Recurring concern

Unreliable ambulance response-time standards and prioritisation

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First reported 16 Dec 2013•Latest report 2 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in ambulance-service arrangements for defining, communicating, applying or reviewing response-time standards and prioritisation criteria for urgent calls, including Amber-category calls, where unclear targets or grading can delay appropriate emergency attendance.

Not included

  • Excludes actual ambulance attendance delays where no deficiency in response-time standards or prioritisation is identified.
  • Excludes ambulance dispatch communication, hospital handover and downstream treatment failures unless they directly concern the response-time-standard or prioritisation process.
  • Excludes condition-specific clinical triage systems where the assertion does not identify an ambulance response-time or prioritisation control.
  • Excludes generic staffing or resource shortages unless they are directly linked to failure to establish or meet a defined response-time standard.
Reports
13

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
13

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
17

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England3
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives2
Department of Health and Social Care2
NHS Pathways2
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust2
Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS)1
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
College of Paramedics1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Essex Police1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Ofcom1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Scott Darren Taylor died at Basildon Hospital on 13 August 2022 following multiorgan failure and rhabdomyolysis associated with cocaine use, physical exertion, prone restraint and Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome. The report raised concerns about inconsistent ambulance response categorisation for acute behavioural disturbance with active restraint, terminology and training, police training, and the removal of restraints during conveyance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to apply consistent ambulance response coding based on clinical presentation rather than sectioning status

    Wider context from the report

    “c. The EEAST updated training on Acute Behavioural Disturbance, active restraint and reports received from police and correct coding remains confusing with the policy and training handouts in December 2023 with discrepancies between those who are sectioned and those who are not. Persons confirmed with Acute Behavioural disturbance and in active police restraint being coded as Category 2 and those in the same circumstances and ‘sectioned’ will require a Category 1 response. The difference appears to be one related to the Mental Health Act and not the presentation or clinical requirements of the person. ”

    Source location

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a standalone procedure for suspected or confirmed Acute Behavioural Disturbance, removing “excited delirium” terminology and requiring Category 1 escalation with clinical review for possible downgrade.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the inquest a working group was set up with the intention of revising the guidance for patients exhibiting signs of Acute Behavioural Disturbance and establishing the most appropriate way to respond to those patients within the Emergency Operations Centre.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update, approve and disseminate the detained-patient procedure and Emergency Operations Centre escalation guidance to reflect the Acute Behavioural Disturbance procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The procedure has also been updated to reflect that a Category 1 coding is now applied to all calls where the police are actively restraining a patient; or reporting agitation/behaviour changes; or the police use the term Acute Behavioural Disturbance. The call handler will immediately escalate this to a Call Handler Team Leader who will upgrade the call to a Category 1 and the response will be dispatched on this basis. If, at this point, the Call Handler Team Leader or Dispatcher believe this may not be a Category 1 call, the call will be highlighted to a Clinical Navigator who will complete a clinical review and triage to establish if a downgrade is required.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Jeffrey Martin Tyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jeffrey Martin Tyler called emergency services with chest pains and difficulty breathing, but his condition deteriorated while he was alone at home. An ambulance arrived several hours later, and his death was confirmed by paramedics on 20 February 2024. The substantive concern was that, despite his deterioration and being alone and in extremis, the emergency call remained categorised as Amber 1, with a reported waiting time of between 5 and 7 hours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to revise ambulance priority when a patient is deteriorating and in extremis

    Wider context from the report

    “In evidence I found that the call handlers had been following the correct algorithm as dictated by the nationally adopted Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS), and that he was appropriately categorised as requiring an Amber 1 ambulance. However, it would also have been clear to any clinician that he was deteriorating and was in the process of having a cardiac event. Mr Tyler was on his own and could not inform the ambulance service if his condition deteriorated. Despite Mr Tyler being alone and being in extremis, the MPDS Code was maintained at Amber 1. The waiting time was between 5 and 7 hours. ”

