Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    CHARLES EVAN GRAINGER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Charles Evan Grainger was admitted to Milford House Residential Unit after a fall and later sustained injuries in a witnessed fall there on 24 November 2013. The inquest concluded that his death was accidental, with the medical cause recorded as bronchopneumonia and central cord syndrome. Concerns included failures to share his history of falls between relevant agencies and inadequate investigation of the circumstances surrounding his fall.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of multi-agencies to share patients' past medical history, including previous falls history

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Relevant information regarding Mr Grainger's falls history could not be shared by his Social Worker with other relevant Multi Agencies such as Milford House or the Health Team at the time his Pre Admission Assessment was undertaken as the process/system did not allow it. Milford House, the Local Authority and the Health Team should have all worked together, more cohesively to ensure they were working in Mr Grainger's best interests. Failure of Multi Agencies to work more cohesively in the future by sharing a patients past medical history, including previous falls history could result in vital information being missed and future deaths occurring. ”

    Source location

    CHARLES EVAN GRAINGER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Venkata Naga Lakshyasi KAGGA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Venkata Naga Lakshyasi KAGGA died on 9 July 2017 after a button battery lodged in her oesophagus and caused an oesophageal arterial fistula. Before her death, she was seen by doctors and ambulance staff, but the battery was not identified. Concerns included failures to examine and assess her, non-compliance with ambulance policy for children under five, inadequate information sharing, and limited understanding of the risks posed by button batteries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of NHS information-sharing systems to share detailed illness histories beyond the OOH GP service

    Wider context from the report

    “7. The 111 service obtained detailed accounts of the history of illness. However systems for sharing information across the NHS are such that this information was not shared beyond the OOH GP service. ”

    Source location

    Venkata Naga Lakshyasi KAGGA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    George French Russell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George French Russell was born prematurely at 35 weeks and 1 day following a footling breech birth on 11 January 2017, in poor condition and with severe brain damage. He died on 23 January 2017 after being transferred for neonatal care. Concerns included inadequate information-sharing between services and a lack of sustained expert input during the breech delivery.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of structured and direct information sharing between hospital and ambulance services

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The way in which information was exchanged between Stepping Hill Hospital and EMAS meant that all those involved in making decisions were not in possession of key facts. There was no structure to how information was shared and it was passed 3rd hand. ”

    Source location

    George French Russell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the SBAR communication framework for clinical handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Point Two: EMAS recognises the importance of good communication and information sharing in relation to the delivery of high quality care and patient safety. As such EMAS will now implement a communication framework to ensure the provision of good quality clinical handovers, the SBAR model. The SBAR model (standing for: Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation) is a structured communication tool that is considered a best practice element in healthcare settings and has been”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and seek regional agreement for a maternity-specific SBAR handover model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the specific concerns identified by HM Coroner’s inquest we are also working with our obstetric service partners to extend the SBAR to create a maternity specific model. This approach has been formally shared with our network partners through the East Midlands Maternity Clinical Advisory Group following a debate in early March 2018, in draft format for agreement as a standardised regional handover tool. This is planned for implementation across the EMAS footprint in May 2018 subject to governance approval.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the maternity-specific SBAR handover model across the EMAS footprint.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the specific concerns identified by HM Coroner’s inquest we are also working with our obstetric service partners to extend the SBAR to create a maternity specific model. This approach has been formally shared with our network partners through the East Midlands Maternity Clinical Advisory Group following a debate in early March 2018, in draft format for agreement as a standardised regional handover tool. This is planned for implementation across the EMAS footprint in May 2018 subject to governance approval.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The HSIB cannot investigate this case because it occurred before the organisation became operational and falls outside its investigation criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you may be aware, the HSIB was set up to investigate systemic safety issues that cut across organisational boundaries. We conduct up to 30 investigations a year and focus on those with the most potential for new learning that have taken place after we became operational on 1st April, 2017. This case occurred before 1st April 2017 and therefore does not meet our criteria for investigation.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-HSIB
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational concerns are for the involved NHS trusts to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises several areas of concern which are operational and for the NHS Trusts involved to address.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HSIB cannot investigate incidents occurring before its establishment because they do not meet its investigation criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am aware that the HSIB has responded to you to advise that, as this incident occurred before its establishment on 1 April 2017, it does not meet the criteria for investigation. Nevertheless, the information provided will assist the HSIB develop a wider picture of safety issues in the NHS and help inform future investigations.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Russell Charles ROBB · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Russell Charles ROBB died at Manchester Royal Infirmary on 9 April 2016 after taking a fatal combination of prescribed and non-prescribed drugs with alcohol. The report identified inadequate monitoring and lack of regular medication reviews, no apparent guidelines to limit the quantity of drugs available, and limited information sharing between agencies involved in adult safeguarding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited information sharing between adult safeguarding board members

    Wider context from the report

    “which ultimately led to his death. There was no evidence of regular reviews of his medication. There appeared to be no guidelines in place to reduce the quantity of drugs available to Mr Robb at any one time. (CCG; Secretary of State for Health) 2. There was limited evidence of information sharing between the members of the Trafford Adult Safeguarding Board. This meant that the Local Authority were unaware of volume of interaction between the Police and Mr Robb.(Adult Safeguarding Board).As a result only 1 strategic meeting took place over a 6 year period ”

