was no transfer delay caused by ambulance-service communication; extrication difficulties and clinical deterioration caused the on-scene delay.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(6) Eastbourne DGH’s system for recalling patients to the Urology Ward following discharge, if they need to go by ambulance, is flawed.”

    Source location

    2018-0018-Response-by-East-Sussex-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 8 March 2018

    Open published response
  5. Southampton and New Forest

    AI-generated summary

    Owen Richard Widlake · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Owen Widlake was born full term and healthy but aspirated meconium and developed worsening respiratory failure. He died at Southampton General Hospital on 31 May 2016 after late diagnosis of persistent pulmonary hypertension of the newborn and an acute intraventricular haemorrhage. Concerns included staffing and medical cover, recognition and escalation of respiratory distress, observation records, staff training, transfer arrangements, and handovers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate transfer policy and escalation indicators for tertiary assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “(1a) Staffing levels over the weekend and bank holiday, in particular the use of ANNP and SANNP trained staff to replace junior and registrar level doctors on duty covering NICU. (1b) The need for a dedicated junior level doctor or registrar to be on duty 24 hours covering NICU, and not a limited 3 / 4 hour shift. (1c) The need to clarify as to the role an ANNP or SANNP has, whether in a nursing capacity or medical capacity, and how they are perceived by other staff. 2) The observations for children in transition or admitted to NICU are not recorded seamlessly nor are easily viewable whether on a chart or graph. 3) The nursing staff do not appear able to escalate concerns either i) due to lack of clear care plans and escalation markers ii) poor training particularly the SANNP and ANNP in the recognition of respiratory distress and PPHN ii) a lack of empowerment indicating a lack of leadership. 4) The on going training undertaken of nursing staff in relation to PPHN and respiratory distress has been the responsibility of SANNP ████████ and a consultant, with no indication that they have undertaken training themselves. 5) Concern as to staff deciding whether a child in respiratory distress should be NBM or not and what is the guidance on this. 6) The Transfer policy for this Trust and what would be guidance or indicators as to the seeking of tertiary level assistance and transfer, especially when a crisis point may be reached past 10pm. 7) What is the current system in place for handovers between medical staff and nursing staff, whether written or verbal, and what information must be included as part of that handover. ”

    Source location

    Owen Richard Widlake · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Steven Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven Jones, aged 27, was a non-verbal resident of a care home who became ill with sickness, diarrhoea, loss of appetite and sleep disturbance before dying on 10 December 2013. He was diagnosed with a perforated colon, leading to multi-organ failure and hypoxic brain injury. Concerns included failures to escalate carers’ concerns, insufficient incident reporting, delayed medical referral, and delays in calling emergency services and transferring him to hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise the seriousness of situations requiring urgent hospital transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) On the occasion of a serious incident of faecal vomit, staff did not assume responsibility for calling emergency services but telephoned the registered managers who in turn did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation resulting in a delay in transferring the resident to hospital. ”

    Source location

    Steven Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the Anticipatory HealthCare Calendar to assess health symptoms, direct staff responses, record significant communications, train staff, and audit use weekly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In June 2014 the Anticipatory HealthCare Calendar (AHCC) was introduced. ████████ raised the introduction of this system in her evidence to the Inquest on 9 November 2017. This is a NHS proforma that acts as a criteria-referenced monitoring system for health-related issues in those with learning disabilities. Specific symptoms are listed and given a risk level of Green, Amber or Red; amber and red directly link to required specific staff actions and responses, which are described within the tool and recorded on a Significant Communication Sheet, part of the tool. These range from continued monitoring, through administering pain relief or attending a GP surgery when possible, to contacting emergency services immediately. AHCC is a career-level tool that is directive in terms of response to specific symptoms.”

    Source location

    2017-0357-Response-by-Beech-Cliffe-Limited
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 February 2018

    Open published response
  7. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Wynne Turnbull · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Wynne Turnbull, a resident at the ICAR Unit with a recognised risk of falls and taking Warfarin, suffered an unwitnessed fall with facial injuries on 9 August 2016 and was taken to hospital after an ambulance was summoned 63 minutes after he was found. He was diagnosed with a large acute-on-chronic subdural haemorrhage and died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 10 August 2016; the principal concern was the delay in summoning an ambulance despite the known risk factors and head injury.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delay in summoning an ambulance for cases to be stepped up to hospital

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Derek Wynne Turnbull had a known history of falls, was on Warfarin and had sustained an obvious head injury after an unwitnessed fall, yet it took from 03:15am to 04:18am to summons an ambulance by a 999 call in a case that was to be “stepped up” to hospital in any event. There was no purpose in waiting, given the known scenario. In Mr Turnbull’s case the delay may not have caused or contributed to his death, but in other cases the opportunity for earlier review at the hospital ought to be taken. Policies, procedures and protocols may need to be reviewed in order to ensure that in those cases that are to be stepped up, that the action is taken immediately. ”