    Source location

    Jeffrey Martin Tyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a national group of clinical and operational leads to review measures for incidents outside the purple and red categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over the next two months, a review will be undertaken to consider whether measures are required for incidents not categorised in the purple or red categories. This will include conditions which currently fall in the ‘amber’ category such as symptoms of a stroke or heart attack. To drive the review, we are establishing a national group of clinical and operational leads to review and consider measures for these conditions. WAST will consider the findings of this additional review before finalising changes to its clinical model.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a review of whether measures are required for incidents outside the purple and red categories, including relevant amber conditions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over the next two months, a review will be undertaken to consider whether measures are required for incidents not categorised in the purple or red categories. This will include conditions which currently fall in the ‘amber’ category such as symptoms of a stroke or heart attack. To drive the review, we are establishing a national group of clinical and operational leads to review and consider measures for these conditions. WAST will consider the findings of this additional review before finalising changes to its clinical model.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek assurance at the next integrated quality planning and delivery meeting on call categorisation and provision of clinically appropriate responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I hold the Chair of WAST to account for oversight of the delivery of those expectations through regular meetings. Officials also hold the Chief Executive Officer and his executive team to account through bimonthly integrated quality planning and delivery (IQPD) meetings where progress against key performance targets is scrutinised and assurance on the quality and safety of services is sought. I have asked officials to seek assurance on the process of categorisation of calls and steps taken by the Trust to ensure service users receive the right response for their clinical need at the next IQPD meeting to be held on 24 April 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Welsh Ministers do not deliver health services or make WAST’s operational decisions on emergency ambulance call categorisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, it is important to note, that the Welsh Ministers are not responsible for the delivery of health services in Wales. Instead, Local Health Boards (LHBs) are responsible for planning, commissioning and delivering services for the population of its area and NHS Trusts are responsible for the delivery of services across Wales within the national policy framework set by the Welsh Ministers.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    WAST is responsible for operational emergency ambulance call categorisation and is best placed to respond to required action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Welsh Ambulance Services National Health Service Trust (Establishment) Order 1998 establishes the Welsh Ambulance Services University National Health Service Trust (WAST). Article 3 delegates the function of managing the ambulance service to WAST.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 February 2025

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Simon Boyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Simon Boyd, who had reported dizziness, lethargy, sweating and later breathlessness, was found unresponsive at home on 1 June 2024 after an ambulance response was cancelled and a routine same-day home visit was arranged. Attempts to revive him were unsuccessful, and the inquest recorded myocardial infarction, coronary artery disease and hypertension. Concerns included ambulance response times not meeting national targets, potentially misleading NHS Pathways wording about ambulance dispatch, and cancellation of an ambulance response without first discussing this with the caller.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adhere to national ambulance response-time targets

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The court heard evidence to the effect that, notwithstanding the national target for Category 3 99% calls of 9 out of 10 responses within 120 minutes, the anticipated wait for a Category 3 ambulance on 1st June 2024 was around 3 hours and 15 minutes. This is a factor which contributed to decision-making in this case. I am concerned that national targets for ambulance response times continue not to be adhered to. ”

    Source location

    Simon Boyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a national directive requiring clinical validation of Category 3 and Category 4 ambulance responses in NHS 111 and 999 services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to support ambulance providers to manage their available resources, NHS England has issued a national directive, requiring providers to undertake clinical validation of Category 3 and Category 4 ambulance responses within both NHS 111 and 999 services. This involves validation of the disposition by a clinician (arranged locally), which can result in a different disposition being subsequently reached. The information captured in NHS Pathways may allow a clinician to re-categorise the call without direct contact with the patient. The Ambulance Trust’s Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, rather than NHS Pathways, is used to manage the validation process. It is a requirement that the CAD must be able to provide appropriate exit scripts for Category 3 / Category 4 codes or dispositions. The wording of the exit scripts is for local determination.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support the NHS, including ambulance services, to achieve safe operational response-time standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This Government recognises that in recent years, ambulance response time performance has been below the high standards that patients should expect. That is why this Government has committed to supporting the National Health Service to improve performance, including ambulance services achieving the safe operational response times standards set out in the NHS Constitution.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2024

    Open published response
  4. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Shirley Ann Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shirley Ann Hughes collapsed at home on 1 June 2024 and, because no ambulance was available, waited more than fifteen hours on the floor before treatment and hospital admission. The principal concern was whether the Medical Priority Dispatch System remained fit for purpose amid ambulance resource pressures, with the coroner concerned that lives were being put at risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the MPDS system to remain fit for purpose for response prioritisation