    Source location

    Russell Charles ROBB · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update TARGet meeting terms of reference to strengthen safeguarding-partner information sharing and multi-agency risk assessment and management planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have updated the Terms of Reference of our TARGet (Trafford Adults at Risk Group) meeting to facilitate better information sharing between safeguarding partners and improve multi-agency risk assessment and risk management planning with regard to supporting”

    Source location

    2017-0385-Response-by-Trafford-Safeguarding-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response
  5. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Anne Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anne Morris died by suicide after hanging herself while alone in a friend’s house on 26 June 2017. The principal concerns were that the Priory Hospital did not contact consented friends or relatives, did not establish a written discharge and follow-up plan, and did not liaise adequately with the relevant Oxleas Home Treatment Team before discharge. Concerns were also raised that the Oxleas team did not obtain a discharge plan or know that Anne had agreed to contact with a friend regarding community support and suicide risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to inform the relevant HTT of consent to contact support persons

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Priory Hospital did not formulate a written plan, before discharge from hospital, identifying the HTT who would be responsible for onward care in the community and, in particular making the relevant HTT aware that Anne was agreeable to health care professionals speaking to Peter Forester and Bernard Bakes regarding support with her mental health issues. ”

    Source location

    Anne Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rafe Robbie Angelo was born at 17:30 on 23 September 2014 after his mother was transferred from the Blake Birthing Centre to hospital during labour. He was born pale and floppy, without breathing or a heart rate, and died after 37 minutes of resuscitation. The principal concerns included delays in recognising the need for urgent delivery and communication failures between the birthing centre, ambulance service and hospital, including failure to request a time-critical transfer and a non-urgent ambulance stop.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the emergency information-relay system between birthing centres and hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “This was a critical part of this case and as such needs further consideration of both the past and current systems and whether appropriate training has been given; whether it is currently working; and whether refresher training is needed. ”

    Source location

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive to require clinicians to identify time-critical transfers and prioritise qualifying inter-facility calls as Category 1.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following your report, we have reviewed the SOP and updated it so that any Health Care Professional (HCP) requesting an Inter-facility transfer (i.e. Hospital or Birthing Unit) who asks for an emergency / immediate response will now be asked “Do you require a Time Critical Transfer?” Due to the known risks associated with obstetric emergencies. Midwives will be asked whether the case is time critical when they call from a patient’s home as well as a standalone birthing centre. If the HCP answers positively then the Emergency Call Taker (ECT) will prioritise the call using the TCT pathway and will process the call as a Category 1 response.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a reminder to Emergency Departments and birthing units across the South Central area about the process for requesting time-critical transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The new Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive has been sent to all staff in the Emergency Operations Centre. A mail drop will also be issued to all Emergency Departments and Birthing units across the South Central Area to remind all HCP’s of the correct process to request a Time critical transfer.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response
  7. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Ruth Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ruth Thompson became unwell in Italy on 14 April 2017 after suffering a dissecting aortic aneurysm and underwent surgery, but subsequently sustained a pontine brain infarction and developed pressure sores during prolonged immobility. She was repatriated to the United Kingdom, entered end-of-life care on 30 May 2017, and died on 31 May 2017. The substantive concerns included inadequate communication and transfer documentation, lack of proper or informed consent, and insufficient clinical information being provided to UK clinicians, causing delay and uncertainty in treatment and care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate vital transfer information to patients, families and receiving clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “2. On her transfer to the United Kingdom, clinicians within the Accident & Emergency Department at the Royal Bolton Hospital were only supplied with two sheets of information from the hospital, written in Italian, which required doctors to use Google Translate, written attempt to interpret that document. The documentation was inadequate and not fit for purpose in that it failed to note or provide basic handover information including:- a. Operative details; b. Interventional treatment and observations; c. Ongoing prescribed medication; d. Recent test results; e. Identification of investigative procedures and their results; f. Treatment plan following discharge; 3. Accordingly, the issue of adequacy of communication of vital information to the deceased, her next of kin and treating clinicians in the United Kingdom following air ambulance transfer from abroad created delay and uncertainty in treatment and care. ”

    Source location

    Ruth Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Central Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Folley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Folley was remanded to HMP Winchester on 15 September 2017 and was found the following day suspended from a ligature made from torn bed sheets after barricading his cell door with mirrors and furniture. He was taken to hospital and died on 18 September 2017 after intensive care treatment. The principal concerns included the transfer and use of information about self-harm risk between police, court and prison; staff training; cell safety and maintenance; systems for checking barricaded cell doors; and the effectiveness of prison radios in relaying emergency calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide PER staff with relevant previous self-harm and suicide risk information

    Wider context from the report

    “b) Mr Folley was assessed as NCTS (no current thoughts of self-harm or suicide) and thus placed on the lowest observation rate of 60 minutes. However, access to previous data held on police (both internal and external) and other agency systems was not available to officers completing the PER and thus they could rely on current observations only. Despite this, it was essential to consider the risk of self-harm or suicide demonstrated and recorded over the previous months (July – September) not simply since detention on this occasion. ”

    Source location

    Michael Folley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the next custody newsletter to reinforce PER completion, inspection, warning-page, envelope, risk-marker and external-information responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Force Custody publishes a quarterly newsletter to all custody officers and detention officers. The next publication is due in September 2019 and will reinforce the issues addressed in this Regulation 28 Notice.”