    Source location

    Derek Wynne Turnbull · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lita Serkes underwent surgery at Whipps Cross Hospital on 22 July 2016, suffered a stroke the following morning, was transferred to the Royal London Hospital later that day, and died on 24 July. The concerns included discrepancies in observations and clinical records, delay in transfer for specialist stroke care, undelivered pain relief, and delayed recognition and assessment of a significant bleed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in transferring patients requiring emergency specialist stroke care

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The decision was made by, at the latest 10.30am, but quite possibly an hour before then, to transfer Mrs Serkes to the Royal London Hospital for specialist care, but transfer was not effected until 2.07pm. Stroke is an emergency. ”

    Source location

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the hospital policy for stroke management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The Trust recognises that stroke is an emergency and that you feel there was inadequate urgency in managing Mrs Serkes stroke. As a result the Trust is currently in the process of reviewing the hospital policy for the management of stroke and is also reviewing the checklist of advice given by the Hyperacute Stroke Unit. The Trust is hoping that this will be completed by 01 April 2017.”

    Source location

    2016-0458-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Hyperacute Stroke Unit checklist of advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The Trust recognises that stroke is an emergency and that you feel there was inadequate urgency in managing Mrs Serkes stroke. As a result the Trust is currently in the process of reviewing the hospital policy for the management of stroke and is also reviewing the checklist of advice given by the Hyperacute Stroke Unit. The Trust is hoping that this will be completed by 01 April 2017.”

    Source location

    2016-0458-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Malcolm Bennett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Malcolm Bennett, a resident of a care establishment, sustained injuries in falls and altercations with other residents. After an alleged assault on 15 December 2015, he was taken to hospital several hours later and died the following day from a head injury; the principal concern was the delay in arranging hospital treatment despite his care plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in arranging emergency hospital assessment and transport after suspected significant injury

    Wider context from the report

    “In the care Plan for this person, it clearly indicated that in the event of any significant injury he should be taken as expeditiously as possible to the Emergency Dept. of the hospital. Clearly this was not done, in that the staff left him knowing that he had apparently been hit by someone and he might well be injured, and they did not call for an ambulance for another three hours. In the light of his cause of death, this delay might have been contributory. ”

    Source location

    Malcolm Bennett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update risk management plans for residents prescribed anticoagulants to require calling 999 immediately after a fall, accident or injury.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. All Home Managers in each of Borough Care's care homes were instructed to update the risk management plans (which form part of a care plan) for all residents who have been prescribed Warfarin or any other anti-coagulant, with an instruction to ring 999 without delay in the event that a resident has, or is suspected of, having had a fall, accident or injury. Registered Managers at all care homes have been asked to confirm that risk management plans for residents prescribed with such medication have now been updated.”

    Source location

    2016-0232-Response-by-Borough-Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2016

    Open published response
  10. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Critall, an 80-year-old man, developed a haemothorax after insertion of a chest drain while being treated for pneumonia and died on 6 July 2014 after further deterioration and emergency treatment. The report raised concerns about the necessity and technique of the drain insertion, the failure to confirm its position, inadequate monitoring and resuscitation, and the hospital’s lack of appropriate emergency facilities and protocols. It also recorded that his family were not contacted after he became unwell or died.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reliance on emergency paramedic attendance to provide hospital care before transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The absence of operational protocols and a HDU/ITU facility to manage emergency situations and a reliance on a 999 call for paramedics to provide care for a hospital who undertakes such procedures prior to transferring an unwell patient to an NHS hospital. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the Elective and Non-Elective Transfer Policy, agreeing emergency transfer processes with Royal Surrey County Hospital and making them available to relevant staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The hospital’s Elective and Non-Elective Transfer Policy, has been reviewed and updated to reinforce the registered level of care provided by the hospital. The process for transfer in an emergency situation was agreed with the Medical Director at the Royal Surrey County Hospital NHS Trust and incorporated into the policy. The Policy is available for RMO and senior nursing staff within the RMO induction and bleep holder file.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a local SOP requiring critically ill patients to move automatically to the theatre recovery area for comprehensive monitoring and anaesthetic support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. A local standard operating procedure (SOP) has been agreed at the hospital resuscitation committee to reinforce the management of a critically ill patient whereby a patient is automatically transferred to the recovery area within the hospital’s theatre complex to ensure access to comprehensive monitoring equipment and anaesthetic staff.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital had an emergency transfer policy and facilities to stabilise critically ill patients before transfer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The hospital has an Elective and Non-Elective Transfer Policy in place which sets out the requirements for transfer of patients in emergency situations. The policy acknowledges that clinical deterioration can occur at any stage of a patient’s pathway. The National Early Warning Score (NEWS) is a tool to support staff to recognise deterioration at an early stage and escalate for medical assessment by the RMO. If following assessment it is deemed necessary, the patient’s consultant or other relevant professional, e.g. consultant anaesthetist should be contacted for advice or asked to attend.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026