    Wider context from the report

    “For many years, myself and other coroners have raised concerns regarding so called “ambulance delays” and I recognise that the challenges faced by WAST around the availability of resources are the result of multifactorial issues, however on every occasion when evidence is presented at inquests, I am reminded that calls are prioritised using the Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) by which a code is generated and that this is then matched to a response priority to provide an indication as to the most appropriate resource to respond. At the inquest of Mrs Hughes, I was advised that MPDS was introduced in 2015 and at that time it was envisaged that an amber 1 priority call would be responded to in 20 minutes, however it was clearly the case that the multifactorial issues which prevail today were not envisaged at that time and that as a consequence this raises questions as to whether the MPDS system remains fit for purposes. As a result of this evidence, I am concerned that lives are being put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Shirley Ann Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed new clinical roles in control rooms to triage 999 calls earlier and support better care decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ As part of our plans for winter we are embedding new clinical roles in our control rooms to proactively triage 999 calls earlier in the call cycle. By using clinical expertise, it enables more effective clinical decisions regarding the best care to meet the patient’s needs.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the deployed Emergency Communication Nurse System and Call Priority Streaming System to support the Trust’s clinical and call-prioritisation strategy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the absence of NHS Pathways or MPDS, it would require significant inhouse development to produce a call prioritisation system and the Trust does not have capacity or capability to pursue this. During the pandemic, MPDS protocols were more flexible to our needs, compared to NHS Pathways, and as such the Trust feels it remains the best product for the Trust to utilise. The Trust has also deployed Emergency Communication Nurse System (ECNS) and Call Priority Streaming System (CPSS), both of which support our strategic direction. These are from the same provider as MPDS. There are a number of advantages presenting themselves, which is the potential synergies between MPDS (999 system), CPSS (111 system) and ECNS (clinical assessment system now used for both 999 and 111 contacts).”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Developing an alternative call-prioritisation system would require significant in-house work beyond the Trust’s capacity and capability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the absence of NHS Pathways or MPDS, it would require significant inhouse development to produce a call prioritisation system and the Trust does not have capacity or capability to pursue this. During the pandemic, MPDS protocols were more flexible to our needs, compared to NHS Pathways, and as such the Trust feels it remains the best product for the Trust to utilise. The Trust has also deployed Emergency Communication Nurse System (ECNS) and Call Priority Streaming System (CPSS), both of which support our strategic direction. These are from the same provider as MPDS. There are a number of advantages presenting themselves, which is the potential synergies between MPDS (999 system), CPSS (111 system) and ECNS (clinical assessment system now used for both 999 and 111 contacts).”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    MPDS remains the best available call-prioritisation product for the Trust, supported by linked ECNS and CPSS systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To the Trust’s knowledge, MPDS and NHS Pathways are the only available products, worldwide. NHS Pathways is only used in England. In comparison to MPDS, NHS Pathways has a very small group of users, and the number of patients triaged using this tool versus MPDS is very small.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Clarke, who had multiple underlying health conditions including end stage renal failure, developed suspected urosepsis after a cystoscopy and died in hospital on 30 July 2023. The report raised concerns about delays in category 3 ambulance responses, the categorisation of a call where sepsis was suspected, and the absence of specific sepsis trigger questions on the ambulance pathway.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to account for actual category 3 ambulance response times when accepting call categorisation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The inquest was told that the initial call to NWAS was made by the out of hours nurse. She made it clear that she felt the ambulance response needed to be within 1 hour. As this was in theory the response time consistent with a category 3 response, she accepted the categorisation. This acceptance did not appear to take into account that on that evening a category 3 call was not going to result in an ambulance within 1 hour. ”

    Source location

    Michael Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Category 3 ambulance categorisation was audited and considered safe and appropriate based on the patient’s presentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You also raised a concern that the initial call to North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) was made by an out of hours Nurse who requested an ambulance within one hour as this is consistent with Category 3 response call-outs. It was not considered then that on that evening a Category 3 call was not going to result in an ambulance attending within one hour.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England and NHS GMIC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  6. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Mark Edward TUCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Mark Edward Tucker was detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to hospital following self-harm and suicidal thoughts, but was discharged on 22 April 2022 despite ongoing concerns about his mental state and risk. He ingested a lethal quantity of a substance later that evening and died. The report identifies concerns about risk assessment and care planning, named-nurse allocation, staff skills in engaging patients, emergency response to confirmed ingestion, and the accessibility of online suicide forums.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of 999 call grading to trigger a category 1 ambulance response for confirmed ingestion of a potent poison