    Source location

    2019-0230-Response-by-Hampshire-Constabulary
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Detention officers completing PERs had access to Hampshire Constabulary systems and the Police National Computer, but not other forces’ internal systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Under Section 5, at paragraph 1(b) the report outlines that the officers completing the Prisoner Escort Record (PER) did not have access to the data held on Police (both internal and external) and other agency systems. The officers completing the PER did have access to Hampshire Constabulary internal systems and the Police National Computer but would not have had direct access to other police force internal crime or intelligence recording systems.”

    Source location

    2019-0230-Response-by-Hampshire-Constabulary
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtaining information from every external agency on every occasion is impracticable, so officers cannot routinely obtain all external data.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Through the newsletter we will equally remind staff to consider the potential external sources of information available to them, including information held on other police force and agency systems when managing risks and completing PERs. This will be dependent on individual case by case circumstances as it is impracticable for data to be obtained from each outside agency on every occasion. Officers must rely on each force or agency adhering to its responsibilities to ensure relevant data is included on the national PNC system to which all forces have access.”

    Source location

    2019-0230-Response-by-Hampshire-Constabulary
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Officers must rely on each police force or agency to place relevant information on the national Police National Computer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Through the newsletter we will equally remind staff to consider the potential external sources of information available to them, including information held on other police force and agency systems when managing risks and completing PERs. This will be dependent on individual case by case circumstances as it is impracticable for data to be obtained from each outside agency on every occasion. Officers must rely on each force or agency adhering to its responsibilities to ensure relevant data is included on the national PNC system to which all forces have access.”

    Source location

    2019-0230-Response-by-Hampshire-Constabulary
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 July 2019

    Open published response
  9. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Joseph Hastings Swain · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Joseph Hastings-Swain, aged 28, was found deceased hanging from a bannister at his home on 30 November 2016. The inquest concluded that he took his own life while the balance of his mind was disturbed. Concerns included inadequate coordination and information-sharing between mental health services, delays in referral, poor clinical records, and insufficiently proactive engagement after his transfer between NHS trusts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure effective information exchange during mental health service transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “A more co-ordinated approach from the mental health services is required when a user is being transferred from one NHS Trust to another. In this case if the user had still been on a Care Programme Approach there would have been a direct referral from service to service rather than through the GP but because he was taken off the programme the referral was made through the GP. This has delayed the intervention and the prevented effective information exchange on a user who was already subject to secondary care services. In effect this resulted in the user having no intervention for a number of months and entering the mental health system afresh when in fact the care should have been a seamless continuation. ”

    Source location

    Lee Joseph Hastings Swain · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the transfer policy to require timely, comprehensive handover of information for CPA and non-CPA service users.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust (MCFT) response I have enclosed the key changes that have been made to policy following the Regulation 28 report at Appendix 1.”

    Source location

    2017-0196-Mersey-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate the inquest outcome and transfer-policy changes through operational management meetings, consultant forums and a Quality Practice Alert.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that the outcome of the inquest hearing and the required changes to the policy have been circulated within MCFT through operational management meetings, consultant forums and via Quality Practice Alert (QPA). I can also confirm that the QPA was issued prior to the Inquest hearing on 16th March 2017 as part of the Trust’s processes of learning from this incident. This included clear guidance on what is expected of teams when a patient is being transferred from one organisation to another. The contents of the QPA included:-”

    Source location

    2017-0196-Mersey-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider including an audit of transfer processes in the Junior Doctor Audit programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An audit of transfer processes based on the amended policies will be considered for inclusion in each Trust’s Junior Doctor Audit programme.”

    Source location

    2017-0196-Mersey-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 August 2017

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    David Ian Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Ian Hamilton developed insomnia in October 2016, sought help from healthcare services, and was prescribed mirtazapine. He became increasingly anxious and reported thoughts of self-harm before being found dead at home on 7 February 2017; the investigation concluded that the death was suicide. Concerns included limited information-sharing between health professionals, unclear referral and escalation processes, lack of referral to sleep clinic services, and insufficient documentation of therapy selection.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited information sharing between health professionals to identify service access and need for psychiatric referral

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The system of sharing information between health professionals (the GP and Healthy Minds) to identify if the correct services were being accessed or if a referral to a psychiatrist was required was limited and meant that those involved did not have a full picture of his mental health; ”

    Source location

    David Ian Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Wrote to the mental health lead requesting improved communication between Healthy Minds and GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) We have also written to the Mental Health Lead to ask for improved communication between the Healthy Minds and the GPs.”

    Source location

    2017-0180-Response-by-Grosvenor-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026