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned that confirmed ingestion of ████████ during a 999 call does not trigger a category 1 response from the Ambulance Service Dan ingested ████████ at around 20:30 on 22 April 2022. His friend informed the 999 call handler that he had done so during a first 999 call at 20:39. That call was correctly graded as requiring a category 2 response, as Dan was both conscious and awake. 14 minutes later, at 20:53, Dan collapsed. His friend’s second 999 call was correctly graded as requiring a category 1 response, as Dan had become unconscious, his breathing agon al. The first ambulance crew arrived at 21:04. Dan went into cardiac arrest at approximately 21:24. Consideration was given by the ambulance crew to ‘scoop and run’ to arrange a rendezvous to administer the necessary “drugs to counter ████████”, but this was no considered longer feasible once Dan had gone into cardiac arrest. The inquest heard evidence from a consultant toxicologist that even in very small quantities ████████ (or ████████) is lethal; it is a potent poison. I understand it is also, tragically, an increasingly common means of suicide. Mental health professionals who gave evidence expressed deep concern at its easy availability and growing popularity for vulnerable people seeking to end their own lives. The expert toxicological evidence indicated that its acute toxic effects can be rapid (as short as 20 minutes after ingestion, depending on dose) and can quickly become irreversible. This suggests that almost any case involving the ingestion of ████████ or ████████ is likely to be a time critical life-threatening event. Yet it is does not currently fall within that category for the purposes of grading 999 calls, unless the patient is unconscious or not breathing. While there was no evidence that a category 1 response would have prevented Dan’s death, I believe there is a risk that other deaths will occur if ingestion of ████████ continues to require a category 2 response. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Mark Edward TUCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue overdose and suicidal-intent guidance requiring further clinical intervention or automatic response upgrades and TOXBASE review for overdose incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England issued guidance for Ambulance Services relating to overdoses and suicidal intent in April 2021. The guidance highlights the critical importance of clinical oversight and review and sets out that:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update overdose guidance to include callers receiving a Category 5 disposition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Most recently, the overdose guidance was updated in November 2023 to include callers who reach a Category 5 disposition (hear and treat). This followed a review by the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG, NHS England) and the National Ambulance Service Medical Director’s Group (NASMeDG, Association of Ambulance Chief Executives) to ensure it remained clinically fit for purpose.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop specific training and a protocol for first-party callers in crisis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPDS also has protocols for overdose patients as well as those patients with mental health conditions that are suffering any self-harm or suicidal thoughts. Since the time of this call, specific training and a new protocol have been developed specifically for first party callers in crisis.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ingestion of a potentially fatal substance does not, by itself, justify assigning a Category 1 ambulance response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Dan’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS, for which there is a protocol. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to consider the Determinant Code and locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the UK Government Emergency Call Prioritisation Ambulance Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing overdose protocols, intentional-overdose coding and clinical oversight enable appropriate prioritisation regardless of the substance ingested.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Dan’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS, for which there is a protocol. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to consider the Determinant Code and locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the UK Government Emergency Call Prioritisation Ambulance Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The relevant ambulance Emergency Operation Centre, including EMAS in this case, determines and applies the local response category.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Dan’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS, for which there is a protocol. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to consider the Determinant Code and locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the UK Government Emergency Call Prioritisation Ambulance Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Listing every potentially fatal substance for dispatcher-led response assignment is impractical and risks dangerous over-triage because caller information may be unreliable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While ingestion of ████████ can lead to fatality, this can unfortunately be said of an array of substances, ranging from prescription medicines to over-the-counter household products and other agents available commercially or over the internet. The MPDS does specifically code some common overdose/poisoning agents, but this is for the provision of specific therapies and information for responders rather than for specific response assignment.¹ The listing of all possible fatal agents would likely lead”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing intentional-overdose coding and clinician review are considered sufficient; listing every potentially fatal agent would cause over-triage and delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On your concern regarding ingestion of ████████, Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Mr Tucker’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the NHS England Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Marshall Elliot STONE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Marshall Elliot Stone became distressed, agitated and paranoid after using cocaine, displayed signs of acute behavioural disturbance, and died after his condition deteriorated during restraint, ambulance transfer and hospital treatment. The report raised concern that the ambulance-service system did not allow a category 1 response for severe acute behavioural disturbance where restraint was taking place, which it stated was putting lives at risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to allow a category 1 ambulance response for severe ABD involving restraint

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The continuance of a system which does not allow a category 1 response in severe case of ABD where restraint is taking place is putting lives at risk. ”

    Source location

    Adam Marshall Elliot STONE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Propose that NHS England and AACE consider an evidence-based review of Acute Behavioural Disturbance response categorisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am aware that AACE will also be writing to you in response to your PFD. The College endorses the content of AACE’s letter to you. However, the College would always support an evidence-based review of the current response categorisation of Acute Behavioural Disturbance in order to ensure that a Category 2 response remains the appropriate disposition and I will share this correspondence with NHS England’s Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group and AACE to propose that such a review be considered in the light of this PFD.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-College-of-Paramedics_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write to ambulance services reminding them to provide senior-clinician oversight for ABD calls and upgrade to Category 1 when deterioration or restraint occurs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England and NHS Improvement are in the process of writing to ambulance services regarding clinical oversight and will include a reminder that ABD calls should have oversight of a senior clinician in the control room and calls should be upgraded to a Category 1 if the patient’s condition deteriorates or if the patient is being restrained.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a joint police and ambulance review of suspected ABD presentations to assess deterioration risk and appropriate response categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To help inform this decision and provide evidence, a joint police and ambulance review was conducted in the north of England between one ambulance service and a police force for a period of 9 months between August 2019 to May 2020. The purpose of the joint review was to establish whether individual presenting features in patients who were identified by police officers on scene as possible ABD, might individually or in combination reliably identify an increased risk of clinical deterioration associated with increased mortality and to determine the most appropriate ambulance response time category. Police officers identified 28 potential ABD cases in the nine-month review period, representing 1% of the mental health or behavioural crisis 999 calls attended by the police”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider whether restraint alone should trigger an automatic Category 1 response for suspected ABD.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We agree that ABD is not a diagnosis or a recognised syndrome, but rather a term used to describe a combination of signs and symptoms of agitation with likely physiological abnormalities, caused by one of a number of possible toxicological, physical, or mental health conditions. In the prehospital setting we are often unable to ascertain the exact cause of the presentation while providing clinical care prior to arrival at an emergency department. We considered whether the use of restraint alone should warrant an automatic Category 1 response, but this was agreed through the ECPAG process as not appropriate unless immediately life-threatening signs were present.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS Pathways recognises ABD and restraint risks and complies with the nationally mandated Category 2 response standard.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We would like to reassure you that NHS Pathways recognises the risks associated with ABD/Excited Delirium and also that restraint may be a factor contributing to a patient’s deterioration.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Any change to ambulance response categorisation must be considered by NHS England and AACE groups and approved by ECPAG.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Therefore, any change in ambulance response categorisation would be matters for the respective”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-NHS-Digital_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for determining NHS ambulance response categories lies with NHS England, supported by AACE evidence and guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College of Paramedics is also not responsible for determining NHS ambulance response categories. That power lies with NHS England, although the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE) provide evidence and guidance to support this.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-College-of-Paramedics_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Severe and mild ABD cannot be reliably distinguished during pre-hospital or telephone triage, so severity cannot determine the response category.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ABD is not common and it is very difficult to identify the difference between agitation, antisocial behaviour, deliberate violent behaviour and ABD, which is not a specific condition with a set of defined symptoms. There is no reliable way to determine mild or severe ABD in the pre-hospital setting and certainly not on the phone during a triage process.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Suspected ABD appropriately receives a Category 2 response, with senior clinical oversight and escalation to Category 1 when the patient’s condition warrants it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Category 1 responses are reserved for immediate threat to life illnesses or injuries and ambulances are diverted when en-route to other emergencies in order to respond to Category 1 priorities. Cases of suspected ABD should be assigned a Category 2 response which is the immediate dispatch of an emergency ambulance, however, ambulance services are advised that a senior clinician within the control room should be made aware of the potential ABD incident to assist with decision-”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    AACE cannot decide or mandate emergency response categories and therefore cannot undertake that decision-making work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We need to highlight that the AACE is unable to make decisions nor mandate which category of response 999 callers receive, this is the responsibility of NHS England who chair and administer the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG) – a group of multi-disciplinary stakeholders who scrutinise evidence to support decisions about appropriate response categories for all clinical codes. AACE make recommendations to ECPAG based on clinical data submitted by ambulance trusts which is considered by National Ambulance Service Medical Directors (NASMeD) prior to any contribution to ECPAG discussion. Through this process the appropriate category of response for patients suspected of presenting with ABD was set by NHS England as a Category 2 response.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England, through ECPAG, is responsible for deciding appropriate ambulance response categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We need to highlight that the AACE is unable to make decisions nor mandate which category of response 999 callers receive, this is the responsibility of NHS England who chair and administer the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG) – a group of multi-disciplinary stakeholders who scrutinise evidence to support decisions about appropriate response categories for all clinical codes. AACE make recommendations to ECPAG based on clinical data submitted by ambulance trusts which is considered by National Ambulance Service Medical Directors (NASMeD) prior to any contribution to ECPAG discussion. Through this process the appropriate category of response for patients suspected of presenting with ABD was set by NHS England as a Category 2 response.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing evidence-based arrangements consider Category 2 appropriate for suspected ABD unless immediately life-threatening signs warrant Category 1; restraint alone does not require Category 1.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “force. The review concluded that for patients who had been recognised as presenting with symptoms and signs of possible ABD, a Category 2 ambulance response was appropriate, if there was information that there were immediately life-threatening signs present, the patient should then receive a Category 1 ambulance response. The evidence and recommendations were accepted through the ECPAG process and implemented by all the UK ambulance services.”

    Source location

    2022-0026-Response-from-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response
  8. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Alyn Rees · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alyn Rees became acutely unwell on 3 December 2019, experienced breathing difficulties, deteriorated into cardiac arrest, and died after paramedics were unable to revive him. Concerns were raised about the approximately two-hour wait for an emergency ambulance, the lack of advice about the expected arrival time, the absence of an indicated response time for an Amber 1 call, and delays transferring patients into hospital care that prevented ambulances from being released.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an indicated expected response time for Amber 1 calls

    Wider context from the report

    “However, the family raised concerns, with which I agreed, that 2 hours is a long time to wait for an emergency ambulance. At no time were the family advised of the expected time of arrival and potentially, if they had been aware of this, they may have contacted earlier the local GP. The report did not indicate what the expected response time for an Amber 1 call should be. I was advised that on this occasion there were significant delays (up to 3 hours) transferring patients into the care of Aneurin Bevan University Health Board Hospitals. This is also of significant concern as it prevented emergency ambulances being released. ”

    Source location

    Alyn Rees · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alf REWIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alf Rewin died at Wexham Park Hospital on 22 November 2018 after taking an overdose of Quetiapine, Methylphenidate and Duloxetine and becoming unresponsive before arrival. The principal concern was that overdose cases could receive a Category 3 ambulance response with a target of up to 120 minutes, despite the risk of unconsciousness, cardiac arrest or other potentially fatal events requiring earlier attendance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement the local overdose response override at the outset

    Wider context from the report

    “The National Ambulance Call Categories prescribed by NHS Pathways to ambulance services, including South Central Ambulance Service, who were the attending service in relation to Alf Rewin's death, indicate that an individual contacting emergency services himself or herself, having taken an overdose may be triaged through the national call handling pathway to a Category 3 Urgent Call. This category currently prescribes a target ambulance within 120 minutes. There is a concern that in cases of overdose, the patient is at risk of becoming unconscious or having a cardiac arrest or other potentially fatal event and will be unable to contact emergency services or be contacted by them subsequently, such that his or her call should at that stage then be regarded as Category 1 (with a 7 minute response time) or Category 2 (with an 18 minute response time). In Alf Rewin’s case, there existed a local policy to override the Category 3 120-minute response in overdose cases to provide a specific triage which could lead to a Category 2 18-minute response (although the 18-minute response was not, in fact, implemented at the outset in Alf Rewin’s case and he was initially allocated the national Category 3 response). It is understood that the national categorisation of overdose cases is under review. Whilst the Category 3 120-minute target may be the standard, subject to local variation, in relation to overdose cases where the patient is conscious, the risk of deaths arising during this period remains where the circumstances of the overdose might enable some counteractive treatment to be given, or successful resuscitation measures to be carried out, if there were to be earlier attendance and / or earlier hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Alf REWIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Olive JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Olive JOHNSON died within 24 hours of admission to Pilgrim Hospital on 11 May 2018. The concerns raised relate to the absence of a first responder, emergency response times, how response delays were recorded after regrading, and whether EMAS had sufficient conveying resources to meet its targets.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include time from the initial call to regrading in response-time measurement

    Wider context from the report

    “c) Is it fair that if a patient is regarded whilst awaiting an initial response the total time from the initial call to the regrading is cancelled out? ”

    Source location

    Olive JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The response clock for re-categorised calls starts at regrading because this timing was decided from a national perspective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c) Is it fair that if a patient is regraded whilst awaiting an initial response, the total time from the initial call to the regrading is cancelled out?”

    Source location

    2019-0031-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026